

# SUPPORTING SPORTING INTEGRITY - THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE DATABASE ON ALLEGED CASES OF CORRUPTION IN SPORT

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**Titolo:** Sostenere l'integrità sportiva - il database del Consiglio d'Europa su presunti casi di corruzione nello sport

## Abstract

The paper addresses the issue of corruption in sports, focusing on the Council of Europe's initiative to establish a Database on Alleged Cases of Corruption in Sport. It illustrates the methodology used in constructing the Database and it shows some cases of corruption – occurred between 2016 and 2021 - included in the Database.

**Keywords:** corruption; sport; integrity; economic crime; organized crime.

L'articolo affronta il tema della corruzione nello sport, presentando il *Database on Alleged Cases of Corruption in Sport* promosso dal Consiglio d'Europa. Il contributo, oltre a illustrare la metodologia utilizzata nell'elaborazione del database, ricostruisce alcuni casi di corruzione – avvenuti tra il 2016 e 2021 – presenti nel Database.

**Parole chiave:** corruzione; sport; integrità; criminalità economica; criminalità organizzata.

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## 1. Introduction

Since the late 1990s, we have cyclically witnessed events that cast doubt on the clean image of sports and the values of fair play and sportsmanship it aims to convey. These events have a direct and indirect impact on sports results. Consider, for instance, the doping scandals that have affected cycling and the Tour de France, leading to the establishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency in 1999<sup>1</sup>, followed by other doping scandals not limited to cycling. Beyond the cyclist Lance Armstrong<sup>2</sup>, the most striking case involved the Moscow laboratory and its director, Gregory Rodchenkov (now an informant under the FBI witness protection program), and allegations of systematic manipulation of anti-doping tests by the Russian authorities<sup>3</sup>.

However, it is not only on-field incidents that are of interest to those investigating deviance in sports. The management of international federations and sports associations has often been the subject of investigations and scandals related to corruption and embezzlement of funds. One notable case is the FIFA scandal of 2015, where arrests were made in Zurich by the Swiss Federal Police, acting under the mandate of the U.S. Department of Justice. The scandal involved allegations of bribery, fraud, and money laundering concerning the allocation of media and marketing rights for FIFA events in the Americas<sup>4</sup>. This incident occurred after previous allegations of systematic corruption during the bidding process for hosting the FIFA World Cup, particularly concerning the 2022 edition held in Qatar<sup>5</sup>.

In this extensive list of scandals, we should not overlook those involving the allocation of the Olympic Games. Following bribery allegations during the bidding process for the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City<sup>6</sup>, the International Olympic Committee took action by sanctioning and expelling approximately ten members who were accused of soliciting favours such as scholarships or jobs for their children or grandchildren, as well as medical care for

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<sup>1</sup> Ask Vest Christiansen, *The legacy of Festina: Patterns of drug use in European cycling since 1998*, in “Sport in History”, 2005, v. 25, n. 3, pp. 497-514.

<sup>2</sup> Paul Dimeo, *Why Lance Armstrong? Historical context and key turning points in the ‘cleaning up’ of professional cycling*, in “The International Journal of the History of Sport”, 2014, v. 21, n. 8, pp. 951-968.

<sup>3</sup> Grigory Rodchenkov, *The Rodchenkov Affair: How I Brought Down Russia’s Secret Doping Empire—Winner of the William Hill Sports Book of the Year 2020*, Random House, New York, 2020.

<sup>4</sup> Emmanuel Bayle, Hervé Rayner, *Sociology of a scandal: the emergence of ‘FIFAgate’*, in “Soccer & Society”, 2018, v. 19, n. 4, pp. 593-611.

<sup>5</sup> Heide Blake, Jonathan Calvert, *The ugly game: The corruption of FIFA and the Qatari plot to buy the World Cup*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2015.

<sup>6</sup> Stephen Wenn, Robert Barney, Scott Martyn, *Tarnished rings: The international Olympic committee and the Salt Lake City bid scandal*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York, 2011.

their relatives, or seeking monetary benefits from the candidate organizing committee prior to the decision on the vote<sup>7</sup>.

Alongside corrupt behaviours of some affiliates within sports organizations, there are also cases of corruption more typically associated with the realization of infrastructure needed to host major events. For instance, in Brazil – a nation that hosted two consecutive mega-events, the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics – numerous corruption investigations have been initiated. These investigations implicate politicians and entrepreneurs who allegedly paid bribes to secure contracts for construction projects<sup>8</sup>.

The list provided above is not exhaustive and primarily deals to economic crime, particularly what is known as white-collar crime. This encompasses representatives of sports associations, political figures, and private business managers. The situation for athletes, especially in cases of doping, appears more complex, as the use of substances to enhance performance may not always be a voluntary choice. Besides this group of individuals, often referred to as the underworld, the sports sector can attract interest from outsider groups, ranging from small to medium criminal organizations to more structured entities like mafias, for various reasons. Firstly, in the field of sports infrastructure development, there can be risks of direct infiltration with participation in the execution of works by companies controlled by mafia groups – as already seen in other public works<sup>9</sup> – and indirect infiltration (extortion). At the level of sports clubs, their acquisition can also be the objective of a strategy aimed not only at gaining social consensus in the territory but also for money laundering and sports manipulation purposes. At the same time, club fanbases may be exposed to infiltration risks and exert undue pressure on football societies for obtaining benefits such as ticket resale. Networks of criminal groups can also be involved in the supply of banned substances for sports practice, overseeing various phases from production to transportation, storage, and distribution. However, it is the widespread availability of online sports betting that has garnered the attention of the media and law enforcement agencies in recent years. The ability to bet on various online platforms and on any sports event worldwide has significantly expanded this economic sector in the last decade, opening up further opportunities for the infiltration of

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<sup>7</sup> Thomas A. Hamilton, *The Long Hard Fall from Mount Olympus: The 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Games Bribery Scandal*, in “Marquette Sports Law Review”, 2010, v. 21, n. 1, pp. 219-240.

<sup>8</sup> Fabricio Leal de Oliveira, Carlos B. Vainer, Gilmar Mascarenhas, Glauco Bienenstein, Einar Braathen, *Mega-events, legacies and impacts: notes on 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympics*, in “International Journal of Urban Sustainable Development”, 2020, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 89-102.

<sup>9</sup> Stefano Caneppele, Sara Martocchia, *Italian Mafias, Public Procurement and Public Works in Southern Italy*, in *Organized Crime, Corruption and Crime Prevention*, Stefano Caneppele, Francesco Calderoni (eds.), Springer International Publishing, Switzerland, 2014, pp. 293–299.

criminal groups<sup>10</sup>. In this case as well, the modalities of criminal exploitation are varied, ranging from the manipulation of individual sports events to the infiltration or establishment of betting centers (online and physical), allowing for economic gain, money laundering, and serving as logistical bases for the activities of criminal groups.

In this context, we should consider the crucial role of the so called grey area where both economic operators and former athletes or individuals associated with sports federations and/or businesses play a connecting or facilitating role in building trust relationships. These relationships are necessary for developing collaborations and business, even in illegal activities. The cases outlined above testify to the existence of the issue of sports corruption.

From a theoretical standpoint, the debate on the conceptualization of sports corruption has developed since the 2000s. For example, Maennig<sup>11</sup> proposed a taxonomy that distinguishes between “competition corruption” whereby the actors involved can be athletes, sporting officials, and referees, and “management (or non-competition) corruption”, whereby sporting bodies and sports officials may be involved in corruption related to selecting host venues, allocating rights (sponsorship or TV rights), nominating officials for positions, and commissioning construction works for sport-related facilities. Similarly, Chappelet<sup>12</sup> refers to “on-field corruption” and “off-field corruption” to distinguish behaviours directly related to the conduct of sports competitions from those related to the management of events and sports federations that occur away from the field of play. In another work, Gardiner<sup>13</sup> divides sports-related corrupt behaviours into two spheres: a core of certainty grouping the most serious behaviours, characterized as illegality, while in an ideal continuum, there exists a broader second sphere defining a penumbra of uncertainty in which the “evaluation as of culpability is essentially a sporting one and involves infringement of sporting rules and potential disciplinary action”<sup>14</sup>. Earlier works had proposed other classifications. The first work that attempted to provide statistical figures of the phenomenon is that of Gorse &

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<sup>10</sup> Stefano Caneppele, Fiona Langlois, Pim Verschuuren, *Those who counter match-fixing fraudsters: Voices from a multistakeholder ecosystem*, in “Crime, Law and Social Change”, 2020, v. 74, n. 1, pp. 13–26, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-020-09889-z>.

<sup>11</sup> Wolfgang Maennig, *Corruption in international sports and sport management: Forms, tendencies, extent and countermeasures*, in “European Sport Management Quarterly”, 2005, v. 5, n. 2, p. 189.

<sup>12</sup> Jean-Loup Chappelet, *Autonomy and governance. Necessary bedfellows in the fight against corruption in sport*, in *Global corruption report: sport*, Transparency International (ed.), Routledge, London, 2016.

<sup>13</sup> Simon Gardiner, *Conceptualising corruption in sport*, in *Corruption in Sport*, Kihl Lisa A. (eds.), Routledge, London, 2018, pp. 10-29.

<sup>14</sup> Ivi, p. 25.

Chadwick<sup>15</sup>. Their study - which adopted a narrow definition of sports corruption as “any illegal, immoral, or unethical activity that attempts to deliberately distort the result of a sporting contest for the personal material gain of one or more parties involved in that activity”<sup>16</sup>- included only four types of corruption in sports, namely match-fixing (betting related); match-fixing (non-betting related); “inside information”; and doping – the use of performance-enhancing substances. Gorse & Chadwick<sup>17</sup> identified, for the period 2000-2010, 2,089 cases, of which 95.64% fell into the category of doping. More recently, Caneppele et al.<sup>18</sup> conducted an online open-source analysis for the year 2016, focusing on various deviant behaviours in sports. The study encompassed a broader set of behaviours, including on-field fraud (such as doping, match manipulation, and eligibility fraud) and off-field fraud (corruption), as well as on-field and off-field violence (including hooliganism and terrorism), and other negative behaviors exhibited by individuals involved in sports, whether on or off the field. The analysis revealed a total of 775 reported cases by online media, with frauds comprising 85% of the total. Specifically, doping incidents were the most prevalent, followed by cases of match-fixing. In the field of criminology, another definitional contribution comes from Brooks et al.<sup>19</sup>, who in their work provided a non-exhaustive list of behaviours including both clearly illicit behaviours (e.g., fraud, embezzlement, money laundering, trading of influence) and situations that, while not illegal per se, could potentially facilitate sport-related fraud (e.g., conflicts of interest, gifts and hospitality, lobbying, revolving door). Beyond the theoretical debates, there is a more general need to better understand the dynamics, modus operandi, and characteristics of corruption in sports to observe trends and their evolution. This understanding is essential for developing more effective prevention policies and assessing whether and how the regulatory framework functions in terms of repression and control. Based on these premises, the Council of Europe promoted the initiative known as DACCS (Database on Alleged Cases of Corruption in Sports). This essay aims to provide context for the establishment of this database dedicated to researching corruption in sports.

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<sup>15</sup> Samantha Gorse, Simon Chadwick, *The prevalence of corruption in international sport. A statistical analysis*, Coventry: Centre for the International Business of Sport, 2011.

<sup>16</sup> Samantha Gorse, Simon Chadwick, *Conceptualising Corruption in Sport: Implications for Sponsorship Programmes*, in “European Business Review”, 2010, v. July/August, p. 41.

<sup>17</sup> Samantha Gorse, Simon Chadwick, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>18</sup> Stefano Caneppele, Giulia Cinaglia, Christina Sperrer, Fiona Langlois, *Fraudes, violences et autres comportements déviants dans le sport professionnel et olympique: opportunités et limites des sources ouvertes en ligne comme moyen de renseignement*, in « Criminologie », 2019, v. 52, n. 2, pp. 110-140.

<sup>19</sup> Graham Brooks, Azeem Aleem, Mark Button, *Defining fraud and corruption in sport*, in *Fraud, corruption and sport*, Graham Brooks, Azeem Aleem, Mark Button, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013, pp. 15-29.

Additionally, it presents selected results from the data collection activity to offer practical examples of the phenomenon.

## **2. DACCS Origins**

The Database on Alleged Cases of Corruption in Sports (DACCS) was initiated by EPAS (Enlarged Partial Agreement on Sport), an entity within the Council of Europe's Sport Division created in May 2007 to serve as a platform for intergovernmental sports cooperation among the public authorities of COE member states, sports federations, and NGOs (COE, n.d.). DACCS finds its legal basis in the 14th CoE Conference of Ministers responsible for sport, held in Budapest in 2016. During that event, state representatives approved Resolution No. 2 titled "Towards better governance in sport through enhanced cooperation between governmental bodies and stakeholders in sport"<sup>20</sup>. The resolution encourages EPAS "to use its joint meeting of the Steering Committee and the Consultative Committee to discuss regularly the implementation of good governance principles based on (1) available indicators and research; (2) a review of recent cases and their follow-up by sports and judicial authorities"<sup>21</sup>. In this sense, the role of DACCS was not limited to documenting suspected cases of corruption in sports but also to monitor the social response, namely the institutional reactions provided by both state bodies and sports federations in terms of sanctions against these behaviours. The underlying rationale was the consideration that, despite numerous efforts to improve both public regulation (such as UN conventions against corruption or transnational organized crime, or the COE Macolin Convention on match manipulation) and private regulation (through enhanced governance of international federations or the adoption of UN standards on corporate social responsibility principles), the overall understanding of the phenomenon was still limited. Therefore, the Database on Alleged Cases of Corruption in Sport aims at: a) Recording alleged cases of corruption in sport reported by the media; b) Monitoring the responses given by the institutions involved (disciplinary sanctions) and by the criminal justice systems; c) Analysing data and identifying trends. The School of Criminal Justice (SCJ) of the University of Lausanne has been tasked with developing and implementing the

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<sup>20</sup> EPAS, *14e Conférence du Conseil de l'Europe des Ministres responsables du sport, Budapest, Hongrie, 29 novembre 2016 Résolutions finales*, in « [icsspe.org](http://icsspe.org) », 2016.

<sup>21</sup> Ivi, p. 7.

data collection methodology. As a member of the School, the author of this essay has been responsible for coordinating the project.

### 3. DACCS Methodology

The methodology employed by DACCS is founded on the collection of data from open sources such as newspapers and online magazines, utilizing keyword searches. While not a novel approach, it aligns with other research projects, like the Global Terrorism Database<sup>22</sup>, that provide global data on various phenomena. In the case of DACCS, the unit of analysis is the suspected case of corruption, mainly in professional sports<sup>23</sup>. The decision to focus on the professional dimension arises from considerations related to media coverage, which tends to be more extensive for sports practiced at elite levels. Additionally, it reflects the pragmatic perspective that policy interventions are more realistic and effective when targeted at the professional realm compared to the amateur domain. However, a methodological challenge involves framing the corruptive phenomenon. Operationally, we define sports corruption as “any abuse of entrusted power for private gain likely to influence directly or indirectly the organization or the smooth running of a sports competition” adapting the definition provided by Transparency international (n.d.) to the sports context. The specification that influence can be direct or indirect aims to encompass behaviours occurring on the field (such as sports manipulation or corruption related to doping) as well as those more tied to the organization of major events (e.g., vote rigging, bribery in the awarding of construction contracts) and in the management of sports organizations (e.g., embezzlement in financial statements or in sponsorship consultancy contracts). In this sense, from a theoretical perspective we endorsed the suggestions provided by Maennig<sup>24</sup> and Chappelet<sup>25</sup>, who operated a distinction between on-field and off-field corruption<sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>22</sup> Gary LaFree, *The Global Terrorism Database (GTD): Accomplishments and Challenges*, in *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 2010, v. 4, n. 1, pp. 24–46.

<sup>23</sup> In the event that multiple sources refer to the same case, the case is reported only once in the database.

<sup>24</sup> Wolfgang Maennig, op. cit..

<sup>25</sup> Jean-Loup Chappelet, *Autonomy and governance*, cit.; Jean-Loup Chappelet, *Pour un cadre global de lutte contre la corruption dans le sport*, in “Jurisport”, 2017, v.181, n.12, pp. 19-22.

<sup>26</sup> Stefano Caneppele, Giulia Cinaglia, Fiona Langlois, *An overview of corruption in sport around the world*, in *Restoring Trust in Sport*, Catherine Ordway (ed.), Routledge, London, 2021, 14–28.

We incorporated a diverse set of keywords while reproducing the approach used for an explorative study already conducted on sport deviance<sup>27</sup>. Data collection involves keyword searches on news aggregators, extracting various variables outlined in Table 1.

The structure of the database reflects the spirit of the mandate received from EPAS, which is to gather information on available cases, not only to understand their essential characteristics but also to track how the involved states and sports federations have reacted to the reported case. It is important to note that, beyond the characteristics of the case itself, there is a specific focus on the evolution from the perspective of social response, i.e., the reaction of disciplinary and jurisdictional bodies following the events. In this sense, another methodological challenge is to be able to track the evolution of corruption cases, especially concerning criminal investigations that can unfold over a broad time span<sup>28</sup>.

Table 1 - Database on Alleged Cases of Corruption in Sport – Main Variables

| <i>N</i> | <i>Name</i>    | <i>Format</i>    | <i>Modalities</i>  |
|----------|----------------|------------------|--|
| 1        | DACCS ID       | Integer          | /  |
| 2        | Nr             | Integer          | /  |
| 3        | Year           | Date (only year) | /  |
| 4        | Sport          | String           | /  |
| 5        | Classification | String           | (1) Manipulation of competitions, (2) Event bids (a), (3) Contracts (b) (4) Ticketing, (5) Doping (c), (6) Election (d), (7) Other |
| 6        | Country        | String           | /  |
| 7        | Organisation   | String           | /  |
| 8        | Title          | String           | /  |
| 9        | Linked to      | See Var. N. 13   | « SOURCE ID »  |
| 10       | Creation       | Date             | dd.mm.yy   |
| 11       | Modification   | Date             | dd.mm.yy   |
| 12       | Sources        | String           | /  |

<sup>27</sup> Stefano Caneppele, Giulia Cinaglia, Christina Sperrer, Fiona Langlois, *op. cit.*

<sup>28</sup> As an example, during the 2016 Rio Olympics, the Brazilian police arrested an Irish member of the IOC on various charges related to fraud, ticketing, money laundering, and promoting or financing a criminal organization. Nearly eight years later, the trial has not yet commenced, and some of the charges have reached the statute of limitations (Caneppele & Konstantopoulos, in press).



|    |   |         |                                  |
|----|---|---------|----------------------------------|
| 13 | Source ID                               | Integer | « Year » - « Nr »                |
| 14 | Description of the case                 | String  | Open                             |
| 15 | Disciplinary follow up (DFU) / existing | String  | Y, N, N/A                        |
| 16 | DFU / on going                          | String  | Y, N, N/A                        |
| 17 | DFU / description                       | String  | Open                             |
| 18 | DFU / decision                          | String  | Open                             |
| 19 | Judicial follow up/ existing            | String  | Y, N, N/A                        |
| 20 | JFU / on going                          | String  | Y, N, N/A                        |
| 21 | JFU / description                       | String  | Open                             |
| 22 | JFU / decision                          | String  | Open                             |
| 23 | Case Closed                             | Integer | Y, N, N/A                        |
| 24 | Degree of Certainty (e)                 | Integer | 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 (Min), 0 (Unknown) |

- (a) “Events bids” refers to bids for hosting competitions or meetings.
- (b) For the manipulation of tenders or bidding procedure in business relations, use “Contracts”.
- (c) “Doping” refers to the corruption of doping cases (e.g., manipulation of the results, blackmail or extortion of athletes) - do not mention “normal” doping cases here
- (d) “Election” refers to the election of persons - for cities of countries use “Events bids”.
- (e) Law case and/or Disciplinary Case with Guilty Verdict (5); Law case and/or Disciplinary case suspended not enough evidence (4); Allegations (3); Rumour (2); Inconsistent Allegations (1).

Source: adapted from Council of Europe – EPAS (2017)

From a methodological perspective, monitoring sports corruption through online media has certain limitations that may restrict the number of identified cases. These limitations include various aspects such as (a) the use of specific keywords, (b) language restrictions, (c) incomplete media coverage, (d) unequal global media coverage, and (e) lack of media reporting. Regarding point (a), different keywords might limit access to news reporting corruption cases if terms other than those specified in the search engine are used. Concerning point (b), limiting the number of languages may restrict the identification of cases, especially less severe ones not covered by the international press. Additionally, technically, (c) the media aggregator provides a broad but not exhaustive list of online press, risking the exclusion of some sports corruption news. In addition, (d) the greater presence of online press (and press freedom) in some countries might lead to identifying more cases where online press is more

prevalent and/or free. Finally, the methodology does not include, for obvious reasons, (e) cases of sports corruption not reported by online press, either due to editorial choice or lack of knowledge.

#### 4. DACCS Findings

Before delving into the in-depth analysis of specific cases, this initial section of the results provides some general outcomes of the database. Since the beginning of the monitoring in 2016 and up to 31 December 2021<sup>29</sup>, a total of 637 cases have been identified and analysed. Three major sport disciplines – Football, Tennis, and Cricket – collectively constitute a significant proportion, accounting for 68% of the total DACCS cases (Tab. 2). With 377 occurrences, the issue most detected was manipulation of competitions. Interestingly, since 2016, we have observed an increase in the dispersion of corruption cases worldwide, progressively affecting a broader range of countries.

Table 2 – Database on alleged cases of corruption in sport – Number of cases up to 31 December 2021 (N= 637)

|                | <i>Previous years</i> | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|----------------|-----------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <i>N Cases</i> | 79                    | 104  | 92   | 83   | 89   | 107  | 83   |

The data reveals a widespread distribution of cases across the globe, underscoring the global nature of the issue. Australia emerges as the most recurrent country, with 39 reported cases, followed closely by the UK (34 cases), the US (32 cases), India (27), and France (23). It is crucial to note that a higher number of detected cases in a particular country should not be misconstrued as an indication of that country being more inherently corrupt. To the contrary, it is an indicator of media attention and the activity of regulatory bodies.


Another aspect under monitoring involves the social response of public and private institutions. The database tracks the existence of disciplinary and judicial proceedings following corruption allegations. As shown in Figure 1, the initiation of a criminal investigation is

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<sup>29</sup> While the data collection activity started to monitor corruption in sport systematically from 2016, occasionally other cases dating back 2016 have been included in the database.

observed in approximately 30% of cases, while the rate of disciplinary follow-up by sports institutions exceeds 50%. This data is partly explainable by the fact that to initiate a criminal investigation, the behaviour must be considered a crime. There must be evidence to support a case in criminal proceedings (requirements are more stringent due to the sanctions that can even lead to deprivation of liberty), and, at least for less serious offenses, the injured party must file a complaint. It should also be clarified that the initiation of an investigation does not necessarily result in a conviction for the individuals involved. Currently, the observation window of DACCS (6 years) is not sufficient to present reliable data on the outcomes of ongoing cases because criminal proceedings can last even longer than 5 years.

Fig. 1 – Corruption in Sport. Existence of a judicial or of a disciplinary follow-up (N=637)



Beyond the descriptive component, which serves to provide a general overview of the problem, emphasizing that these numbers represent only the visible and media-exposed part of the phenomenon, the database offers some insights to identify the risk factors that may create opportunities for corruption by internal actors (athletes, coaches, managers) or external entities (criminal gangs or organized crime groups) in the world of sports. In the next paragraphs we provide examples of corruption in sport derived from the database. We decided to present examples for each classifying category reported in the DACCS<sup>30</sup>: (1) Manipulation

<sup>30</sup> When citing a case, we will use the case's ID reference as identified in DACCS 1.7 (last updated on 31.12.2021) (see Annex 1).

of competitions, (2) Event bids (a), (3) Contracts (b) (4) Ticketing, (5) Doping (c), (6) Election (d), (7) Other.

*Manipulation of sports competitions.* As reported by the Council of Europe Macolin Convention, the term refers to a deliberate arrangement, act, or omission intended to irregularly alter the outcome or course of a sports competition to eliminate all or part of its unpredictable nature, with the aim of gaining an undue advantage for oneself or others. As explained earlier, this form of sports corruption is the most prevalent in the database, with 377 occurrences, the majority of which stem from popular sports such as football, tennis, and cricket, although cases of match manipulation have been detected in more than 30 disciplines. The period from 2016 to 2021 coincides with the progressive implementation of monitoring systems for online sports betting to identify suspicious betting patterns. This period also signifies the initiation of the institutionalization of sports investigative units at both state and sports federation levels. On the one hand, the Macolin Convention, which came into effect in 2019, urging the reinforcement or establishment of national platforms to coordinate and exchange public/private experiences. On the other hand, numerous sports federations, particularly those on the international scale, have allocated resources to establish specialized units focused on combating match-fixing. In this context, the global tennis movement has been among the most proactive creating the first integrity unit in the 2000s. However, in 2016, leaked files suggested that tennis authorities had hidden the true extent of the issue, permitting certain key suspects to continue participating. Allegedly, players were approached in hotel rooms during major tournaments and enticed with substantial amounts by corrupt gamblers (ID 20160117001). Gambling syndicates in Russia and Italy reportedly garnered significant profits by placing highly suspicious bets on matches, including those at prestigious events like Wimbledon and the French Open. Although the Independent Review Panel appointed ad hoc following the scandal did not substantiate the leaked allegations, its final report formulated numerous recommendations to enhance integrity of tennis competition. Among them, the 2018 report (Lewis et al., 2018) highlighted the heightened vulnerability of minor tennis competitions, corroborated by previous investigations by the Tennis Integrity Unit (TIU). In 2016, umpires from Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Ukraine were accused of accepting bribes from betting syndicates, manipulating live scores during the International Tennis Federation's Futures Tour in 2015 (ID 20160209001). This manipulation allowed criminal

gamblers to place bets with foreknowledge of the next point's outcome<sup>31</sup>. The involvement of organized crime in match-fixing has raised concerns voiced by sports federations (see E.g., International Olympic Committee, n.d.), Interpol<sup>32</sup>, and Europol<sup>33</sup>. Certainly, in the early 2010s, Europol's Operation VETO<sup>34</sup> exposed the extensive connections of organized crime syndicates based in Asia that influenced the outcomes of 380 football matches played in 15 countries globally. This operation raised suspicions about 425 individuals, including match officials, club representatives, players, and criminals. Due to their intricate nature, these investigations are less common compared to those involving only athletes or individuals within the sports realm. A notable operation occurred in 2018, led by Belgian authorities, resulting in the indictment of a Belgian-Armenian group on charges of corruption, money laundering, forgery, and membership in a criminal organization (ID 20180605001). This operation was part of a major international investigation into tennis match-fixing, involving raids in the US, Germany, France, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and the Netherlands. The probe revealed that the Belgian-Armenian ring had been bribing over 100 tennis players since 2014, profiting from bets on the fixed outcomes. Allegedly, players manipulated matches, sets, or games in exchange for payments ranging from 500 to 3,000 euros. The bets were placed on lower-division matches with prize money typically ranging from \$5,000 to \$15,000, often unrecorded, making players susceptible to corruption. The organizers of fixed matches operated through an encrypted messaging system, orchestrating a massive scheme involving numerous low-ranked players in small tournaments with minimal prize money. To circumvent controls, the group employed individuals as mules to place small amounts of bets for a few euros, aiming to avoid raising suspicions among betting operators. In some instances, criminal groups employ the strategy of establishing friendships or trust relationships with athletes to gain their confidence, access confidential information, and ultimately, persuade them to manipulate matches. For example, in 2017, the New South Wales Police (Australia) failed to find evidence of match rigging in connection with four NRL (National Rugby League) games from 2015 and 2016 (ID 20170705001). However, there was proof of "insider information" being

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<sup>31</sup> Umpires at lower-tier professional events manually recorded scores on IBM tablets, transmitted to the ITF's data partner. Bookmakers use this scoring data for in-play betting, enabling bets to be placed and cashed out during the game. The implicated umpires deliberately delayed score input, providing gamblers with 30 seconds to a minute of advance notice before betting odds adjusted to the updated score.

<sup>32</sup> Interpol, *INTERPOL Match-Fixing Task Force closes ranks on organized crime*, in "www.interpol.int", 12 September 2018.

<sup>33</sup> Europol, *The involvement of organised crime groups in sports corruption*, in "www.europol.europa.eu", 2021.

<sup>34</sup> Europol, *Update—Results from the largest football match-fixing investigation in Europe*, in "www.europol.europa.eu", 6 February 2013.

shared from players to organized crime figures. In other cases, organized crime may attempt to directly control a club to manipulate matches. In 2019, the Australian Sporting Integrity Intelligence Unit received reports of match-fixing in Counter-Strike: Global Offensive games (Esport), along with indications of organized crime links to the ownership of an Australian-based team. Betting anomalies have been reported in matches involving that team (ID 20190823001). In summary, it becomes clear that more intricate schemes originate from criminal networks with the ability to access information on various fronts. This involves establishing connections with clubs to directly engage with players and coaches, influencing referee nominations and contacting officials within the sector, and delving into regulatory aspects to comprehend both national sports betting regulations and the operation of alert systems for suspicious bets. A noteworthy case setting a precedent in CAS jurisprudence is the Skenderbeu case<sup>35</sup>. The Albanian club was accused by UEFA in 2016 of manipulating several matches, including the UEFA Champions League qualifying round. In total, UEFA identified 53 matches involving Skenderbeu – spanning friendlies, domestic fixtures, and European club competitions – allegedly manipulated for betting purposes between November 2010 and April 2016 (ID 20160525002). The then president of Skenderbeu and a former Albanian finance minister were implicated in the alleged scheme. The latter was accused of targeting friendlies for illegal gain, leveraging his political influence and network to manipulate Skenderbeu's matches while allegedly being involved in betting companies for personal business gain. In 2018, the Court of Arbitration for Sport confirmed the decision made by UEFA disciplinary bodies to ban KS Skënderbeu from participating in UEFA club competitions for ten years and imposed a fine of EUR 1,000,000 on the club.

*Event bids.* The term under consideration encompasses all actions aimed at influencing decisions regarding the allocation of major sports events, particularly those commonly referred to as mega-events. Prominent instances involve the FIFA World Cup championships and the Olympic Games. The majority of cases documented in the database pertain to corruption allegations related to events that occurred in 2010, specifically concerning the bidding process for the World Cup (e.g. ID 20170627001). These allegations gained significance following the release of the report by FIFA's Adjudicatory Chamber, widely known as the Garcia

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<sup>35</sup> The significance of this case lies in the fact that the sanction for match-fixing affected a club and not an individual and that the CAS acknowledged the probative value, along with other pieces of evidence, of UEFA's betting fraud detection system (BFDS) in detecting abnormal betting patterns on matches played by clubs in both European and domestic competitions.

Report, named after the head investigatory chamber of FIFA's ethics committee, Michael Garcia. Appointed in 2012 to investigate allegations of conduct violating FIFA's ethical code, Garcia, a former FBI investigator, delivered his report in 2014, while its content was initially kept confidential and then disclosed by FIFA in 2017. The inquiry delved into the conduct of several countries vying to host the World Cup, including Russia, the United States, Australia, Spain and Portugal, Belgium/Holland, Qatar, South Korea, Japan and England. From these investigations and journalistic probes, the pivotal role of certain executive committee members surfaced, such as Jack Warner, the former CONCACAF president (Trinidad & Tobago), and the Qatari delegate, then FIFA vice president Bin Hamman. Leaked documents suggested that Bin Hamman utilized slush funds controlled by his private company, hosted opulent events for African football presidents, disbursed substantial cash incentives, and directed financial support to various federations, influencing their support for the Qatar bid (ID 20140317001). The revelations exposed intricate webs of financial transactions, clandestine lobbying, and improprieties involving key FIFA executives, shedding light on the multifaceted nature of corruption within the process of awarding major sporting events.

Other investigations into bid integrity issues often revolve around the Lamine Diack (the then president of the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), now World Athletics) and his son Papa Massata Diack, recurring figures in these inquiries. Documents suggest that during Doha's bid to host the 2017 world championships, Papa Massata Diack, a IAAF consultant), requested a payment of \$4.5 million via bank transfer and \$440,000 in cash to be collected in person in Doha (ID 20141210001). Moreover, in 2016, media reports revealed an alleged seven-figure payment from the Tokyo Olympic bid team to an account linked to Papa Massata Diack, occurring during Japan's successful bid to host the 2020 Games (ID 20160301001). This payment, approximately €1.3 million, raises serious questions about Tokyo's winning bid in 2013 and the role of Dentsu, the Japanese marketing giant with an extensive sponsorship contract with the IAAF, unilaterally extended by Diack. The suspicious payment was reportedly sent directly to the Black Tidings secret bank account in Singapore, linked to Papa Massata Diack, employed by the IAAF as a marketing consultant. Further investigations unveiled a payment of \$78,000 made by Pamodzi consultancy, linked to the Diacks, to a Parisian jewelry store on the day Rio was awarded the Olympics in 2009. In 2016, during "Operation Unfair Play," French and Brazilian police arrested 11 individuals, including Brazilian Olympic Committee President Carlos Nuzman, accused of being part of an international corruption scheme to buy votes for awarding the Rio Games (ID

20170905001). Investigators revealed that Nuzman played a central role in securing votes for Rio's Olympic bid in 2009, connecting Soares Filho and Lamine Diack, then an IOC voting member. Soares Filho's company, Matlock Capital Group, allegedly paid Diack \$2 million into an account controlled by Diack's son, Papa Massata Diack, with authorities claiming substantial documentation of payments through Caribbean accounts.

*Contracts.* In our database, the category "Contracts" includes all agreements that sports institutions enter into with individuals and businesses for the supply of goods and/or services. In situations involving corruption, these commercial agreements may be obtained by companies through the payment of bribes, and the recruitment of consultants or employees may be part of an agreement to provide legal legitimacy and justification for the payment of money. In other cases, contracts may provide legal benefits but may be structured to evade or circumvent legal requirements. When referring to organizations in general, in our case, sports organizations, this often involves the crime of embezzlement. In this context, too, the 2010s decade is marked by a major investigation conducted by US authorities, culminating in the arrest in Zurich in 2015 of two representatives of the FIFA executive committee (ID 20150527001). The criminal investigation, led by The US Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York, focused on the allocation of media, marketing, and sponsoring rights for football tournaments in the United States and Latin America. More than 50 defendants, also including the (then) current or former FIFA executive committee members and the (then) current presidents of CONCACAF and CONMEBOL, were alleged to have engaged in schemes spanning 24 years, designed to solicit over \$200 million in bribes and kickbacks for selling media and marketing rights to international soccer tournaments and matches. The allegations involve several bribery schemes linked to multiple cycles of FIFA World Cup qualifiers and international friendly matches. Six Central American member associations within UNCAF are implicated. Additionally, another bribery scheme involved numerous top CONMEBOL officials. It concerned the sale of broadcasting rights for the CONMEBOL Copa Libertadores over an extended period. Lastly, an Argentinian sports marketing company was accused of obtaining various rights properties from CONCACAF by paying bribes to three Central American soccer officials, influencing them to favor the company. To compensate for losses incurred by FIFA, CONCACAF, CONMEBOL, and various constituent



national soccer federations, the US Department of Justice remitted a total of \$201 million to them<sup>36</sup>.

Another category of cases, sometimes linked to 2015 FIFA investigations, involves the outcomes of internal audits commissioned by sports federations from independent bodies following corruption inquiries related to individuals holding positions of responsibility within the institution. For instance, an independent investigation mandated by CONCACAF, representing soccer in North and Central America and the Caribbean, reported allegations of financial mismanagement by former president Warner and ex-general secretary Blazer (ID 20130418001). The investigation uncovered various misconducts, including Warner's failure to disclose to CONCACAF or FIFA that a \$25.9 million Center of Excellence was built on land owned by his companies. The report also revealed that Blazer had attempted to purchase property in the Bahamas in 2007, using football funds, for approximately \$4 million. In the same category, there are all the corruption scandals related to public works contracts for the construction of sports facilities, particularly those linked to major events. For instance, in 2016, a Russian entrepreneur was arrested on suspicion of embezzling millions of rubles from a contract to supply screens for the new Zenit Arena stadium in St. Petersburg, Russia, constructed for the country's hosting of the 2018 FIFA World Cup (ID 20161116001). Numerous investigations also unfolded in Brazil following the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics. For example, in 2017, former Rio de Janeiro Mayor Eduardo Paes was being investigated for allegedly accepting at least \$5 million in payments to facilitate construction projects tied to the Games, as indicated in documents published by Brazil's top court (ID 20161211001).

Another cluster of cases revolves around actions taken or faced by football clubs to sidestep tax obligations and/or navigate certain limitations imposed by sports federations. These allegations came to light through the efforts of whistleblower Rui Pinto, a Portuguese activist who, in September 2015, established the website Football Leaks with the intention of unveiling the financial landscape of association football<sup>37</sup>. Notably, the case of Manchester City garnered significant attention. According to reports from the German media outlet Der Spiegel, Sheikh Mansour, the club's owner and a member of the ruling family of Abu Dhabi, predominantly financed the substantial £67.5 million annual sponsorship through his

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<sup>36</sup> Department of Justice, *Department of Justice Announces Additional Distribution of \$92 Million to Victims in FIFA Corruption Case*, in "www.justice.gov", 30 June 2022.

<sup>37</sup> Hans Nelen, *Ostrageous: How Greed and Crime Erode Professional Football and We All Look the Other Way*, Eleven International Publishing, The Netherlands, 2022.

country's airline, Etihad, as a manoeuvre for Manchester City to bypass UEFA's Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations (ID 20181105001). Lastly, there are other instances where positions of influence are leveraged to gain financial advantages through consultancy contracts. For instance, in 2016, businessman Iñaki Urdangarin, a former Olympic handball player and the ex-husband of Spain's Princess Cristina, faced accusations of exploiting his royal connections to secure inflated public contracts for organizing sporting and other events (ID 20160129001). In 2018, the then President of the Ghana Football Association, Kwesi Nyantakyi, received a lifetime ban from FIFA for corruption (ID 20180405002)<sup>38</sup>. He was caught on camera accepting \$65,000 from an undercover reporter, explaining the process of establishing an agency to broker a sponsorship deal for the Ghana Premier League. The proposed dummy company aimed to ensure the Ghana Football Association fulfilled all commitments outlined in the contract. The discussed deal was valued at \$5 million annually for a five-year period, with the football association allegedly agreeing to pay an agency fee ranging between 20 to 25 percent to the proposed agency set up by Kwesi Nyantakyi.

*Ticketing.* The term "ticketing" encompasses all behaviours aimed at illicitly profiting, whether directly or indirectly, from the unauthorized or inflated sale, exchange, or fraudulent forgery of tickets for sports events. This conduct is made possible through privileged access to ticket distribution, either due to the advantageous position of a sport federation manager or through access to a privileged distribution network based on one's managerial position within a sports or non-sports institutions. In other cases, there is an interest from organized crime figures linked to fan environments who can gain economic benefits by exerting pressure on sports clubs. Finally, fraudulent schemes or scams related to bulk purchasing of available tickets for resale on secondary markets or inflating ticket prices on the false promise of the participation of prestigious athletes in a sports event also exist.

In our DACCS, allegations of ticketing involved in 2015 the then FIFA secretary general, the then French Tennis Federation president, a former IOC member in 2016 Rio Olympic Games, one of the vice-presidents of the French rugby Federation (ID 20150917001; ID 20160503002; ID 20160819001, ID 20161119001). In another case, the former president of the Peruvian Soccer Federation was arrested for various offenses, including the distribution of numerous tickets for matches involving the Peruvian team during the 2018 World Cup in

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<sup>38</sup> In 2020, the Court of Arbitration for Sport reduced the lifetime ban to a 15-year ban.

Russia (ID 20181220001). The recipients were several Peruvian judges who were slated to preside over a case in which Oviedo was under investigation, facing charges related to allegedly orchestrating the murder of two sugar industry union leaders. In 2019, the president of the Federation of Uganda Football Associations (FUFA) resigned amid a FIFA investigation into the alleged illegal sale of tickets for the 2014 World Cup. Reportedly, 177 tickets designated for Uganda were illicitly acquired by American and South African agents, who subsequently traded them on the black market (ID 20190928001). Regarding external criminal actors in the sports world, cases reveal the involvement of both criminal entrepreneurs and organized crime. In 2018, approximately 3,000 Chinese fans fell victim to fraud when purchasing fake tickets for the Argentina vs. Iceland match at the World Cup in Russia (ID 20180621001). They bought these counterfeit tickets from a Russian intermediary at a cost of around \$600 each. The suspect was later arrested on suspicion of large-scale fraud, as reported by the Interfax news agency. In another well-known cases, la finale di Euro 2020 a Wembley, it was reported that fans bribed stewards and others forged tickets in their name by altering photographs of genuine tickets to gain entry. Additionally, in 2017, there were reports of the Calabrian mafia 'Ndrangheta infiltrating groups of ultra-fans associated with Juventus Turin FC. These groups were involved in reselling tickets provided by the football club for financial gain (ID 20170126001).

*Doping.* The DACCS, under the doping category, does not aim to include cases of athletes testing positive but rather to report those instances where corruption has been used to cover up or conceal anti-doping results that would otherwise be positive. Or, to report cases in which criminals (individuals or groups) are involved in the supply chain of prohibited substances. In this context, the scandal that most significantly influenced the 2010-2020 decade was related to allegations of systematic doping orchestrated by Russia during numerous sports events, particularly the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi. Public accusations first surfaced in 2014 on the German broadcaster ARD airs in a documentary alleging systematic doping in Russian athletics (ID 20141212001).

Based on these allegations, WADA decided to initiate an inquiry commission led by Professor Richard McLaren, who presented a report in May 2016 referring to “state-sponsored” doping, resulting in Russia’s partial ban from the 2016 Summer Olympics and a complete ban as an independent nation from the 2018 and 2022 Winter Olympics, as well as the 2020 Summer Olympics. A key figure in this scandal is the former head of Moscow’s anti-doping

laboratory, Grigory Rodchenkov, who admitted his involvement in a state-sponsored doping program supplying performance-enhancing substances to at least 15 Russian medallists from the Sochi Olympics. Rodchenkov claimed to have mixed cocktails of three banned substances (methenolone, trenbolone, and oxandrolone) with alcohol, providing them to dozens of Russian athletes with the intention of aiding them in cheating. He also detailed how anti-doping agents and members of Russia's intelligence service, the Russian FSB security service (the successor to the KGB), conspired to replace dirty samples with clean urine, passing bottles through a hole in the wall of a specially created “shadow laboratory”. Despite not witnessing the opening and closing operations of the samples, Rodchenkov’s testimony was considered credible. Currently living in the United States under the FBI’s protection program<sup>39</sup>, the law passed in 2020 by the U.S. Congress to impose criminal sanctions on certain persons involved in international doping fraud conspiracies, provide restitution for victims of such conspiracies, and require sharing information with the United States Anti-Doping Agency to assist its fight against doping is referred to as the Rodchenkov Act<sup>40</sup>. Beyond this colossal scandal, there have been other significant events raising concerns about the anti-doping testing processes within international federations, particularly in athletics, weightlifting, and biathlon. In 2015, the president of Athletics Kenya faced suspension from the IAAF (now World Athletics) amid allegations of undermining anti-doping processes and potentially misappropriating sponsorship funds from Nike (ID 20151130001)<sup>41</sup>. A year later, the manager of the Kenyan Olympic athletics team was reportedly removed from the Rio Games following an investigation that claimed he sought financial compensation to provide advance notice about doping tests (ID 20160807001). In 2018, the president of the International Biathlon Federation resigned after numerous revelations. Anders Besseberg, a Norwegian who held the office from 1992 to 2018, was accused of concealing 65 Russian doping cases in exchange for various favours, including money, prostitutes, and hunting parties in Russia (ID 20180412002). In 2020, the French justice system convicted Lamine Diack, the former president of global athletics, and his son Papa Massata Diack of corruption for covering up Russian doping cases in exchange for bribes in what magistrates called the “full protection”

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<sup>39</sup> Jonathon Gatehouse, *Russian doping whistleblower accused of being a spy recruited in Canada*, in “www.cbc.ca”, 14 February 2018.

<sup>40</sup> Genevieve F.E. Birren, *The Rodchenkov Anti-Doping Act: The United States’ Response to the Russian Doping Scandal Symposium: Perspectives from Sports Law Alumni*, in “Marquette Sports Law Review”, 2021, v.32, n.1, pp. 241–258.

<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, Kiplagat faced allegations of receiving, either personally or on behalf of Athletics Kenya, a suspected gift consisting of two motor vehicles from the Qatar Association of Athletics Federations between 2014 and 2015. This occurred during Doha's bid to host the 2019 World Championships of Athletics.

scheme, preventing 23 Russian athletes from testing positive in doping tests in exchange for payments ranging from €100,000 to €600,000 (ID 20151106001). In the same year, Tamas Ajan, president of the International Weightlifting Federation (IWF), resigned following an investigation by the ARD channel. The investigation uncovered allegations that top weightlifters were purportedly exempted from numerous tests until 2017, and some of the conducted tests were allegedly falsified in exchange for bribes (ID 20200123001). While instances of individuals or groups in doping scheme are seldom reported, it is noteworthy that in 2019, German police collaborated with their Austrian counterparts in a coordinated operation named “Aderlass” (German for bloodletting). This operation led to the conviction of a German sports doctor, sentenced to nearly five years. The doctor was held responsible for advising cross-country skiers and cyclists on blood doping, an illicit practice involving the re-infusion of an athlete’s blood to boost red-blood cell concentration (ID 20190227001).

*Election.* In the elections category, DACCS documents public suspected cases of corruption and vote manipulation involving the selection process for representatives of sports clubs and sports federations, with a particular focus on international federations. For example, under this category we can mention the payments made by the then-president of the International Weightlifting Federation (IWF), Ajan, ranging from \$5,000 to \$30,000 to influence the 2017 election in his favour and defeat his competitor, Antonio Urso (ID 20200617003). Additionally, allegations of vote-buying emerged during the 2018 election for the presidency of FIDE, involving Arkady Dvorkovich, the former Russian deputy prime minister (ID 20181226001). Accusations of vote rigging were also directed at Bill Beaumont and Bernard Laporte by Pacific Rugby Players Welfare (PRPW) in the World Rugby presidential election, where Fiji’s vote was allegedly secured in exchange for organizing an annual match with the French Rugby Federation and providing training courses for the Flying Fijians (ID 20200503001). In 2022, Ho Kim, a South Korean sports official, disclosed that in 2006, several delegates from national federations were purportedly bribed to support the Korean candidate, Wu Ching-kuo, for the AIBA (Amateur International Boxing Association) Presidency in 2006<sup>42</sup>.

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<sup>42</sup> Mark Staniforth, *IOC questions Olympic taekwondo and boxing corruption claims*, in “www.independent.co.uk”, 21 September 2022. The International Boxing Association (AIBA, now IBA) has experienced significant controversy in recent decades, marked by financial troubles linked to alleged embezzlement. In 2018, it became embroiled in scandal when the appointed interim president, Gafur Rakhimov (Uzbekistan), faced sanctions since 2012 from the United States Government due to his associations with organized crime groups. The U.S. Treasury accused Rakhimov of involvement in drug production and heroin trafficking (ID 20180128002). Following his appointment, a Swiss bank closed the AIBA account because of the “reputational risk” of being associated

*Other.* Within this miscellaneous category, various types of conduct are encompassed, with particular attention given to what we term eligibility fraud. This type of fraud involves the falsification of documents or certificates aimed at enabling an athlete to participate in a competition for which they would not be eligible without the aforementioned documentation. Frauds may pertain to age limits, nationality, or medical certifications for health status. For instance, in 2017, 53 athlete parents accused the All India Tennis Association (AITA) of overlooking the issue of age fraud during the commencement of the Under-14 and Under-16 Indian Championship (ID 20171011001). In the same year, the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) investigated whether certain athletes and coaches intentionally exaggerated disabilities to enhance their chances of winning (ID 20170918001). A BBC investigation alleged the use of tactics such as taping up of arms, taking cold showers in trunks, and even surgery to shorten limbs to secure a more favourable classification. In 2017, the Equatorial Guinea soccer federation faced exclusion from the 2019 Women's World Cup due to players presenting forged documents (ID 20170309001). The federation was accused of attempting to achieve soccer success by luring foreign players. One implicated player, a Brazil-born midfielder, participated in various tournaments using passports displaying different names and birth dates. Also in 2017, in the Philippines, 150 professional boxers were banned for falsifying brain scan results intended to detect serious head injuries in the sport (ID 20170815001)<sup>43</sup>. Within the same category, another scandal emerged from an FBI investigation, revealing numerous instances of bribes being offered to potential student-athletes. In NCAA basketball college, at least three top high school recruits were promised payments of as much as \$150,000, funded by Adidas, to attend two universities sponsored by the athletic shoe company (Louisville and Miami) (ID 20170927001)<sup>44</sup>.

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with the world governing body. Rakhimov resigned in 2019, leading to a comprehensive restructuring of AIBA's governance in 2021.

<sup>43</sup> These boxers submitted "fake" CT scan results due to financial constraints preventing them from affording the actual test (\$170). The government imposed the brain scan requirement following the deaths of several Filipino boxers.

<sup>44</sup> In adherence to NCAA's amateurism rules, student-athletes are not allowed to receive compensation beyond reasonable and necessary expenses for obtaining an education.

## **5. Conclusion**

This essay has presented analyses and described illustrative cases within the broad category of corruption in sports with a particular focus on the period 2016-2021. The collected data reveal that the sports world is not immune to the risks of corruption and that criminal gangs or organized crime groups may also infiltrate sport business. In recent years, there has been an increased awareness of these risks. Many countries and international federations have acknowledged the existence of the problem and have taken steps to enhance transparency and control in their activities. Initiatives such as the Database on Alleged Cases of Corruption in Sport, despite their limitations, can contribute to building awareness of the historical evolution of the phenomenon and its societal response. This involves not only sporting and legal sanctions, but also institutional and governance reforms aimed at combating corruption in sports.

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**Annex 1 – DACCS ID References mentioned in the manuscript by sport discipline.**

| <i>Category</i>                     | <i>DACCS ID</i> | <i>Sport discipline</i> |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| Manipulation of sports competitions | 20160117001     | Tennis                  |
| Manipulation of sports competitions | 20160209001     | Tennis                  |
| Manipulation of sports competitions | 20180605001     | Tennis                  |
| Manipulation of sports competitions | 20170705001     | Rugby                   |
| Manipulation of sports competitions | 20190823001     | Esport                  |
| Manipulation of sports competitions | 20160525002     | Football                |
| Event bids                          | 20170627001     | Football                |
| Event bids                          | 20140317001     | Football                |
| Event bids                          | 20141210001     | Athletics               |
| Event bids                          | 20160301001     | Olympics                |
| Event bids                          | 20170905001     | Olympics                |
| Contracts                           | 20150527001     | Football                |
| Contracts                           | 20130418001     | Football                |
| Contracts                           | 20161116001     | Football                |
| Contracts                           | 20161211001     | Olympics                |
| Contracts                           | 20181105001     | Football                |
| Contracts                           | 20160129001     | Sports events           |
| Contracts                           | 20180405002     | Football                |
| Ticketing                           | 20150917001     | Football                |
| Ticketing                           | 20160503002     | Tennis                  |
| Ticketing                           | 20160819001     | Olympics                |
| Ticketing                           | 20161119001     | Rugby                   |
| Ticketing                           | 20181220001     | Football                |

|           |             |               |
|-----------|-------------|---------------|
| Ticketing | 20190928001 | Football      |
| Ticketing | 20180621001 | Football      |
| Ticketing | 20170126001 | Football      |
| Doping    | 20141212001 | Olympics      |
| Doping    | 20180128002 | Boxing        |
| Doping    | 20151130001 | Athletics     |
| Doping    | 20160807001 | Athletics     |
| Doping    | 20180412002 | Biathlon      |
| Doping    | 20151106001 | Athletics     |
| Doping    | 20200123001 | Weightlifting |
| Doping    | 20190227001 | Nord Skiing   |
| Election  | 20200617003 | Weightlifting |
| Election  | 20181226001 | FIDE          |
| Election  | 20200503001 | Rugby         |
| Other     | 20171011001 | Tennis        |
| Other     | 20170918001 | Paralympics   |
| Other     | 20170309001 | Football      |
| Other     | 20170815001 | Boxing        |
| Other     | 20170927001 | Basketball    |