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The citizen and the ‘outsider’: reconstructing civic identity and ideology in Demosthenes’ political (forensic) speeches¹

Abstract

Citizen identity is central to democracy. The Athenian civic self-representation has been the subject of modern studies, such as Lape’s (2010) *Race and citizen identity in the classical Athenian democracy* (CUP), recently, who offers an elegant framework for the theorization of citizen identity in classical Athens. However, little scholarly attention has been given to the rhetorical reconstruction of civic identity in Demosthenic forensic oratory. As part of the process of aligning themselves with (and engaging) their audience and alienating the audience from their opponent, litigants often articulate narratives of civic identity, relying on common values, (democratic) codes of political conduct, morality and ideology, to complement their legal argumentation. These reconstructions take the form of antithetical representations of oneself as a valuable member of the citizen group, having a share in civic *ethos*, political conduct, and morality with what comprises the ‘civic’ identity, as against the ‘other’, the ‘outsider’.

This article examines the speeches written for cases of *graphē paranomōn* in the *Corpus Demosthenicum*, which are highly politically charged and accordingly, illustrates strands of the elaborate rhetoric of civic identity. It looks at the way speakers exploit ideas/concepts (e.g. slavery vs freedom), social expectations regarding performance of civic obligations/duties, and manipulate the emotions of the audience by drawing on shared attitudes and social norms on private (e.g. exclusion from the citizen-body as a result of sexual activity) or political grounds (cf. oligarchic/tyrannical vs democratic conduct). It also reveals how reconstructions of civic identity are interwoven with legal argumentation, both in prosecution and defense speeches.

L’identità del cittadino ha una grande rilevanza per la democrazia. L’autorappresentazione del cittadino ateniese è stata oggetto di studi recenti, come *Race and citizen identity in the classical Athenian democracy* (CUP 2010) di S. Lape, che

¹ I am grateful to Konstantinos Kapparis for his observations on an earlier draft, to Brenda Griffith-Williams for her suggestions on style, and to the anonymous referees of the journal for their valuable comments.

presenta una cornice elegante per la teorizzazione dell'identità civica nell'Atene classica. Tuttavia, gli studiosi hanno dedicato scarsa attenzione alla ricostruzione retorica dell'identità civica nell'oratoria forense di Demostene. Nel quadro della tattica che mira a riconoscersi e a farsi riconoscere dall'uditorio e a disporlo negativamente nei confronti della controparte, i litiganti spesso introducono, ad integrazione delle loro argomentazioni legali, narrazioni relative all'identità civica, facendo leva su valori condivisi, codici (democratici) di condotta politica, morale e ideologica. Queste ricostruzioni assumono la forma di rappresentazioni antitetiche di sé stessi quali membri onorevoli della compagine cittadina, che condividono l'ethos civico, la condotta politica e la moralità in cui si esprime l'identità 'civica', in contrapposizione all''altro', l''estraneo'.

Questo articolo si occupa in particolare delle orazioni, politicamente pregnanti, del *Corpus Demosthenicum* scritte per una *graphē paranomōn*, e ne ricava un'illustrazione della raffinata retorica riguardante l'identità civica. Esamina il modo in cui gli oratori mettono a frutto idee o concetti (ad es. schiavitù/libertà), aspettative riguardanti l'adempimento di obblighi civici, e manipolano le emozioni dell'uditorio delineando attitudini e regole sociali in ambito privato (ad es. l'esclusione dal corpo cittadino a seguito di attività sessuali) o politico (contrapponendo ad es. comportamenti oligarchico/tirannici all'agire democratico). Inoltre, mette in luce come le ricostruzioni dell'identità civica interagiscono con le argomentazioni legali, sia nei discorsi di accusa sia in quelli di difesa.

Introduction

Citizen identity is central to democracy. Athenian citizenship, on a very basic level, can be defined as an institution protected by laws as well as by the *ethos* of the Athenian citizen and *his identity*,² which is vitally related to his participation in the democratic government.³ The terms 'citizen identity' or 'civic identity' are used here to suggest membership of the citizen body (normally by birth), which went hand in

² See also Lape 2010: 5 with references to earlier scholarship; Manville 1994: 21-29.

³ Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1326b12-7: Aristotle's definition of citizen in terms of political participation: having a *share* in the government of the city (decision-making and office-holding) is the predominant aspect of 'membership' of the city relevant to our analysis. Recently, Blok 2017 has developed an elaborate argument about the definition of citizenship, which is shaped primarily, as her main thesis, by the bond between the *polis* and the gods. Having a share in the *polis* is presented as a fundamentally active experience firmly rooted in descent and expressed through participating in the various cults of the *polis*. However, when we turn to the construction of civic identity in forensic speeches, as we shall see, what is emphasised is not the religious dimension of 'sharing' in the citizen group (as a result of Athenian descent), but *political* participation, democratic ethos and morality, as manifested with specific political actions and policies.

hand with honour (*timē*) exclusive to the citizen group, and with their privileges and responsibilities.⁴ We have no comprehensive list of those rights preserved,⁵ but we can reconstruct them on all levels of personal, political, and economic aspects of life, such as the capacity to own property, to control one's own labour and movement, to engage in judicial proceedings, to exercise marital and family rights, to be involved in the military; to have the right to participate at all levels in the government of the city.⁶ Civic identity was articulated in public discourse and the Athenians developed a rhetoric for explaining how birth and ancestry were qualifications for citizenship as well as determining factors of political conduct. In legal terms, birth automatically distinguished citizens from non-citizens⁷ and accordingly, the civic, democratic morality, as articulated and exemplified on the political level: from participation in the political bodies, in the capacity of citizen, to the most demanding and highly risky political activity as a public speaker/adviser and office-holder. Nonetheless, at the level of rhetoric, as many orations show, citizen identity and civic morality can be disputed, and litigants develop elaborate narratives either to argue in support of their membership of the civic body, through shared civic morality and conduct as well as free birth, and to deny free birth, civic ethos and morality to their opponents, alienating them from the civic body.

The rhetoric of 'racial' identity, as she termed it, in Classical Athens has been studied by Lape (2010, *Race and Citizen Identity in Classical Athens*). 'Race' and 'racial identity' refer to Athenian birth, ancestry, and the shared values and abilities that the Athenians understood as separating *them* from the 'others', the non-citizens.⁸ Lape explores a variety of evidence (drama, oratory, historiography) to show how the Athenians developed a 'racial narrative of citizen identity'⁹ employed in various arenas, including the lawcourts. Here I am looking into a different set of narratives, in more depth—the forensic public speeches of Demosthenes written for *graphē paranomōn*

⁴ Although, in practice, there were differences in terms of social status and the citizen group was more diverse than this definition may suggest.

⁵ See Carey 2017: 51.

⁶ Cf. Kamen 2013: 110-111.

⁷ For Pericles' citizenship law and Athenian citizenship laws, see de Ste Croix 2004: 233-253; Patterson 2005: 277-278; Blok 2017: 47 ff.

⁸ For justified criticisms of the employment of the term 'race' and cognates (and associated methodological problems) in this study, cf. Blok 2014: 869-873. Despite such terminological issues, what matters for my purpose is the features (discussed to a lesser or greater extent by Lape) that the Athenians considered to separate from the non-Athenians.

⁹ Lape 2010: 52.

cases (Dem. 18, 22, 23), i.e. public prosecutions against illegal decrees; I examine how 'political' arguments offer reconstructions of the civic identity of the 'self' as the true democratic citizen, and of the 'outsider' as a bad anti-democratic citizen. Since the speeches involve Athenian citizens, it becomes clear that the 'outsider' is, in fact, an 'internal outsider', an Athenian who is singled out from the civic body in matters of political conduct, morality and ideology.¹⁰ No serious accusation founded on legal issues is made in these speeches so as to suggest that the opponent is not a citizen—except in Androtion's case, where the allegations against him concern the loss of certain of his civic rights, i.e. his legal capacity to introduce decrees in the Council and Assembly, as a former prostitute and as an heir to his father's debt to the city.¹¹ Thus this paper seeks to explore another strand of this rhetoric of civic identity as reconstructed in public trials, which, although they are *not* concerned with challenging citizen status as a legal issue, offer elaborate reconstructions of the civic identity of the speaker and the opponent; these reconstructions are interwoven with, and complement, the legal argumentation of political trials.

Such constructions of identity will lead to conclusions about the nature of the political arguments employed by the litigants in public trials concerning illegal decrees, for both the defence and the prosecution. They will shed light on the ways in which speakers exploit ideas and concepts, such as slavery as against freedom, social and political expectations regarding performance of civic obligations and duties (for instance, public-spiritedness as against hatred of the city; abuse of the people, and treacherous conduct) to describe the opponent as an 'outsider', and manipulate the emotions of the *dikastai*, a subset of the demos, by drawing on shared attitudes and social norms on political grounds (for example, 'oligarchic' or 'tyrannical' conduct as against 'democratic' conduct). It will ultimately reveal the various strands of such reconstructions of civic identity, at the level of *rhetoric*, and the way in which they are interwoven with legal argumentation in *graphai paranomōn*.

¹⁰ Cf. Lape 2010: 148.

¹¹ For the details regarding these two allegations, which have legal value but are never proved, see Giannadaki forthcoming.

I. Shaping civic identity: the presentation of ‘self’; democratic ethos and ideology

Demosthenes 18: speech for the defence

This section focuses on the rhetorical reconstruction of the citizen identity of Demosthenes in Dem. 18, a speech written in support of Ctesiphon, whose decree awarding Demosthenes a crown for his services to the city is indicted as illegal. Some context here is essential: Ctesiphon proposed an honorific crown for Demosthenes for his services to the city in a formal ceremony at the theatre of Dionysos. Demosthenes at the time held the office of supervisor of the Theoric Fund, while he was also in charge of the fortifications of the city. Although the honorific decree does not survive, the preserved speech (along with Aeschines 3) provide evidence for its content. Reference was made to Demosthenes’ contribution to the repair of the city’s walls as well as to his general public service to the city, and particularly, that ‘he continues to advise and act in the best interests of the people’ (Aesch. 3.49). The *graphē paranomōn* is accordingly introduced on the following grounds of illegality: i. Demosthenes was holding two offices while he had not rendered his accounts for either of them at the time when the decree was introduced; ii. Aeschines objects to the location of the proclamation of the award, as according to the law awards made by the Assembly should be proclaimed in the Assembly; iii. the decree was inaccurate in substance when it asserted that Demosthenes continued to advise and act in the best interests of the people. Aeschines essentially puts under scrutiny Demosthenes’ political career and his service to the city from the Peace of Philocrates (346) to the time of the trial (330), and Demosthenes offers a vehement account of his political career in response to Aeschines’ attack. A substantial part of the speech relies on arguments in defence of Demosthenes’ career, arguments devised to address Aeschines’ third objection to Ctesiphon’s decree, as stated above. Our focus will be the reconstruction of Demosthenes’ civic identity as depicted in his argumentation. More specifically, his democratic credentials, ethos and conduct are challenged by Aeschines who offers a ‘classic’ definition of the inherently *dēmotikos* citizen, the democratic citizen who possesses a number of traits and features that Demosthenes allegedly lacks. This is our starting point for discussion of Demosthenes’ self-fashioning in the speech.¹²

¹² Although Aeschines’ definition is designed to advance his rhetorical strategy and meet the needs

ἐγὼ μὲν μεθ' ὑμῶν λογιούμαι ἃ δεῖ ὑπάρξαι ἐν τῇ φύσει τῷ δημοτικῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ σώφρονι, καὶ πάλιν ἀντιθήσω ποῖόν τινα εἰκός ἐστὶν εἶναι τὸν ὀλιγαρχικὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ φαῦλον· ὑμεῖς δ' ἀντιθέντες ἑκάτερα τούτων θεωρήσατ' αὐτόν, μὴ ὀποτέρου τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλ' ὀποτέρου τοῦ βίου ἐστίν. [169] οἶμαι τοίνυν ἅπαντας ἂν ὑμᾶς ὁμολογήσαι τάδε δεῖν ὑπάρξαι τῷ δημοτικῷ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐλεύθερον εἶναι καὶ πρὸς πατρός καὶ πρὸς μητρός, ἵνα μὴ διὰ τὴν περὶ τὸ γένος ἀτυχίαν δυσμενῆς ἢ τοῖς νόμοις, οἱ σφύζουσι τὴν δημοκρατίαν, δεύτερον δ' ἀπὸ τῶν προγόνων εὐεργεσίαν τινὰ αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ὑπάρχειν, ἢ τό γ' ἀναγκαιότατον μηδεμίαν ἔχθραν, ἵνα μὴ βοηθῶν τοῖς τῶν προγόνων ἀτυχήμασι κακῶς ἐπιχειρῆ ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν. [170] τρίτον σώφρονα καὶ μέτριον χρῆ πεφυκέναι αὐτόν πρὸς τὴν καθ' ἡμέραν δίαίταν, ὅπως μὴ διὰ τὴν ἀσέλγειαν τῆς δαπάνης δωροδοκῆ κατὰ τοῦ δήμου. τέταρτον εὐγνώμονα καὶ δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὴν μὲν διάνοιαν προαιρεῖσθαι τὰ βέλτιστα, τὴν δὲ παιδείαν τὴν τοῦ ῥήτορος καὶ τὸν λόγον πείθειν τοὺς ἀκούοντας· εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν γ' εὐγνωμοσύνην ἀεὶ προτακτέον τοῦ λόγου. πέμπτον ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἵνα μὴ παρὰ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους ἐγκαταλίπη τὸν δῆμον. τὸν δ' ὀλιγαρχικὸν πάντα δεῖ τὰναντία τούτων ἔχειν...

(Aesch. 3.168-170)

[168] I shall reckon up together with you the qualities a democrat and decent man should naturally possess, and then I shall set against them the character to be expected of an oligarch and a base man. You should compare the two and examine him to see which side he belongs to, not in his words but in his way of life. [169] Now I think that you would all agree that a democrat should possess the following qualities: first of all, he should be a man of free birth on both his father's and his mother's side, so that the misfortune of his birth will not make him hostile to the laws that keep the democracy safe; second, he should be able to claim good services toward the people from his ancestors, or at the very least no enmity toward them, so that he will not try to harm the city in an attempt to avenge the disasters of his ancestors. [170] Third, he should show a decent and moderate disposition in his daily life, so that he will not be led by excessive spending to take bribes against the interests of the people. Fourth, he should have sound judgment and ability to speak. For it is a fine thing when the intellect chooses the best course and the speaker's training and skill at speaking persuades his audience. Failing this, sound judgment must always be preferred to skill at speaking. Fifth, he must have a courageous spirit, so that he will not desert the people in the face of threat and danger. The oligarchic man should possess the complete opposite of these qualities...

(Transl. Carey 2000)

of this particular case, it is reasonable to suppose that the traits of the Athenian democratic man and political figure singled out by Aeschines here (as against the oligarchic man) are apparently shared with his audience. Cf. Ober 1989: 188-189.

The definition of the democratic man is telling for our purposes, as it suggests that these civic ‘virtues’ should be the possession of the Athenian democratic man *by nature*,¹³ thus are *shared* among citizens, and by implication, the *dikastai* themselves, as Athenians, too. So, what are these features? First, the democratic man must possess freedom by birth; second, he should be able to claim good services towards the *demos* by his ancestors or at least no enmity toward the *demos*; third, he should show decency and moderation in everyday life, so that excessive spending will not lead him to take bribes against the interest of the people; fourth, he should be an able speaker with good judgement in order to persuade the people with the best advice; and fifth, he must have a courageous spirit so as not to desert the city at critical times. These function as the ‘criteria’ according to which Demosthenes has failed as a democratic citizen, as Aeschines alleges. Demosthenes’ political argumentation in Dem. 18 offers an elaborate reconstruction of his civic identity in response to Aeschines: on the one hand, he constructs a favourable ‘civic identity’ for himself, for his own democratic *ethos* and conduct, while he constructs Aeschines’ *ethos* and conduct in exactly opposite terms, by portraying him as a political ‘outsider’. He is isolated from the *shared* civic values and character which comprise the identity of the democratic man, as we shall see.

In what follows there is a mixture of generic and specific features of civic identity: that is, features which mark a citizen and features which mark a specific high-profile subset, the *active political figure*. As a result, we should note the convergence between the ideals of the ‘ordinary’ citizen and the ‘elite’ political figure, which is as one would expect in a democracy, where in theory anyone can speak or act, but there is additionally a heightened set of expectations for the more high-profile figure as office-holder and public speaker (*rhētor*) or adviser (*symbolos*). One’s civic *ethos*, and specifically, one’s loyalty/favourable disposition to the city (*eunoia*) is articulated as ‘racial’ inheritance, just as Demosthenes’ is depicted in Dem. 18.¹⁴ *Eunoia* is presented as a shared civic virtue, a natural *disposition*¹⁵ of the citizen and this is a central feature

¹³ Aeschines 3.168 ἐγὼ μὲν μεθ’ ὑμῶν λογιούμαι ἃ δεῖ ὑπάρξαι ἐν τῇ φύσει τῷ δημοτικῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ σώφρονι... Cf. Ober 1989: 266 noting the belief of the Athenians that it was possible to inherit from one’s ancestors their love for the city and the democracy. Contrast the discussion of the ‘outsider’ in the exact opposite terms, i.e. inherent enmity to the *dēmos* (see section II below).

¹⁴ Cf. Dover 1974: 83-95; Lape 2010: 41-52; Cook 2009: 31-52.

¹⁵ Dem. 18.321 ... ἐν παντὶ δὲ καιρῷ καὶ πράξει τὴν εὔνοιαν· τούτου γὰρ ἡ φύσις κυρία.

in Demosthenes' self-representation in the speech, exemplified by his policies, as a public speaker and adviser of the city at critical times.¹⁶

A vivid example comes from his remarkable narrative of the events following the capture of Elateia.¹⁷ Demosthenes offers a dramatic account of the Assembly meeting at this time in Athens, setting the scene for his counselling, in his capacity as a public speaker. The city, he says, was calling for a man to save it and no general or public speaker rose to offer his advice. The *rhētores*, the public speakers, who were expected to address the pressing situation and the imminent threat to Athens from Philip, remained silent, offering no advice on this crisis. Only Demosthenes stood up to speak among them, and only he possessed the civic attributes necessary to offer his political advice (*symboluein*), namely loyalty to the *demos*. The use of the term *rhētōr* to refer to public speakers in general, who failed to act on this occasion, is subtly contrasted with political advice provided by the *symbolos* (political adviser), a task that Demosthenes claims for himself in this narrative (18.172-173). Thus his political advice is presented as the task of the high-profile public speaker, and the extraordinary traits of a *symbolos* compose Demosthenes' distinctive political profile. He emphasises that he has the courage to act, never surrendering his disposition of *eunoia* towards the city.¹⁸ His account of the meeting, with his remarks about the desperate call of the city, personified through the herald's call, makes an explicit contrast between the ordinary, patriotic citizen (a designation which includes all the *dikastai*)¹⁹ and the high-profile political adviser, who is not only a patriot but also a man with excellent political judgment and in-depth knowledge of political affairs. Demosthenes is then presented as a *deus ex machina*²⁰ who provides a solution to the pressing matter of external policy, while the present *dikastai* are identified with the citizen body who listened carefully his advice at that critical time when Philip was aggressively advancing in Southern Greece

¹⁶ He identifies himself both as *symbolos* (e.g. 18.66, 94 and 212 juxtaposed with *rhētōr*) and as *rhētōr* (e.g. 18.246) in the speech.

¹⁷ Dem. 18.170-173. A much-admired narrative of the events relating to the capture of Elateia since antiquity (e.g. [Long.] *Subl.* 10.7, Theon *Progymn.* 70.1, Hermog. *Id.* 2.1.199): cf. Serafim. 2017: 23, Yunis 2001: 204-205, Usher 1993: 230-231, Wankel 1976: 848.

¹⁸ Dem. 18.172 ... ἴν' εἰδῆθ' ὅτι μόνος τῶν λεγόντων καὶ πολιτευομένων ἐγὼ τὴν τῆς εὐνοίας τάξιν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς οὐκ ἔλιπον.

¹⁹ Dem. 18.171 καίτοι εἰ μὲν τοὺς σωθῆναι τὴν πόλιν βουλομένους παρελθεῖν ἔδει, πάντες ἂν ὑμεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναῖοι ἀναστάντες ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμ' ἐβαδίζετε· πάντες γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι σωθῆναι αὐτὴν ἐβούλεσθε·

²⁰ Cf. Yunis 2001: 207.

and was on the doorstep of Athens.²¹ *No-one* held a different view at that meeting, and Demosthenes' proposal ultimately became the policy of the city. This presentation of 'self' echoes features of the *dēmotikos* man, as defined by Aeschines, such as displaying bravery and not abandoning the demos in difficult times, as well as the ability to evaluate political affairs and the rhetorical skill to persuade the people and, ultimately, offer the best advice. This is particularly important for the enhancement of Demosthenes' construction of civic identity, as the people are presented in alignment with his political counselling. This bond between city-citizen/political adviser in this speech is further highlighted by an example, Demosthenes' selection by the people to deliver the funeral speech in honour of the dead at Chaironeia.²² This event is interpreted as a vote of confidence by the demos in Demosthenes, a reciprocal act of recognition of his enthusiastic and patriotic public service.²³

Loyalty is also highlighted through his political activity as a public speaker and a political adviser in the years *before* Chaironeia, too. Demosthenes' policy was consistently approved by the *demos*, and his decrees and laws shaped the internal and external policy of the city, as the best advice.²⁴ The internal or external policy of Athens is identified with the political advice of Demosthenes,²⁵ which echoes the attributes of good judgement and ability to speak and persuade the people from Aeschines' definition of the genuinely democratic citizen. The passage constructs a strong bond between Demosthenes and the audience through collective trust in his policy, emphasising the concord between Demosthenes and the people—as identified with the present *dikastai*—by aligning himself with those who *naturally* share the same civic virtues as he possesses and espouses for others.²⁶ Demosthenes' alignment with the

²¹ Dem. 18.172 ἐράνην τοίνυν οὗτος ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγὼ καὶ παρελθὼν εἶπον εἰς ὑμᾶς, cf. 18.179-180 for the popularity of Demosthenes' policy, followed by the city.

²² Dem. 18.285-286.

²³ Dem. 18.286 ἀμφοτέρῃ ἤδεσαν αὐτοῖς, τὴν τ' ἐμὴν εὖνοιαν καὶ προθυμίαν μεθ' ἧς τὰ πράγματ' ἐπραττον, καὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀδικίαν. Yunis 2001: 267.

²⁴ Cf. Dem. 18.320 ὅτε μὲν τῇ πόλει τὰ βέλτισθ' ἐλέσθαι παρῆν, ἐφαμίλλου τῆς εἰς τὴν πατρίδ' εὖνοίας ἐν κοινῷ πᾶσι κειμένης, ἐγὼ κράτιστα λέγων ἐφαινόμην, καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ψηφίσμασι καὶ νόμοις καὶ πρεσβείαις ἅπαντα διωκεῖτο, ὑμῶν δ' οὐδεὶς ἦν οὐδαμοῦ, πλὴν εἰ τοῦτοις ἐπηρεάσαι τι δεῖοι.

²⁵ Dem. 18.65.

²⁶ Dem. 18.281 (alignment with the city). Acting for the benefit of the city is another strand of this rhetoric: 18.25 καὶ τίς ὁ πράττων ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ τὸ τῇ πόλει συμφέρον ζητῶν; 18.30 ταῦτα γράψαντος ἐμοῦ τότε καὶ τὸ τῇ πόλει συμφέρον οὐ τὸ Φιλίππῳ ζητοῦντος; 18.86 πάντ' ἀνωμολόγημαί τὰ ἄριστα πράττειν τῇ πόλει; 18.88 τίς ὁ κωλύσας τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἀλλοτριωθῆναι κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους; ὑμεῖς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. τὸ δ' ὑμεῖς ὅταν λέγω, τὴν πόλιν λέγω. τίς δ' ὁ τῇ πόλει λέγων καὶ γράφων καὶ πράττων καὶ ἀπλῶς ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὰ πράγματ'

dikastai, as representatives of the citizen body, is enhanced by vivid metaphors from military language: he places himself in the *ranks of the city and the democratic government* through a military metaphor which recurs six times in the speech.²⁷ The characteristics of Demosthenes which shape his civic identity are further exemplified by his role as a successful adviser who offers his best advice *before the events present themselves*;²⁸ he shows sound political foresight and undertakes all the legal responsibility which goes hand in hand with the introduction of his proposals.²⁹ Thus the reconstruction of his civic identity reveals both a public-spirited citizen and a loyal public speaker and adviser who always strives to offer the best policy to the city. He was successful in proposing resolutions and deliberating and executing policies and, ultimately, was crowned for his services,³⁰ one of the most honourable reciprocal acts on behalf of the city towards a political figure. This particular aspect is significant for the present *graphē paranomōn*, as Ctesiphon's decree proposed the grant of an honorific crown to Demosthenes for his services and for always offering the best advice to the city.

As the argument goes, the earlier honorific award for his services to the city meant the crowning of *the city* itself: Demosthenes' honour as a citizen, a public speaker and official, is presented as a matter of wider political significance which implies, if hyperbolically, shared honour between Demosthenes and the people. The popularity of his policies throughout his political career emphasises his constant partnership with the *demos*, which, in turn, constructs a vital bond between the citizen group and himself, a *shared* interest for the beneficial policy of the city.

Another trait that defines the democratic man is incorruptibility, which is especially related to the *active political figure*.³¹ Aeschines' definition makes it clear that political corruption is inherently incompatible with the nature of the democratic

ἀφειδῶς δούς; ἐγώ. He explicitly equates ὑμεῖς/the city's policy with his constant counselling, political actions (ἐγώ).

²⁷ Dem. 18.62, 138, 173, 192, 221, 304, 320 (military metaphor): 'in the ranks of the government' (*taxis, tattomai*).

²⁸ Dem. 18.189 ὁ μὲν γε πρὸ τῶν πραγμάτων γνώμην ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ δίδωσιν ἑαυτὸν ὑπεύθυνον τοῖς πεισθεῖσι. Cf. also 18.190-191.

²⁹ Foresight is a central virtue of Demosthenes' self-portrayal which recurs in the speech (e.g. Dem. 18.172, 192, 246), cf. also 4.41 (Assembly). Foresight is discussed by Mader 2007: 339-360 as a fundamental characteristic of the *symbolos*, with special reference to Demosthenes' *Philippics*. Cf. also Usher 1993: 254 on *pronoia*.

³⁰ Dem. 18.86.

³¹ Cf. the definition of the democratic man in Aesch. 3.170, cited above p. 6.

citizen. Accordingly, Demosthenes repeatedly emphasises this feature of his civic identity, associating himself with the victory of the city against corruption (Dem. 18.247). Demosthenes' incorruptibility is expressed in elaborate language:

οὐδὲν ἐπῆρεν οὐδὲ προηγάγετο ὧν ἔκρινα δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων τῆ πατρίδι οὐδὲν προδοῦναι, οὐδ', ὅσα συμβεβούλευκα πώποτε τουτοισί, ὁμοίως ὑμῖν ὥσπερ ἂν τρυτάνη ρέπων ἐπὶ τὸ λῆμμα συμβεβούλευκα, ἀλλ' ἀπ' ὀρθῆς καὶ δικαίας καὶ ἀδιαφθόρου τῆς ψυχῆς. (Dem. 18.298)

nothing at all seduced or impelled me to betray what I saw as the honourable and advantageous course for the country, nor, whenever I advised these men, did I offer that advice as you and your accomplices did, sinking towards profit like a balance. Rather, with an honest, just, and incorruptible soul I presided over the greatest issues affecting the people of my day and directed the city's affairs throughout reliably and honourably. (Transl. Yunis 2005)

Demosthenes maintained his political integrity in foreign affairs and remained unbribeable, simultaneously aiming at the *common* good of Greek cities against Philip's expansion, as well the good of the Athenians (Dem. 18.109). Corruption and submission to a paymaster suggested surrendering personal freedom and free will in the exercise of civic rights, and, ultimately, treacherous behaviour by siding with the enemies of the city for personal gain.³²

So far, we have explored elements of the civic identity of the citizen, and in particular the high-profile public speaker, the political adviser (as exemplified by Demosthenes) on two complementary levels: ethos and political conduct. Another aspect of the narrative of civic identity, woven together with political conduct and morality, is the citizen's alignment with, and preservation of, fundamental civic values such as freedom, and political activity in line with Athenian tradition, following ancestral examples.³³ Freedom is a fundamental democratic virtue which defines 'Athenian-ness' (Dem. 18.66-68), and Demosthenes identifies himself with the Athenian *symbolos* (Dem. 18.66), whose policy was always inspired and shaped by the civic virtues and the allegedly continuous Athenian tradition: namely, striving for

³² Cf. Taylor 2001: 158-159; Ober 1989: 236-238; Harvey 1985: 76-117 on bribery in Greek politics (with other Demosthenic parallels, among other sources, from both forensic and deliberative speeches: *ibid* p. 115).

³³ Cf. Dover 1974: 86-87.

freedom, primacy and renown more than any other Greek city. By using the ethnic name here and claiming for himself the ethos and credentials of the *Athenian* adviser, Demosthenes aligns himself and his policy of resisting Philip with long-lasting tradition and the deeds of the forefathers who fought for the city's freedom and Greek freedom more widely (Dem. 18.66). The emphatic and strategic use of the ethnic name for both Demosthenes and the *dikastai* (Dem. 18.68), highlights the *share* of both parties in the city's character and value system,³⁴ their civic heritage of 'being Athenians' (ὁμῶν δ' οὖσιν Ἀθηναίους). This reference to Athenian character and praise as well as the allusion to Athenian autochthony and the sacrifice of the individual for the city (18.204-206), recurrent in funeral speeches,³⁵ becomes a feature of unity and civic concord in Demosthenes' rhetoric of civic identity. As the argument develops, 'Athenian-ness' is manifested by the ancestral examples and civic values, which contemporary Athenians (including the *dikastai*) chose to safeguard by fighting at Chaironeia. He depicts the audience as staunch defenders of the Athenian tradition and himself as the city's mouthpiece; in particular, he is credited for his contribution to the city's 'ancestral' policy of defending liberty through his political advice.³⁶ Demosthenes constantly presents the demos embracing the same policies as he does, and he portrays himself as the loyal instrument of the city.³⁷

³⁴ Cf. Dem. 18.72; The same idea recurs later in Dem. 18.297. Cf. 18.80, 295. See also, Patterson 2005: 270 on the use of the ethnic to suggest membership of the political community.

³⁵ Cf. Thuc. 2.42.4, Lys.2.62, Loraux 1986: 101-104 for this *topos* of choosing to sacrifice oneself for the benefit of the city; for personal sacrifice for the community, cf. Loraux 1986: 37-71.

³⁶ Dem. 18.206 νῦν δ' ἐγὼ μὲν ὑμετέρας τὰς τοιαύτας προαιρέσεις ἀποφαίνω, καὶ δείκνυμι' ὅτι καὶ πρὸ ἐμοῦ τοῦτ' εἶχεν τὸ φρόνημ' ἡ πόλις, τῆς μέντοι διακονίας τῆς ἐφ' ἐκάστοις τῶν πεπραγμένων καὶ ἐμαυτῷ μετεῖναι φημι. *Metainai* vividly suggests the alignment between individual policy of Demosthenes and the city's policy, articulating his standing with the *dēmos*; cf. also Dem. 18.316 for a similar idea articulated with the same vocabulary. Cf. Blok 2017: 8, 11, 21 ff., 54-55 and Carey 2017: 51-52 on this language. The same idea of aligning Demosthenes' policy with the ancestors' policies recurs in 18.199. Contrast the shaping of the civic identity of the outsider in Dem. 22 (see section II below), Androtion as an oligarchic man, where he is denied 'a share' in the city's constitution, ethos, and morality.

³⁷ It is worth remembering here the ancient tradition associating the political self-presentation of Demosthenes along the same lines as the Thucydidean Pericles: the former's self-portrayal shows remarkable similarities with the self-portrayal of Demosthenes in Dem. 18 and in his Assembly speeches: Thuc. 2.60.5 Pericles is presenting himself as the type of statesman who is superior to all, who has knowledge of the best policy and the ability to expound it, a genuine patriot, and unbribable. On the self-portrayals of Demosthenes and of Pericles in Thucydides, see further Yunis 1996: 268-277; Yunis 2000: 97-118, Mader 2007: 339-360. Cf. also Aristotle's remarks (*Rh.* 2.1.4-7) on the three attributes needed by a public speaker to be more appealing to the people: good sense (φρόνησις), virtue (ἀρετή), good will (εὖνοια).

The political profile of Demosthenes emerging from this much-celebrated narrative, and from Dem. 18 in general, shows remarkable similarities with Demosthenes' persona as a political adviser in his successful Assembly speeches advocating specific policies before the people. As already discussed, the emphasis on the self-presentation of Demosthenes stresses three central features: i. his intellectual judgement of a political situation and ability to offer expert advice to the people; ii. his moral integrity and incorruptible character; iii. his patriotic feeling, alignment with the democratic values and devotion to the cause of the city.³⁸ In line with these traits, Dem. 5 serves as a good parallel from the *symbolleutic* genus, a speech delivered in 346 advising the Athenians to maintain the peace concluded with Philip and avoid military engagement. In particular, he identifies himself as a *symboloulos* (Dem. 5.3-4) and he straightaway attempts to establish himself as an expert political adviser who has shown foresight on previous occasions when counsel was needed (Dem. 5.5-10 *pronoia*) and he even claims superior foresight, which he attributes to good fortune and incorruptibility. The latter is also another trait that features Demosthenes' persona as adviser along with his constant concern to offer the most advantageous advice to the city (Dem. 5.12).³⁹

Civic identity in Dem 22 and 23 (speeches for the side of the prosecution)

Having examined key features of the reconstruction of civic identity in Demosthenes' speech for the defence of Ctesiphon, we now turn to the reconstruction of the civic identity of the 'self' in Dem. 22 and 23, speeches written for the prosecution.⁴⁰ The presentation of 'self' in those speeches is subtle and occupies much less space than in Dem. 18. In contrast, Demosthenes reconstructs the identity of the 'outsiders', the defendants, at greater length in these speeches. As far as the self-

³⁸ The attributes of the political adviser as discussed by Demosthenes in Dem. 18 are also recurrent in his demegoric proems. Cf., for example, *Ex.* 1.2, 6, for the political adviser who offers the best advice and has the courage to share his policy with the people, *Ex.* 23.2, 33.3 (the role of the active adviser).

³⁹ This last aspect is dominant in the presentation of the role of the *symboloulos*, a term linked with the political persona of Demosthenes in other Assembly speeches, for instance, in Dem. 8 delivered before the Assembly in support of the Athenians' aggressive response to Philip's campaigning in Thrace. A true *symboloulos* is the one who offers the best advice to the people (cf. Dem. 8.32, 72, 73-75).

⁴⁰ It is worth noting that Dem. 22 is a supporting speech for the side of the prosecution, while Dem. 23 is the main speech for the prosecution.

representation of the speakers is concerned, emphasis is put on their public-spirited motivation to introduce the *graphai paranomōn* or to participate in the trials as supporting speakers; their rhetoric of civic identity is revealed by the antithetic presentation with the defendants, Androtion (Dem. 22) and Aristocrates (Dem. 23) respectively.

Androtion's decree is attacked by Diodoros as illegal: it prescribed the crowning of the Council in which Androtion himself had served, but Diodoros objects on the grounds that the decree has not followed the typical procedure (*probouleusis*); also, the Council could not ask for an award if it failed to build ships, as was the case with this Council; and finally, Androtion has lost his right to introduce decrees before the Assembly, as a result of the hereditary state debt and his engagement with prostitution, as Diodoros alleges.

From the outset, Diodoros, the speaker of Dem. 22, a speech written in support of the prosecution against the legality of Androtion's honorific decree, reveals the effort of both the prosecutor and himself (as a supporting speaker) to appear as public-spirited citizens who have initiated this public trial for the benefit of the city,⁴¹ which is represented as the injured party as a result of Androtion's policy, public conduct, and morality. In contrast with the defendant, Diodoros is presented as an active political figure with a genuine concern for the interest of the city⁴² and the preservation of its laws.⁴³ Diodoros urges the *dikastai* to convict Androtion; indeed, they are presented as an interested party in this political trial. The effects of a conviction in this case would also be especially beneficial for the political system more widely, in that it would be a blow to the gangs of established public speakers—including Androtion and his associates—as Diodoros argues.⁴⁴

The civic representation of Euthycles, the prosecutor of Dem. 23, is even more oblique and subtle than that of Diodoros. The *graphē paranomōn* was introduced against Aristocrates' decree, which proposed further honours to the Thracian Charidemos, who was earlier granted Athenian citizenship. The honorific decree prescribed inviolability for Charidemos: anyone who tried to assassinate him would be liable to summary arrest, and any city that harboured him would be excluded from any

⁴¹ Dem. 22.1 ἄμα τῇ τε πόλει βοηθεῖν οἶεται δεῖν καὶ δίκην ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν, τοῦτο κἀγὼ πειράσομαι ποιεῖν.

⁴² Dem. 22.1, 68.

⁴³ Dem. 22.46, 57-58.

⁴⁴ Dem. 22.37.

treaty with Athens. The grounds provided for the illegality of this decree is that it contravenes other laws, the content of the decree does not benefit the city, and finally, the honorand does not deserve such a privilege.

Euthycles is focusing on the illegal and detrimental nature of the decree that Aristocrates proposed, to provide protection to the Thracian Charidemos in Athenian and allied territory. He makes clear that his motivation to introduce the *graphē* was not hatred towards the proposer of the decree, but the benefit of the city in relation to its external affairs and particularly, the Chersonese.⁴⁵ He shapes his civic *ethos* by presenting himself as an actively involved and public-spirited citizen, but *not* an established political figure,⁴⁶ unlike Demosthenes' self-representation in Dem. 18. Nonetheless, Euthycles, too, seeks to create a bond between the *dikastai*, in their capacity as citizens (Dem. 23.4, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι), and himself, in the form of a joint enterprise so that they will make the best decision for the benefit of the city: Euthycles' acquittal and the simultaneous annulment of Aristocrates' decree.⁴⁷ Thus he presents his prosecution in compliance with the city's interest and aligns himself with the *dikastai*, as representing and judging not simply a decree but a policy which will be detrimental, as his argument goes.⁴⁸

Therefore, civic *ethos* and morality, as shaping features of civic identity, are present in the prosecution speeches, too, but unlike speeches for the defence as exemplified by Dem. 18, the prosecutors' civic identity is reconstructed more subtly: in public prosecutions, such as these *graphai paranomōn*, the personality of the speaker is less central and the presentation of self tends to be both more brief and more oblique. This may be explained by the public nature of the trial as well as the specific charge (*paranomōn*). The prosecutorial speakers do not focus on themselves as individuals but subtly emphasise their civic credentials and identity in alignment with the benefit of the city as a whole. They are careful to stress their public-spiritedness straightaway and to remove any suspicion of misuse of the procedure against a political opponent, thereby

⁴⁵ Dem. 23.1 ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἄρ' ὀρθῶς ἐγὼ λογίζομαι καὶ σκοπῶ, ὑπὲρ τοῦ Χερρόνησον ἔχειν ὑμᾶς ἀσφαλῶς καὶ μὴ παρακρουσθέντας ἀποστερηθῆναι πάλιν αὐτῆς, περὶ τούτου μοί ἐστιν ἅπασ' ἡ σπουδή.

⁴⁶ Dem. 23.4 οὐδὲ τῶν πολιτευομένων; 23.147 a contrast between himself and the *rhētores*, vaguely implying Aristocrates; 23.185, 188. See also MacDowell 2009: 196.

⁴⁷ Dem. 23.5 πρᾶγμα ἄλυσιτελὲς τῇ πόλει.

⁴⁸ Dem. 23.15, 93 τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦθ' οὗτος ἔγραψεν οὐχ ἴν' ὄντος ἀκύρου μηδὲν ἀηδὲς ὑμῖν συμβῆ... ἀλλ' ἴν' ἐξαπατηθέντων ὑμῶν διαπράξαιντο τινες τάναντία τοῖς ὑμῖν συμφέρουσιν. Cf. 23.5, 190 the duty of the honest and patriotic, active citizen, as exemplified by Euthycles' self-representation.

presenting themselves as supporters of the city and its laws in cases in which *paranomon* (illegal) is rhetorically blended with policies that are detrimental for the city (*asymphoron*). The similarity of the employment of this strategy for an indirect presentation of 'self' as a citizen in Dem. 22 and 23 may reveal an 'unwritten convention' and limits on reconstructing one's own 'civic identity' when acting as a prosecutor. An active interest in looking after the city's benefit is certainly an important trait for prosecutors to claim for themselves; it simultaneously allows them to align themselves with the *dikastai* and the citizens in general, in the course of highly charged political trials.

But central to these speeches are the narratives which focus on the construction of the 'anti-civic' behaviour of the 'outsider'. Besides the legal foundations of such cases (and there is always a legal ground) the prosecutors or supporting speakers for the prosecutor develop elaborate narratives which construct vivid portrayals of the civic identity of the defendant, not only in close relation with the case at hand, but also loosely (but this is not to imply irrelevant) connected narratives, which however, provide consistency and plausibility in their representation of the opponent as an anti-democratic man, developing his 'anti-civic' identity. This strategy would seem comparable with the interesting conclusions of Rubinstein (2004) about emotional appeals, especially to anger or hatred, in prosecution speeches in public cases.⁴⁹ The frequency of the employment of such emotional appeals suggests, as Rubinstein argues, that a litigant who adopted this strategy was on safe ground, and it is unlikely to have aroused the disapproval of the *dikastai*. Similarly, such appeals to *ethos*—by means of constructing a civic identity for the opponent—must have been considered a useful way to complement other rhetorical arguments (legal and political). In stark contrast, in public speeches written for the side of the prosecution, we find elaborate reconstructions of the *ethos* and conduct of the opponent as an 'outsider'.

⁴⁹ See Rubinstein 2004: 187-203; cf. Rubinstein 2013: 136-137.

II. The rhetoric of reconstructing ‘the outsider’

1. *The construction of the outsider in Dem. 18*

The rhetoric of servile descent and upbringing

Having explored the shaping of the civic identity of ‘self’ in speeches for defence and prosecution in cases of *graphai paranomōn*, we now turn to the rhetorical construction of the civic identity of the outsider, again in speeches for defence and prosecution.

As will become clear, the persona of the opponent is presented in opposition to the virtues of the true *symbolos* (Demosthenes), as discussed earlier, as a result of the (alleged) lack of democratic credentials that define a citizen and the high-profile public speaker/adviser. Aeschines will be portrayed as lacking the essential attributes of a citizen, let alone the public speaker. One of the features of the portrayal of the outsider is the construction of slave origins and upbringing, a rhetorical strategy which is pursued both by Demosthenes and Aeschines in their speeches concerning the honorific crown proposed by Ctesiphon. What is of chief interest to us is the reconstruction of Aeschines’ civic identity as an outsider in Dem. 18, through a direct challenge to his family lineage as an Athenian citizen and his depiction as man with a servile ethos and anti-civic conduct.⁵⁰ Although Aeschines, like Demosthenes himself, was an Athenian citizen, the two exchange harsh characterisations, each presenting the other as a man of servile nature. Although such arguments have no legal foundation, coming out of the mouths of Athenian citizens, nevertheless they are recurrent in the speech,⁵¹ which may indicate that they would carry some rhetorical value on an *ideological* level. They could stir up fear in the *dikastai* regarding underlying anxieties about the transgression of status boundaries between freeborn/free and slave/servile.⁵² Servile features serve Demosthenes well in reconstructing the identity of a persona diametrically opposed to the representation of citizen *ethos* and conduct. A slave’s unfree status and his condition

⁵⁰ Cf. Ober 1989: 270-272 and Kamen 2009: 43-56 who focuses on the discussion of the employment of servile invective in courtroom speeches and its potential effects on the audience: comic effects or fear. The latter is most relevant to our analysis of speeches where no servile background can be legally substantiated for Aeschines.

⁵¹ Servile associations, e.g. Dem. 18.129-131, 258, 261; Aesch. 3.78, 169, 171-172.

⁵² Cf. Kamen 2009: 55.

of being owned by a master, *ab initio*, puts him in opposition to Athenian civic identity, whose foundation is built on freedom by birth.⁵³ As becomes clear, the depiction of the opponent as having servile origins is one of the manifestations of his anti-civic identity on the political scene: servile descent is further developed and illustrated by his ethos and morality, both presented as *natural* traits.

More specifically, Demosthenes presents Aeschines as an outsider of servile status by descent: *eleutheros ek doulou* (Dem. 18.131),⁵⁴ whose transition from servile to citizen status was a recent development. His patronymic and metronymic are ridiculed and despite the convention of not naming Athenian women in court,⁵⁵ his mother is depicted as a prostitute of servile background and is named as Empousa, a name borne by prostitutes, before the alleged change of her name to Glaukothea.⁵⁶ The rhetorical depiction of Aeschines' origin and servile descent serves as the foundation for the depiction of Aeschines' anti-civic morality, as naturally deriving from his servile status: despite the transition from servile status to citizen status and from slavery to freedom, Aeschines fails even to express his gratitude to the *demos* for this; instead he has sold himself to a paymaster and accordingly has acted to the detriment of the city. He is ungrateful and morally worthless because of his own, allegedly servile, nature,⁵⁷ and only became rich as a result of his harmful activity towards the *demos*, by serving the interests of the enemies of the city.⁵⁸ These features construct an anti-civic identity, the identity of an outsider whose morality stands in stark contrast with features of citizen identity: servile descent as against free birth, corruptibility and treacherous behaviour as against benefaction to the *demos* or at least favourable disposition to the constitution. Aeschines' ethos and disposition, his ungratefulness, corruption, and treason would be features suitable, by nature, to a slave, not a citizen. Therefore, his *natural* anti-civic morality and servile descent serve to mark his exclusion from the citizen body and the absence of fundamental qualities inherent for citizens.

⁵³ Cf. also Aesch. 3.169-170 cited on p. 6.

⁵⁴ Cf. Lape 2010: 84-88.

⁵⁵ For the general tendency to avoid naming respectable women, see Lewis 2002: 108-109.

⁵⁶ Lape 2010: 43-44.

⁵⁷ Cf., e.g., Dem. 24.124, Ober 1989: 270-279.

⁵⁸ For the idea that certain political advisers prioritise their own interest (especially becoming rich by questionable means) over the city's interest as recurrent in the Demosthenic corpus, cf. 3.29, 13.20, 21.158, and Ex. 53.3.

The servile portrayal of Aeschines' conduct, as a result of his descent, is further illustrated by his servile upbringing and education.⁵⁹ These aspects of his life are explicitly articulated in terms which create an association of Aeschines with servile status, not civic.⁶⁰ The poverty of the family led him to perform some petty tasks in the school where his father taught, which required physical labour rather than cultivation of the mind: he was 'grating the ink, sponging the benches and sweeping the classroom' (Dem. 18.258). Aeschines' life thereafter was of the same servile character: he assisted his mother in her obscurely presented cult practices reading the service-book, while she performed the ritual, and helping in general with the paraphernalia. Not even his subsequent and mysterious enrolment in the citizen rolls (Dem. 18.261), the details of which are notably evaded by Demosthenes, had any positive effect on his political conduct: on the contrary, his political disposition is described as treacherous, suitable for a slave, and entirely incompatible with a citizen's disposition: Aeschines has served the interest of the city's enemies,⁶¹ showing a complete divergence from the *ethos* and morality of the civic insiders, the citizens. The rhetoric of Aeschines' estrangement from the civic body and the questioning of the fundamental features of his civic identity on a socio-political level are exploited here to create resentment and to arouse the disapproval and indignation of the *dikastai* against him; he has been presented as hostile to the demos and as an inherently servile man, with treacherous traits in stark contrast with the definition of the democratic man, as defined by Aeschines himself.

At the same time, the rhetoric of the outsider serves as the best vehicle to draw a line between the citizen body and the servile, 'counterfeit' citizens who have found their way into the registers of the citizens, just as Aeschines has allegedly done, but whose entire life was determined by their servile and dishonourable descent and upbringing. Slaves were perceived as natural enemies of the democratic political order, which kept them in their servile status. Thus, this depiction of his servile nature and morality become strands of Demosthenes' depiction of Aeschines as an outsider: he has no share in the civic traits of a genuine Athenian citizen. Even though Aeschines' depiction as a freed slave may not be trusted by the audience, on the level of ideology, Demosthenes exploits it as a valuable strategy to alienate him from the civic body,

⁵⁹ Dem. 18.258-261.

⁶⁰ Dem. 18.258 οἰκέτου τάξιν, οὐκ ἐλευθέρου παιδὸς ἔχων.

⁶¹ Dem. 18.265 ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν πεπολίτευσαι πάντα.

portraying him as a man of questionable origin and civic values, and thereby sustaining his portrait of Aeschines' naturally anti-democratic conduct in the course of the speech.

Treason and enmity to the city

Aeschines' exclusion from the citizen group is a recurrent feature in the reconstruction of his civic identity not only on account of his allegedly servile descent and upbringing, but also in relation to his public conduct and policy. Demosthenes provides other strands of his rhetoric of anti-civic identity in the case of Aeschines, namely, his treacherous conduct and *natural* enmity towards the city.

To start with, Aeschines is presented (Dem. 18.291-293) as lacking fundamental and inherent democratic features. In particular, he is denied a core civic virtue, loyalty to the city (*eunoia*).⁶² Demosthenes further reviews Aeschines' political conduct in comparison with the political conduct expected of an Athenian democratic citizen and active political figure (a high profile subset of politically active citizens), and he concludes that Aeschines never performed the expected civic duties.⁶³ The catalogue of duties and services to the city alludes to liturgies (e.g. trierarchy), magistracies which entail management of external affairs (ambassador), and a range of posts related to internal policy. But Aeschines has no public record of civic accomplishments to show.

Furthermore, Demosthenes goes so far as to portray him as an enemy of his own city by shaping his anti-civic identity in terms of hatred of the city and treason. This allusion to treason is a recurrent feature of his identity and Demosthenes presents it as a natural disposition of Aeschines, *physei*.⁶⁴ *Physei* suggests that this behaviour is part of Aeschines' very existence, which is incompatible with civic identity. In stark contrast with the character of the man who supports the demos by nature, Aeschines is committed to harm it by nature. The vivid narrative is intended to undermine the *ethos* of the opponent and at the same time evades the need to present evidence in support of the allegation made. Only ostensibly does Aeschines serve Athens and respects its laws;

⁶² Dem. 18.291 οὐχ ὡς ἄν εὐνοῦς... οὐδὲν ὁμοίως ἔσχε τοῖς ἄλλοις.

⁶³ Dem. 18.311.

⁶⁴ Dem. 18.137 οὗτος αὐτὸς ὑπῆρχε τῆ φύσει κατάσκοπος καὶ πολέμιος τῆ πατρίδι. Demosthenes provides examples of the private dealings of Aeschines with Philip's spy, Anaxinos, in the private house of a third party. The episode is set in an environment of secrecy; association with the spy of the enemy turns Aeschines himself into a spy. For explicit references to Aeschines as a traitor (*prodotēs*), cf. Dem. 18.47, 61, 134. This treacherous behaviour is also described as an inherent anti-civic feature in Dem. 19.310.

in reality, he is not acting for the benefit of the demos by his choice of policy. His involvement in the city's affairs is diametrically opposite to the conduct of the citizen group. He does not have a share in the things at which *the many* rejoice or about which *the many* are distressed. The emphatic contrast between 'the many' and the one who is singled out, emphasises the estrangement of Aeschines from the citizen group, clearly suggesting Aeschines' hostility to the city.⁶⁵

This enmity to the city as a feature of Aeschines' anti-civic ethos and morality is further enhanced through his treacherous behaviour, acting as a hireling of Athens' enemies. Instead of serving his own homeland, as a genuinely active citizen would do, he hired himself out to the enemy of the city.⁶⁶ As a result, through his opportunistic speeches before the demos to offer his advice, he maliciously attacks fellow citizens, or his advice causes harm to the entire city.⁶⁷ In short, Aeschines fails as an adviser and public speaker and his political actions define him as a treacherous enemy of *his* city.

Aeschines is a *common* enemy, *not* merely Demosthenes' personal enemy: this is illustrated not only by his natural hostility to the people (as Demosthenes alleges) and political conduct, but also by his failure to fulfil a fundamental duty of the democratic citizen (Dem. 18.124-125): he refrained from exercising his judicial rights by indicting alleged offenders against the city and thereby failed to act for the benefit of the people, who are cleverly identified with the current audience (ὕπερ τούτων).⁶⁸ As a result, the *dikastai* have become an injured party, as a representative group of the injured *demos*. Demosthenic rhetoric attempts to suggest that the *dikastai* are not a neutral party in this trial, but an *interested party*, as recipients of Aeschines' hatred, and they are accordingly invited to treat him as a common enemy of the city,⁶⁹ (cf. Aesch. 3.168-170, cited above).

⁶⁵ Dem. 18.292 καὶ μὴ τῇ προαιρέσει τῶν κοινῶν ἐν τῷ τῶν ἐναντίων μέρει τετάχθαι: ὁ σὺ νυνὶ πεποικῶς εἶ φανερός.

⁶⁶ Dem. 18.307 μισθώσαντα δ' αὐτὸν τοῖς ἐναντίοις, τοὺς ὑπερ τῶν ἐχθρῶν καιροὺς ἀντι τῶν τῆς πατρίδος θεραπεύειν.

⁶⁷ Dem. 18.309 συμφορὰν δὲ τῷ τυχόντι τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ κοινὴν αἰσχύνην.

⁶⁸ 18.124 πότερόν σε τίς, Αἰσχίνη, τῆς πόλεως ἐχθρόν ἢ ἐμὸν εἶναι φῆ; ἐμὸν δῆλον ὅτι. εἶθ' οὗ μὲν ἦν παρ' ἐμοῦ δίκην κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ὑπερ τούτων λαβεῖν, εἴπερ ἠδίκουν, ἐξέλειπες, ἐν ταῖς εὐθύναις, ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς, ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κρίσεσιν: [125] οὗ δ' ἐγὼ μὲν ἀθῶος ἅπασι, τοῖς νόμοις, τῷ χρόνῳ, τῇ προθεσίμῃ, τῷ κεκρίσθαι περὶ πάντων πολλάκις πρότερον, τῷ μηδεπώποτ' ἐξελεγχθῆναι μηδὲν ὑμᾶς ἀδικῶν, τῇ πόλει δ' ἢ πλέον ἢ ἔλαττον ἀνάγκη τῶν γε δημοσίων πεπραγμένων μετεῖναι τῆς δόξης, ἐνταῦθ' ἀπήνηκας; ὄρα μὴ τούτων μὲν ἐχθρὸς ἦς, ἐμοὶ δὲ προσποιῆ. Cf. Dem. 22.66 for the same argument.

⁶⁹ Along similar lines, see Yunis 2001: 182.

2. The reconstruction of the identity of the 'internal outsider' as an oligarch. The dynamics of private life and public conduct: Dem. 22

Another aspect of the rhetoric of the outsider, from the perspective of the prosecution, is the rhetoric of enmity against the democracy through the display of anti-democratic conduct and ethos, which comes in stark contrast with the defining features of the *dēmotikos* man, whom we discussed earlier. Whereas in cases of alleged treason the traitor presents an existential threat to the city, the oligarch presents an existential threat to the democracy. Androtion is presented as an 'internal outsider': he is an insider who allegedly threatens the democracy from within. But Athenian citizens had a natural interest in the protection of democracy, unlike non-Athenians, and this is a commonplace (*topos*) in extant oratory more generally.⁷⁰

Besides the legal arguments in support of the case, roughly the second half of the speech is devoted to Demosthenes' non-legal argumentation (Dem. 22.42-78), the political conduct (*politeuesthai*) of Androtion, including his service as a tax-collector, his policy, and ethos. The depiction of Androtion as an outsider is attempted in a review of his political actions, *politeumata*.⁷¹ First, he deposed Euktemon, the prosecutor, from his office which was *filled by lot*, while he appointed himself *by decree* to fill the vacancy, an action which is explicitly presented as anti-democratic. The deposition is vividly described with terms fitting treason and the overthrow of the democracy: Demosthenes is using *katalysis* (dismissal/dissolution)⁷² to emphasise the deposition of an official selected by the people. *Katalysis* is never used for the appropriate termination of an office in Demosthenes⁷³ and has significant implications for the political ideology exploited in the speech and the depiction of Androtion as an anti-democratic and, specifically, an oligarchic plotter. Furthermore, Androtion's excessive power is stressed in relation to his role in political life as a public speaker in the Assembly. In the Assembly, 'holding you [the citizens] in his power with his

⁷⁰ See Volonaki 2014: 181; Worman 2008: 270; Yunis 2001: 187.

⁷¹ Dem. 22.47, cf. 22.3 οὗτος δημοσία πεπολιτευμένος οὐκ ὀλίγ' ὑμᾶς ἐβλαπεν, 22.69 πεπολίτευται. For the same rhetorical strategy cf. Dem. 21.142, 148-177, an attack against Meidias' public record and his alleged hostility to the democratic city.

⁷² Dem. 22.48. The precise offence is never stated, but the implication is that Androtion made a formal complaint against Euktemon, apparently before the Assembly for embezzlement.

⁷³ Cf., e.g., Thuc. 2.15.2., *LSJ* s.v. A.I.

promises⁷⁴ and he managed to depose Euktemon, possibly alleging that the latter embezzled money.

This rhetoric of reconstructing the anti-civic identity of the outsider is further developed by a vivid narrative of Androtion's conduct as office-holder. Androtion is heavily criticised for his harsh methods of collecting arrears of property tax, which allegedly violated democratic procedures and were detrimental for the democratic ethos of the *polis*: he entered the houses of individuals who are identified with the current *dikastai*,⁷⁵ and exercised physical power and abuse towards his fellow citizens as if his motive was not tax-collection but *hatred towards the demos*.⁷⁶ The intense repetition of the second person of the pronoun (ὕμετέρας) articulates the terms of the antithesis between the citizens as a solid group and the outsider who abuses his power in the democratic city to harm the *demos*. Thus Androtion is dissociated from the ethos of the *dēmotikos* citizen and precisely that of the high-profile political figure, and he is estranged from the citizen group because of his employment of oligarchic methods and his (alleged) preference for oligarchy more generally.⁷⁷

Androtion's anti-civic identity is also developed through another strand, his private conduct, specifically, his engagement with prostitution, an activity that was incompatible with democratic participation and the exercise of certain civic rights. According to the law⁷⁸ a citizen who had prostituted himself was banned from speaking before the Assembly and the Council, the core decision-making bodies of the democratic *polis*. As Demosthenes suggests, the lawgiver established these sanctions because he considered prostitution entirely incompatible with the democratic constitution, since prostitutes are extremely hostile to democracy which depends on the private individual to expose their disgraceful actions.⁷⁹ For that reason, citizens who have prostituted themselves, depriving themselves of fundamental democratic participation in the Assembly and Council, naturally favour oligarchic regimes, in

⁷⁴ Dem. 22.49. The expression ταῖς ὑποσχέσεσιν κατέχων is unusual and has implications for his control of the *dēmos*.

⁷⁵ Dem. 22.50 ἤγ' ἐπὶ τὰς ὑμετέρας οἰκίας/ὥσπερ οὐ διὰ τὴν Εὐκτήμονος ἔχθραν ἐπὶ ταῦτ' ἐλθὼν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ὑμετέραν.

⁷⁶ Cf. Dem. 22.47, 51, 52 for Androtion's enmity towards the democracy and his tyrannical conduct.

⁷⁷ Dem. 22.51.

⁷⁸ Dem. 22.21.

⁷⁹ Dem. 22.31 ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτ' ἐσπούδασεν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἀπεῖπεν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ τῆς πολιτείας. ἦδει γάρ, ἦδει τοῖς αἰσχροῦς βεβιωκόσιν ἀπασῶν οὐσαν ἐναντιωτάτην πολιτείαν ἐν ἧ πᾶσιν ἔξεστι λέγειν τὰ κείνων ὀνειδίη.

which those who have the power are less likely to be denounced for their illegalities.⁸⁰ Thus private life and conduct are presented in direct relation with civic life and, in particular, Androtion as a former prostitute is inherently hostile to democracy. The allusion to Androtion's prostitution later in the speech makes the point that such shameful private conduct is an element of his very nature as well as the result of his education.

The idea of natural hostility to the city and constitution that was observed in Dem. 18 as an inherent trait that singles out Aeschines as an outsider and shapes his anti-civic nature, is also used in Dem. 22 along the lines of natural disposition.⁸¹ Androtion has no share (οὐ μετέχει τῇ φύσει οὐδὲ τῇ παιδείᾳ) *by nature and breeding* in the values and democratic features that all the citizen body naturally shares; he has always acted against the laws and the customs of the city, 'which must be preserved by you', the *dikastai*. Androtion's character fails to qualify as democratic. Anti-democratic characteristics are portrayed as an inheritance and conveyed by the narrative that relates the allegedly unpaid debt of Androtion's father and his subsequent escape from prison before paying it off. Instead of inheriting democratic features, Androtion inherited (κληρονόμον γὰρ σε καθίστησ' ὁ νόμος τῆς ἀτιμίας τῆς τοῦ πατρός)⁸² anti-civic behaviour in the form of unpaid debt and *atimia*, hereditary exclusion from the political life, namely speaking and making proposals before the Assembly and the Council. Thus, the person whose father has been punished by the democratic city is likely to become equally inimical to the democracy, just as Androtion did. Similarly, a man who has prostituted himself, who sold his body to another man, is likely to sell the city's interest to her enemy, too.⁸³

But Androtion, the 'outsider', is not only estranged from the civic body and the democratic government; his *conduct* is further vividly compared with the atrocities of the oligarchic regime of the Thirty regarding their treatment of citizens. This comparison suggests that Androtion's conduct was more detrimental to the city than

⁸⁰ Dem. 22.31 ἦδει γὰρ, ἦδει τοῖς αἰσχροῦς βεβιωκόσιν ἀπασῶν οὐσαν ἐναντιωτάτην πολιτείαν ἐν ἧ πᾶσιν ἔξεστι λέγειν τάκεινων ὄνειδη. ἔστι δ' αὕτη τίς; δημοκρατία. Dem. 22.32 πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τὸν δῆμον ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὑπαχθέντ' ἐξαμαρτεῖν, κάκεινους ἦτοι καταλύσαι γ' ἂν πειρᾶσθαι τὸ παράπαν τὸν δῆμον (ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, οὐδ' ἂν ὦσιν ἔτ' Ἀνδροτιώνος τινας αἰσχίον βεβιωκότες, οὐκ ἔστι λέγειν κακῶς τοὺς ἄρχοντας)...

⁸¹ Dem. 22.57-58, just as Aeschines is excluded from the citizen body (see section II.1 above), there is emphasis on the undemocratic and unfitting nature of Androtion as a result of his prostitution.

⁸² Dem. 22.34. Cf. Aristogeiton (Dem. 25.32) for the same argument with Lape 2010: 75-76.

⁸³ Cf. Aesch. 1.29 and Dover 1974: 298 f.

that of the Thirty.⁸⁴ Although the comparison is hardly accurate in its historical details, the point is emphatically made and aims at arousing the *pathos*, resentment and anger of the *dikastai* by narrating Androtion's excessive brutality against his fellow citizens, both physical and verbal.⁸⁵ The person and honour of citizens (*timē*) were legally protected: corporal punishment was banned for citizens and an insult against a citizen could be prosecuted by public procedures (e.g. *graphē hybreōs*). Therefore, Androtion violated the laws which define Athenian civic status and protect the citizen body and honour, and treated his fellow citizens as slaves, *isolating himself from the civic body*, while he was serving as a public official in a democratic city.⁸⁶ Androtion's political conduct alienates him from the civic body to the point that his treatment of fellow citizens would still be outrageous, even 'if you confessed, Athenians, that this was a city of slaves not of men who claim rule over others, you would not have tolerated his insults, which he employed throughout the Agora for both metics and Athenians'.⁸⁷

His oligarchic conduct becomes more emphatic with the description of the potential reactions of the citizens trying to escape on the roof to a neighbour's house or hide under the bed to avoid being arrested for their debts. Moreover, these actions would be taking place before the eyes of their *freeborn wives*:⁸⁸ the detail is remarkable as it presents Androtion's conduct not only as illegal, but also as disgraceful for a free citizen and his *timē* (honour), which went hand in hand with his civic status. Demosthenes aims to alienate his opponent from the audience: the *dikastai* become an interested party rather than an objective dikastic panel, and conviction is suggested as the fitting penalty for a man who has harmed the democratic ethos of the city and violated and abused its laws.⁸⁹ The *dikastai* must acquit those who imitate the ethos of the city and preserve it, while those who harm it must be punished and hated, as Diodoros' argument goes. He even suggests that the *dikastai* themselves are responsible for setting the examples for imitation, as they are being judged, in their turn, by the people for their verdicts.

Finally, it should be noted that the construction of the outsider in *Against Aristocrates* is quite different from the narratives explored in this section, in that the

⁸⁴ Dem. 22.52.

⁸⁵ Dem. 22.61.

⁸⁶ For citizens immune to corporal punishment, see Kamen 2013: 99.

⁸⁷ Dem. 22.68.

⁸⁸ Dem. 22.54.

⁸⁹ Dem. 22.64.

speech focuses not on Aristocrates and his civic identity but on a *real* outsider, Charidemos, in order to show that he is not worthy of the honour that Aristocrates' decree prescribed for him (Dem. 23.144-195). Unlike the other *graphē paranomōn* cases, which focus on the exclusion of a citizen from the citizen body, through shaping his anti-democratic identity (personal or political conduct incompatible with the democracy), this speech is especially concerned with the unworthiness of the *honorand* (Dem. 23.100-143), not the defendant. This may well relate to the fact that the preliminary decree (*probouleuma*) had lapsed and the defendant was not liable to punishment.⁹⁰ Aristocrates' civic identity is only portrayed obliquely: he is not acting for the benefit of the city, having proposed an allegedly detrimental decree for an allegedly unworthy foreigner.⁹¹ The construction of his anti-civic identity is especially blurred and is only manifested in relation to the decree: Aristocrates' decree is detrimental to the city and conviction in this case is presented as the just and advantageous verdict. Demosthenes criticises contemporary political figures (Dem. 23.201), the *rhētores*, who readily make awards of citizenship—which are no longer adequately valued by the recipients—to non-Athenians, essentially selling the honours and grants of the Athenians to satisfy their own interests. Although the targets of the harsh attack are contemporary political figures, Aristocrates can only implicitly be included in this group.⁹²

Conclusion

Demosthenes' speeches written for cases of *graphai paranomōn* (Dem. 18, 22, and 23) offer a variety of means for reconstructing civic identity and the persona of the internal 'outsider' from the perspective of the prosecution and the defence. With Aeschines' definition of the *dēmotikos* citizen by nature as our starting point, we have explored strands of the rhetoric of civic identity used by Demosthenes to align himself with the *dikastai* in Dem. 18 and to offer a portrayal of the exemplary public-spirited, loyal, democratic citizen/public speaker (*rhētōr*) and adviser (*syμβουλος*). Along

⁹⁰ Dem. 23.92 and Giannadaki 2014: 21-22.

⁹¹ Dem. 23.192 δεινὰ ποιεῖν αὐτοῦς ἡγοῦμαι, 194-195. Charidemos may well be considered as an outsider, since he was a citizen by decree, of doubtful loyalty to Athens.

⁹² Cf. MacDowell 2009: 205-206.

similar lines, Euktemon (Dem. 22) and Euthycles (Dem. 23) shape their civic credentials and personae favourably, albeit more obliquely compared to Demosthenes' civic identity in his speech for the defence of Ctesiphon. In contrast with these democratic representations of 'self', the prosecution speeches focus on the reconstruction of the identity of the political 'outsider'. Unlike the qualities and morality of the true citizen, the 'outsider' has no share in natural democratic qualities, loyalty and public-spiritedness. On the contrary, they are described by the rhetoric of treachery, corruption and natural or inherited enmity to the demos (Dem. 18, Dem. 22); their democratic credentials and conduct are severely questioned on account of their private and public conduct (Dem. 22) or else their supposedly servile descent and upbringing class them as 'servile' outsiders (Dem. 18). These opposing reconstructions of citizen and outsider are designed to depict Athenian *citizens*, who are eager to align themselves with the demos and their activity with demos' best interest, while demonising their opponents in these trials as 'outsiders', by challenging their democratic credentials and their loyalty to the city. The recurrence of this rhetoric in these politically charged speeches, where the stakes were high, and *actual* removal from the citizen body was a reality by means of a severe penalty which could lead to *atimia* (loss of citizen rights) or even death, suggests that the audiences were receptive to the rhetoric of identification of the litigant with the democratic citizen and by extension, with the *demos*, as represented by the respective court panels. The rhetorical shaping of civic and anti-civic identity respectively in both speeches for the prosecution and the defence reveals the dynamics of this strategy in terms of appealing to the democratic ideology and morality of the *dikastai* as Athenian citizens themselves, and stirring up their emotions, favourable for the speaker and unfavourable for the opponent (such as anger or fear). The rhetoric of civic identity capitalises on the ideological anxieties and prejudices of the *dikastai* when questions of servile morality, oligarchic conduct, and treacherous public actions are associated directly or more obliquely with the opponent, the outsider. On the other hand, the identity of self is depicted in line with the democratic conduct and morality that is inherent in genuine citizens of Athenian descent who are naturally favourably inclined to the city and the interests of the people, from the very basic level of the active citizen to the highest subset of the citizen group, the public speaker (*rhētōr*) and political adviser (*syμβουλος*). Litigants found it useful to alienate and estrange their opponents from the civic group on the level of civic ideology, with the aim of winning a favourable verdict in cases that concerned illegal

legislation. The study of the *graphē paranomōn* speeches in the Demosthenic corpus suggests that, besides the shaping of civic identity on the grounds of birth and ancestry, the rhetoric of identity could be manifested through various other strands, hereditary and non-hereditary features ('servile' upbringing and education) as well as public conduct (*politeuestai*) and morality.

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