A New Model for the Liar

Authors

  • Luca Castaldo Leibniz University Hannover

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.13130/2037-4445/7958

Abstract

A new model for the language of arithmetic enhanced by the unary truth predicate T is presented, which extends Kripke’s minimal fixed point. The latter, it will be argued, does not adequately model the truth predicate, since no difference between Liars and Truth-tellers can be made. The new model, which contains an extension of Kripke’s in- terpretation of T along with a new 4-valued logic, overcomes this inadequacy. The gist of my proposal is that 'paradoxical' ought to be treated as a truth value: Liar sentences, unlike Truth-teller sentences, do not simply lack a truth value. They do posses one: they are paradoxical. 

Author Biography

Luca Castaldo, Leibniz University Hannover

Since 2016: PhD candidate at Leibniz University Hannover. - 2014-2015: MSc in Science, Technology, and Society at University College London. - 2011-2014: BA in Philosophy at University of Milan.

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Published

2016-12-24

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Section

Articles