

FORUM

IAN BUCHANAN

(University of Wollongong)

***The Incomplete Project of Schizoanalysis. Collected Essays on
Deleuze and Guattari***

Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press 2021


Discussants:

JOE HUGHES

PATRICIO LANDAETA

JANAE SHOLTZ

Edited by Daniela Angelucci



JOE HUGHES

(University of Melbourne)

How does one respond to a book like Ian Buchanan's *The Incomplete Project of Schizoanalysis* which, in the first sentence of its acknowledgements, announces itself as a "culmination of more than twenty years work in the field of Deleuze and Guattari Studies"? On the one hand there's the book's formidable status as a culmination and as an accumulation: twenty essays synthesising sophisticated interpretations of Deleuze and Guattari's thought which, however old or new those essays might be, are themselves the *culmina* of a considerable and significant intellectual practice. It is quite simply not possible to even approach this practice in a form as minimal as a book forum response. On the other hand, there's the fact that the more or less routine expression, "the field of Deleuze and Guattari Studies" cannot be routine when the person uttering it is responsible for the very institution of that field. Or if not its institution, its reproduction. Deleuze and Guattari Studies quite simply wouldn't exist, or certainly not in its current form, were it not for the intense and sustained organisational work that arguably began at what might be taken as its founding event in the anglophone world, namely the 1996 *Deleuze: A Symposium* which Ian Buchanan, with Claire Colebrook and Horst Ruthrof among others, organised at the University of Western Australia while Buchanan was on a short-term contract there.

It's here, with the question of the institution of a field, that I want to start, in part because what would eventually become Deleuze and Guattari Studies (DGS) very quickly accumulated in the wake of that 1996 symposium. The event led directly to two important special issues, and the second, a spectacular special issue of *South Atlantic Quarterly*, become one of the first major edited collections of the field, *A Deleuzian Century* (Duke UP, 1999). Then, over the next ten years, the field exploded: a staggering number of book series and monographs appeared that supported publishers like Continuum (before they were gobbled up by Harry Potter money), then the publication of the journal *Deleuze and Guattari Studies* in 2007, and, in the background, an annual conference, currently approaching its fifteenth year and which, by the late 2000s, had split into two and then three annual conferences to accommodate the global interest—and of course the Deleuze camps, which are magnificent no matter how cringy the name.

The book's fascinating auto-biographical Introduction traverses the history of the field, but only from a distance, and only in a first-person mode—and this is related to the first of two sets of questions I want to raise here. The Introduction's opening clause ("That there was a time before Deleuze and Guattari studies is hard to believe now" (1)) transitions immediately to Buchanan's early work on Deleuze and Guattari in the 1990s, when the only books available in English were Ronald Bogue's still magnificent *Deleuze and Guattari* (1988), Brian Massumi's *User's Guide* (1992) and Michael Hardt's *Gilles Deleuze* (1993). The Introduction then recounts the publication of *Deleuzism*, and it mentions the 1996 conference twice, but each time as a passing note while making another point. And then a summative note:

When *Deleuzism* appeared, it was part of a breaking of a wave in Deleuze and Guattari studies. It really was the case that after *Deleuzism*, the deluge. In the years that followed, my decision of a decade earlier to write a dissertation on Deleuze and Guattari began to seem very canny indeed as dozens upon dozens of books about their work were published in practically every field of the humanities and social sciences. (3)

This strikes me as a radical disavowal, no doubt mandated by good manners and a certain modesty. An introduction that did the opposite, that enumerated all of the ways in which Buchanan was central to the history and development of the field would obviously be intolerable. Since I'm not Ian, however, I can say: we are talking about the founding editor of the journal, the person who launched the first major conference with the good sense to line up Fredric Jameson as keynote, the person on the board of every subsequent conference committee, the person who edited many of the most important D&G series, and, even when he wasn't editing a series, had the ear of the commissioning editor at Continuum or EUP, and so on. There is nobody more central to the institution of the field. Deleuze and Guattari Studies as a breaking wave, as a deluge? It's as if it were a kind of natural force that went in whatever direction it was inclined with no reflection or agency. It's like it just kind of happened and swept Buchanan along with it. That can't be true.

The first text listed in Deleuze's official bibliography is his Introduction to his first and still-untranslated book, *Instincts et institutions* (1953). *Instincts* is a *détournement* of the textbook from which reconstitutes the textbook as kind of philosophy as collage. Deleuze assembled a sequence of extracts drawn from the history

of philosophy, ethology and anthropology relating to the nature of instincts and the nature of institutions (it is first of all, then, a textbook for no discipline at all). Across its fragments, the book develops a singular theory of the institution that is sketched in the Introduction and which would be elaborated in his book on Hume (also 1953)—and so the book constitutes his first published development of an account of the nature of social reality. Deleuze conjugates the two titular terms by relating them to a theory of need. Instincts are mechanisms for the direct satisfaction of needs: when you're hungry, you eat. Institutions, by contrast, are indirect mechanisms for the satisfaction of needs: when you're hungry, you wait until lunchtime. The weight of the thesis falls on what the dialectic means for both the nature of social reality and for the nature of human reality. I'll quote at length the final lines of the Introduction because they're so infrequently cited:

What does the social mean with respect to the drives (*tendances*)? It means integrating circumstances into a system of anticipation, and internal factors into a system that regulates their appearance, thus replacing the species. This is indeed the case with the institution. It is night because we sleep; we eat because it is lunchtime. There are no social drives, but only those social means to satisfy drives, means which are original because they are social. Every institution imposes a series of models on our bodies, even in its involuntary structures, and offers our intelligence a sort of knowledge, a possibility of foresight as project. We come to the following conclusion: humans have no instincts, they build institutions. The human is an animal decimating (*dépouiller*) its species.¹

This passage gives, I think, a determinate sense to Roberto Esposito's recent image of an institution as an institution of life itself². Institutions do not have their own drives, there's no separate social reality that would be separate from life and impose its constraints upon it; rather the social is, itself, a redistribution and education of the drives. One has to say at the same time, however, that it is so to such an extent that the drives themselves

¹ Desert Islands, p. 21; trans. modified—cf. *Instincts et institutions* (Paris: Hachette, 1953), p. xi. "*Tendance*" is untranslatable in Cassin's sense here. On the one hand, it was, in 1953, the translation for Freud's *Trieb*; on the other, it was the impulse of life and the past for Bergson—and the resonances of this passage with the theses of both *Civilisation and Its Discontents* and *Creative Evolution* are unmistakable.

² Esposito, *Institution* (Cambridge, Polity 2022).

cannot be seen, in retrospect, to serve as a pre-given substrate that might define the species. They are radically reworked by the institutions through which they find their satisfaction to the extent that those institutions strip the species of any quality that might define it.

This thesis seems to put the emphasis on ephemerality. It's as if the drives are erased by institutions which have no reality other than the very drives they transform. But one of the implications of this thesis is that ephemerality does not indicate insubstantiality. An institution is not some empty possibility, a passing, accidental, mostly annoying formation that could be articulated in a different way or could have taken a different form or could be better structured had one time or competence or a better boss. All of that is certainly true, but, according to this image of the institution, one has to bracket the field of possibilities and affirm that institutions are also immediately constitutive of the very reality of one's existence and the objects that populate it. (And given the level of generality at which this thesis operates, this would be the case for "de-institutionalised" institutions like La Borde too.) In short: DGS is the way in which certain intellectual and material needs are indirectly satisfied in the anglophone academy today.

My first set of questions turn around the kind of institution that DGS is. Some of the defining aspects of the field follow from concrete decisions that I suspect Buchanan himself is probably responsible for—if not by actually instituting them, then at least by reproducing them. Consider Buchanan's only complaint about the state of the field:

If I have one complaint to make about the current state of Deleuze and Guattari studies, it is that we seem to have lost the 'right' to ask whether any given reading of them is valid or not (4).

I agree, and I think there are important reasons for this. One of them is a structural consequence of the radical openness of the DGS conferences, at least as I experienced them. In contrast to organisations that require the submission of an entire, polished paper that would be peer-reviewed in order for someone to be considered for admission to the program, the DGS conferences have been open and accessible to different levels of scholarship, to anti-scholarship, and to practices of thought that don't often find a place on the conference scene. Career-defining works of scholarship and thinking are spoken alongside people who have just encountered

Deleuze and Guattari for the first time. Whence the title of this paper: at the end of every Deleuze/Guattari conference I've been to, I've heard Ian say, "too much Deleuze is never enough." The joke grasps exactly that sense of exhaustion and exhilaration that follows from two weeks (if you count the camps) of participating in an enormous, open, exploratory assembly. *Which is to say*: the relation of D&G scholarship to validity partly follows from the manner in which the conference was instituted: the question of validity is explicitly and practically downstream from the priority of the open act of speech itself. The converse proposition is equally important however: the desire for another kind of validity has to be seen as a kind of metonymic contagion from the scholarly institutions with which DGS intersects and which demand quite different protocols of selection, evaluation and truth.

Reading the Introduction, I kept wondering how Buchanan thinks about this organisational work—from sustaining and reproducing determinate institutions like the *Deleuze and Guattari Studies* journal to more diffuse, but still decisive assemblages like collegial friendships with editors and figures in the field. What values underlie these acts of organisation, and not "values" in the toothless managerial or corporate sense of the word, but in the strong sense of the term: what are the ends and goods that orient this labour? What are the needs that these institutions are satisfying, and what new ones are they creating? One of the striking consequences of the organisation of a journal, of books series, of the conferences and camps, is that Deleuze and Guattari Studies suddenly becomes legible and legitimated within the regimes of evaluation that structure the contemporary university. Careers become possible. But how do these institutions negotiate the competing commitments that arise when a sometimes anti-academic mode of thinking begins to address itself to the academy? An institution is obviously not reducible to an individual person, and I'm wary of positioning Buchanan as a mythical founder here, whose decisions gave a univocal sense and direction to the field. But the reality of DGS in the anglophone world turns very much on practices of judgment and the intellectual value that are hard to gauge in the Introduction to this book.

DGS is a perpetually renewed series of acts of institution, made out of sub-institutions (book series, conferences, symposia, friendships), and set within a wider contexts of institutions which directly and indirectly shape it (the university, publishing houses,

late capital): this problematic of institutional nesting reappears at a theoretical register in the decisive opening chapters of *The Incomplete Project of Schizoanalysis*, and it's related to the second set of questions I want to raise here.

Chapter 1 turns around the provocative claim that “the key to schizoanalysis,” indeed, “the key to understanding their entire project,” lies in the way D&G construct a non-Freudian or anti-Freudian theory of association (18). Freudian free association (Buchanan leaves the question of memory-traces to the side) is supposed to allow desire to speak indirectly for the analyst who can listen, but that indirect desire ultimately points to a determinate content for every act of association, namely the oedipal drama. Buchanan's test case here, the subject of the penultimate essay of the book, is Freud's account of Little Hans, which Deleuze and Guattari had used to formulate their position in *Anti-Oedipus*. If, for Freud, the train station is always ultimately mummy, for Deleuze and Guattari, it is one part of a more complex associational structure: the Hans-street-station-horse assemblage. On this model, each term carries its own affective force bound in a contingent associational complex. That complex registers the truth of Little Hans's history and channels explosive energy of his affections in complex ways, and is thus determining of a reality which exceeds that past, but in no way can the persistence of that structure and its force be reduced to a structure from elsewhere. There is nothing here but the assemblage itself and its consolidation of Little Hans's history.

I think this proposition—that the key to D&G's thought lies in the way they rethink the nature of association—gets to something fundamental about their work and allows one to make important connections to Deleuze's earlier works: consider his project of grounding Humean association in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*; or consider the way in which Spinoza's theory of affects resonates with this pared-down Freudianism (affect as structures that bind affections, where each of the elements bound are imbued with particular charges of power—a link Deleuze himself made in countless places, most importantly chapter 2 of *Nietzsche and Philosophy*); or consider Deleuze's re-writing of Kant's deduction in *Difference and Repetition*, a deduction, which turns, in Kant, precisely on the manner in which the association of ideas demands a higher synthesis of recognition—but, precisely, Deleuze explicitly draws on the concept of structure to replace the concept of the

concept in *Difference and Repetition* and thus displaces the sense and function of Kantian recognition. In Deleuze's reworking of Kant, association and recognition give way to a more mobile and differential concept of the concept: the Idea, which articulates a structure or assemblage rather than a subject or essence.

This retrospective glance poses interpretative problems, too, not least of which is the fact that it would be disastrously imprecise to say that Deleuze is anti-oedipal. He has his own elaborate version of the Oedipus complex, and it shapes the most fundamental moment in the conceptual architecture of both *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*: there is no virtual, no impersonal transcendental field of sense, without the castrated phallus carving a furrow across the surface of the body, redistributing the content of its passive syntheses according to another logic. The act of thought which becomes possible in the wake of the oedipal process is precisely one that rearticulates the content of imagination and memory, which is to say the faculties on which association depends. So at the very least one would have to distinguish "assemblage," "structure," "Idea," from association as such. But these hesitations would not at all alter Buchanan's more fundamental point that Deleuze's oedipal complex does not bestow a determining content on any given structure. It is not the master-meaning that gives any local meaning its real sense. Rather in Deleuze's hands, as in Lacan's, the oedipal process becomes more fundamentally the condition of possibility for any structure at all.

In other words: this account of schizoanalysis resonates in important ways with decisive moments and concepts of Deleuze's earlier thought, and while it doesn't exactly align with them, it wouldn't take too much dovetailing to get there. What I'm less certain about is how it works with certain aspects of schizoanalysis as such, and, in particular, the image of social reality it implies.

Assemblage theory works well for local phenomena. It has the capacity to register and make sense of what little Hans actually said, and it allows the specific energetic charges of his associations to become visible. It works well when Buchanan is reading a film or discussing metaphor, because it doesn't require the subordination of one or another part of the work to another. It opens up a mode of analysis in which the different salient elements of a work can co-determine one another without one of them becoming *the* element. It beautifully demonstrates the way in which assemblages are like institutions in the sense that they're local and contingent ways of

organising life but which, for all of their locality and contingency necessarily accumulate and articulate the traces of specific histories.

What's not clear to me is how to think of the problem of nested assemblages or institutions, and, ultimately, the manner in which one might be able to think something like a determination in the last instance or grasp the organisation of society not as a neutral collection of groups, institutions, structures, but according to the articulation of those groups in relation to organising antagonisms like class, race or sex. Once again, the question is how to understand the relation of one institution to another. One can pose this problem at any level of scale but it's worth underlining that when Deleuze and Guattari first developed the notion of schizoanalysis they did so in the context of what they themselves named a "universal history." *Anti-Oedipus* isn't really concerned with Little Hans or assemblages of the personal type, except to the extent that they dethrone a false image of the Oedipus complex as a determination of content. It's concerned with the manner in which desiring production is hijacked by social production, the way it gets 'captured' by social forms. Those forms follow, in a loose way, Marx's distinction between different modes of production: agrarian, feudal, capitalist become territorial, despotic/urstaat, capitalist. And yet, at the same time, assemblage theory tends to render the very notion of something like a mode of production unthinkable because it has no account of how one assemblage determines another, other than the Spinozist thesis that one subsumes the other.³ There is no *universal* way of producing and reproducing life within a historical formation on the assemblage model. There is only this or that assemblage. Society no longer exists, only individual societies. I know I need to sell my labour to survive, but is that important? Assemblage theory links me to a parent-with-young-children assemblage, to a reading group assemblage, to an extractive university assemblage, and so on. The notion that the parent-with-young-children assemblage might have a fundamentally different texture in a feudal mode of production and a capitalist because of the manner in which each modulates the production and reproduction of life? That is totally off the table—well, not totally because one can always drop a casual "neoliberalism" or "racial capitalism" on the grounds that

³ Cf. Spinoza, *Ethics*, 2d7.

everybody already knows that's the name for this or that fundamental reality; it's off the table in the sense that this relation to a mode of production or a grammar of suffering is not theoretically determined with any clarity in assemblage theory. That's my thesis, at least, and hence the question: How is the determination of one assemblage by another, one institution (DGS) by another (the university) thinkable on this model, and, ultimately, is it possible to think *the content* of social reality in its complex totality on this.

IAN BUCHANAN

Joe Hughes opens by saying, "How does one respond to a book like Ian Buchanan's *The Incomplete Project of Schizoanalysis*", I'm tempted to say in reply how does one respond to an appraisal of one's work such as the one Hughes' writes? Indeed, the same can be said in response to the extremely generous readings by Landaeta and Sholtz. I remember asking Fredric Jameson how he felt about listening to people talking about his work – we were at a conference organised in his honour – and said to me, and I'll never forget it: "At first I'm pleasantly surprised and gratified to be reminded that I said this or that interesting thing, but then I become sad at the thought I will never again write interesting things." I have experienced both of those emotions reading these responses, which have been amplified by the further thought, the sense of regret that I never completed any of the incomplete projects that comprise *The Incomplete Project of Schizoanalysis* because the questions put to me here are a poignant reminder of all the things I've thought about Deleuze and Guattari's work but haven't committed to paper and perhaps never will.

Hughes's first question has to do with my role in establishing Deleuze and Guattari studies as a field, he says I'm too modest, that write as if I was simply caught up in a wave. But in a way that is exactly what happened and the proof of that is nobody remembers that in the same period I produced the journal issues Hughes cites I also organized a conference on Michel de Certeau, wrote a book about his work, and edited two journal issues. Yet none of those things initiated a groundswell of interest, which is all the more strange when one remembers that in the mid-1990s de Certeau

was far more highly cited than Deleuze and Guattari. So, while it is true that I have worked very hard over the past 20 years or more to help bring into being the institution we know today as Deleuze and Guattari studies it wouldn't have happened if the interest wasn't already there.

Relatedly, Hughes asks about the underlying values of the institution of Deleuze and Guattari studies. I can only answer this from my own perspective and in relation to my own actions over the years, but I would add that as an institution it is a collective endeavour – dozens of people have been involved in organizing the conferences and camps (so named to avoid the idea that there is an orthodoxy to their thought which the word 'school' would inevitably imply), hundreds have presented at these events, and a similar number have contributed to the journal. The camps, the conferences, the journal itself, would all have been stillborn as ideas if there had not been a Deleuze and Guattari community-in-waiting, as it were, that was willing and able to bring it into being. My role in that process was to persuade my fellow Deleuze and Guattari scholars to do it in a coordinated way so we created something that endured. My motives were many, but at the top of the list was the unashamedly selfish one of wanting a regular excuse to see my friends and to have the opportunity to teach Deleuze and Guattari. As I said in my opening remarks at the first conference in 2008, it was my sense that Deleuze and Guattari scholars were mostly 'lonely schizos', the only ones in their schools with an interest in Deleuze and Guattari, and as such we needed a regular meeting so that we could be lonely schizos together. I also said, as Hughes mentions, that I felt 'we' (the established, tenured Deleuze and Guattari scholars) owed an obligation to our graduate students to help them to legitimate their choice of research topic in such a way that it enabled them to get a job and have a career. Both of those motives remain as strong as ever for me, particularly now when academic careers have become hard to come by and much more driven by neoliberal metrics than they were when I did my Ph.D.

Hughes notes my complaint that I think we've almost lost the right to say whether we think a given reading of Deleuze and Guattari's work is valid and counterpoints it with what he rightly perceives to be the radical openness of the conferences and wonders whether the institution as has evolved isn't the cause of the thing I complain about, but also whether the desire for validity

isn't a kind of hangover effect from the larger institution of the neoliberal university itself. These are important questions which are not easy to reconcile in any convincing way. I have always insisted on the necessity of keeping the conferences as open as possible because I see them foremost as 'gatherings', rather than professional meetings, though that's part of it, which is to say occasions for otherwise isolated scholars to come together with likeminded people, and I would hate it if people felt put off by a pervading sense of needing to 'measure up'. I don't think that it is necessarily impossible to have active forms of critique within such a setting because being open to all-comers doesn't mean being open to the obviously false notion that all readings of their Deleuze and Guattari's work are in essence the same. But that critique needs to be driven by questions and problems rather than hierarchies of who is right and who is wrong. I think we should be able to adjudge whether or not a reading of Deleuze and Guattari is valid in the sense that it actually helps to answer a question or problem that we couldn't previously answer.

Hughes' last question is not one that I answer in my book, but I can say it is a topic I have lately been writing about as part of my current project on affect. In a way the answer to his question is there in *A Thousand Plateaus*, which frequently refers to 'the abstract machine of abstract machines', 'the body without organs of body without organs', and so on, albeit without really explaining what they really mean by that. One could certainly see this as an area of the schizoanalytic project that is manifestly incomplete. I agree that the issue of what links assemblages has not been adequately addressed by me, and perhaps not by anyone else, but if I was pushed to try to do that this is where I'd start: what is meant by these strange notions, 'the abstract machine of abstract machines', 'the body without organs of body without organs'? It would take a book to answer that question adequately, but I can perhaps (in a very quick way) answer it as follows. Both of these notions should be tied to the notion of presupposition, which Deleuze discusses in *Difference and Repetition*, because that is what they are: they are not concepts – Deleuze and Guattari are explicit on this point – they are essentially unasked questions. Faced with an apparently unconnected sequence of assemblages we should ask, what abstract machine connects them? Or more precisely, what would we have to presuppose in order to see them as connected? When we use terms like 'capitalism' and 'neoliberalism'

we are in effect using them as possible candidates for ‘the abstract machine of abstract machines’, ‘the body without organs of body without organs’. It is not, however, a matter of scale: ‘the abstract machine of abstract machines’, and ‘the body without organs of body without organs’, isn’t produced accumulatively, by one assemblage being added to another; on the contrary, it is generative, they are what enable the assemblages to proliferate without the world descending into chaos and anomie.

PATRICIO LANDAETA

(Centre for Advances Studies. University of Playa Ancha,
Valparaíso, Chile)

I am grateful for the invitation to comment on Ian Buchanan's book, recently published by Edinburgh University Press, as it allows me to sort out some ideas in relation to his work and in general around the academic production around the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari in the Anglo-Saxon world.

At a time when the authors of *What is Philosophy?* have become, in different latitudes and against all odds, practically the "commonplace" of the humanities (except in philosophy departments), the arts, and the social sciences, it is necessary to revisit the formulation of their concepts to restore the problematic dimension of their philosophy. Indeed, through this book, a *performance* of the schizoanalytic method is put into play, just when the concepts that shape this method have become a kind of abracadabra, which seems to open a thousand doors. The concepts of "Rhizome", "becoming", "micropolitics", "deterritorialization", and "cartography" have become mere adjectives in recent years; cardboard hammers and saws that could hardly serve to build "another possible world". Regrettably, one could launch this cry of unease: if the century has become Deleuzian, as Foucault humorously pointed out, it has done so in the worst sense: its concepts have been emptied of meaning as they have lost the pragmatic ground on which they were born.

Faced with this situation, I believe that this book helps from its very first pages to restore their vital dimension, not by praising the authors, not by paying posthumous homage to them, but precisely by *violating them*, by putting them to the test in other coordinates, in our own present time. More specifically, in the conditions in which they force us to think.

At first sight, this compilation of works published over a period of two decades, in a book entitled 'The incomplete Project of Schizoanalysis', could point in a double direction: on the one hand, to place a marker, a kind of signpost, in the midst of the apparent dispersion of a work that brings together philosophy and psychoanalysis in the task of articulating a pragmatics of the assemblage of desire; on the other hand, to trace a line of continuity in the apparent dispersion of the work of the author of the present book, who drifts in his essays in different directions. This would

seem evident if one considers both the proliferation of topics and disciplines convened in the joint production of Deleuze and Guattari, as well as the dialogue of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy with authors and problems often distant from the work of the authors of *Anti-Oedipus*, in Buchanan's works.

However, with this book, it is not a matter of conjuring the "chaos of dispersion" by being foreign or improper to the Deleuzoguattarian open (rhizomatic) system, nor is it a matter of achieving *a posteriori* a common thread or justification for a fragmentary work carried out for years around the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari. My hypothesis is that in this recent work by Buchanan, which continues the work done in his previous book *Assemblage Theory and Method*, one notices the effort to think with Deleuze and Guattari, delineating the intricate edges of their method or pragmatics (not always evident), precisely to "set our time adrift" or to think through the problems of the historical condition of the author.

The incomplete Project of Schizoanalysis works in a coordinated way on two levels. Separating what in reality is united, one notices on a first level that an essential task consists in highlighting how this new "topology of the psyche" proposed by the French is shaped, showing step by step that schizoanalysis breaks neither with Freud nor with psychoanalysis (despite the bellicose rhetoric often put into play by the philosophers themselves), rather it tries to make psychoanalysis work in an "other" way, that is, by confronting the practice, or rather, the obstinate deafness of psychoanalysts who refuse to hear what their patients are saying. At the second level, the need to draw out all the implications of the "theory of assemblages" in the articulation of the concepts of "assemblage", "abstract machine" and "Body without Organs", the latter being considered the touchstone of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of desire, is recognized.

As one might expect, this work on two fronts has numerous consequences for contemporary readings of Deleuze and Guattari and for "Deleuze and Guattari Studies". We could, perhaps playfully, conceive of a series of "commandments" proposed by the "patriarch Buchanan" that cannot be forgotten when working with the philosophy of the authors of *A Thousand Plateaus*. Undoubtedly, many of them are quite recognized by their readers, but it seems to me that their articulation in a single assembly is a characteristic sign of the author of the book we are commenting on.

Each commandment or prohibition is accompanied by the well-known curative property of the poison to be avoided.

1.- *Not to "apply" Deleuze and Guattari to the problems of the present.* At the base of the pragmatics of multiplicity, it is argued that it is not possible to continue conceiving the world (the given and objective) on one side and thought (subjective) on the other. Cartography, one of the names of pragmatics, does not represent but "intervenes" in the real.

2.- *It is not a question of "repeating" Deleuze and Guattari by going once again into their authors or artists of reference.* It is necessary to fight hard in the study of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy against the tendency to constantly revisit and frequent their elective affinities. Moreover, it is essential to think against the taste of their own authors in order to refine the method with greater precision.

3.- *It is not a question of completing Deleuze and Guattari.* The philosophy of the assemblages is an open system, whose limit is impossible to cross, insofar as each analyst must confront their own impossibilities in order to put themselves into action, that is to say, to transform the world, *to intervene in the real*.

4.- *It is not a matter of imitating or remaining faithful to the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, as if it were an unquestionable revealed truth proclaimed by prophets, who force us to speak their own jargon, as well as to avoid others.* It is important to think with their alleged enemies and detractors (e.g. Plato, Hegel, Badiou, Žižek, Jameson, Althusser, etc.), just as it is fundamental to think about problems that do not seem so close to their thinking (e.g. photography, communications, law, etc.). There are no topics more suitable than others, which reminds us of one of the first rules Deleuze puts into play, which is to be able to create problems.

Such commandments, however, would be worthless if there were not in these collected essays a "game" (a transvaluation in the Nietzschean sense), an effectively practical conceptual movement that conjugates, connects, and assembles the construction of a problem, with the author's situation and, to a large extent, with the delirium of the author's own unconscious. In this sense, it is worth remembering that the journey through the cinematographic works, the novels, the constructions, the cases of psychoanalysis chosen, etc., are not in fact mere "cases". In each of them, the need to strain

the usual reading of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy is evident, beyond even using them as intercessors: against the reading of filiation, the construction of alliances (hence the usual presence of Jameson) to think what remains unthought in schizoanalysis, starting from "situated" problems, that is, events that mute the thinker himself and force him to think, that is, to conceptually find a way for desire to manifest its fugues.

Having said this, it seems to me that there is a tremendously important point to emphasize. Buchanan is undoubtedly one of the main disseminators of Deleuze and Guattari's work in the Anglo-Saxon world. In fact, the relevance of his work in history is mathematically delimited at the beginning of the book: he is, on the one hand, one of the pioneers in the reading of Deleuze and Guattari's work and, on the other hand, one of the key figures in the organization of academic events around their work. Not only that, but he has long directed a major journal and an editorial collection on the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari. As such, Buchanan is fully aware of much of what is being produced in connection with Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy.

Therefore, it could be hypothetically thought that, if not responsible, at least indirectly he plays a fundamental role in the circulation of the "bad" readings of Deleuze and Guattari criticized by himself. I am referring to the proliferation of interpretations that are attached to the letter, but which either overlook the place of desire in the configuration of the concept of agency, or which attempt to "apply" their philosophy to various disciplines (Deleuze for architects, educators, filmmakers, etc.), in order to extract new problems that produce new academic yields that the neoliberal university enterprise will always know how to appreciate.

In short, Buchanan's critique in this collection of articles could be seen as a dispute against the extractivist mode that prevails in the Anglo-Saxon interpretation of Deleuze (and Deleuze and Guattari), where precisely his role as producer is indisputable. Or is it, in the end, a "settling of scores" by Buchanan with his own role as a figure in the assembly line of Deleuze and Guattari Studies?

I do not intend to encourage in Buchanan the figure of the censor to avoid the circulation of hasty interpretations of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy. Nor do I claim that Buchanan is responsible for the philosophical extractivism that prevails in neoliberal academia around the world. It simply seems to me that there is a certain tragic breath in his combat, which can certainly be

interpreted in an Oedipal way: the hero's combat against his destiny. However, another reading of the tragedy is possible: I am referring to the political institution characteristic of democracy where the community (of readers) observes itself, as if in front of a broken mirror.

IAN BUCHANAN

I am grateful to Landaeta for his incisive and generous reading of my book. I am especially grateful for his enumeration of 'my rules' for working with Deleuze and Guattari – they are like a window into my unconscious for they document the procedures I was not myself aware that I followed. That, I think, is one of the benefits, not to mention the privilege, of publishing a collection like this, which by combining works written over many years, usually without any conscious sense of their connection, gives an unexpected glimpse into one's own underlying obsessions. And it is true I have always thought that there was no point in simply trying to understand Deleuze and Guattari's work for itself, which to me would be sheer scholasticism. For me, understanding their work is only a preliminary step along the way to the real job at hand, which is to use their work to analyze an aspect of the world that otherwise eludes understanding. I became interested in the concept of the assemblage for precisely this reason, because it is an aspect of Deleuze and Guattari's work that was explicitly designed to be used for analytic purposes. I began to think of Deleuze and Guattari's work as incomplete precisely because the more I tried to elucidate their methodology, as it centres around their elaboration of the concept of the assemblage, the more I realized there were considerable gaps – by which I mean unanswered questions – in their work. Hughes highlights one such gap, but there are many others. This in turn begs the question, and to me it is the most interesting question one can ask of Deleuze and Guattari's work, how does one go about filling in these gaps?

Thinking about this question I am often reminded of the Australian art critic Robert Hughes' excoriating critique in his book on Barcelona of the work that has been done to 'complete' Gaudí's vision for the still incomplete construction of the Sagrada Família. Hughes complains that modern materials and techniques,

especially poured concrete, have been used, thus making a mockery of Gaudí's artisanal vision of handcrafted stone blocks. Given that it has taken more than a century already to build, one might argue that the new processes are a blessing because they've probably shaven a century or more of the construction time (for comparison one may think here of the Cathedral of Milan which began construction in 1386 and was only completed in 1965). But, then again, perhaps shortcuts aren't necessary for something designed to be eternal – as Gaudí's himself said when people complained about the slow progress, 'my client isn't in a hurry'. This example only works, though, because it is an image of the exact opposite of how things should be approached: Deleuze and Guattari did not intend to build a cathedral, their work should not be treated as eternal, much less an orthodoxy, and their vision is best kept alive by recognizing that their intent was always to understand what is going on right now. This does not mean 'anything goes' and I have been sharply critical of what I see as the 'dumbing down' of Deleuze and Guattari's work, but it does mean we have to experiment with their ideas and pose new questions. And occasionally it may require reading their work 'against the grain', as Benjamin said, as I did by applying concepts from *A Thousand Plateaus* to Deleuze's work on cinema in order to 'read' the blockbuster films he ignored.

JANAE SHOLTZ
(Alvernia University)

The driving question of this collection, whether applied to desire, cinema, space, architecture, clutter, is “how does it work?” In these essays, Buchanan’s interest lies in applying D&G’s philosophy to practical problems, revealing the transformative capabilities of their ideas, and insisting upon schizoanalysis’ diagnostic and therapeutic power. For, if their concepts don’t help us make sense of the world, aren’t helpful in conducting more precise, informative social and cultural analyses, what are they for? I am interested in juxtaposing this pragmatic aim with the various resonances of the title of the book itself – schizoanalysis as an incomplete project. The title could indicate, of course, that Deleuze and Guattari’s work is unfinished, a fact that Buchanan readily acknowledges. As he says in the introduction, Deleuze and Guattari provide no model or programme for doing schizoanalysis. Completing schizoanalysis would be to provide such a methodology. But incompleteness could also indicate that schizoanalysis hasn’t done what it was supposed to do or been seen for its potential, at least, not yet. Buchanan is aware that the very idea of methodologizing Deleuze seems out of joint with prevailing commentary and anything goes interpretations – Deleuzianism as so many rhizomatic, liberated offshoots. In this respect, schizoanalysis as an incomplete project could be seen as a critique of Deleuze and Guattari Studies itself, which has veered away from the project of utilizing Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts to systematize or clarify towards esoteric fascination with a compendium of tantalizing concepts. We can also consider incompleteness, positively, as constitutive of schizoanalysis itself, its aspiration to permanent revolution or to perpetual liberation from the incessant reassertion of the status quo. As a cartographic practice, schizoanalysis provides a method that does not hypostasize into a model. These senses of incompleteness assert themselves throughout the book – previewing its aims and critiques. One of my first questions would be whether Ian views the state of Deleuze Studies any differently, now? Are there more (or any good) attempts to put Deleuze and Guattari to work, to utilize D/G to solve problems?

In Ch. 4, Buchanan indicates his intention to apply schizoanalysis even in places where Deleuze does not (to Deleuze’s own cinematic writings): ‘his [Deleuze’s] account of cinema ... is more a catalogue

of effects than a full-blooded explanation of how the cinematic machine works” (57). The price of Deleuze’s precision renders Deleuze’s treatment *incomplete*. Buchanan suggests that we should disregard Deleuze’s purist approach to film (to extract cinema’s concepts or those concepts that are unique to cinema alone) and incorporate questions of audience reception, technical development, industrial and commercial development - how film functions in and for society, or the *realpolitick* of film making. One can detect residues of his critique of Deleuze Studies as such here – that we have become so caught up in the beautiful dazzle of pure concepts, the swirling headiness of zones of indetermination and deterritorializations, that we neglect to bring them down to earth.

Buchanan’s third proposition of this chapter, that we need to read Deleuze in reverse, suggests that rather than identifying the exceptional moments in film, if we want to understand what film means or does, culturally speaking, we should be concerned with the unexceptional and with the ways that, by and large, cinema fails to meet this potential. Buchanan wants to return to the habitat, the practical realities of film making (what one might say makes film miss the fulfilment of its bare/pure potential) – the cultural and social milieu – thereby marrying this project with that of schizoanalysis. Buchanan’s desire to combine Deleuze’s projects in *Anti-Oedipus* and his work on cinema provides another clue as to what Buchanan thinks schizoanalysis can do – its ambition should be to engage with cinema (or any subject) as a whole. This sentiment is revisited with respect to literature in chapters 14 and 15, where he insists that Deleuze’s concept of life must be put back in context to its literary referent – the lesson of taking an author as a whole, not neglecting form (style) for content, is one that should be engineered as an overall analytic praxis.

What comes to my mind is a practical concern that motivates Buchanan – how does identifying the pure elements of cinema, the unique cinematic exceptions or works of genuine originality help us deal with the world – the world of clichés, the world that does not escape commodification, reproduction, mechanization, routine? If cinema is the production of desiring-machines, then the deliriums produced by so-called bad or popular films gives us just as much insight into the motivations, desires, and behaviors of society, if not more. Cinema is at once a locus of the innate tendency towards fascism (the power of the movement image and its common sense to sweep us into its common delirium) and the

potential to break free through moments of cinematic brilliance (towards the crystalline power of the time-image which allows the viewer to become a visionary – to move beyond toleration of the present). Towards the end of this chapter, Buchanan makes the bold claim: Philosophy has no higher calling (or other) than the identification of the intolerable (65) and, by extension, to make visible the inexplicable willingness on the part of many to put up with and indeed tolerate the intolerable. I like this; it provides explanation for the necessity of concept creation – Deleuze's definition of philosophy. If philosophy identifies the intolerable, it becomes incumbent to seek a path towards change. Paired with Ian's suggestion to reverse Deleuze with respect to his cinematic inquiry, it seems that insight into this issue happens through confrontation with the nullity in film, the irascible presence and even preference for the unoriginal, common, and commodified, and I wonder if this is really so - it may be that cinematic dress helps us understand cinema better but does it help us understand ourselves and our desires better in a way that actually transforms these rather than simply confirming them?

For me, the words “intolerable” and “inexplicable” are particularly poignant at this moment, particularly with respect to the frustratingly repetitious and horrific spate of mass shootings in the US and the recent edict of the Supreme Court, nullifying *Roe v. Wade*. There is nothing more intolerable than the senseless massacre of 19 children such as occurred at Robb Elementary in Uvalde, TX, and the refusal to deal with roots causes of the problem is inexplicable. Similarly, the stubborn insistence on the wholesale priority of the unborn over every concern or situation that the termination of pregnancy might involve – not to mention the implicit devaluing of all women qua persons for their instrumental status as mere conveyors of possible, future humans – is inexplicable – to many, at least – and intolerable, in that this policy means death, unequivocally, in many instances. My question is, how does schizoanalysis help us address these situations, rather than continue to go round and round with the same arguments, the same rebuttals, the same problems?

Buchanan's discussion of the nature of problems in chapter 6 is pertinent to this question. Deleuze calls the tendency to view problems as given and our task as that of merely responding to them infantile (an interesting take on the Kantian pronouncement of our self-imposed immaturity with respect to enlightenment),

leading us to assume the inviolability of the frame of reference to which the problem applies. Coupled with Deleuze's mantra that philosophy has the concepts it deserves according to how well it formulates its problems, we begin to see the golden road to revolution. Problems are not there, waiting to be solved, but must themselves be created, reworked, and reoriented. The issue would be then to cease formulating the problem of gun violence or anti-choice legislation in the same way.

What we know, and what schizoanalysis reveals, is that we must see how the bwo works first, then formulate problems from there. Like Ian's point about cinema, it's no use to address the ideal forms or pure concepts without recognizing that we must work backward from the bwo guiding and framing the desires that exist – that motivate the socius. When we focus on the singular aspects of the problem as given, we lose sight of the larger framing (i.e. ignore or mistake causation). In other words, when we circumscribe a problem and assume its parameters without question, we become blind to the question of the selective interests manifested in the problem. Ian's article about Occupy Wallstreet (ch. 8) is instructive, in that he identifies the crux of the problem – the political frameworks in place today are conceptually inadequate to deal with something like the Occupy movement.

What I glean from this is that the sources of Ian's insistence on the analytic, evaluative, and therapeutic aim of concepts like the bwo, rhizome, and assemblage, stems from this. These concepts indicate "a means of fabricating a mental position from which to view conditions of our everyday life as making sense" (197). He likens this organization/arrangement to subterranean pathways connecting our actions and invisibly determining our decisions – framing them. Cartography and the diagramming of relations of desire is necessary to change the frame, by identifying these contours. For instance, in chapter 13, he examines the internet as an incorporeal apparatus of capture, a plane of consistency that has transformed the meaning of body, place, community, observing that, insofar as we remain unaware of its existence, we do not have control over our lives (204). Isn't this essentially Heidegger's point about the deleterious effects of Enframing, as a means of gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man? Does this discussion of changing the frame catapult Deleuze back towards Heidegger? How are their concepts of frame different?

One difference is that Deleuze sees this transformation of frame happening at the level of desire. We should be trying to figure out those ideas and concepts that would cause the rearrangement of desire, leading to new patterns of action; Yet, if the organization of desire produces new intuitions and ideas, isn't this tautological– I would like to hear Ian's thoughts on this impasse.

Going back to Ian's characterization of the project of schizoanalysis with respect to what is revolutionary: we must respond at the level of unconscious organization of desire rather than ideology, which reflects a conscious investment of interest and is sustained by various affective allegiances. If affect is what motivates and sustains ideology, then we must ask how the affect is generated, requiring a deep dive into the cartography of desire, its organization. What is revolutionary is to change the organization in order to change the affect – in this case, the inexplicable affect of tolerance for the intolerable (being unaffected is an affective stance).

I believe that this is why Buchanan takes issue with the material/affective turn – the panacea of feeling/engendering compassion still leaves open the question of towards whom, for whom; compassion and affect must have a discriminate element, else it has no ethical direction. Yet, in chapter 6, Buchanan suggests that Deleuze's clinical model ultimately fails, in that it posits symptoms but cannot figure out how to solve the problem of causation (90) - another sense of "incomplete." I would like to hear more about this – how is it, or rather why is it that Deleuze and Guattari falter with respect to cause? Buchanan suggests that this is the unplumbed potential of schizoanalysis but only if mixed with something like Jameson's concept of historical context. It has never struck me that Deleuze was bereft of a concept of context (milieu, territory, strata), so this analysis of lack seems strange to me, especially if context is comprised of the intellectual currents as well as particular events (which seem present in D&G's references to incorporeal and corporeal ecologies). Does combining the clinical and the geophilosophical elements in D/G address this concern? Regardless, I do think that with respect to the issues raised above, if symptoms provide the cartography of desire/socius, this notion of history can be useful for discerning cause and would love to hear Ian address this.

Buchanan has several essays on the importance of art for Deleuze. In chapter 15, Buchanan wonders about the extent to

which Deleuze's concepts are influenced by or explained through percepts (225). His point is that many of the concepts, such as life or line of flight, are tethered to literary references and, moreover, for concepts to be more than empty formalisms, they must be animated by their non-philosophical outside. Ultimately, percepts and affects have a special manner of transforming concepts. My question is, if this is the case, what can art do to help us create these new framing concepts that are necessary if we want to change desiring production and thus the products of desire, i.e. the social body itself. The easy answer is that literature and art generate insights through percepts and affects that open us up to something new, but with respect to the intolerable and the inexplicable, how do percepts and affects not just as easily fall into reinforcing these?

My final question has to do with power – the power of ideology. Buchanan says that revolution must be organizational, not ideology – and with this, I agree, it is at the level of desire and understanding the arrangement of desire. But 'connecting the dots' (doing schizoanalytic cartography) that is required to recognize the perversion of desire is inhibited by ideology – which constitutes, to my mind, a refusal of thought. Does Deleuze (or Buchanan) give enough credit to the ideology and conscious investment of interest, especially when could with power – like the power to arrange a certain type of national pedagogy, the likes of which we are seeing in the U.S. with bans on certain types of theory, concepts, and ideas?

IAN BUCHANAN

I find it difficult to answer Sholtz's first question: I mean there are a great many attempts to mobilize Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalytic project, but I wouldn't want to say here which ones I think are good or bad. There are several reasons for this, but the most important to me is that I think it is important never to be simply dismissive of work, even work one disagrees with; so, as far as possible, I like to offer a considered argument for rejecting a piece of work and there isn't scope for that here.

I must admit that I find Sholtz's second question almost impossible to answer! How can schizoanalysis help us address complex social problems like gun violence in the US? I tend to think, paraphrasing Deleuze, if anyone knew the answer to that question

it would have happened already. Having said that, I agree with Guattari when he says that if the institutions needed to address such issues don't already exist, then we should invent them. It's worth noting in this regard that the only time the NRA has backed-pedaled on its absolutist position on private gun ownership was when the Black Panthers advocated for their members to carry weapons. I don't say this because I endorse any kind of an escalation in the potential for gun violence, because I sincerely do not hold that view, but because it shows that the only way to bring about progressive change is through the power of social movements. Feminism demonstrates the truth of this, as do the various Green movements. I think schizoanalysis can help with this by helping us to sort through the problem of competing demands and competing interests that threatens to disable every social movement at some point in its development.

Sholtz's next question is more technical, but not less difficult. She suggests that my way of defining the body without organs encompasses the same conceptual ground as Heidegger's Enframing, which in turn begs the question of whether it is possible to transform the frames of desire. I'll admit this question is perplexing (in a good way, I hasten to add, because it forces me to think!), but ultimately, I don't think I agree with its premise. I don't think the body without organs, or the abstract machine, or any of Deleuze and Guattari's other concepts, can usefully be equated with Enframing because to do so is to subvert their immanence. It may be that the Internet can be regarded in these terms, but my point was – but perhaps it wasn't clear – somewhat different: I wasn't approaching it as a piece of technology, or infrastructure, or apparatus, my interest was rather in the perceptions people have of it, which in turn shapes how it is regulated. One of the great scandals of our time, in my view, is the degree to which companies like Google, Meta, and so on, have been allowed to develop virtual monopolies on the gathering, storing, and distribution of information. It is my sense that this has been allowed to happen because the threat these corporations posed was kept carefully hidden from view behind such innocuous sounding functions as 'search engines', which make it sound like they're a free service.

In response to my claim that Deleuze's symptomatological approach ultimately fails because he could not solve the problem of causation, but that that failure can be attenuated by the combining it with Jameson's notion of history, Sholtz reminds me that Deleuze

and Guattari do not lack for concepts capable of bringing to bear historical context in the manner I say is lacking. She is of course correct in saying this and it is a reminder to me that one can never be too careful in formulating one's expressions. I was specifically referring to Deleuze's writing about literature, rather than his work as a whole. So, Sholtz's question of whether or not Deleuze and Guattari's later geophilosophical work answers this problem is one that I should have anticipated and addressed myself. In a certain sense the assemblage is designed to answer the question of causation, but as an answer to the question of causation it is always, and can only ever be tenuous, experimental, and speculative, because unlike Freud they are unwilling to postulate a universal framework that would enable them to determine causation as confidently as he does. It is for this reason that I have often said, in agreement with Jameson, that we should view Deleuze and Guattari's work as the elaboration of a new kind of hermeneutic – yet another incomplete project!

In answer to Sholtz's last two questions regarding whether or not art can help us to bring about meaningful social change in the face of the many powerful obstacles to thought contemporary society throws at us, I would simply say, as Deleuze does in the cinema books, that if it was easy to make people think it would have happened already. He argues that a certain kind of violence is needed in art in order to make us think – what he means by this isn't entirely clear to me. It is my sense that he isn't referring to 'shock' because as is well known 'shock' is subject to diminishing returns and soon ceases to be shocking at all. The outrage modernism once induced has long since dissipated and now it's seen as a set of basic design principles that can be incorporated into any work. Today hotel art is pointillist, or cubist, or impressionist, and whatever shock those styles once invoked is utterly gone. But while this proves that in a certain sense capitalism is capable of recuperating literally anything, by blunting its capacity to make us think, it is worth noting that Deleuze and Guattari reject this way of thinking. In this regard they are actually utopian thinkers, because they hold onto the transformative possibility of art even in the face of capitalism's proven powers of commodification. I don't think this answers the question, but I hope it shows that I think it is a vital question.