SERENA FELOJ

THE ENVIRONMENTAL SUBLIME: AN ANALYSIS BEYOND NATURE AND CULTURE[1]

I will show you fear in a handful of dust
(T.S. Eliot, *The Waste Land*)

The concept of the sublime, after having been relegated as an outdated and purely eighteenth-century notion, going through a long evolution seems to have returned to interest in contemporary debate. In particular, the environmental sublime emerges as an aesthetic category that reflects the complexities of our contemporary relationship with nature. I would therefore like to return to explore the sublime with reference to environmental aesthetics, examining its relevance and transformation considering the current debate about the 'environmental humanities'. Through a critical reading of Kantian theory of the sublime, I will attempt to understand how the sublime can still offer a reflection on our experience of nature (Hepburn 1988).

An actualisation of the sublime raises several questions: does it still make sense to talk about the sublime today or is it an outdated category? Does the contemporary experience of nature still allow for the feeling of the sublime? And how can we define the sublime in contemporary aesthetics?

The main thesis of this article is that it is possible to actualise the Kantian sublime in the context of environmental aesthetics, emphasising the contrapurposive element of nature. This aspect makes it possible to show a dialectical relationship with nature, overcoming the mere opposition between nature and culture and promoting ethical responsibility. In other words, the sublime can help us recognise the relevance of direct experience of nature and the need for a more respectful and sustainable relationship.

[1] This paper is the result of a presentation as part of the "Minima Naturalia" seminar, organized by the *Pavia Research Group in Environmental Humanities*. I would like to thank the participants of the research group for the rich discussion that certainly improved my work.

1. Environmental aesthetics: a non-cognitivist approach

My interpretation of the sublime in relation to the contemporary debate refers to a few authors who constitute the predominant voices of environmental aesthetics; in particular, Emily Brady (2003; 2009), Arnold Berleant (2012), Allen Carlson (2002; 2010), and Noël Carroll (1993) provide a solid theoretical basis for exploring the concept of the environmental sublime. These scholars discuss issues such as the autonomy of aesthetic experience, the distinction between aesthetic and ethical value, and the importance of imagination in the aesthetics of nature. Through these studies, it will therefore be possible to propose an interpretation of the Kantian sublime applicable to the contemporary context.

The debate on the sublime has seen many changes over the centuries. After its centrality, alongside the beautiful, in the second half of the eighteenth century, interest in the sublime seems to have waned during the nineteenth century, only to reappear in the late twentieth century in reference to the possibilities of art. The natural sublime seems to have been sidelined after its initial eighteenth-century relevance, however, with the emergence of environmental aesthetics, the sublime once again becomes a category to be discussed and redefined.

Briefly, in environmental aesthetics, we can distinguish between a position of aesthetic non-cognitivism, within which Arnold Berleant, Emily Brady and Noël Carroll argue for the autonomy of aesthetic experience and the centrality of the imagination, and a cognitivist position, with Carlson and Shapsay (2013), which integrates scientific knowledge into aesthetics, arguing that a scientific and informed understanding of nature enriches and deepens aesthetic appreciation (see D'Angelo 2006).

I will argue here for a position close to that of Berleant and Brady, thus classifiable as aesthetic non-cognitivism. In particular, I would like to emphasise how non-cognitivism in environmental aesthetics emphasises the direct aesthetic experience of nature, without necessarily referring to scientific knowledge or cognitive information. While presenting significant differences, Berleant's and Brady's studies offer a unique perspective on how we should interact with and appreciate the natural world in direct experience.

Arnold Berleant is known for his concept of 'aesthetics of engagement', which emphasises an immersive and interactive aesthetic experience with the natural environment. Berleant rejects the traditional disinterested view of Kantian aesthetics, which

separates the observing subject from the observed object, and promotes a direct and sensory involvement with nature (Berleant 2012, ch. 13). For Berleant, environmental aesthetics is thus not a matter of detached observation, but of immersion and interaction. Aesthetic experience would thus be deeply embodied and contextual, requiring the active participation of the observer. This direct sensory involvement would allow for a more intense and complete experience of nature (Berleant 2012, ch. 5).

Following the involvement theory, Berleant criticises the traditional dualism between nature and culture, arguing that nature is not an entity separate from us, but something with which we are intimately connected. This connection would be what eliminates aesthetic distance and allows for a more genuine and integrated aesthetic experience of nature. In the aesthetics of engagement, emotions then play a crucial role. Indeed, Berleant emphasises the aesthetic appreciation of nature not only as a visual perception, but as an experience that also involves deep feelings and emotions (Berleant 2012, ch. 4).

Since these convictions, Berleant criticises cognitivism for its excessive focus on information and scientific knowledge. He argues that this approach risks reducing aesthetic experience to mere intellectual understanding, neglecting the importance of direct sensory and emotional experience. For Berleant, environmental aesthetics should instead be based on the immediate, unmediated experience of nature.

Emily Brady, like Berleant, is an advocate of non-cognitivism in environmental aesthetics, but her approach is slightly different. Defining environmental aesthetics, Brady emphasises how this discipline has emerged since the 1960s in reaction to the centrality of the philosophy of art alone in the debate (Brady 2003, 86-88; Brady 2009). Emphasising the distinction from "ecological aesthetics", Brady proposes a theory he calls "integrated aesthetics" in which the role of imagination is decisive (Brady 2003, 102). Borrowing some fundamental concepts from Kantian aesthetics, such as teleological formalism and aimless purpose, the theory of integrated aesthetics has ethical effects, but maintains a distinction between aesthetic value and the ethical value attributed to nature.

Brady places special emphasis on imagination and emotion as key components of the aesthetic experience of nature. Imagination is understood as that faculty that allows us to go beyond mere sensory perception, enabling us to grasp deeper and more complex

meanings. Through imagination, we can thus connect with nature in new and unexpected ways, discovering hidden beauty and symbolic relationships. Like Berleant, however, Brady also emphasises the importance of emotions in aesthetic experience. Emotions are not simply subjective reactions but are an integral part of aesthetic appreciation; they can intensify the aesthetic experience and make it richer and more meaningful (Brady, 120-142).

Like Berleant, Brady also criticises the scientific reductionism of cognitivism. Although recognising the value of scientific knowledge, Brady argues that environmental aesthetics should not be reduced to cognitive understanding. Rather, aesthetic experience is broader and more complex, involving the imagination and emotions in ways that science alone cannot explain.

Brady acknowledges so that our perception of nature is influenced by culture and history but argues that this does not diminish the aesthetic value of nature. On the contrary, this cultural interconnection can enrich the aesthetic experience, allowing us to appreciate nature as a cultural artefact.

Although Berleant and Brady share many ideas about non-cognitivism in environmental aesthetics, there are some significant differences in their positions. Both approaches offer complementary ways of understanding the aesthetic experience of nature but differ in their main focus. Although they are both critics of cognitivism, Berleant and Brady provide different arguments: Berleant emphasises the importance of immediate and sensory experience, while Brady emphasises imagination and emotion. With reference to this difference, it should also be mentioned that the two authors attribute a different role to culture. Brady more explicitly explores the role of culture in environmental aesthetics, recognising that our perception of nature is influenced by cultural and historical factors. Berleant, on the other hand, while acknowledging these influences, focuses more on direct and embodied experience (Brady 2003, 106-107).

While acknowledging their differences, Berleant and Brady's positions are complementary and have important implications for contemporary environmental aesthetics. Both authors call for a reassessment of how we relate to nature, emphasising the importance of direct experience, imagination and emotion. This non-cognitivist approach can in fact contribute to developing a greater aesthetic sensitivity towards the natural environment. Indeed, non-

cognitivism can encourage a direct aesthetic experience that recognises the intrinsic beauty and complexity of the natural world.

Recognising the interconnection between culture and nature, as Brady suggests, can also enrich our aesthetic experience and promote a more integrated and holistic approach to environmental aesthetics. This can help overcome the traditional dichotomy between nature and culture, promoting a more unified view of our relationship with the environment (Brady 2003, 104).

Finally, although non-cognitivism criticises the overemphasis on scientific knowledge, it does not deny the importance of science. Rather, it invites us to consider science as a component of a broader and more complex aesthetic experience, which also includes imagination and emotions. This approach can lead to a more balanced and comprehensive view of environmental aesthetics.

Non-cognitivism in environmental aesthetics, as advocated by Arnold Berleant and Emily Brady, therefore offers a promising perspective on our relationship with nature. By emphasising the importance of direct experience, imagination and emotions, this approach invites us to re-evaluate how we appreciate and interact with the natural environment. What role can an actualising consideration of the Kantian sublime play in this perspective?

2. When nature comes into conflict with man: the sublime and contrapurposiveness

One of the greatest difficulties that the Kantian sublime presents to contemporary debate is its non-artistic character. According to Kant, in fact, the sublime is only aroused by natural phenomena, characterised by the absence of form and the failure of the imagination to represent them.

In §23 of the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant defines the sublime as opposed to the beautiful and clearly lists its essential characteristics. The sublime is: 1. aroused only by natural phenomena, and not by works of art; 2. experienced when confronted with objects that present an absence of form; 3. arises following a failure of the imagination, i.e. there is no representation of the sublime; 4. defines the subject, and not the object; 5. is a mixed feeling, combining humiliation and elevation, terror and attraction; 6. has a moral component as it produces admiration and respect in the face of nature; 7. is experienced in the face of natural phenomena that appear contrapurposive (*zweckwidrig*), i.e. in conflict with the subject (KU 5: 244-247).

Beyond attempts to relate the Kantian sublime to contemporary art, I will limit myself here to considering the emotional relationship established with nature in the experience of the sublime described by Kant. The term Kant uses to describe an ambiguous relationship, one of conflict and attraction at the same time, with nature is 'contrapurposiveness' (*Zweckwidrigkheit*).

Contrapurposiveness refers to the perception of natural phenomena that seem to lack a defined purpose or even appear hostile to our capacity for understanding and imagination. The element of contrapurposiveness is found in both types of the sublime. The mathematical sublime is about boundless magnitude, which exceeds our capacity for quantitative understanding. When we are confronted with the infinitely large or the infinitely complex, the imagination fails in its attempt to represent the infinite, and from this failure the feeling of the sublime is generated. This feeling is not simply one of inability, but results in moral elevation, as reason recognises the superiority of its own ability to conceive the infinite over the limitations of the imagination.

The dynamic sublime, on the other hand, manifests itself when faced with powerful and destructive natural phenomena, such as storms, earthquakes or volcanoes. These events make us perceive the irresistible force of nature, which seems to threaten our existence by making us small and powerless. However, even in this case, the apparent hostility of nature provokes a feeling of respect and admiration, as we recognise the ability of our reason to transcend these forces through morality and freedom (KU 5: 258-259).

The contrapurposiveness of the Kantian sublime thus emphasises a dialectical relationship between man and nature. Faced with nature that seems indifferent or hostile, the human being experiences a feeling of humility and moral elevation. This dialectical process then allows us to recognise our limitedness and, at the same time, our ability to rise above natural forces through reason and morality.

Contrapurposiveness then essentially distinguishes the sublime from the harmony proper to the beautiful and manifests itself in natural phenomena that do not respond to our need for order and understanding, thus defying the principle of purposiveness. This resistance of nature highlights the limits of our faculties, but also underlines our duplicity between the sensible and supersensible worlds.

To understand contrapurposiveness, it is useful to remember that the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 represents a significant historical moment for reflection on the sublime. This catastrophic event, which caused the death of a large part of the population of a lively commercial city, shocked European consciences and challenged the optimism of the Enlightenment. Voltaire, in his *Poem on the Lisbon Disaster*, criticised Leibnizian optimism and Alexander Pope's motto: 'all is going well', pointing out the senselessness of such optimism in the face of such devastating calamities (Voltaire 1756). Instead, Rousseau shifts the focus to human responsibility, attributing the catastrophe not to nature, but to technical progress that led to the construction of dangerous buildings.

Kant, participating in the debate, argues that natural catastrophes should remind us of our non-centrality in the universe, as opposed to the irrationality, catastrophism and fatalistic submissiveness that can emerge in response to such events. Kant thus recognises that the human being is both reason and nature: we have the capacity for infinite thought, but we are also subject to natural laws. Awareness of this duplicity is fundamental to critical thinking that recognises the limits of our reason and our fragility.

In his teleological conception of nature, Kant then introduces the concept of contrapurposiveness to describe those phenomena that do not respond to the natural order, such as deformities or injuries (KU 5: 260-261). These phenomena, inadequate for our faculty of judgement, are couterpurposive because they do not bring pleasure but an initial displeasure. And the sublime describes that feeling we experience when faced with what may appear to be couterpurposive: when faced with the infinitely great or powerful in nature, the imagination fails to represent the infinite, causing a sense of powerlessness. However, this failure prompts reason to become self-aware, generating a feeling of moral elevation.

In the sublime, therefore, it emerges how the conflict between nature and human understanding is inevitable. Nature, indifferent to man, presents phenomena that challenge our need for order. This conflict, far from being resolved, then, reminds us that we can contemplate nature but not completely master it, and perhaps not even understand it completely. Contrapurposiveness, then, emphasises the need for critical thinking that accepts the limits of our knowledge and our belonging to nature, while recognising our capacity to rise through reason. In my opinion, this aspect of dialectical conflict with nature, which constitutes the essential ambiguity of the

sublime, could make a relevant contribution to the contemporary debate within environmental aesthetics, removing the reflection on environmental catastrophe and a feeling of apocalyptic pessimism.

3. The environmental sublime: what remains of Kant?

As Emily Brady has pointed out, there are several arguments against a recovery of the Kantian sublime in our contemporary times (see Brady 2013, 183-195).

First, a historical argument can be made: the bourgeois appreciation of nature in the 18th century contrasts with our contemporary relationship with nature, influenced by technology and scientific knowledge. Climate change and apocalyptic sentiment, together with the critique of wilderness (Cronon, 1986), further complicate this relationship. Indeed, Bruno Latour (2011) emphasises how our understanding of nature has been transformed since modernity, influencing the way we perceive the sublime.

Secondly, there is a metaphysical argument against the sublime: aesthetic eliminativism and scientific cognitivism question the need for an aesthetic representation of nature, favouring a scientific understanding. Timothy Morton (2007) thus criticises the sublime as a concept that reiterates a separation between humans and nature, proposing instead a 'dark aesthetic' that embraces intrinsic ecological complexity.

Finally, according to an anthropocentric argument, the sublime would be unactualizable because it describes the subject and defines humanity, re-proposing a dualistic and hierarchical relationship between man and nature, humanising nature through a projection of self. This risks perpetuating an idea of human dominance over nature. Moreover, as Morton (2007) argues, the sublime can reinforce an anthropocentric view that does not recognise the autonomy of nature.

Brady (2013, 102), however, attempted to go beyond these arguments by re-actualising the Kantian sublime through the notion of the 'environmental sublime'. The sublime describes, in fact, a specific experience we have in relation to nature, characterised by a mixed emotionality of humility and limitedness in relation to the will to dominate. Nature thus presents itself as otherness that goes beyond humanity, being ineffable and incomprehensible, but at the same time generates a feeling of respect that can be transformed into a sense of responsibility. The conviction is therefore that this

type of aesthetic experience can encourage reflection, preparing one for an attitude of respect towards nature.

Adopting a similar perspective, Gene Ray has recently taken up the concept of the environmental sublime, emphasising the role of terror and fear that accompany environmental catastrophes. Ray suggests that the contemporary sublime is characterised by a combination of wonder and terror in the face of the destructive power of natural forces altered by human activity (Ray 2020, 2-5).

Ray is convinced that the contemporary experience of nature is different from that of the eighteenth century, and this alters our use of imagination and reason; however, it is possible to resort to the sublime to express our socially mediated experience of nature and the emotional complexity that is compounded in environmental fear. Referring then to Andreas Malm's studies (Malm 2018, 62), Ray shows the importance of recognising a form of resistance by nature to our understanding and domination by resorting to the concept of nature's persistence (Ray 2020, 9-10)

Starting with the notion of the environmental sublime as elaborated by Brady, Ray thus confirms how the sublime can be taken up in the contemporary debate in a very fruitful way for the environmental theme. Indeed, the notion of the environmental sublime, as explored by Emily Brady, offers an innovative and theoretically profound perspective on our experiences of nature. Recognising the sublime in nature can therefore help us develop a greater respect for the environment, promoting responsible behaviour (Willinston 2017; Horn 2016).

What I would like to explore from Brady's thesis is the idea that the environmental sublime emerges from a frightening quality of nature that requires us to maintain a respectful distance, renouncing dominance. Nature thus appears as contrapurposive to our capacity for judgement, almost violent to the imagination, but at the same time expresses a self-awareness and arouses a feeling of human respect, generating a dialectical relationship (Brady 2013, 195-197).

Actualising the Kantian sublime in the form of the environmental sublime then means recognising that the sublime describes a specific experience we have in relation to nature. It is therefore not just an abstract aesthetic category, but a concrete experience of natural phenomena that 'impose themselves' on us. In its complexity, this experience refers to a mixed emotionality, which cannot be reduced to the wonder of beauty alone. That is, the sublime describes a

mixed emotionality that combines humility and limitation with our will to dominate. In addition to this, the feeling of ineffability and incomprehensibility of nature that prevails in the sublime, as opposed to a more peaceful wonder, emphasises the otherness of nature as a set of phenomena beyond humanity (Brady 2013, 199-200).

Responding to the arguments against an actualisation of the sublime, I therefore argue that the direct aesthetic experience of nature, brought back to the sublime, fosters an even greater capacity for reflection than that fostered by art (cf. Hepburn 1966; Berleant 1992; Carlson, 2000, 2010). This experience of conflict with nature, in which we experience its otherness, prepares us for an attitude of respect towards the natural environment and points to something beyond human control. In this sense, then, it is also crucial to recognise the role of fear in relation to natural power, as an emotional instrument that shows its independence (Williams 1995). If, on the one hand, this emotional experience makes us aware of ourselves, in a dialectical relationship of connection and at the same time of otherness with nature, on the other hand, it is precisely the recognition of this dialectical conflict that allows us not to assume an attitude of anthropocentric assimilation of nature and humanisation of the environment (Brady 2013, 202-203).

4. The Sublime Today: A Philosophy of Catastrophe

In line with this revival of the sublime in the contemporary debate, I then propose to elaborate a philosophy of catastrophe, which involves accepting our smallness in the face of nature's power, recognising nature's persistence and affirming the necessity of dialectical conflict. My belief is that by emphasising the contrapurposiveness of nature, an actualisation of the Kantian sublime is possible in the context of environmental aesthetics from a non-cognitivist perspective. By expressing a dialectical relationship, the sublime describes an ambiguous and complex experience that transcends the mere opposition between nature and culture, allows for a distancing and at the same time a sense of belonging to nature, and eschews a logic of domination by favouring an assumption of ethical responsibility.

Certainly, the analysis of the environmental sublime reveals how our experience of nature is profoundly influenced by culture and technology. However, direct experience of nature reveals an attitude that moves between perceiving the frightening qualities of

nature and our putting ourselves at a distance, taking a reflective stance. In the face of disasters and natural catastrophes, from the Lisbon earthquake to climate change, it is then fruitful to recognise the role of fear in the aesthetic experience of nature, a fear that can turn, through reflection, into respect. Moreover, the sense of incomprehensibility that we may feel in the face of nature's most catastrophic phenomena, and which needs to be acknowledged, can lead to an assumption of the impossibility of a technological, yet representative, domination of nature, describing a new experience of terror in nature.

I would therefore like to encourage an aesthetic reflection on catastrophe that, however, does not give rise to an apocalyptic attitude, but rather to a positive ethical conclusion in line with an actualisation of the Kantian sublime. Picking up on Kant, the sublime "appear in its form to be contrapurposive for our power of judgment", is "unsuitable for our faculty of presentation" and "is as it were doing violence to our imagination" (KU 5: 245). However, the more contrapurposive nature appears, the more we can feel a feeling of respect. It is therefore a question of directing this respect towards our ability to be responsible for the environment in which we live.

Kant recognises that the sight of natural catastrophes strikes the soul to the core and has the power to arouse human respect, because catastrophe is a warning: it reminds us of our inevitable duplicity, we are reason and culture, but we are also nature. That is, we have the capacity to think and to extend our thinking to infinity, but we are also a fragile body subject to the laws of nature. It is certainly not a question of disdaining technological progress, nor is it a question of reasoning according to a disjunction: saving our physical life at the expense of cultural progress and thought, according to the ancient opposition between nature and culture. Rather, it is about accepting our smallness in the face of the power of nature, also in terms of representability, comprehensibility and dominance. And it is proposed to train critical thinking in the awareness of the duplicity that emerges from the direct experience of nature, and which shows a dialectical conflict relationship. Only by recognising the otherness of nature is it possible to enter a profound relationship of respect with it. Moving from an apocalyptic vision to the assumption of a dialectical conflict with nature means first recognising that nature resists our understanding and dominion, forcing us to renounce an irenistic perspective on nature. Within this conflict,

we do not nullify nature's element of contrapurposiveness, which manifests itself in the ambiguity of our mixed emotion between attraction and fear but show the subject's finalistic capacity to feel respect for nature as well. Kant was certainly interested in telling us what the contrapurposiveness of nature could tell us about the subject, moving within the anthropological interest in man's destination. Today, we might instead dwell on the conflict itself between us and nature.

As Kant writes in §61 of the Third Critique, there is no idea of nature in nature itself. In terms of Kantian teleology, this means that in order to understand nature, we must move from the perception of the object to the idea of the subject; it is thus in the subject's reflection that nature can be understood as being ordered finalistically and that the ability to sustain even phenomena that resist our understanding is entirely subjective. Within this perspective, nature is not constituted as a system in itself, it mostly presents irregularities and phenomena that threaten man, as nature as a thing in itself is indifferent to man. It must then be admitted that it is we who need to order nature, on a phenomenal level for the purposes of knowledge, in finalistic terms for the purposes of judgement (KU 5: 359-361). What is defined is therefore not an independent system, but a relation. In these terms, having respect for nature is not a feeling for an abstract entity, but respect for the relationship between us and nature. It thus emerges that, as is evident in the face of natural catastrophe, we cannot materially affect nature (persistence of nature), but we can act on the relationship between nature and culture, i.e. on our (cultural and aesthetic) experience of nature by transforming it into an experience of respect for an otherness that inevitably stands in relation to us.

Bibliography

KU: Kant I., 1790: *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, in *Kants Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. 5, hrsg. von der königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Reimer, Berlin, 1913; *Critique of the power of judgment*, ed. by P. Guyer, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.

Berleant A., 1992: *Aesthetics of Environment*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia.

Berleant A., 2012: *Aesthetics beyond the Arts: New and Recent Essays*, Burlington, Ashgate.

Brady E., 2003: *Aesthetics of the natural environment*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.

Brady E., 2009: "Environmental Aesthetics", *Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy*, ed. J. Callicott and R. Frodeman. Vol. 1, Macmillan, Detroit, 313-321.

Brady E., 2013: *The Sublime in Modern Philosophy. Aesthetics, ethic and Nature*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Budd M., 2002: *The aesthetic appreciation of nature. Essays on the aesthetics of nature*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Carlson A., 2000: *Aesthetics and the Environment: Nature, Art and Architecture*, Routledge, New York.

Carlson A., 2002: *Aesthetics and the environment. The appreciation of nature, art and architecture*, London-New York, Routledge.

Carlson A., 2010: *Contemporary Environmental Aesthetics and the Requirements of Environmentalism*, "Environmental Values", 19, 289-314.

Carroll N., 1993: *Being Moved by Nature: Between Religion and Natural History*, in S. Kemal, I. Gaskell (eds.), *Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 244-266.

Cronon W., 1996: *Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature*, W.W. Norton, New York.

D'Angelo P., 2006: *Sul cosiddetto cognitivismo scientifico nell'estetica ambientale contemporanea*, in R.M. Calcaterra, Le ragioni del conoscere e dell'agire, Franco Angeli, Milano.

Hepburn R.W., 1966: *Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty*, in B. Williams, A. Montefiore (eds.), *British Analytical Philosophy*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 285-310.

Hepburn R.W., 1988: *The Concept of the Sublime: Has It Any Relevance for Philosophy Today?*, in *Dialectics and Humanism* 1–2, 137–155.

Horn E., 2017: *The Anthropocene Sublime*, in *After Nature: Justin Bryce Guariglia*, TwoThirtyOne Gallery.

Latour B., 2011: *Waiting for Gaia: Composing the Common World through Arts and Politics*, in Bruno Latour website, http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/124-

Malm A., 2018: *The Progress of this Storm: Nature and Society in a Warming World*, Verso, New York.

Morton T., 2007: *Ecology without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics*, Harvard UP, Cambridge.

Ray G., 2020: *Terror and the Sublime in the So-Called Anthropocene*, in *Liminalities*, 16.2.

Shapshay S., 2013: *Contemporary Environmental Aesthetics and the Neglect of the Sublime*, in *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 53(2), 181-198.

Voltaire, 1756: *Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne*; *The Lisbon Earthquake*, in *Candide, or Optimism*, trans. By T. Smollett, Penguin, London 2005.

Williams B. (1995), *Must a Concern for the Environment Be Centred on Human Beings?*, in *Making Sense of Humanity And Other Philosophical Papers 1982–1993*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 233-240.

Williston B., 2016: *The Sublime Anthropocene*, in *Environmental Philosophy*, 13.2, 155-174.