1. Habitualities (from a pathic point of view)

A pathic aesthetics (Griffero 2019) does not focus on art and beauty but on sensitive perception, and in particular on the felt-bodily involvement aroused by external atmospheres (Griffero 2014, 2021a) and affective affordances. Therefore, for a pathic aesthetics, the habits that are of interest are exclusively those of the lived body (*leiblich*, namely not physical). This approach implies anti-introjectionism (atmospheric feelings are not inside but outside) and downplays the role of consciousness and mental processes, focusing rather on environmental affectivity – indeed, for a pathic aesthetics, how people ‘find’ or ‘feel’ themselves in their environment is the original question of philosophy (Schmitz 2009, 45). As a result, this perspective posits a pre-predicative, affective and felt-bodily communication (Griffero 2017b) with the perceived world, in particular with ‘situations’ whose expressive qualities atmospherically tonalize the lifeworld and ‘allow’ the experiencer to feel (and later also to reflect and act) a certain way. The concept of *pathos*, then, marginalized or even proscribed by rationalistic common sense, acquires importance in a pathic aesthetics, focused on the notion of ‘suffering’ and undergoing what happens involuntarily without looking for causes (*Widerfahrnis*). In other words, the focus lies on those ephemeral but invasive feelings that, being quasi-things (Griffero 2017a), come and go without one being able to say where they have been in the meantime. Their felt-bodily and pathic resonance as ‘affected self-awareness’ paradoxically turns out to be both our own and foreign to us.

Investigating aesthetic, or better, aesthesiological habits certainly means rejecting the reductionist approach, which explains ‘what is it like’ to feel a corporeal resonance through brain activity graphs. A pathic perspective requires embracing the neo-

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phenomenological first-person approach to Erlebnisse. This is especially true when Erlebnisse – when something bad or unexpected happens – reveal some dysfunction in the normal flow of life and raise doubts or perplexities up to, in the worst cases, the ‘loss of natural self-evidence’. Indeed, this kind of state can be pathological, unless, like an elastic band, one can quickly return from this condition to the natural attitude of healthy habituation (Blankenburg 1971, 88-89). The unquestionable fact that there are phases of crisis in habituality prompts us to reflect on the relationship between habitus and the unexpected within the dynamics of the lived body, also from a pathic point of view.

The topic of habits (including bodily habits) could also be dealt with, by going back to Husserl: in order to escape the objection that he regarded the Ego as an isolated and worldless subject (pure transcendentalism), he defined it as a substrate of habitualities (Husserl 1950, 100), that is, of a sedimented structure of compossible potentialities (‘I can’) that guide the course of one’s experiences. An equally predictable approach to habits is the reference to Bourdieu’s theory of ‘habitus’ (1979, 2012) as a structure that links the internal and external (social) aspects of the body, thus generating the ‘aesthetic’ faculty of taste and the resulting personal or social lifestyle.

However, I will not refer to either of these two traditional perspectives on habits, because neither focuses on the lived body. I will therefore concentrate first on the relationship between experience (in two of its possible meanings) and habituality, and then on the type of habituality that is most relevant to the lived body. The question is quite simple: for a felt-bodily pathic philosophy, what is the lived body? Is it what is precisely felt in its emotional and non-transitive involvement? Or is it an unthematized substratum, which is always transcended in its transitivity towards the other-than-itself? Is the felt-bodily experience an experience ‘of-the-body’ or rather ‘from-the-body’?

Unfortunately Husserl’s statements are not entirely consistent and are often based on the polyvocity of the term ‘habituality’ (see Bergmann-Hoffmann 1984, 287). He only recognises that a ‘pre-egoic’ passive association brings experiences together in an orderly harmonious way. This harmony, as an incorporated hidden intentionality made up of memories, skills and practical abilities forming a specific lifestyle, is prior to any explicit conscious organization (Moran 2016).
2. Experience as the unexpected

What conception of experience is presupposed by an analysis of lived-bodily habits? Certainly not one that, invoking a more original experience than the ordinary one (Erfahrung), sees habit as excessive closeness, which suffocates the potential atmospheric radiation of the environment by (even conceptually) taking over and annihilating the significance of things (or quasi-things) themselves. And yet, when we felt-bodily feel something that deserves emphatic comments (‘what an experience that was!’), we are actually experiencing the (at least partial) failure of an expectation. It is particularly important to keep this in mind today, when the necessary link between experience and expectation seems to be broken. Indeed, the resulting vicious circle between the loss of experience and the illusory character of expectations – also due to a scientific reductionism that gradually replaces personal experience with third-person objectivist knowledge – finds very little compensation in aesthetic experiences (in the broad sense), where, for example, a good doctor goes beyond algorithms and clinical examinations and an experienced seaman is able to look outside the nautical chart.

New Phenomenology, in turn, mainly values the unexpected and the involuntary, certainly opposing the rationalistic compulsion to foresee and plan everything upfront (whether it be a holiday, a research project or grocery shopping!). However, New Phenomenology also rejects the opposite tendency to hyper-normalize what seems irregular – a trend that may even take on a pathological hue. Nonetheless, we are tormented by decision-making less often than we find ourselves in habitual situations, and the unexpected, after all, appears to be foreign and ‘incalculable’, to ‘stand in our way’, only when it breaks into some unreflected

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3 As Klages (1944, 258) observes, «nothing resembles the shiver of a first encounter, and never does familiar land lure the wanderer. Habit is the name of the sling in which nothingness binds the gods».  
4 Expectation, no longer inhibited by experience and increasingly delegated to specialist mediation (the veneration of expertise!), is transformed into an empiricism related not to nature but to a desensitized schematisation. Thus understood, expectation seems fatally transformed into «a single and immense super-expectation: in the eschatological expectation, that is, and as such denying the radical contingency revealed by the unexpected, of an imminent world that is completely different from the present one and finally healed» (Marquard 1994, 82).  
5 The unexpected is obviously foreign to both pure spirit, which encompasses a view ‘from nowhere’, and – for opposite reasons – to animals (which can be frightened but not disappointed, as they do not really anticipate states of affairs). It is also extraneous to the magical-animistic vision for which everything is always possible.
habituality. These kinds of habits are tacitly significant movements whose ‘grace’ and fluency depend more on an implicit pathic ‘know how’ (incorporated in some bodily motor scheme) than on a (gnostic) ‘know what and why’ (Straus 1935). A pathic philosophy must therefore acknowledge that experience, understood as undergoing the unexpected, is found at home, figuratively speaking, only for those who do feel at home somewhere, relying on old habits as unreflective-sedimented performances.

But it is not easy to get rid of the issue of the unexpected. After all, even habit-based skills and the required postures only become incorporated and available, of course after adequate exercise, all of a sudden and unexpectedly. This means that the atmospherically unexpected does not only manifest itself in a clearly dissonant feeling, one that – say – converts a protective-familiar atmosphere into disappointment, whose felt-bodily resonance is narrowness and contraction. A pathic aesthetics must also focus on the kind of feeling that, breaking into a known ‘scene’, refers to something unexpectedly remembered (involuntary memory) or foreshadowed (involuntary anticipation) – the kind of situation where ‘one doesn’t know where that came from’. This kind of feeling is thus (literally) senseless and unfounded for an experiencer who is not yet an ‘I’ but only a responsive (though not responsible) ‘Me’ (Mineness). In addition to memories or expectation, the unexpected can also break into a habitual situation through strange coincidences, or when the whole world seems a gigantic déjà-vu (hence Freud’s uncanny), leading to derealisation and paranoia. In these cases, everything, while remaining fundamentally (objectively) unaltered, is suddenly felt as if it were embedded in a seemingly set-up atmosphere.

In spite of this inextricable entanglement of routine and the unexpected, there is no doubt that a pathic aesthetics must mainly focus on experience as the undergoing of the unfamiliar that, preventing things from going completely ‘smoothly’, best reveals how we ‘find ourselves’ (Befinden) in a certain situation. But this seems to conflict with the thesis that the lived body is an absent body, which I will now discuss.

3. The silent, transitive body
‘Experience’ can also mean the agency by which felt-bodily memory frees our attention from details and, thanks to the repetition-typification engendered by the Gestaltkreis of
perception/movement and the incorporation of the media used, allows for a whole-oriented unreflective performance (as is well known, paying attention to single letters actually hinders reading). This tacit knowledge is neither a mere collection of data nor an experimental investigation of causal links, but a key-component of people’s ‘style’ (in acting, thinking, feeling) and their ‘landscape’⁶, and it becomes explicit only situationally, especially when it’s missing. Usually it takes the shape of a (holistic, pathic-atmospheric, situational, synaesthetic, pre-reflective) know-how that can be partially mimicked even though it cannot be fully communicated linguistically, as it depends on the lived body’s perfect responsiveness. This type of knowledge is felt ‘in one’s fingers’ or ‘in one’s toes’; freeing us from having to make new reflective decisions time after time, it facilitates extra-reflective and somewhat ‘peripheral’ decisions that disregard both details and general axioms. This implies that the body shifts into the background and becomes transparent to the actual reality (Fuchs 2008, 246)⁷.

The question now is whether this unthematical know-how can be adequately explained by New Phenomenology. According to it, the felt-bodily communication with the forms of the pericorporeal space is an ad-hoc lived body elicited by motor suggestions and synaesthetic characters shared by both the percipient and the perceived. The resulting implicit-intercorporeal knowledge, which one does not so much ‘have’ but rather ‘is’, certainly enables perfectly synchronized resonance (Griffero 2021b): this happens, for example, when dodging an object by making a sudden movement. Indeed, we do such things without perceiving our whole physical body or the geometric dimensionality of the space around us – so much so that, as soon as something disturbs this unreflective communication, the resonance ceases to be smooth and effective. The stable expressive and receptive identity that results from this unreflective communication is indeed a gift of the lived and physical body, whereby the body is paradoxically all the more operative the more it is absent, so to speak, and does not become a thematic object of

⁶ As such opposed to a more reflective-representational ‘geography’ (Straus 1935).
⁷ As can be seen from the famous example of the organist suggested by Merleau-Ponty (1945, 168): «during the rehearsal, as during the performance, the stops, pedals, and manuals are given to him as nothing more than possibilities of achieving certain emotional or musical values, and their positions are simply the places through which this value appears in the world».
experience. This experiential absence (Leder 1990), embedded in the indeterminacy and horizontality of the lifeworldly experience, implies that the body is absent or «surpassed» (Sartre 1943, 429) because what is perpetually at work in order to allow for sensation cannot itself be sensed.

The body’s absence can have several characteristics. It can depend a) on the focalisation of one perceptual sense, while setting the others as a supporting background (exteroception), or it can be due b) to the unconscious healthy functioning of visceral perception (interoception), but it may also depend c) on the special ubiquity of the physical body as a point of view about which there can be no (external) viewpoints and some parts of which (part of the face, the back, etc.) are in principle non-perceivable. However, the «focal disappearance» (Leder 1990, 26) we are interested in here only concerns the felt body (proprioception) as a null or vanishing point with a fully transitive function. This is an unthematized structure acting as an absolute ‘here-and-now’ feeling whose awareness ‘might’ interfere with its effectivity, sometimes even with pathological consequences: for example, if we constantly paid attention to (and manipulated) the way we feel, we would end up living less fluently and effectively.

But the issue is more subtle than that: is the lived body fully absent or rather only marginally present like the kinaesthesias accompanying focalisation? Can the lived body’s recessiveness

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8 Which also explains, maybe, the traditional illusion of an increasingly decorporealised existence.
9 In addition to other types of absence like the momentarily unperceived sides of oneself and of things, of the unconscious motivations behind our actions, etc.
10 This is what Leder (1990, 26-27) calls «background disappearance», which may vary across different cultures.
11 Its diagnosis is certainly difficult, given that pain in this area (e.g. a stomachache) can be traced back to different emotional states, can be localized at the gut level only imprecisely (not to mention so-called referred pain), and can be more intermittent than what we feel through exo-exception (hence the uncertainty of its causal links). Cf. Leder (1990, 39 ff.).
12 Even when one mirrors them, given the noncoincidence (yet without any absolute division) between, for example, the seeing eyes and the eyes-as-seen, or, according to the archetypal example introduced by Husserl of one hand touching the other, between the touching hand and the touched one.
13 Its functioning is only motivated by outer-directed concerns and governed by a ‘magic’ (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 94) transitivity.
14 As is well known, Husserl talks about Empfindnisse for these continuous visceral, kinesthetic and cutaneous sensations.
really coexist with proprioception, or is its resistance to reflective gaze only occasional?

4. Lived body, resonance and ‘style’
As a structural element of body dynamics and lifeworldly ‘aesthetic’ sensoriality, felt-bodily habits, just like physical ones, are partly built from childhood until they form a past that tacitly structures our experience. This is only partly the case, however. The ‘motor scheme’, in fact, is much less related to trial-and-error-based ‘habituation’ than the ‘perceptual scheme’ (a truly abused notion!). Rather, it relies on a ubiquitous-unreflective physiognomization of the surrounding reality that, while making experience possible, is relatively independent of the experience itself, and even remains active in brain-injured individuals that have become unable to choose between different possible behaviors (Tellenbach 1986, 180-181). A motor scheme-based habit can ‘inhabit’ the world, but only after having ‘suffered’ (and plastically ‘filtered’) its affordances and atmospheres. From the most elementary emotions up to the most sophisticated ones, it provides the latent pre-intentional and pre-reflective continuity or «operative intentionality» (Merleau-Ponty 1945, XVII, 137, 243) that is the latently active apriori of all our emotional states, as evidenced dramatically, ex contrario, by psychiatric depersonalization disorders. The latter, in fact, manifest themselves both in the ‘loss of natural self-evidence’ which makes our actions and feelings fluid and ‘free’ (Blankenburg 1971), and in the absence of the correct atmospherisation that a healthy protective atmosphere should ensure (Tellenbach 1968).

This necessary sedimented and therefore tacit felt-bodily and unreflective resonance is the reason why we don't have to decide what to feel time after time, and provides a first holistic-Gestaltic impression that only later (and only up to a certain point) can be analyzed into its components and verbalized. In the long term, the resulting sensitivity to atmospheres becomes second nature, involving both the body – as it is considered by oneself and seen (as well as judged, approved, disciplined, etc.) by (real or virtual) others – and the collective felt-bodily disposition. The latter is the basis for rooting and rooted situations that explains the otherwise inexplicable ‘expressive’ similarities found in certain time periods, for example, in the way of speaking and walking, of painting and clothing, etc. (Griffero 2022). These individual and collective styles
of intercorporeality, due to silent felt-bodily habitualities sedimented in bodily memory\textsuperscript{15}, also scaffold and consolidate all the feelings (consonant or dissonant, it doesn’t matter) that form one’s felt body’s niche and that, in the absence of these atmospheres, would remain at best in an embryonic state. This felt-bodily habit is equally reliant on remembering (incorporating a perceptual-motor structure in an implicit memory that is clearly distinct from the explicitly narrative-biographical one), and forgetting, that is, receding from awareness, as the latter could break the flow in doing and feeling. As a habit that «enables and inhibits at the same time» (Fuchs 2008, 41) and is not subject to the true-false paradigm\textsuperscript{16}, it can also obviously be misleading by pointing to familiarity where there is none.

As for the problematic relationship between atmospheric pathicity and intentional choice, one may well want to initiate a perception, deciding to enter a certain building, for example, but the felt-bodily resonance triggered by that atmospheric situation will then proceed automatically without any guidance. It is a case of ‘it happens’, exhibiting a «foreign-mineness» (Buytendijk 1974, 295) that is involving in a sensory-motor way and no longer at our disposal. Some kinds of atmospheres are entirely projected outside by visceral sensations (the atmospheres I called ‘spurious’)\textsuperscript{17}: this is the case when the world seems to be enveloped in a more serene atmosphere than before once I have appeased my hunger. After the first impression, an atmospheric felt-bodily perception can certainly be mitigated, distanced (for example by paying attention to something else or leaving the space it permeates) and to an extent even rejected – but only because it has been felt and ‘suffered’ before!

\textsuperscript{15}Every habituation, indeed even the simple perception of something, in fact, presupposes the perception of some analogy through a «congruent felt-bodily resonance», a more or less intense déjà-vu and déjà-vécu (Fuchs 2008, 51, 46).

\textsuperscript{16}Any discussion of the normative dimension of atmospheric perception rests on a completely different level, which cannot be examined here.

\textsuperscript{17}Without fully embracing the radical neo-phenomenological campaign of desubjectification of all feelings initiated by Hermann Schmitz in the 1960s (for an introduction see Schmitz 2009), I prefer to admit (at least since Griffio 2014, 144) that there are three different types of atmospheres: prototypical atmospheres (objective, external, and unintentional, sometimes lacking a precise name), derivative-relational ones (objective, external and sometimes intentionally produced as well as dependent on the subject/world relationship), and even some that are spurious because of their relatedness (subjective and projective, that is, also related to single objects and projected by the subject to the outside world).
5. Doubts on felt-bodily meliorism

According to New Phenomenology, «felt-bodily isles» make up the peculiar lived body’s ‘anatomy’. Here I will not examine in detail in what specific way they act as ways of finding oneself in the environment and elicit a perfect coenesthetic resonance to outside atmospheric impressions. Instead, I wish to stress that a felt-bodily habit may respond with narrowness to oppressive atmospheres and with expansion to brightening ones, in both cases possibly reorienting one’s mood completely. In this experience, however, the lived body (as well as the physical one) does not disappear in the background, but becomes more thing-like: something that doesn’t work as well as before and turns out to be a «conspicuous body» (Ratcliffe 2008, 112) that one has rather than is. The lived body certainly stands in one’s way and at least testifies reflectively (‘I feel that way’) to a gap between oneself and the world; in the most serious cases it forces one to monitor and obsessively control the body, paving the way to a pauci-symptomatic and pre-delusional schizophrenic alteration that is always about the worldly felt body.

So far, I have addressed the theory of the absent body from a neo-phenomenological perspective that hints, paradoxically, that true knowledge requires unawareness. This approach is openly opposed by Richard Shusterman’s pragmatist Somaesthetics (Shusterman 2008; 2012). For him, there are four levels of consciousness, and one might be conscious, for example, of one’s

18 Examples of their location include: neck pain, muscle tension, abdominal cramps, spastic colon, or unexpected muscle relaxation, hunger, weightlessness, boundless energy, etc.

19 The term ‘coenesthetic’ (from koiné), in the sense that it’s not localized but total and visceral, is a sort of echo-expression that follows the perception of patterns related to sound, touch, sight, smell as well as weather and space.

20 For example, a woman, like and more than a man, perceives parts of her body also through the objectifying gaze of others and sociocultural standards (Marion Young 1992), which are intertwined with her own sense of self (related to the feeling she has of her body rather than how it appears to others). She therefore always sees parts of her own body as also belonging to others (husband, lover, son, etc.).

21 In hypochondria, for example, a concern for health atmospherically overshadows everyday thoughts and activities and sometimes urges people to use their ailment to manipulate others, for example demanding attention, guilting them out, etc.

22 «When we know something, we do not know it, in the sense that we are unconscious of it», as «reflection and attention can even be harmful since they yield uncertainty and hesitation» (Csepregi 2006, 119).

23 a) Unconscious consciousness (one does something intentionally while asleep); b) awakened but unreflective, unthematized perception (one does something absentmindedly, that is, without focusing on it); c) explicit awareness (one does
breathing to the point of influencing and possibly improving it. For New Phenomenology, instead, one is alive and self-conscious only when one is not completely emancipated from the ‘primitive present/presence’ triggered by ‘subjective facts’ (including dramatically authoritative atmospheric feelings), and when one can still access this present/presence by personal regression.24 Instead, Somaesthetics de-dramatizes self-awareness and neglects the most intense felt-bodily affects, so as to openly oppose the thesis of the body’s performative forgetfulness. Indeed, somaesthetics assumes that a reflection on the lived body does not automatically hinder its fluidity and effectiveness: the smooth and skillful performance of body habits, revealing an automatism that allegedly resists our intentions and any behavioral readjustment, could actually even be completely inaccurate and dysfunctional. This performance therefore could (and should) coexist with a non-cognitive but reflective self-monitoring (at least for a limited time) – as prescribed by various disciplines of body training and even Daoist texts – in order to correct bad habits and improve self-perception and self-use (including the plasticity and efficiency of the brain’s neural networks).

Shusterman’s strategy to defend the usefulness of reflective awareness for somatic behavior relies on the distinction between (bad) reflection, a ruminative introspection that actually interferes with the fluidity of bodily performance without bringing a clear somatic sense of self,25 and (good) reflection, usually trained to undertake our everyday multitasking. Following Dewey’s claim that bad habits can be amended and vindicating the bodily freedom to control them, he believes that the ‘absent body’ theory is only apparently founded on real experience, because it overlooks the fact that the early phases of learning a sensorimotor skill need careful and critical bodily attention. Above all, as learning is never fully over, even successful spontaneous body habits need critical self-attention (even if this somatic self-examination is not always achievable or worth achieving). In fact, an allegedly fluid behavior

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24 The primitive present-presence is the fusion point of five elements (here, now, being, this, and I). Through a felt-bodily resonance, it ensures an awareness that is not about one’s self-attributed and slightly abstract properties, but only about one’s being emotionally involved as a subject.

25 This would lead to a neurotic self-attentiveness inclined to depression and always obscured by anxiety.
might appear dysfunctional to an external observer, be the latter a master of bodily training or even the subject themselves in front of a mirror. Above all, this minimal critical self-awareness is not necessarily fully external to the critically examined situation, as instead posited by the theory of the absent body. In short: ‘this’ somatic awareness could promote good bodily performances, because unreflective behavior is not entirely mindless (like ‘muscle memory’ and ‘perceptual schemas’ for example); vice versa, somatic reflection is not entirely disembodied.

However, Somaesthetics may underestimate that a) it elects as the best judge of ‘good’ bodily habits not the experiencer but an external expert, and b) it gives too much importance to external postural appearance and its efficiency in relation to external goals. It also underestimates two things: c) that a not-so-good somatic habit is sometimes less oppressive when one lives with it and does not paranoidly resist it or try to transform it, and d) that language, rather than enhancing our body habits, is a seriously reductionist option compared to the manifold-chaotic qualitative reality of the situations we felt-bodily inhabit. Finally, e) Somaesthetics seems to lack the precision with which New Phenomenology explains that the embodied communication with the outside world depends on some specific variant of an ‘alphabet’ of corporeality26, or on an inter- and intra-corporeal economy whose extreme poles are narrowness and vastness.

Nevertheless, there are many possible points of contact between New Phenomenology and Somaesthetics, starting with the centrality of the lived body’s proprioception, up to the idea that only a new philosophy of the body can provide a critical analysis of the troubling ways in which all bodily dimensions have been distorted, exploited, and abused in the superficially aestheticized contemporary culture, thus helping people live better (Griffero 2021c). The greatest difference relates precisely to the issue addressed here, namely the reliability of a melioristic approach to the felt body according to which the body’s absence is not considered an advantage. The idea that experience can benefit from an improved somaesthetic knowledge and lead to a creative self-stylization is certainly alien to New Phenomenology, for which ‘style’ as a Lebensform is rather something anonymous-impersonal.

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26 Whose ‘letters’ include: angst, vastity, contraction, expansion, direction, tension, dilation, intensity, rhythm, privative expansion, privative contraction, protopathic tendency, epicritic tendency, felt-bodily isle formation, and felt-bodily isle decrease.
and not the result of intentional enhancement. Even though Schmitz and Shusterman come from very different ‘metaphysical’ backgrounds (existential Leib-phenomenology for New Phenomenology, melioristic-pragmatic aesthetics for Somaesthetics), though, both reject the excesses of Western naturalistic-rationalistic reductionism, which lead to genuine body-phobia, and try to revive the late-antiquity and Oriental attitude to philosophy as an art of living (also felt-bodily). Yet the melioristic optimism of Somaesthetics seems largely alien to New Phenomenology’s philosophy of history, which is opposed to the very idea of progress and the intentional improvement of experience.

To conclude: a pathic-phenomenological aesthetics or aesthesiology of the lived body has to hold together the different dimensions investigated here. First: regarding the gnostic/pathic dualism, one should assume that the incorporation-familiarization of foreignness and its consequent sedimentation in implicit or procedural memory necessarily requires both a prior involuntary ‘pathic’-involving-suffering experience27 of what happens and resist us28, – how else can one explain the first effective reaction to the affordances of objects and/or situations? – and an extension of our bodily and felt-bodily existence through habits by which to open up to new possibilities. Secondly, the idea of ‘experience’ must be equally dialectical, insofar as it implies both helplessly exposing oneself to the unexpected (up to affective catastrophe) and learning to avoid the unexpected (up to predictable routine).

Both dimensions must be taken into account in atmospherology. In fact, there are atmospheres whose resonance is based on a taken-for-granted (absent) felt body, which is fully transitive towards the world, and others that, eliciting previously inactive and unnoticed felt-bodily isles, make the felt body proprioceptively aware and maybe even perfectible. It must also be conceded that the acquisition of an affective skill may involve initially thematizing the felt-body, before letting it recede into the background – i.e., a discrepant-epicritical atmosphere that can later turn into a syntonic-protopathical one. After all, atmospheric experience is so rich that a non-unilateral atmospherology can

27 «The pathic sensations of the body are translated into gnostic perceptions» (Fuchs 2000, 329).

28 The very demonstration of the existence of external reality derives from this resistance of the world, as has been traditionally claimed for centuries.
refer to experience both as silent habituality (experience ‘from-the-body’) and as exposure to the unexpected (experience ‘of-the-body’).

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