



# Two Modernisations: Widescreen Cinema, Film Art Discourses, and U.S. Aid in 1950s Taiwanese Film Culture\*

I-Lin Liu, Oregon State University 

This article examines the contradictions inherent in the modernization of the film industry through a case study of government-owned film studios in postwar Taiwan. Between 1955 and 1958, under the framework of economic aid, the U.S. government sought to modernize and restructure film studios owned by the ruling authoritarian Kuomintang (KMT, the Chinese Nationalist Party) party-state in Taiwan. Through grants and loans from the U.S. government, Taiwanese film studios were able to renovate outdated facilities, repair and acquire equipment, and send technicians to the United States and Japan to learn the latest filmmaking technologies. Yet Taiwanese film bureaucrats also resisted the more radical reform projects proposed by their U.S. counterparts.

Drawing on government archives, the first part of the article analyzes the emergence and eventual termination of the U.S. aid program. The second part further illustrates the dual dimensions of the modernization of the Taiwanese film industry: the pursuit of cutting-edge technologies—particularly widescreen formats—and the pursuit of film knowledge and theory. Through a close reading of film critic Bai Ke's formalist critiques of widescreen cinema written during this period, I demonstrate how these two aspects of modernization often stood in tension.

 ORCID

ILL 0009-0004-4159-7867

## Keywords

Modernization

Taiwanese film industry

U.S. economic aid

Widescreen cinema

Film knowledge

## Dates

Accepted: 23/07/2025

Published: 27/02/2026

## DOI

10.54103/2036-

461X/28883

© I-Lin Liu, 2026



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License

\* This article is adapted from a chapter of the author's doctoral dissertation completed at Indiana University Bloomington. I thank Professor Gregory Waller for his comments on an earlier draft. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Society for Cinema and Media Studies 2024 Annual Conference in Boston (March 16, 2024) and at the *Asian Cinemas Encounter the Cold War Conference* in Chapel Hill (March 29, 2025). I am grateful to the panelists and audiences at both conferences for their valuable feedback and questions. I thank Professor Sangjoon Lee for providing me with a copy of his article. I also thank the anonymous reviewers, whose inquiries and critiques helped refine this article.

I am grateful to the Chun and Jane Chiu Family Foundation for their support during the proofreading process. Some of the primary sources used in this article were made available with the assistance of the Stanford University East Asia Library, including support from a travel grant. The contents of this article were developed under grant #P015A220015/84.015A from the U.S. Department of Education. However, these contents do not necessarily represent the policy of the U.S. Department of Education, and you should not assume endorsement by the Federal Government.

In this essay, I analyse U.S. aid to the Taiwanese film industry in the 1950s to elucidate two primary aspects of modernisation: technology and knowledge. Like other industrial modernisation processes, the film industry's modernisation involved importing both filmmaking technologies and knowledge. Through the case of an emerging formalist critique of widescreen cinema led by critic-director Bai Ke, I will demonstrate that the relationship between new technologies and knowledge in the film industry can be contentious, if not contradictory.

To place these two modernisations within a concrete historical context, I examine the case of the Taiwanese film industry in the 1950s. After the Japanese Empire surrendered to the Allies on October 25, 1945, the Republic of China (ROC), ruled by the authoritarian Kuomintang party (KMT), became Taiwan's de facto ruler.<sup>1</sup> The corrupt and inept governance of the KMT in Taiwan led to the February 28 Incident in 1947, triggered by the police confiscating contraband cigarettes from a female vendor. This incident escalated into a political movement, demanding greater self-governance, which was violently suppressed by the state in March of that year. On May 19, 1949, the KMT government declared martial law, severely infringing on the human rights of the Taiwanese people. Initially hesitant to support the KMT, the U.S. government quickly incorporated Taiwan into its anti-communist network following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.

As the United States' new anti-communist ally, Taiwan received significant economic aid—about USD 100 million annually between 1951 and 1965 (Jacoby 1966, 32). The influx of material goods, equipment, and personnel helped to stabilise Taiwan's economy, laying the foundation for the island's so-called "modernisation". Between 1955 and 1958, an aid program for Taiwanese film studios began, with the U.S. government looking to restructure and modernise the film studios controlled by the KMT party-state (hereafter referred to as the party-state studios). U.S. grants and loans enabled Taiwanese studios to renovate outdated facilities, repair and acquire equipment, and send technicians to

---

<sup>1</sup> Ideologically, the postwar KMT party-state in Taiwan retained many of the ideas and values of the "conservative revolution" and "revolutionary nativism," as analysed by Brian Tsui (2018) and Maggie Clinton (2017). This set of ideas of radical conservatism was anti-communism and suspicious of liberal capitalism and aimed to renew Chinese culture through the intervention of a strong state. The term "party-state," or *dang guo* in Mandarin, refers to the political structure under KMT rule in Taiwan. During the martial law period, the KMT, led by Chiang Kai-shek and later his son Chiang Ching-kuo, held ultimate authority over all critical political decisions. Government agencies were required to meet regularly with party representatives to coordinate their tasks, effectively rendering the party and state inseparable (Xue, Yang, and Su 2015). For a classic analysis of the KMT party-state's operations, see Nai-teh Wu (1987). I use "authoritarianism" to describe the illiberal rule of the KMT party-state, which largely conforms to the definition offered by Juan J. Linz, who describes authoritarianism as "political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism: without elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilisation (except some points in their development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones" (Linz 1964, 297).

the United States and Japan to learn about the latest filmmaking technologies. However, a proposal for a second phase of U.S. aid to the film industry—albeit drafted by the Taiwanese studios—was never realised.

This period of Taiwanese film history clearly demonstrates that the party-state studios played an important role in developing Taiwanese film culture. While they were part of the propaganda machine,<sup>2</sup> they were also keen students of world cinema.<sup>3</sup> In addition to importing new filmmaking equipment, the party-state studios published magazines featuring essays on film art and theory.<sup>4</sup> To understand the development of film culture in Cold War Taiwan, it is essential to consider the triangular relationship involving the party-state and international film discourses, mediated through U.S. film culture, beyond the small group of cultural elites and their endeavour in critical writings and filmmaking.

This essay also contributes to the burgeoning scholarship on Asian cinema and the Cold War (Fu and Yip 2020; Fu 2023; Lee 2024; Lee and Espena 2024). Scholars have shown how the U.S. government's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) used a front organisation, The Asian Foundation (TAF), to support a regional film festival—The Southeast Asian Film Festival (successively called The Asian Film Festival), a Hong Kong-based film studio Asia Pictures, and the fledgling South Korean film industry (Lee 2017, 2020; Fu 2023; Leary 2012). Scholars have pointed out the important role United States Information Agency (USIA) and its South Korean United States Information Services (USIS) posts played in training South Korean filmmakers (Kim 2017). However, relatively little is known about the U.S. government's investment in local film industries during the 1950s through foreign aid programs operated jointly by the International Cooperation Administration (ICA),<sup>5</sup> Mutual Security Agency (MSA), Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), and Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA).<sup>6</sup>

---

**2** For a general account of Taiwanese film history see (Lu 1998). For analyses of Taiwan Film Studio as the state's propaganda machine see (Hong 2011, Chapter 1) and (Tsai 2018).

**3** The successes of Kurosawa Akira's *Rashomon* (1950) and other Japanese historical costume dramas at European film festivals inspired producers in Taiwan and Japan in the 1950s and 1960s. As *Rashomon* and other Japanese costume dramas contributed to the development of art cinema discourses, Taiwanese producers came to believe that costume dramas represented the kind of film that they should make, as they could showcase national aesthetics and culture while attracting international audiences. For an account of how Taiwan Film Studio imitated the *Rashomon* model and how its overseas distribution plan was frustrated by orientalism in the U.S. and European exhibition markets in the early 1960s, see (Liu 2024).

**4** *Central Film and Drama Weekly* [Zhongyang yingju zhoukan] featured Chinese film criticism as well as English works translated into Chinese, including theoretical writings. Taiwan Film Studio began publishing a journal, *Movie Arts and Techniques* [Dianying xuekan], in 1957; this journal also featured original and translated film criticism and theoretical writings. Taiwan Film Studio also translated and published selections from Paul Rotha's book *Documentary Film* (1959).

**5** ICA was established in 1955 and became the U.S. Agency of International Development (USAID) in 1961.

**6** For a summary of an USAID program for the Nigerian film industry during the 1960s, see (Stevens and Pett 1970).

For conciseness, I follow economist Neil H. Jacoby's usage and refer to all foreign aid-related agencies as "AID" (Jacoby 1966), and the film modernisation program it sponsored in the 1950s as the "AID film program". This essay operates within the field of cultural Cold War studies but shifts the focus from CIA and USIA to AID and the recipient countries of its development projects. By doing so, I aim to demonstrate the complexity of U.S. government's cultural Cold War strategies. Furthermore, this essay avoids a top-down narrative reliant on the coloniser-colonised schema to frame the relationship between the U.S. and Taiwanese governments. Instead, through an analysis of the Taiwan Film Studio archive (record group 076) at Taiwan Historica, I highlight negotiations between bureaucrats on both sides and tensions that emerged within the Taiwanese film industry during its modernisation.

Although the AID film program in Taiwan only ran from 1956 to 1958, party-state studios later proposed a second aid phase, outlining their vision for "modern cinema." Their proposals listed books, magazines, and films seen as essential for training filmmakers. While it's unclear how many of these resources were actually imported after losing U.S. funding, some had already circulated locally. Rather than unfulfilled promises, these proposals highlight the materials and ideas the studios valued in building a new Taiwanese cinema. They also reveal differing views on widescreen cinema—party-state officials embraced it as modern, while filmmakers influenced by Western theory often criticized its artistic impact.

## U.S. AID TO THE TAIWANESE FILM INDUSTRY

The first AID film program for the Taiwanese film industry was a three-year plan lasting from FY 1956 (July 1, 1955, to June 30, 1956) to FY 1958 (July 1, 1957, to June 30, 1958). To coordinate the party-state studios and mediate their relationship with U.S. bureaucrats, the Chinese Motion Picture Coordinating Committee (CMPCC) was established in 1955. Once this program came to an end, the Taiwanese party-state studios applied for another three-year plan covering FY 1960 to FY 1962,<sup>7</sup> but the proposed program never materialised, and the CMPCC was disbanded in 1959 (ZX 1959, 3).

Why did the United States take an interest in the Taiwanese film industry? According to a draft proposal prepared by Ralph L. Boyce,<sup>8</sup> American adviser to

---

**7** "Dianying zhipianchang 48 niandu haiwai dinggou qicai juan" [Film studio's overseas equipment procurement for fiscal year 48], 07600298, Taiwan Historica, 121–125.

**8** Ralph L. Boyce (1919–2002) was an army correspondent during World War II. After the war, he joined the staff of *Army Times*. In the 1950s, he first served as an information officer with the Marshall Plan before becoming a communication adviser to the governments of Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Vietnam. He later joined the United States Information Agency (USIA) to serve as an information officer in Pakistan

the CMPCC in 1955, the AID film program would enable the party-state studios to "obtain maximum utilisation of equipment and facilities"<sup>9</sup> and "raise the quality and quantity of motion picture production for educational and informational uses."<sup>10</sup> Taiwan's party-state studios were in need of foreign assistance because they could not keep up with the demand driven by the country's recent economic development. Boyce argued that the KMT government needed more films to train workers to keep up with the demand of the developing industrial sector as well as more propaganda films to show the world the economic progress that Taiwan, under the tutelage of the United States, had accomplished in the decade after the war.<sup>11</sup>

If TAF's goal was to foster an alliance of anticommunist film producers in the regions of East and Southeast Asia to contain communism, AID film program for Taiwan represented a different method to containment. AID officials in Taiwan were interested in increasing the productivity of the local film industry so that it could produce industrial and documentary films to train workers and promote postwar Taiwan's economic development abroad. In contrast, the earlier film projects associated with TAF during the 1950s were fiction films and literary adaptations (Lee 2017, 3 and 8; Leary 2012).<sup>12</sup> In the context of postwar East Asia, the AID film project in Taiwan, with its emphasis on nonfiction film, more closely resembled USIS-Korea's efforts to train South Korean filmmakers to produce propaganda films locally (Lee 2017, 10).

The goal of increasing the efficiency and productivity of the Taiwanese film industry was evident in two April 1955 reports made by Dana C. Rogers, a motion picture adviser associated with ICA. Rogers's reports were based on his survey of the five major film studios associated with the KMT party-state—the KMT party-owned Central Motion Picture Corporation (CMPC), the Taiwan provincial government's Taiwan Film Studio (TFS), the Ministry of Defence's China Film Studio (CFS), the Ministry of Education's Chunghwa Film Studio (ChFS), and the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction's film group (JCRR).

In "Existing Film Production Facilities in Taiwan and Plans for Future Expansion",<sup>13</sup> Rogers observed that all studios lacked functional equipment and infrastructure for modern operation. The most crucial problem was inadequate

---

and director of field activities in Japan. See "Ralph Boyce Sr. Dies", *Washington Post*, December 3, 2002, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2002/12/04/ralph-boyce-sr-dies/5f2c4f3f-53a9-45bd-b4a4-4d6199a6dcbd>.

**9** The copy of the proposal that I am examining here is from the Taiwan Film Studio files. See "Dianying shiye hezuo weiyuanhui (1)" [CMPCC (1)], 07600210, *Taiwan Historica*, 73-77). The proposal was sent to TFS director Long Fang on August 12, 1955.

**10** "Dianying shiye hezuo weiyuanhui (1)", 07600210, *Taiwan Historica*, 73.

**11** Ivi, 74.

**12** One of the earliest films produced by TAF was an adaptation of a play by Burmese Prime Minister U Nu—*The People Win Through* [Ludu Aung Than, 1953]. Asia Pictures, TAF's main collaborator in Hong Kong, began by producing feature films *Tradition* [Chuan tong, 1955] and *The Heroine* [Yang E, 1955]. See (Lee 2017, 3 and 8) for a description of these projects.

**13** "Dianying shiye hezuo weiyuanhui (2)" [CMPCC (2)], 07600209, *Taiwan Historica*, 89.

electricity infrastructure, with existing equipment needing extensive repairs. This resulted in the filmmaking conditions being sub-par.

Rogers reasoned that even with U.S. aid, individual studios couldn't maintain separate crews and facilities. He argued for integrating and restructuring party-state studios to avoid duplication, with each serving specific functions. CMPC, being best-equipped, would serve as the core. The U.S. would help acquire new equipment and train filmmakers.

Rogers proposed vertical integration of the diverse party-state studios into one coordinated entity handling production, distribution, and exhibition. TFS, ChFS, and CFS would primarily serve as distribution sites, with TFS distributing state documentaries whilst retaining 16mm nonfiction capability. Another distribution branch would operate through National Taiwan Normal University's audio-visual centre for educational films in Taipei. This centre would be in charge of the distribution of educational films and films made or commissioned by the Ministry of Education at both central and provincial levels. In contrast to the standard account of the AID film program for the Taiwanese film industry (Huang and Wang 2004, 122), Rogers's plan did not only focus on providing equipment to or training technicians for Taiwanese studios. It also restructured the party-state studios, assigning an "editor-writer" to oversee the "planning, budgeting, writing, and editing" of films for at least a year.<sup>14</sup> In "Plan for the Effective Use of Proposed Facilities", Rogers reasoned that, to more efficiently leverage the production ability of the Taiwanese party-state studios, the studios should be producing more films overall. Thus, "an Editor-Writer Technical Assistant [sic] should be recruited as soon as possible to help solve this problem".<sup>15</sup> While Rogers did not explicitly state that an American should fill this role, it was likely on his mind. In his plan, Rogers also suggested that the CMPCC hire experts in cinematography, audio recording, and post-production. Notably, Mandarin proficiency was specifically emphasised for the cinematography "technical assistant," as "photography is an art and needs an understanding, light values, etc. It can be taught any place but should be taught in one's own language. Therefore, it is felt that it is not advisable to bring a Technical Assistant from the United States for training."<sup>16</sup> Based on this logic, other "technical assistants" did not need to know Mandarin, meaning an American, a non-Chinese, or a non-Taiwanese individual could serve in these roles as technical directors.

In summary, Rogers's modernisation plan was more radical than implied by the standard account of the AID film program for the Taiwanese film industry. Rogers proposed the creation of a vertically integrated party-state studio,

---

**14** "Dianying shiye hezuo weiyuanhui (2)", 07600209, Taiwan Historica, 98.

**15** *Ibidem*.

**16** Ivi, 99. Why this exception? Conference minutes around this time suggest that Rogers and his US colleagues were trying to push Taiwanese government to hire veteran Chinese-American newsreel cinematographer H.S. "Newsreel" Wong ("Dianying shiye hezuo weiyuanhui (2)", 07600209, Taiwan Historica, 60.) Based on extant archival materials, Wong was never hired by CMPCC. The exact reasons for the failure of this plan could only be determined when more materials are available.

suggesting that the first task of the modernisation effort should be to hire an "editor-writer".<sup>17</sup> If this plan had gone through, it would have drastically altered the role of each party-state studio, and it would have likely put a non-KMT bureaucrat at the helm of film production of the party-state studios.

## KMT PARTY-STATE BUREAUCRATS' REACTION

Taiwanese bureaucrats from the party-state studios were not keen on the U.S. proposal for studio integration and the appointment of an "editor-writer" to lead the new unified studio's production. Taiwanese bureaucrats opposed the proposal for several reasons, the most significant of which was institutional tradition. They believed their studios served specific functions that could not so easily be dissolved into a new entity. The party-state studios discussed Rogers's integration plan during their inaugural meeting to coordinate the AID film program for the Taiwanese film industry on April 23, 1955.<sup>18</sup> Representatives from the Taiwan Provincial Government Information Office, the Ministry of Education's Science and Education Committee, and the Ministry of Defence expressed principal agreement with Rogers's plan but suggested that the technical details still required resolutions. However, the Ministry of Education's ChFS and the Ministry of Defence's CFS were sceptical. Ministry of Education representative Wang Xingzhou disagreed with moving the ChFS's films to the National Taiwan Normal University, advocating instead for the persistence of the status quo for all studios. CFS Director Zhang Jinde highlighted the CFS's role in producing films for the military and handling confidential materials, arguing that the CFS should remain as part of the Ministry of Defence. Rogers was deferential to Taiwanese bureaucrats, maintaining that his plan was a suggestion with the main goal being to establish a coordination unit among Taiwanese film studios for filmmaking activities. With these disagreements noted, Rogers's plan was approved in principle by the party-state studios.

The standoff between the ChFS, the CFS, and AID officials did not significantly improve by the time of the second meeting on April 27. The discussion focused on each studio's dark rooms and indoor sets, debating how many (if any) each studio could retain. The ChFS's representative continued to reject Rogers's plan, and the CFS Director insisted on keeping the studio as part of the Ministry of Defence with all of its facilities intact. The meeting resulted in an agreement that studios concerned about their "indoor sets" could retain them.<sup>19</sup> After a rocky start, the CMPCC was formally established on April 30, 1955 and managed by KMT bureaucrats, primarily—if not exclusively—of mainland Chinese background.

---

**17** This does not mean that Taiwanese filmmakers were not interested in content or subject matter. It is clear from Bai Ke's writings and the 1959 reading list that means of making better films (in terms of subject matter or content) was on filmmakers' minds.

**18** "Dianying shiye hezuo weiyuanhui (2)", 07600209, Taiwan Historica, 148.

**19** "Dianying shiye hezuo weiyuanhui (2)", 07600209, Taiwan Historica, 145.

After pushback, U.S. officials revised their plan. Whilst studios shared equipment more regularly under CMPCC, their fundamental structure remained unchanged, and Rogers's ambitious integration never came to fruition.<sup>20</sup>

## CMPCC: A COMPROMISE

The conflict between the party-state studios and AID officials strongly influenced the design of the CMPCC, creating a structure in which the committee would manage only exteriority (technology and equipment) rather than interiority (content and subject matter). The CMPCC's 31 May 1955 by-laws defined it as a "coordinating group of public and private motion picture production organisations," though no private companies ever joined.

The CMPCC's mission was to "provide the opportunity for coordination of technical and operational problems among member motion picture studios, [...]. It aimed to serve as a centralised, coordinated sponsor for applying for and utilizing technical and economic assistance for motion picture production facilities."<sup>21</sup> Its authority was limited to physical and technical capacities, not content, number, or type of films produced by members.

This structure embodies "Chinese Learning as Substance, Western Learning for Application," a 19th-century Qing slogan for modernisation. As Partha Chatterjee has shown, many non-Western intellectuals developed this sort of dualist way of thinking, as exemplified by the tenet that while the West had seemingly superior technology, that fact should not detract from, concern, or affect the more important spiritual aspect of "our" non-Western culture (Chatterjee 1993, 10). In postwar and quasi-postcolonial Taiwan, the CMPCC followed this arrangement, focusing on equipment and funding (exteriority) whilst avoiding film form or content (interiority).

The first phase ended in 1958, when, according to a newspaper article entitled "Inspecting AID Film Program" (*Lianhebao* 1959, 6), AID officials were dissatisfied with the program's outcomes, leading it to not pursue another aid program in the coming years. The officials' dissatisfaction stemmed from Taiwanese bureaucrats' rejection of Rogers's integration plan, shortcomings in the technician exchange program, and the misuse of newly acquired equipment by party-state studios. Instead of using new equipment to make "documentaries" (*jilupian*) as stipulated in the application, party-state studios rented it out to private film companies for profit, defying the aid program's intentions.

Despite these shortcomings, Taiwanese party-state studios were eager for another round of U.S. funding. In their proposals for a new three-year plan for FY 1960–1962, they expressed hope for continued support for equipment acquisition, technician training, infrastructure development, and establishing

---

**20** The U.S. aid was not a swift process. Even by May 1, 1956, a year after the CMPCC's founding, the three technical advisors had still not been sent to Taiwan. "Dianying shiye hezuo weiyuanhui (1)", 07600210, Taiwan Historica, 136, 140.

**21** "Dianying shiye hezuo weiyuanhui (2)", 07600209, Taiwan Historica, 118.

colour printing, film stock distribution, and research centres. The goal, at least rhetorically, was to create a “modern and perfect” film production environment, enabling party-state studios to produce higher-quality films, enter the international film market, and propagate the official message of “Free China” more effectively.<sup>22</sup>

## WIDESCREEN CINEMA AND FILM KNOWLEDGE IN THE AID FILM PROGRAM PROPOSALS

Two things stood out in the proposals for a second phase of AID film program for the Taiwanese film industry: the party-state studios’ interests in acquiring widescreen cinema and film knowledge. A year prior to the establishment of the CMPCC, Taiwanese film culture was enveloped by the craze of widescreen cinema.<sup>23</sup> During the first week of November 1954, two theatres in Taipei showcased CinemaScope films—*The Robe* (Henry Koster, 1953) and *Knights of the Round Table* (Richard Thorpe, 1953). Private-sector film production companies were eager to acquire the new screen technology. Veteran Taiwanese film director He Jiming visited Japan on March 1, 1958, to learn about the latest widescreen technologies and colour cinematography and to explore co-production opportunities with major Japanese studios. He embarked on this business trip with the hopes of bringing Taiwanese-language films into “the stage of colour and widescreen cinema” (ZX 1958, 3).

After his trip to Japan, He Jiming and his brother He Lingming immediately put the newly bought widescreen lens to use. Hua Xing’s first widescreen film was a comedy set in contemporary Taiwan. The film was *Gutless Hero* (1958), advertised as the first Taiwanese-language widescreen film. The choice to make a comedy was a deliberate departure from the typical Taiwanese-language fare of murder mysteries and tragedies (MR 1958, 8). *Gutless Hero* was promoted as a “modern” film: it was about “modern” men and women’s love stories and exposed contradictions within “feudal” (*feng jian*) modes of thinking. The cutting-edge widescreen cinema thus became a suitable medium for telling this “modern” story.<sup>24</sup> Namhee Han (2014, 9) has argued that the widescreen cinema was a concrete visual form to express “both desire and

---

**22** “Dianying zhipianchang 48 niandu haiwai dinggou qicai juan”, 07600298, Taiwan Historica, 122.

**23** For the broader history of widescreen cinema see (Belton 1992; Belton, Hall, and Neale 2010). For a history of widescreen cinema in Japan and South Korea see (Han 2014).

**24** This approach to widescreen also makes widescreen cinema as another form of vernacular modernism, that is a discursive field in which experiences of modernity are articulated and debated. Miriam Hansen, “The Mass Production of the Senses: Classical Cinema as Vernacular Modernism,” *Modernism/Modernity* 6, no. 2 (1999); Miriam Hansen, “Vernacular Modernism: Tracking Cinema on a Global Scale,” in *World Cinemas, Transnational Perspectives*, ed. Durovicová and Newman (Routledge, 2010).

scepticism toward postwar modernity and modernisation" in Japan and South Korea. Looked at this way, *Gutless Hero* and its widescreen imagery can also be read as an expression of and a tool for promoting modernity.

Party-state studios viewed widescreen cinema as modern cinema's crown jewel. For instance, in the CFS's proposal for a new three-year phase of AID film program, a major stated goal was to obtain widescreen technology and the capability to independently produce widescreen films by the end of the new phase. The CFS claimed it needed another round of U.S. funding and technical assistance to catch up with the "advanced Euro-American film industry",<sup>25</sup> and produce widescreen films for military entertainment and education.

Beyond technology, studios sought books and films for filmmaker training. This desire for film knowledge was most evident in the Educational Film Studio's (EFS's) "Three-Year Expansion Plan of Educational Film Studio National Academy of Arts and Crafts".<sup>26</sup> The EFS was the studio in which film students at the National Academy of Arts and Crafts (NAAC), an art college established in 1955, engaged in practical training. This studio was also in charge of producing "educational films" and "documentary films". In its proposal, the EFS stated that it needed to modernise and catch up to the "current international standard", as the Chinese Communist Party was aggressive in exporting feature and "cultural films" to Southeast Asia.<sup>27</sup>

In its plan, the EFS outlined the qualities of the ideal filmmakers it sought to train—those who should understand "why they should do this," "why this equipment performs like this," and "why [EFS] makes films." An ideal filmmaker should have knowledge of social psychology and mass communication theory to understand "the role of motion picture as a medium of mass communication". A "reference library" would "consist of important literature and films published and produced domestically and internationally".<sup>28</sup>

The library lists were impressive.<sup>29</sup> The book list featured over 200 items classified into 20 categories: acting, aesthetics, biographies and autobiographies, censorship and propaganda, criticism, directories, bibliographies, annuals, economics, education, history of movies, music, novels of Hollywood and other film centres, technical handbooks, photo plays, sociological aspects of films, special films, technique, television, writing, periodicals, and technical manuals. The film list contained 147 items across five categories: film classics, important documentaries, experimental films, films on photography, and miscellaneous.

---

**25** "Dianying zhipianchang 48 niandu haiwai dinggou qicai juan", 07600298, Taiwan Historica, 123.

**26** The document is written in English. The plan had a starting date of March 1959; thus, it may have been drafted in late 1958 or early 1959 ("Dianying zhipianchang 48 niandu haiwai dinggou qicai juan", 07600298, Taiwan Historica, 137).

**27** "Dianying zhipianchang 48 niandu haiwai dinggou qicai juan", 07600298, Taiwan Historica, 137.

**28** Ivi, 134.

**29** Ivi, 146–158.

The lists reflected the development of Western film studies at the time.<sup>30</sup> The reading list comprised books and journals dating back to the interwar period produced by liberal institutions that pertained to matters of cinema and mass society. It included UNESCO publications by scholars associated with the Payne Fund studies, such as Edgar Dale's *How to Appreciate Motion Pictures* (1933). The list also included classic film theory and criticism books by Eisenstein, Kracauer, Sadoul, Rotha, and Pudovkin, as well as names that have been largely forgotten by today's film studies syllabi, such as Raymond Spottiswoode. Important magazines included *American Cinematographer*, *The Living Cinema*, *The Screen Writers*, *Cahiers du Cinéma*, *Film Culture*, *Films in Review*, *Educational Screen*, *Journal of University Film Producers Association*, and *Sight and Sound*. The range covered by the film list was also wide, featuring film classics alongside instructional films on filmmaking. Griffith's *The Birth of a Nation* (1915) and *Intolerance* (1916), neorealist films, Kurosawa's *Rashomon* (1950), and teaching films like *Film Problems* (1958), created by Indiana University, were all on the list.

Though the second programme never materialised, these lists showcase the writing and film Taiwanese bureaucrats deemed crucial for industry development and modern filmmaker training. Some titles already circulated in Taiwanese film discourse, influencing how Taiwanese filmmakers theorised the cinematic medium. A case in point is Raymond Spottiswoode's *Film and Its Techniques* (1951), labelled as item 146 in the reading list. By 1955, the CMPC's newsletter *Central Film and Drama Weekly* [Zhongyang yingju zhoukan] had already begun printing translations of chapters from *Film and Its Techniques*. According to the translator's preface, Spottiswoode's book was chosen because it was a textbook used by the film program at "the University of California" (CFDW 1955, 2). Spottiswoode's *A Grammar of the Film*, first published in 1935 and reissued in 1950 (Spottiswoode 1935, 1950), was translated and later adapted into a book by leftist film critic and director Chen Liting in 1930s and 1940s China (L. Chen 1941).<sup>31</sup> Chen's book *Dianying guifan*—also titled "A Grammar of the Film" in English—included translated passages from Spottiswoode's original work, especially the segments on montage, alongside Chen's own theorisation of the cinematic medium.

In particular, Spottiswoode's work and Chen's reworking of it shaped filmmaker/film critic Bai Ke's thinking about the cinematic medium and helped him to develop a formalist critique of widescreen cinema, the acme of the party-state studios' modernisation plan.

---

**30** For an important review of the development of film studies in the West, see (Grieverson and Wasson 2008).

**31** Spottiswoode's *A Grammar of the Film* was reissued by the University of California Press in 1950 (Spottiswoode 1950).

## BAI KE'S FORMALIST CRITIQUE OF WIDESCREEN CINEMA

Bai was not only a successful commercial filmmaker but also an early film theorist and educator in postwar Taiwan.<sup>32</sup> Born in 1913, Bai Ke was originally from Southern China and attended college in Xiamen. In his youth, he participated in several leftist student groups, a factor that led to his incarceration and eventual execution by the KMT party-state in 1964. From 1936 to 1938, Bai initially worked in film studios associated with the KMT and later at Diantong, a film studio established by artists and technicians affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (Xie 2022, 269). When World War II ended—perhaps due to his film industry experience and his ability to speak Hokkien, a language popular in Southern China and Taiwan—Bai became the first administrative director of the TFS.<sup>33</sup> In addition to filmmaking, he wrote film reviews and theoretical essays on cinema. On top of all that, he taught filmmaking at the Political Warfare College (PWC), a military institution focused on psychological warfare, and the newly established cinema department at NAAC beginning in 1957 (Xie 2022, 271–272).

Close attention to Bai's engagement with Western film theories and his conceptualisation of the cinematic medium can deepen our understanding of the reception and development of film theory and knowledge in postwar East Asia and point to a transnational and translational networks consisted of British and Chinese film theorists. This, in turn, sheds light on what Aaron Gerow describes as "the complexities of living theory (*riron ni ikiru*) within modernity and the global and local struggles over cinema" (Gerow 2010, 11). Bai's career and theorisation efforts also reveal that the authoritarian KMT's filmmaking apparatus was more complex than a homogenous propaganda machine. Bai's close connection with the party-state's film institutions—Taiwan Film Studio and NAAC—alongside his critique of mainstream Chinese-language cinema highlight the complicated and heterogenous nature of postwar Taiwanese state-run filmmaking and film culture, both of which were tightly controlled by the KMT regime.

Bai outlined his film theory and critique of widescreen cinema in *On Film Directing* [Dianying daoyan lun], which collected his critical essays published over the course of the previous decade. The book, published in 1961, was used as teaching material in Bai's film classes at NAAC and PWC.

*On Film Directing* was influenced by Raymond Spottiswoode's *A Grammar of the Film* (along with Chen's adaptation and translation though Bai didn't disclose this in the preface to the book) and *Film and Its Technique*, as well as Don Livingston's *Film and the Director* (Bai 1961, 1; Spottiswoode 1950, 1951;

---

**32** Bai's film *Longshangsi zi lian* [Romance at Long Shan Temple] was the fourth highest-grossing film in Taipei in September 1962. Its box office revenue that month in Taipei was NTD\$ 279,854, ranking behind two Japanese films—Inoue Umetsugu's *Nocturne of a Woman* (*Onna wa yoru keshō suru*, 1961) and Watanabe Kunio's *365 Nights* (*Sanbyaku rokujū go ya*, 1962) and one American film, Roger Corman's *The Pit and the Pendulum* (1961). For the box office information, see (XH 1962, 3).

**33** "Bai Ke," 129-090000-4990, Academia Historica.

Livingston 1953; Chen 1941). Monographs by Spottiswoode and Livingston were included in the reading list from the EFS's proposal for another round of AID film program. Since that list represented for Taiwanese film bureaucrats a blueprint with which to train modern filmmakers, I propose that Bai Ke's film theory be viewed as an intellectual product that the second round of AID film program for the Taiwanese film industry—had it been approved and implemented—may have produced. The point I am making here is not that Bai Ke's film theory is a necessary outcome of the second round of the AID film program, but to highlight the complexity and possible contradiction within the film modernisation project as exemplified by the EFS's reading and viewing lists.

In using today's theoretical language to describe Bai Ke's theory of film, Bai would be categorised as a formalist, since he believed that the essence of cinema lay in its ability to manipulate reality.<sup>34</sup> Film becomes art by transcending recording function. Bai argued that new advances in film technology, such as widescreen cinema, focused on reproducing reality as faithfully as possible. For Bai, film was a medium for self-expression, so fetishising technology would only hinder cinema's true function.<sup>35</sup>

Bai's criticism of widescreen cinema is most strongly expressed in "On the Formal Problem of Film Screen", and it is here that Spottiswoode's influence is most clearly felt. Bai's essay was partially based on the "Delimitation of the Screen" and "Square and Expanding Screens" sections in Spottiswoode's *A Grammar of the Film* (1950, 141-146). In these sections, Spottiswoode discussed Eisenstein's essay on the square screen, "The Dynamic Square" (Eisenstein 1996 [1930]), and criticised the widescreen experiment prevalent at the time: Magnascope.<sup>36</sup>

Bai adapted many themes from Spottiswoode's book but developed his own idiosyncratic critique of the widescreen format. Bai first posited that a movie screen and projected images were necessary conditions for cinema to be classified an art form, as they enabled cinema to transcend still photography (Bai 1961, 22-23). By projecting natural phenomena and human figures on screen in an "exaggerated" [*kuada*] manner and constantly forming and reforming images of actions within the frame, cinema could become art.

Since the screen defines cinema as art, the shape of the screen represents a crucial aesthetic problem for critics and filmmakers. Bai noted that the problem of screen shape became crucial once Hollywood launched the widescreen format to lure audiences back to the theatres in the 1950s. Bai believed that this shift toward widescreen cinema was detrimental to film art, as the format violated the rule of the "golden ratio". Bai claimed that the golden ratio was

---

**34** Dudley Andrew calls this tradition "formative," which believes that cinema is an art because "it changed the chaos and meaninglessness of the world into a self-sustaining structure and rhythm." (Andrew 1976, 11).

**35** This view is most clearly expressed in Bai (1954) which became the first chapter of *On Film Directing*.

**36** Developed in the 1920s, Magnascope is a zoom lens used during screening. When cued, the film is switched to a projector with a Magnascope to enlarge the screen image. See Maltin (2025).

the reason why the ratio (length to width) of a 35mm film was (or was close to) 1.618:1 (Bai 1961, 25). He believed that the academy format—with an aspect ratio of 1.375:1—was superior to the widescreen format because the former's rectangular shape could provide dynamism by "incorporating variation within the order". Human psychology, according to this reasoning, preferred this dynamism to the stage-like presentation of CinemaScope or VistaVision (Bai 1961, 26). Furthermore, Bai critiqued Eisenstein's proposal of a "square screen" on the grounds that it deviated too far from human psychology (Bai 1961, 24).

Bai's reasoning is obviously flawed. For one, the academy ratio is not a golden ratio. Second, the golden ratio reasoning is criticised by Eisenstein in his "Dynamic Square" essay, which is summarised by Spottiswoode (1950, 144). In fact, Bai repeated Eisenstein's precise critique that the supporters of the golden ratio in cinema often argued that a golden-ratioed rectangle is a "dynamic symmetry"—a geometrical shape that has a sense of movement built into it. Eisenstein argued that "cinema as a whole" consisted of camera movement and montage, which already imbued a sense of movement in films. Hence, cinema didn't need to rely on the golden ratio to provide a sense of movement (Eisenstein 1996 [1930], 213-214).

While Bai's theory falls short, he nevertheless attempted to develop a film theory based on a universal understanding of human psychology ("golden ratio will be agreeable to all human beings") and formalist aesthetics (artworks do not reflect but rearrange reality). With this theory, he debated established film theorists and launched a critique of widescreen cinema. Bai's theorisation was made possible partly by studying Spottiswoode's, Chen's, and, perhaps indirectly, Eisenstein's works—all listed as essential reading for the training of modern filmmakers in the proposal for the second phase of the AID film program.

Bai's theory of the antagonistic relationship between film technology and film art may be read as an expression of the tension within the modernisation project carried out by the party-state studios in 1950s Taiwan. Modernisation entailed the importation of new equipment as well as new discourses of film knowledge and art cinema. However, as Bai's writings reveal, these two aspects were not necessarily harmonious; in fact, they represented two sides of what was often a contentious relationship.

## CONCLUSION

By analysing governmental archives, I have painted a more nuanced picture of the modernisation of the 1950s Taiwanese film industry. In contrast to earlier scholarship, I have demonstrated that the AID film program for the Taiwanese film industry was more radical than previously assumed. Had Rogers's plan been implemented, the Taiwanese party-state studios would have been vertically integrated and possibly led, at least temporarily, by someone with little connection to the KMT. This essay reconstructs the negotiation between U.S. AID officials and KMT bureaucrats, thereby avoiding a simplistic top-down, coloniser-colonised framework for understanding this history. Furthermore, I do not treat moderni-

sation as a monolithic process. Instead, I explore the contradictions within the modernisation plan and present a scenario where new film knowledge sparked a critique of the desire to acquire new film technologies.

Situating this case study within the larger scholarship on the cultural Cold War in East Asian cinema, I propose that the AID film program for Taiwanese party-state studios illustrates another facet of the U.S. government's cultural Cold War strategies. Recent scholarship tends to focus on the CIA-funded organisation—The Asian Foundation (TAF)—and its collaboration with different charismatic figures in the film industries in the region. These “anticommunist entrepreneurs” shared an anti-communist ideology with the U.S. government, yet they also had their own motives and often mobilised resource from the United States to advance their own goals (Iber 2013, 169; Fu 2023, 86). These idiosyncratic characters included Chang Kuo-sin of Asia Pictures in Hong Kong, Nagata Masaichi of Daiei Film in Japan, among others. U.S. government agencies did not always select their local film collaborators based on their experiences in the industry. The case in point is Chang Kuo-sin. A bilingual reporter and a staunch anticommunist, Chang had a vision for the film studio he wanted to establish but lacked practical experiences. Chang's failed efforts to establish his Asia Pictures as a strong competitor against the People's Republic of China-backed Great Wall Movie Enterprise in Hong Kong caused TAF to withdraw its support for the Asia Pictures. Po-shek Fu notices the peculiar aspect of this collaboration between TAF and Chang, who lacked any real experiences in the film industry. Fu asks: how could TAF believe that Chang could shoulder the responsibility of setting up a film studio and produce quality anticommunist films for the overseas Chinese audiences? Fu reasons that this shows TAF's “inconsistent and unrealistic in its dealing with Asia Pictures,” which might be reflective of “larger US policy toward China and Asia in the twentieth century” (Fu 2023, 107). The case of the AID film program for the KMT party-state studios in Taiwan demonstrates that the U.S. government, as a complex entity, could have agencies devising different and even conflicting plans to fulfil abstract policy and ideological goals. If in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, TAF and the CIA believed it was more effective to set up a pro-US film studio to serve their objectives, then in Taiwan, at least during the 1950s, AID officials saw the integration of the party-state studios and the increased production of nonfiction films as more efficient means of containing the spread of communism. Furthermore, as I document, the AID bureaucrats had their rationale and basic understanding of the local industry based on some empirical research when they suggested the integration plan of all party-state studios. Their plan was thwarted not necessarily because it was “unrealistic”, but because they failed to anticipate and, perhaps were unwilling to confront, the pushback from the KMT party-state bureaucrats. These bureaucrats were not “entrepreneurs” like Chang, yet they had their own reasons and logic for managing their posts, which did not necessarily align with the plans outlined by their U.S. counterparts.

This case study also highlights the importance of archival research in achieving the goal of “de-Cold War”—overcoming a Manichean understanding of the world (K.-h. Chen 2010, Chapter 3). Regarding Cold War-era Taiwan and its relationship with the United States, scholars have long argued that the KMT was com-

plicit in the U.S. anti-communist network. Scholars stressed that the U.S. empire recruited this repressive authoritarian regime into its economic system, fostering a booming—but heavily dependent—economy (Y.-H. Chen 1981). While there is some truth to this claim, the historical relationship between the United States, the KMT party-state, and Taiwanese cineastes is far more complex. Responding to Shu-mei Shih's call for a more sophisticated understanding of Americanism (2024), this essay showcases the agency of local actors by illustrating how KMT bureaucrats resisted the top-down plans of U.S. AID officials. Furthermore, this essay provides a more intricate understanding of modernisation (Cooper 2005, 149). By examining how international discourses on film knowledge and film art enabled a critique of widescreen cinema—the ultimate goal of film industry modernisation in Taiwan—this essay demonstrates that modernisation is not solely about technological advancement but also encompasses the potential for critiquing modernisation itself.

# REFERENCE LIST

- Andrew, Dudley. 1976. *The Major Film Theories: An Introduction*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Bai, Ke. 1954. "Lun dianying jishu yu yishu de duili tongyi." [On the dialectical unity of technology and art in film]. *New Century* 1(1): 30-32.
- Bai, Ke. 1961. *Dianying daoyan lun* [On film directing]. Taipei: Liangyu.
- Belton, John. 1992. *Widescreen Cinema*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press Cambridge, Mass.
- Belton, John, Sheldon Hall, and Stephen Neale, eds. 2010. *Widescreen Worldwide*. New Barnet, UK: John Libbey.
- CFDW. 1955. *Central Film and Drama Weekly*, November 20, 1955 (translated by Li Xixian).
- Chatterjee, Partha. 1993. *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Chen, Kuan-hsing. 2010. *Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialisation*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Chen, Liting. 1941. *Dianying guifan* [A grammar of the film]. Chongqing: Zhongguo Dianying Zhipianchang.
- Chen, Yu-Hsi. 1981. "Dependent Development and Its Sociopolitical Consequences: a Case Study of Taiwan." Ph.D. diss., University of Hawai'i at Manoa.
- Clinton, Maggie. 2017. *Revolutionary Nativism: Fascism and Culture in China, 1925-1937*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Cooper, Frederick. 2005. *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Dale, Edgar. 1933. *How To Appreciate Motion Pictures: A Manual of Motion-Picture Criticism Prepared for High-School Students*. New York: Macmillan Company.
- Eisenstein, S. M. 1996 [1930]. "The Dynamic Square." In *Sergei Eisenstein, Selected Writings, 1922-1934*, edited by Richard Taylor, 206-218. London: British Film Institute.
- Fu, Poshek. 2023. *Hong Kong Media and Asia's Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fu, Poshek, and Man-fung Yip, eds. 2020 *The Cold War and Asian Cinemas*. New York: Routledge.
- Gerow, Aaron. 2010. "Introduction: The Theory Complex." *Review of Japanese Culture and Society* 22: 1-13.
- Grieverson, Lee, and Haidee Wasson, eds. 2008. *Inventing Film Studies*. Durham: Duke University Press.

- Han, Namhee. 2014. "Technologies of Anamorphic Vision: Widescreen Cinema and Postwar Modernity in Japan and South Korea." Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago.
- Hansen, Miriam. 1999. "The Mass Production of the Senses: Classical Cinema as Vernacular Modernism." *Modernism/Modernity* 6(2): 59–71.
- Hansen, Miriam. 2010. "Vernacular Modernism: Tracking Cinema on a Global Scale." In *World Cinemas, Transnational Perspectives*, edited by Natasa Durovicová and Kathleen E. Newman. London: Routledge.
- Hong, Guo-juin. 2011. *Taiwan Cinema: A Contested Nation on Screen*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Huang, Ren, and Wei Wang. 2004. *Taiwan dianying bainian shihua*. [One hundred years of Taiwan cinema]. 2 vols. Vol. 1, Taipei: Chinese Film Critics' Association.
- Iber, Patrick. 2013. "Anti-Communist Entrepreneurs and the Origins of the Cultural Cold War in Latin America." In *De-Centering Cold War History: Local and Global Changes*, edited by Jadwiger Mooney and Fabio Lanza, 167–186. New York: Routledge.
- Jacoby, Neil H. 1966. *U.S. Aid to Taiwan: a Study of Foreign Aid, Self-Help, and Development*. New York: Praeger.
- Kim, Han Sang. 2017. "Film Auteurism as a Cold War Governmentality: Alternative Knowledge and the Formation of Liberal Subjectivity." *Journal of Korean Studies* 22(2): 317–42.
- Leary, Charles. 2012. "The Most Careful Arrangements for a Careful Fiction: A Short History of Asia Pictures." *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 13(4): 548–558.
- Lee, Sangjoon. 2017. "Creating an Anti-Communist Motion Picture Producers' Network in Asia: The Asia Foundation, Asia Pictures, and the Korean Motion Picture Cultural Association." *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 37(3): 517–38.
- Lee, Sangjoon. 2020. *Cinema and the Cultural Cold War: US Diplomacy and the Origins of the Asian Cinema Network*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Lee, Sangjoon. 2024. "Shin Films Presents: The 'Korean-Style' Studio System and The Modernisation of the Film Industry in South Korea, 1952–1975." *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 44(2): 341–363.
- Lee, Sangjoon, and Darlene Espena, eds. 2024. *Remapping the Cold War in Asian Cinemas*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Lianhebao*. 1959. "Inspecting AID Film Program" *Lianhebao* [United Daily News], June 29, 1959.
- Linz, Juan J. 1964. "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain." *Transactions of the Westermarck Society* 10: 291–341.
- Liu, I-Lin. 2024. "Wufeng: Taiwan dianying zhipianchang de xiandai dianying zhuixun." [No Greater Love, or Wu Feng (1962): Taiwan Film Studio's search for "modern cinema"]. *Taiwan Historical Research* 31(2): 87–133.

- Livingston, Donald L. 1953. *Film and the Director*. New York: Capricorn Books.
- Lu, Fei-i. 1998. *Taiwan dianying: Zhengzhi, jingji, meixue, 1949-1994*. [Taiwan cinema: politics, economy, aesthetics, 1949-1994]. Taipei: Yuanliu.
- Maltin, Leonard. 2025. "Bored with 70mm? Try Magnascope!", *Leonard Maltin*, accessed June 27, 2025, <https://leonardmaltin.com/bored-with-70mm-try-magnascope/>
- MR. 1958. Wo dao yan *Wu Dan Ying Xiong*" [How I directed *Gutless Hero*], *Minsheng Ribao*, October 25, 1958.
- Rotha, Paul. 1959. *Zenyang zhizuo jilupian*. [How to make documentary]. Translated by Zhai Guojin. Taichung: Taiwan Film Studio.
- Shih, Shu-mei. 2024. "Conditions of Theory in Taiwan: Americanism and Settler Colonialism." In *Sinophone Studies Across Disciplines*, edited by Chiang Howard and Shih Shu-mei, 243-262. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Spottiswoode, Raymond. 1935. *A Grammar of the Film*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Spottiswoode, Raymond. 1950. *A Grammar of the Film*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Spottiswoode, Raymond. 1951. *Film and its Techniques*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Stevens, Warren D., and Dennis W. Pett. 1970. "Nigeria's USAID/Indiana University Communications Project." *Journal of the University Film Association* 22(4):122-29.
- Tsai, Lin-chin. 2018. "Mapping Formosa: Settler Colonial Cartography in Taiwan Cinema in the 1950s." *Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies* 44(2): 19-50.
- Tsui, Brian. 2018. *China's Conservative Revolution: The Quest for a New Order, 1927-1949*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Wu, Nai-Teh. 1987. "The Politics of a Regime Patronage System: Mobilisation and Control in an Authoritarian Regime." Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago.
- XH. 1962. "Taibei shi jiuyuefen dianying piaofang jilu" [Box office report in Taipei, September], *Xiyuan Huixun* [Theater bulletin] 30, October 10, 1962.
- Xie, Minqi. 2022. "Bai ke ji longshan si zhi lian yanjiu." [Bai Ke and the study of romance at Lung Shan Temple]. Master thesis, Institute of Art Studies, National Cheng Kung University.
- Xue, Huayuan, Xiuqing Yang, and Ruiqiang Su. 2015. *Zhan hou Taiwan ren quan fa zhan shi, 1945-2000*. [The history of human rights in post-war Taiwan, 1945-2000]. New Taipei City: Daoxiang.
- ZX. 1958. "He Jiming Visited Japan Today", *Zhengxin Xinwen* [Investigative News], March 1, 1958.
- ZX. 1959. "The U.S. Aid Film Program Will Be Taken Over by the GIO", *Zhengxin Xinwen* [Investigative News], June 27, 1959.