The battle that took place near Konotop in late June 1659 was a continuation of the Muscovite-Cossack war, which began in the fall of 1658, soon after the signing of the Union of Hadiach. Cossack and Tatar detachments trapped a significant portion of the Muscovite army, leading to enormous Russian losses. The unprecedented defeat of the previously invincible forces caused panic in Russia, but Muscovites’ capacity to turn defeat into political victory, and the fratricidal struggle in Ukraine, known as the “Ruin”, left most of the Cossack lands on the Right Bank of the Dnieper uninhabitable.

Konotop is a classic example of a battle won, but a war lost. Mariusz Robert Drozdowski, Ksenia Konstantynenko, Piotr Kroll, Serhii Plokhy, Oleg Rumyantsev, Natalia Yakovenko and Tatjana Yakovleva-Tairova, the authors of this collection, hail from Poland, Italy, USA, Ukraine and Russia. They consider the military, political, social, and cultural context of the battle and also investigate its treatment in historical and literary writings from the early modern era to the present. They approach their topic from the point of view of various disciplines, traditions, and schools of thought. Their essays expand our understanding of the battle, its outcome and legacy in unexpected and historiographically productive ways.
THE BATTLE OF KONOTOP 1659

Exploring alternatives
in East European history

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In late June 1659, two armies faced each other near the town of Konotop in the Cossack Hetmanate. One was led by a top Muscovite military commander of the era, Prince Aleksei Trubetskoi, the other by two East European rulers, Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky of Ukraine and Khan Mehmed Giray IV of the Crimea. The coalition forces included Polish detachments as well. The composition of the two armies attested to the dramatic reconfiguration of military and political alliances in the region since 1654, when the Cossacks had sworn allegiance to the Muscovite tsar in the Ukrainian town of Pereiaslav. The fortunes of both the Muscovites and the Cossacks had prospered spectacularly thereafter. Together they managed to defeat the armies of their traditional enemy, the king of Poland. The Cossack armies led by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky reached the city of Lviv and established control over most of Ukrainian ethnic territory; the Muscovites, under the command of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, captured Vilnius and, together with the Cossacks, established their hold over Belarus.

Relations between the two allies began to deteriorate in the autumn of 1656, when the Muscovites, against the wishes of their Cossack partners, signed a separate armistice with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in Vilnius. The Muscovites feared that the fall of Poland-Lithuania would promote the rise of their other competitor in the Baltics—Sweden. The Cossacks, burdened by no such concerns, considered the Vilnius armistice a breach of the contract into which they had entered at Pereiaslav. This was the beginning of a divergence that would lead to confrontation on the battlefield of Konotop. The two former allies had different geostrategic goals.
in the region and incompatible views of the Pereiaslav Agreement. For the Muscovite tsar, that agreement signified the unconditional submission of new subjects under his high hand, while the Ukrainian hetman regarded it as a conditional contract from which one party could withdraw if the other did not fulfill its obligations.

Ivan Vyhovsky, the Ukrainian hetman who succeeded Khmelnytsky, the “father of Pereiaslav,” in the summer of 1657, believed that the tsar was not living up to his responsibility to protect his new subjects from their traditional enemies, the Poles. The tsar was also trying to establish control over the Hetmanate by appointing military governors (voevodas) and encouraging internal opposition to Vyhovsky. In 1658 Vyhovsky decided on a drastic political realignment. He concluded a treaty with representatives of the Polish king, who agreed to readmit Cossack Ukraine to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and reform the latter by creating a third constituent, the Grand Duchy of Rus’, whose status would be comparable to that of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Union of Hadiach, as the new agreement was called after the town in the Hetmanate where the negotiations took place, had the potential to reconfigure not only the Commonwealth but also the structure of East European politics.

The battle that took place near Konotop in late June 1659 was a continuation of the Muscovite-Cossack war that began in the fall of 1658, soon after the signing of the Union of Hadiach. The Cossack and Tatar detachments managed to lure a good portion of the Muscovite army into a trap: after crossing the river one day and pursuing the retreating Cossacks and Tatars the next, the Muscovite cavalry was suddenly assaulted by the main body of the Crimean forces, of whose arrival the Muscovite commanders had had no reliable information. The Muscovite horsemen attempted a retreat but could not cross a river valley that the Cossacks had flooded the previous night. Muscovite losses were enormous, especially among the boyars and the officer corps. When the rest of the Muscovite army began its retreat from Konotop, which it had besieged for the previous two months, the Cossack detachment beleaguered there sallied forth to join the rest of the coalition army in pursuit of the Muscovites. Having suffered heavy losses, Aleksei Trubetskoi managed to withdraw to the town of Putyvl on the Muscovite side of the Russo-Ukrainian border. It was a stunning victory for the Polish-Tatar-Cossack coalition. News of the unprecedented defeat of the tsar’s previously invincible forces reached Moscow, causing panic there. Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich suggested that Patriarch Nikon to move to a monastery with better fortifications and ordered that the Moscow palisades be reinforced. Rumor had it that he was planning to flee beyond the Volga.

The fate of the future of Muscovite power in Ukraine hung in the balance. Since the battle was a disastrous defeat for the Muscovite forces, it
seemed at first to guarantee a sound military foundation for the political arrangement established the previous year by the Polish and Ukrainian negotiators. But that is where the story of a victorious battle ends and the narrative of a war disastrous for the Ukrainian Hetmanate continues. The battle was won, but history missed its putative turning point. In the summer of 1658 many expected a Tatar assault on Moscow. It never came. That summer the Crimean Tatars launched more than a dozen attacks on Muscovite territory, burning villages and taking close to twenty-five thousand captives. Yet this Muscovite reversal brought about no change in the balance of power in Ukraine or in Eastern Europe generally. In September Ivan Vykovsky was forced to resign the hetmancy in the face of a revolt against his rule that was supported by Muscovy but had its own indigenous roots.

The Cossack elite and the rank-and-file Cossacks were unhappy with the conditions of the Union of Hadiach, which denied most Cossack officers the prospect of attaining noble status, reduced the Cossack Host, and limited the Hetmanate’s autonomy. Dissatisfied with Vykovsky’s policies, the Cossack elite replaced him with Yurii Khmelnytsky, the son of the founder of the Cossack state, Bohdan Khmelnytsky. The Muscovite voevodas approved the results of the election, seizing the opportunity to deprive the son of some of the rights granted to his father, while still offering the Cossacks a better deal than the Poles had given them at Hadiach. But the Muscovites’ capacity to turn military defeat into political victory was soon tested by a new defection. In 1659 Yurii Khmelnytsky switched sides, taking the Polish king as his protector. The fratricidal struggle in Ukraine entered a new stage, known as the Ruin, which left most of the Cossack lands on the Right Bank of the Dnieper uninhabitable.

Konotop became a classic example of the situation in which one side wins a battle but loses the war. Why did it happen? Until recently, this question remained without a satisfactory answer. Historiographic debate on the battle focused on the number of Muscovite casualties, which ranged from five thousand to fifty thousand, depending on the sources consulted. The authors of the papers in the present collection expand the debate by considering the military, political, social, and cultural context of the battle. They also deal with its reflection in historical and literary writings from the early modern era to the present. The essays have their origin in papers presented at a conference on the 350th anniversary of the Battle of Konotop organized in Venice in December 2009 by Giovanna Brogi Bercoff of the University of Milan. The authors come from USA, Poland, Ukraine, Russia, and Italy. They represent a variety of disciplines, traditions, and schools of thought, as
well as different levels of mastery of English, slightly unaligned transliteration systems, and distinct conventions of documentation. For all that, the essays contribute to our understanding of the battle, its outcome, era, and legacy in a number of unexpected and historiographically productive ways.

The collection opens with a revisionist essay by Natalia Yakovenko on the attitudes of the Ruthenian nobility and Orthodox hierarchs toward the Cossack revolts in the decade leading up to the Union of Hadiach and the Battle of Konotop. Nobles and clergymen in the rebel ranks were among the main supporters of Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky’s policy of reconciliation with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. To understand why Vyhovsky fell and the Battle of Konotop became a mere footnote in the international history of the region, one would need to examine the differences between the Cossack and nobiliary visions of Ukrainian statehood and its relation to Ukraine’s immediate neighbors. Ever since the publication in 1912 of Waclaw Lipiński’s revolutionary studies on the role of the nobility in the Khmelnytsky Uprising, most students of the era have gone out of their way to emphasize various aspects of collaboration between the old Cossack elite and the Ruthenian nobility that joined the Cossack ranks in 1648. Natalia Yakovenko departs from this tradition, considering the nobles and hierarchs as social groups with agendas of their own that often did not coincide or coexist peacefully with the purposes of the “old Cossacks.” As she points out, some members of the nobility joined the rebel ranks voluntarily, while others did so under duress. Others still opposed the revolt altogether. Contrary to the position taken by many of her predecessors, Yakovenko shows that the choices made by nobles in 1648 and thereafter were not always determined by religious allegiance or sense of national identity. The Cossack officers on the one hand and the Ruthenian nobles and Orthodox hierarchs on the other remained distinct groups long after the start of the Khmelnytsky Uprising.

The picture becomes even more complex when Yakovenko goes on to discuss divisions within the noble stratum itself. On the one hand, the Ruthenian nobility on both sides of the Polish-Cossack divide maintained a certain level of solidarity and wanted to bring hostilities to an end. On the other hand, there were major regional divisions within the noble stratum outside the Hetmanate that manifested themselves in attitudes toward the Union of Hadiach, which promised the realization of the nobility’s long-dreamt-of Grand Duchy of Rus’. Part of the Ruthenian nobility supported the Union; others were offended that the treaty had been negotiated with the Cossacks without their participation. Fissures also emerged in the Orthodox hierarchy. Yakovenko’s research prompts the suggestion that the failure of the Union of Hadiach was as much a result of the split between the Ruthenian nobles outside the Cossack lands as it was of friction between
the Cossack and noble camps among the rebels. The Ruthenian nobility simply failed to present a united front and insist on Polish fulfillment of the treaty provisions. In Yakovenko’s view, the Battle of Konotop and the subsequent Cossack ouster of Vyhovsky marked the beginning of a new schism in Ukrainian noble society: from this point on, divisions between the Polish Right Bank and the Muscovite Left Bank would play an increasingly important role. Both groups would eventually adjust their views and loyalties to the reality of living under the rule of kings or tsars.

In many ways, Oleg Rumiantsev picks up where Natalia Yakovenko leaves off the story of the elites that tried to reconcile their patriotic feelings for the Hetmanate with their loyalty to the tsar. He examines the Russo-Ukrainian war of 1658–59 as described in the Ukrainian chronicles, the most important of which were written in the eighteenth century. They are as much historical treatises as traditional chronicles. Rumiantsev reconstructs the events of the war and the course of the Battle of Konotop on the basis of the Eyewitness Chronicle, the Dvoretsky Chronicle, and the chronicles of Hryhorii Hrabanka and Samiilo Velychko. He considers their accounts of developments and evaluates the chroniclers’ contribution to our knowledge of them. He also shows how Samiilo Velychko and others tried to steer a course between loyalty to their land and to the tsar. None of the chroniclers had a high opinion of Ivan Vyhovsky or his policy of reconciliation with Poland. For that reason, and probably also out of loyalty to the tsar, they did not rejoice in Vyhovsky’s victory at Konotop. But neither did they welcome the incursion of Muscovite armies into Ukraine. Roman Rakushka-Romanovsky, who wrote the Eyewitness Chronicle, and Samiilo Velychko described the cruelty with which the Muscovite troops treated the local population. Moreover, Velychko interpreted the khan’s order to kill Prince Semen Pozharsky, a Russian military commander who fell into Tatar hands, as retribution for the devastation of the town of Sribne, which Pozharsky’s forces had captured earlier in the campaign. As can be judged from Rumiantsev’s essay, early modern Ukrainian historical writing was quite ambiguous with regard to the Battle of Konotop and the Union of Hadiach. The authors of numerous chronicles despised Polish rule but also had no liking for Muscovite political dominance or military presence in the Hetmanate.

Piotr Kroll takes a different approach to Konotop, shifting from the Ukrainian to the Polish side of the story. He looks in particular at the vicissitudes of military cooperation between the three coalition partners—the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Crimean Khanate, and the Hetmanate. He proceeds from the premise that the Union of Hadiach and the restructured Commonwealth that it envisioned could survive only with the backing of military force, as the Muscovites would never willingly have given up the Cossack and other Commonwealth territories they had acquired
during the previous five years. Kroll argues that Hetman Vyhovsky had a threelfold political and military agenda as he entered into negotiations with Polish representatives on what would become the Union of Hadiach. He wanted to convince the Polish king to conclude a peace treaty with Sweden, which would make the two countries allies in a war on Muscovy; to help the Cossacks persuade the Crimean khan to send military assistance to the Hetmanate; and, last but not least, to prepare the Polish army to intervene in case of a Cossack-Muscovite conflict. As things turned out, it proved much easier to obtain Crimean support for the Cossacks than to arrange Polish cooperation. The Poles continued to fight the Swedes, and by early 1659 it was the khan who was trying to persuade the king to help the Cossacks, not vice versa. And at Konotop it was the Crimean cavalry, not the Polish troops that constituted the main fighting force of the coalition.

Why this particular turn of events? Kroll highlights the difficulties of the Polish treasury in paying the troops that were supposed to help Vyhovsky. Given this financial default, the Polish army of seventeen thousand declared a confederation—a form of legitimized mutiny under Commonwealth law—and did not make ready to leave for Ukraine until September 1659, more than two months after the Battle of Konotop. Even then, the available troop strength was considered insufficient for battle. The Poles did not join forces with other regiments until late October 1659. By that time Ivan Vyhovsky, the main Cossack proponent of the Union of Hadiach, was out of office. He was deposed by the Cossack officers, who switched sides when they realized that Polish assistance was not forthcoming. The victory at Konotop, achieved largely with the support of the Crimean khan, was not consolidated by the Polish side, even though Poland was not only a party to the Union of Hadiach but was also supposed to be one of its main beneficiaries. Vyhovsky had no prospect of single-handedly continuing his struggle against Muscovy or of pushing through the unpopular provisions of the Union of Hadiach at a Cossack assembly: the treaty provided for the return of the Polish and Ruthenian nobility to Ukraine. Consequently, Kroll blames the Polish side for the failure of the Union. Lacking funds and faced with a mutiny of his troops, the Polish king was in no position to deliver on his treaty commitments.

By the fall of 1659, whatever military advantages accrued to the Cossack-Polish-Tatar coalition had been reversed, and the authors of the Union of Hadiach faced the defeat of their hopes. The Union indeed became a “dead letter,” writes Mariusz Drozdowski, but the idea lived on. As he demonstrates in his essay, the next two decades witnessed numerous attempts to revive it on both the Polish and the Ukrainian sides. The first such attempt was made in October 1660, a year after the ouster of Vyhovsky, when the fortunes of war changed in favor of Poland. That month, at Chudniv and
Slobodyshche, Polish forces dealt major defeats to the Muscovites and their Cossack allies, led by Hetman Yurii Khmelnytsky. The Cossacks decided to switch sides once again, declaring their readiness to acknowledge the king’s suzerainty under the terms of the Union of Hadiach. The Poles were hesitant. Many considered the Union a concession forced on the Commonwealth by unfavorable circumstances. The agreement eventually signed with the Cossacks promised all that had been stipulated by the Union of Hadiach except the creation of a Grand Duchy of Rus’. Without that key provision, the chances of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation were nil. Drozdowski blames the Polish nobility, which placed its own privileges above the task of securing the borderlands, for turning the new agreement into another “dead letter.”

Still, the idea of the Union of Hadiach and a commonwealth of three nations lived on—at least, as Drozdowski shows, in the minds of the Cossack elite. He demonstrates that instructions presented by Cossack envoys to the Commonwealth Diets of 1664 and 1666 were informed by the provisions of the Union of Hadiach. Direct references to the Union were included in a Polish-Ukrainian agreement signed in October 1667 by the future king of Poland, Jan Sobieski, and by one of the best-known Cossack hetmans of the second half of the seventeenth century, Petro Doroshenko. The Hadiach Articles also formed the basis of the Cossack negotiating position at their deliberations with Polish representatives in the town of Ostrih in 1670. The Cossacks did not get very far in either case. What they were offered instead of the Grand Duchy and other provisions of the Union was a return to the king’s rule with guarantees of religious freedom and estate rights. The idea of a commonwealth of three nations dreamed up by the Ruthenian nobility was buried forever. This was confirmed in the negotiations conducted with the Cossacks by Jan Sobieski after his election to the throne in 1674. The Cossacks were not the formidable adversaries they once had been, and the Polish state would not grant the concessions they asked for. Once again, Drozdowski lays the blame at the feet of the nobility, which refused to make the Cossacks partners and co-owners of the Commonwealth.

Ksenia Konstantynenko’s essay traces changes in Italian depictions of the Cossacks through the late sixteenth century and most of the seventeenth, linking Venice (and Italy), where the conference took place, with its faraway subject—the Cossacks of Ukraine. The essay is concerned with outsiders’ views of the Cossack wars of the period, often introduced into Italian historiography and literature by the Venetians, who had a long-standing interest in political and military developments in Eastern Europe. If most previous students of Cossack subjects in the Italian “literature of fact” were interested largely in “fact”, mining the narratives of the period for information about developments in the region, Konstantynenko puts the empha-
sis on “literature.” She claims that throughout the entire period, one topos maintained its importance in Italian description of Ukraine and its inhabitants. It was first introduced into European letters by Maciej Miechowski, who depicted the northern Black Sea region in the early sixteenth century as an ultimate frontier, a land of abundance populated by strange animals and brave but ruthless Barbarians who combined the features of ancient Sarmatians and Amazons.

While this topos can be detected in almost all later writings on the subject, the seventeenth century also brought new approaches to the subject. These can be linked not only to a change in models of literary depiction and imagination but also to the political and military interests of the Italian states. As the Ukrainian Cossacks became important participants in wars against the Ottoman Empire—the main military and geopolitical adversary of Venice and other early modern Italian states—the depiction of the Cossacks in Italian literature took on new characteristics. In writings of the first half of the century they are often portrayed as brave Christian warriors who defended their faith and homeland against Muslim invaders. This image accorded closely with the depiction of the Cossacks in Polish literature after the Battle of Khotyn (1621), in which Cossack detachments helped the Polish army defeat the Ottoman forces led by Sultan Osman II. It was also congruent with the Poles’ conception of their country as Antemurale Christianitatis. The outbreak of the Khmelnytsky Uprising and the possibility of enlisting the Hetmanate as an ally against the Ottomans helped develop a new image of the Cossacks as fighters for the freedom of their homeland.

But once the Cossacks decided to part ways with the Polish king, they were regarded with growing suspicion by Italian authors, whose polities, patrons, and reading public still thought of the Commonwealth as a major ally in the anti-Ottoman struggle. Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, portrayed by Alberto Vimina in positive terms as a leader of the Spartan type, was cast by his fellow Venetian Maiolino Bisaccioni as a traitor to the king soon after the Pereiaslav Agreement. The shift of the Cossacks (at least in buona parte) back toward Poland, as manifested by the conclusion of the Union of Hadiach and the Battle of Konotop, gave rise to a more nuanced interpretation of the Cossack topos and Cossack political choices in the Italian “literature of fact.” In his Historia di Leopoldo Cesare (1670), Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato presented the Cossack-Polish conflict as a three-sided contest in which the Ukrainian Cossacks did their best to remain loyal to the king but were spurned by the selfish nobility. Surprisingly, some elements of Priorato’s interpretation of Cossack-Polish relations of the period stood the test of time and made their way into the modern literature of the subject.

Tatiana Yakovleva brings the discussion of the Battle of Konotop and its era into the sphere of present-day political and historiographic concerns as
she engages current Russian and, in part, Ukrainian historiography on the subject. Early in her essay, she asks why a battle that had no major influence on the political and military realities of the period has received so much attention in recent historiography. Her answer will not surprise anyone who closely follows current political developments in Russia and Ukraine. It is pure politics—a peculiar type of post-Soviet politics, one might add—whereby both countries and historiographic communities are trying to define their new identities. Yakovleva argues that when it comes to Russian interpretations of the battle and the period in general, the approaches chosen by some authors are anything but new. Like their imperial and Soviet predecessors, Russian historians of today are inclined to present all Ukrainian hetmans who rebelled against Muscovy as negative figures, reserving positive treatment for their opponents. Yakovleva takes particular note of the works of Igor Babulin, arguably the leading Russian expert on the battle and its era. In his work she finds not only the repetition of Soviet-era cliches but also inadequate knowledge of the sources and of recent and not so recent literature on the subject. The essay calls almost desperately for the depoliticization of research on the history of Russo-Ukrainian relations.

It is heartening to think of this volume of essays as a step in just that direction. In analyzing a military victory that, oddly enough, did not change the course of history, the authors contribute to the exploration of historical alternatives and thus to a better understanding of the complexities of early modern international history.
The instructions of the Lutsk dietine for its delegates at the 1645 Diet open with a glorification of peace: «Miedzy Bozkiem dobrodziejstwu pokóy jest naiwyssze dobrodziejstwo [...]. Gdy tedy świata chrześcijańskiego wszystkie symmetriae ardent bello, w samej tylko oyczyznie naszey złoty kwitnie pokóy...»1 [Peace is the highest of all divine graces [...] While all the Christian world symmetriae ardent bello, only in our sweet fatherland does golden peace flourish]. The Volhynian szlachta referred to the Thirty Years’ War, but the metaphor of «golden peace», so often quoted by their contemporaries, soon took on a new meaning: it came to signify the decade between 1638, when the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth successfully suppressed the Cossack revolts, and 1648, which marked the outbreak of the Cossack uprising. In Ukrainian historic memory, this decade is conceptualized not as one of «golden peace», but rather as a lull before the storm, rife with internal tensions. This view was formed not only by historiographic writings, but also by fiction: suffice it to mention the classical novel Before the Storm by Mykhajlo Staryts’kyj (1894), the writer who came to be regarded by later critics as an icon «of the whole Ukrainian cultural and social movement»2. In

1 Arxhiv Jugo-Zapadnoj Rossii, izdavaemyj Vremennoj komissiej dlya razbora drevnikh aktov [in further mentions – Arxhiv JuZR], ch. 2, t. 1, Kiev, 1861: 284.

2 Zerov M., Literaturna pozytsija M. Staryts'kyho (v dvadtsat' p'jati rokovyny smerti), in: idem,
historical writings, meanwhile, this concept was immortalized by Mykhajlo Hrushevsky’skyj in his *History of Ukraine-Rus’*: «golden peace» is mentioned in the title of the chapter in quotation marks³, whereas the preface further stresses that the decade described was but an «intermission», «a short pause in the ... inevitable unraveling of the historical process»⁴.

Hrushevsky’skyj was right, as far as the Cossacks were concerned. Having been left weakened and reeling after the Diet constitution «Ordynacja Wojska Zaporowskiego registrowego w służbie Rzeczypospolitej będącego»⁵ (1638), the Cossacks perceived this decade as a mere pause in their fight for self-assertion. However, Hrushevsky’skyj’s further claim that the decade marked the maturing of «the one indivisible feeling of national bondage» for «the whole Rus’ nation»⁶ requires more comment. It is widely known that Hrushevsky’skyj viewed only the lower strata of society as the «nation», since, for him, they were opposed to the «de-nationalized» szlachta and preserved Ukrainian ethnicity⁷. In a particularly caustic remark, Hrushevsky’skyj states that szlachta remained «deaf and dumb» throughout the pre-war decade, and cared only for the «uninterrupted continuance of the blessed calm»⁸. While conscientiously documenting the rapid acceleration of the pace of life during the late 1630s and throughout the 1640s (when the steppe borderlands were mastered, religious life became livelier and education developed)⁹, he fails to mention that these changes were instigated by this very same «deaf and dumb» szlachta; on the contrary, he keeps emphasizing that the scope of the changes could not possibly have been significant since «they could not have driven the people to revolt»¹⁰.

Of course, the szlachta had no intention of instigating further revolts. Moreover, during the «golden peace», when the State was not torn by internal or external wars, the territories that soon became the epicentre of the Cossack rebellion saw the rise of a distinct «Ruthenian patriotism», described later on in this article. Meanwhile, the surprisingly short period

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⁴ Ibid., 3.
⁹ Ibid., 43-50, 83-112.
¹⁰ Ibid., 51.
between the beginning of the war and the Battle of Konotop (1659), which eradicated all hope of a return to the world of the past, encompassed numerous phenomena concomitant to social cataclysms, such as political and social transformations and maneuverings, the polarization of views, survival-related adaptations, etc. Such fluctuations can obviously not be described in this short article, so my notes will by necessity remain sketchy. First, I will try to outline briefly the worldviews and priorities of the szlachta and church hierarchs on the eve of war; second, I will outline the strategies for adapting to the new situation, as well as the renewed hopes of a return to the status quo after the Treaty of Hadjach; third, and last, I will illustrate the rifts between the szlachta and the church hierarchs: they began with the Treaty of Hadjach and were consolidated by the subsequent war and political chaos.

THE DECADE OF OPTIMISM

In 1647, the outlook of the szlachta and the Orthodox church hierarchs of the Ukrainian palatinates of Bratslav, Volhynia, Kyiv and Chernihiv (which were soon to become battlefields and then Cossack territories) could be described as «brimming with optimism». Recently published works on the economic and public life of the region testify to that fact. For example, Petro Kulakows’kyj resorts to a range of different sources in order to outline the great scope of economic changes («modernization», as the author puts it) in the Chernihiv-Sivers’k area; this had once been the backwoods of Muscovy but it returned to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1618 and became the Chernihiv palatinate in 1635. Kulakows’kyj’s treatise documents the rapid colonization of these territories, the rise in the urban population, improvements in economic infrastructure and developments in communication networks, etc.11. Similar advancements in former loca deserta reclaimed at the steppe frontiers of Bratslavshchyna are documented in the monograph by Mykola Krykun, which lists 50 urban settlements first mentioned in sources at the end of the 1630s12.

The particular characteristics of the events connected to the public dietines of these territories are no less telling. For example, Henryk Litwin has thoroughly analyzed the composition of dietine delegates from the Kyiv palatinate and the dynamics by which this was determined: he came to the conclusion that during the second quarter of the 17th C. affluent local groups

became the true leaders and «masters», as he put it, of the Kyivan szlachta corporation, keeping their political decisions relatively independent with respect to the agenda of the magnates. Karol Mazur’s observations on Volhynian dietine life, where local priorities took precedence as early as the end of the 16th C., led to similar conclusions, which are supported by a number of occurrences. These include protests against the documents from the Royal Chancellery being sent to Volhynia in Latin or Polish rather than in «Ruthenian»; vehement defences of the so-called «Volhynian right», i.e. use of the Lithuanian Statute; protection of the «Greek faith» against the church union; widespread indignation at the 1638 Diet’s attempt to abolish princely titles, which the szlachta perceived as a symbol of the singularity of the Ukrainian palatinates incorporated into the Polish Crown in 1569.

It is worth noting that corporate solidarity was more important to representatives of local communities than any denominational differences. This is illustrated by the breakdown of the figures among the 32 delegates that represented Volhynia at the Diets of 1638-1647 (some repeatedly): Orthodox Christians and Catholics were almost equally represented (10 and 11 respectively), followed by 5 Protestants and 6 people of unclear denomination. At the 1634 dietine of the Bratslav palatinate, as one contemporary source remarked, «the votes were counted by bullets» because of the conflict between prince Stefan Chetvertyns’kyj (Orthodox) and the local starosta Adam Kalinowski (Catholic): the «parties» of both leaders featured members of both denominations. The same trends were recorded at the Kyiv dietines of the late 1630s-1640s: the local Catholic «party» was headed by palatine Janusz Tyszkiewicz, whereas his main opponent in the battle for power, the Antitrinitarian Jurij Nemyrych, garnered the sympathy not only of numerous Kyiv Protestants, but also of Orthodox locals. Neither did denominational differences stand in the way of szlachta solidarity in the Chernihiv palatinate, where Petro Kulakovs’kyj estimated that at least half of the landlords were Orthodox Christians from Ukrainian palatinates. However, when they cared more about the prestige of their «small fatherland» than a fight for leadership, Catholic converts were guided by their «Ruthenian» sensibility first and foremost. For example, in autumn

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15 Their names are listed in: ibid., 417-419.
17 Litwin H., Równi do równych: 151.
18 Kulakovs’kyj P., Chernihovo-Sivershchyna u skладi Rechi Pospolotí: 165.
1647, such Kyiv Ruthenian nobles as Oleksandr and Remihijan Jel’ts (who converted to Catholicism in 1632 and before 1647 respectively) solicited the General of the Society of Jesus Vincenzo Carafa to turn the Jesuit residence founded by Oleksandr in Ksaveriv (near Ovruch) in 1635 into an institute of higher education: «aby w tych państwach ruskich te altiora studia młodzieży naszej ruskiej tłumaczył»19 [in order to elucidate those altiora studia to our Ruthenian youths]. It should also be noted that the outbreak of the Cossack uprising reinforced this sense of solidarity regardless of the denominations: in the decision of the Kyiv dietine of December 25, 1648, the szlachta of various denominations pledged to «pokój między sobą zachować, a dla różnej wiary greckiej i rzymskiej krwi nie rozlewać ... jako spólni i zgodni bracia...»20 [Preserve the peace between us and refrain from spilling blood for Greek or Roman faith ... as brothers of unity and accord...].

Frank Sysyn posits that local solidarity became more broadly regional around 1635, when the Chernihiv palatinate was granted the same administrative and legal specificities confirmed by the Union of Lublin (1569) for the Volhynian and Kyivan palatinates, then newly-incorporated into the Crown21. This assumption is supported by the fact that the dietine delegates of Chernihiv-Sivershchyna started to coordinate their politics with the Volhynians as early as the 1640s: this means that, like the Kyivans and Bratslavans, they started to consider the Volhynian dietine as the «leading» dietine for the whole region22. The four palatinates formed on the eastern borders of the State differed from the rest of the kingdom not only in terms of their rights and administrative organization, but also ethnically and denominationally; according to Sysyn, this led to a blend of regional («Ruthenian») patriotism, the realization of cultural otherness and ‘participation’ in the heritage of the «ancient Ruthenian nation»23.

Two factors fostered the creation of the szlachta’s «historic memory», in which the «Ruthenian» past supplanted their own history. On the one hand, there was a strong influence of secular and ecclesiastical writings that rapidly developed in the 1620s-30s and narrated «the complete history» of Rus’, its rulers and its church, with Kyiv as its capital24. On the other hand,

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19 Litwin H., Równi do równych: 133.
22 Kulakovs’kyj P., Chernihovo-Sivershchyna u skladi Rechi Pospolitoї: 146-147.
24 An analysis of the earliest work of this kind, Camoenae Borystenides, can be found in: Jakovenko N., Latyna na službî kyjevo-rus’koї istorî («Camoenae Borystenides», 1620 rik), in:
the deeds of rulers and the history of the state had to be supplemented with more «personalized» historical accounts, which elevated the average szlachta into lofty historical plots and made the past of Rus’ emotionally relevant. I think that the armorial written by the Dominican monk Szymon Okolski (1641-1645) perfectly fulfilled this function: it brought its readers closer to Ruthenian history, which became a set of Kyiv, Volhynian and Bratslav armorial legends, most of which were «tied» to the Rus’ heritage. This undermines the traditional assumption that predominance of Rus’ motifs in local historical conscience was primarily linked to the defence of the Orthodox Church. Without going any further into this issue, which after all is only tangentially related to the topic under consideration, I would like to mention that «Ruthenian patriotism» was shared likewise by Ruthenian Uniates (such as Meletij Smotryts’kyj), Ruthenian Protestants (such as Jurij Nemrych, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Rus’, established in 1658), and Ruthenian Catholics (such as the Dominican monk Jan Dombrowski, who wrote the first historical poem glorifying Kyiv, *Camoenae Borysthenides*). As to Szymon Okolski, his «Ruthenian patriotism» became apparent not only in his armorial, but also in the subsequent *Russia florida*, where the tale of the Dominican Ruthenian province is supplemented by data on the ancient Ruthenian past; to prove his point, he also liberally quotes the glorification of the princes from the above-mentioned poem by Dombrowski.

The Volhynian politician Adam Kysil, in his glorious *votum* at the Diet of 1641, where the use of princely titles was harshly debated (since Crown szlachta interpreted them as an insult to the ideal of szlachta equality, where-
as Kyiv and Volhynian szlachta perceived them as a symbol of their singularity\textsuperscript{30}, draws a clear distinction between the «Ruthenian» and Polish nations; the former term refers only to the szlachta of the territories incorporated under the Crown through the Union of Lublin: «Primum, że przodkowie nasi Sarmatae Rossi do w. m., do Sarmatas Polonos libere accesserunt, cum suis diis penatibus przyniesiśl prowincje... [...] A my non ad regionem, sed cum regione, non ad religionem, sed cum religione, nie do tytułów i honorów, ale z tytułami i honorami accessimus do tej spólnej ojczyzny naszej»\textsuperscript{31} [Primum, our ancestors Sarmatae Rossi brought the provinces to You, my Gracious Lords, to Sarmatas Polonos libere accesserunt, cum suis diis penatibus [...] And we non ad regionem, sed cum regione, non ad religionem, sed cum religione, not to titles and honours, but with them accessimus to our common fatherland].

The concept of a voluntary union between «Ruthenian Sarmates» and their Polish counterparts («not in the country, but with the country, not in faith, but with faith»), around which the votum was centered, was not invented by Kysil'. It was first voiced by the Kyiv hieromonk Zakharija Kopystens’kyj in his 1621 treatise Palinode, or The Book of Defence\textsuperscript{32}: to prove the legality of the unsanctioned restoration of the Orthodox hierarchy in 1620, he stresses that the rights and privileges of the Kyiv Orthodox metropolitan were acknowledged by the Polish kings when «Ruthenian princes were voluntarily joining the Polish Crown according to the conditions of certain pacts»\textsuperscript{33}. Since those who took part in further polemics saw the world through the lenses of the szlachta democracy, the aforementioned «Ruthenian princes» came to be viewed as the «Ruthenian nation», that is, as the szlachta that voluntarily joined the Crown on condition that its rights would be acknowledged. In his anonymously published treatise Justifikacja niewinności (1623), Meletij Smotryts’kyj described this process as follows: «Zą taką wolnością z wolnymi narodami Polskim i Litewskim Ruski naród złączył się w jedno ciało, o jedne się głowę spoił i oparł»\textsuperscript{34} [The Ruthenian


\textsuperscript{31} Quoted after appendices to the article by Frank Sysyn: Regionalism and Political Thought in Seventeen-Century Ukraine: 186, 189.

\textsuperscript{32} For analysis of this work as a type of «program» for Kyiv ecclesiastical evolution in Mohylan and pre-Mohylan times, see: Jakovenko N., Symvol «Bogokhranimogo grada»: 311-332.

\textsuperscript{33} Pamjatniki polemicheskoy literatury v Zapadnoj Rusi, Kn 1, SPb, 1878, Stb. 1110 («Russkaya istoricheskaia biblioteka», t. 4).

\textsuperscript{34} Quoted after: Arkhiv JuZR, ch. 1, t. 7, Kiev, 1887: 514.
nation freely united into one body, crowned and joined by one head, with the Polish and Lithuanian nations] (this same passage almost verbatim can also be found in «Supplicacja», offered to the Diet by Orthodox szlachta in 1623; here, the «Ruthenian nation» is described as «the third nation» of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth\(^35\)). Amongst the then-popular recitals of the rights that the Orthodox Church was unfairly deprived of\(^36\), it is worth mentioning the Synopsis, albo Krótkie spisanie praw (Vilno, 1632), which quotes the incorporation privilege (1569) in order to prove that the Union of Lublin was the voluntary union of «rownych do rownych, wolnych do wolnych»\(^37\) [equals with equals, the free with the free]. In that same year the Lutsk dietine, held on the eve of the Election Diet, resolved to refrain from electing a new king until «we, the Ruthenian nation ... without exceptions» (totaliter) have all our rights reinstated, as set out in the 1569 privilege\(^38\) (note also that the marshal of the dietine that approved such a drastic resolution was Andrzej Firlej, himself a Polish Protestant\(^39\)).

After that, the Lublin privilege was quoted in most dietine instructions on various occasions; this shows that by the 1640s the idea of the «third nation» in the Commonwealth of Two Nations, which had first surfaced twenty years earlier, had grown strong and popular both amongst the ethnically Ruthenian szlachta and their Polish «brothers» and neighbours, regardless of their denominations.

The idea of «the third nation» – albeit in a somewhat different interpretation – had also spread amongst church hierarchs, who, after all, were szlachta themselves. This gave rise to numerous endeavors, started in the 1620s, to reunite Orthodox and Uniate Church hierarchs and, possibly, to create a united Ruthenian (Kyivan) Patriarchate. Such initiatives were not dampened by the fiasco of the Lviv unificatory council of 1629: the second attempt was made in 1635-1636, when Petro Mohyla was a metropolitan; however, it was impeded by interference from the Holy See\(^40\). The last wave of

\(^{35}\) Published in: Dokumenty, objasnajushchie istoriju Zapadno-russkogo kraja i ego otnoshenie k Rossii i Poleshe, 1b, 1865: 230-310.


\(^{37}\) Quoted after: Arkhiv JuZR, ch. 1, t. 7: 547.

\(^{38}\) Arkhiv JuZR, ch. 2, t. 1: 203.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 207.

negotiations came in 1642-1646; however, it was delayed by the sudden death of Petro Mohyla, whereas the council for unification set for 16 July, 164841 was interrupted by the outbreak of the Cossack uprising.

In fact, the Cossacks were the main opponents to the Orthodox hierarchs’ attempts to enter into talks with their Uniate counterparts42. Therefore, it is no wonder that the leaders of the Orthodox Church came to view their unpredictable defenders with growing unease. In fact, they no longer relied on Cossack sabers for their protection after the Kyivan Orthodox metropolitanate was legally re-established, when Petro Mohyla was reinstated in his rights by the King’s diploma of 1633. The «anti-Cossack course», started by Mohyla himself, can be traced through many works published in the Cave monastery during his life. Such works often criticize «rebels from Zaporizhia» and glorify the heroes who courageously suppressed the «Cossack rebellions». Among the most outstanding works we may recall the Patericon by Syl’vestr Kosov (1635), Teratourghema by Afanasij Kal’nofojs’kyj (1638), the funerary sermon on the death of Illja Chetvertens’kyj by Ihnatij Starushychn (1641), the panegyric to Adam Kysil’ by Teodozij Bajevs’kyj (1646), some polemical notes in the prefaces to ecclesiastical works, and others. Having changed their strategic guidelines, Kyivan hierarchs resorted to the usual church tactics of securing the support and patronage of «important people». For Petro Mohyla, who was the heir of Moldavian rulers, these «important people» included King Władysław IV43, the Crown Chancellor Tomasz Zamoyski44, the princes Chetvertens’kyj45, senator Adam Kysil’46, and Volhynian and Kyiv nobles rather than Cossack leaders.


45 For more information on «elaborations» of Chetvertenskjy’s genealogy as supposed heirs to Kyivan Rus’ princes and, therefore, patrons of the Orthodoxy Church, initiated in Kyiv church circles, see: Jakovenko N., Vnesok heral’dyky u tvorennja «terytorij z istorijeju», «Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva imeni Shevchenka», 2010, vol. CCLX, kn. 1: 274-298.

46 See also: Kakovenko N., Kyiv pid shatrom Sventol’dychiv (mohyljan’s’kyj panehryk Tentoria venienti Kioviam 1646 p.), in: Nel mondo degli Slavi. Incontri e dialoghi tra culture. Studi in onore
After the death of Petro Mohyla, Syl’estr Kosov became the Kyivan metropolitan in February 1647. He actively implemented Mohyla’s reforms; the Holy See deemed it politically advantageous to carry on further negotiations for a possible Orthodox-Uniate understanding\(^{47}\). After the church stabilized there were several reasons for an optimistic outlook for the future: the collegium that Mohyla had founded on the Jesuit model was flourishing, publishing was blossoming and, thanks to liturgical reforms, discipline was established in the life of the church. As I\(h\)or Shevchenko metaphorically put it, «spirits were uplifted, and minds were expanding»\(^{48}\). However, not a year had passed before the war destroyed all hopes of uniting «Rus’ with Rus’» in one «Ruthenian nation of Greek faith».

**In the Turmoil of War**

The Cossack uprising came as an unexpected blow. Though military leaders may have noticed warning signs, it came as a surprise even to prince Jarema Wi\-\(ś\)niowiecki, an altogether well-informed politician. The prince failed to pay heed to the note he received on February 15, drawing his attention to the fact that «Chmielnicki jakiś zebra\(ś\)zy trochę hultajstwa z Zaporo\(ž\)a spę\(ź\)dził pu\(ł\)k kor\(s\)ruiski» [having gathered some ruffians in Zaporo\(ž\)hai, Kh\(m\)el’\(n\)y\(t\)s’\(k\)y\(j\) took over the Korsun’ regiment]; he spent March and April in Lubny and it was not until late April that he sent a servant to reconnoiter at the hetman’s headquarters on the Dnipro’s right bank\(^{49}\). The szlachta of Kyiv, Bratslav, Chernihiv and Volhynia, shocked by the news of the defeat of the Crown forces in late May 1648 and the ensuing chaos, turned en masse to flee the war-torn region; their flight gave origin to frightening rumors and apocalyptic expectations. However, this shock would soon wear off, as shocks do. Life demanded adaptation to the changing circumstances, and the first strategies of adaptation became apparent in 1648.

The Kyiv Orthodox hierarchs provide remarkable examples of political flexibility. On the eve of the uprising, on May 1, 1648, when there were still hopes that this Cossack revolt would be suppressed as efficiently as the previous ones, the Cave monastery press published a panegyric for Jeremi Wi\-\(ś\)niowiecki (the most powerful magnate in Dnipro Ukraine) who was ex-


pected to pass through Kyiv⁵⁰. Facing the danger which appeared evident already in February-March (and which was well-known in Kyiv), the Kyivan poets tried to prove their loyalty not only with the text, but also with an etching predicting Jeremi’s victory over the rebels: amongst the enemies crushed by «Korybut»’s chariot, in the foreground, there is a Cossack. Not a year would pass before these very same professors of the Kyiv-Mohyla collegium would greet the triumphant entry of Bohdan Khmeln'kyj into Kyiv on January 2, 1649 with «orations and acclamations», calling him «Moses, the savior and liberator of his people from Polish bondage»⁵¹.

However, such «liberation from Polish bondage» brought Kyivan hierarchs more trouble than good. Metropolitan Syl'vestr Kosov showed forced loyalty to the new Cossack rulers, but in his 1651 letter to the hetman of Lithuania, Janusz Radzywill stated that he had spent 4 years in fear of the Cossacks⁵². The situation became even more complicated after Khmeln'kyj swore allegiance to the Muscovite czar with the Treaty of Perejaslav (1654). Kyivan hierarchs at first refused to swear the concomitant oath, but were soon forced to do so; the czar, however, issued the deed acknowledging the status of the Kyivan metropolitanate only later, at Khmeln'kyj’s insistence: this allowed the latter to gain patronage over the church (which formerly belonged to the king) in the Cossack-controlled territories⁵³. The clergy, however, had de facto acknowledged this patronage ever since the outbreak of the war: fearing looting, they obtained decrees (universal) of protection from the hetman in the form of deeds confirming land ownership for monasteries and granting them properties whose former owners had fled⁵⁴.

The szlachta experienced similar upheavals. It is hard to say how many of them were swept up by the first tide of the uprising. The Muscovite envoy Grigorij Kunakov reported from Warsaw that the szlachta started arriving at Khmeln'kyj’s headquarters even before the Cossacks had left Zaporizhia;

⁵⁰ Maiores illustrissimorum principum Korybut Wiszniewiecciorum in suo nepote ... Jeremia Korybut Wiszniewiecki... Ab auditoribus eloquentiae in Collegio Mohilaeano Kioviensi comice cum eorum gestis memorabilibus celebrati. Anno D[omi]ni 1648, Maii die 1. For more in-depth analysis of the panegyric, see: Jakovenko N., «Effusus populus, tota plebs witała go w polu, i Academia oracyami i acclamacyami, tamquam Moijsem, servatorem, salvatorem, liberatorem populi de servitute Lechica...» (Jakuba Michałowskiego ... księga pamiętniczca, wyd. A. Z. Helcel, Kraków, 1864: 377).


⁵² Ibid., 257-260.

⁵³ Khmeln'kyj had issues 6 such universals as early as in 1648; later on, their number varied from 3-4 to 7-9 per year: Universaly Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho, 1648-1657, upor. I. Kryp'jakevych, I. Butych, Kyïv, Al'ternatyvy, 1998.
In December 1649 he communicated that Khmel’nyts’kyj’s troops numbered 40,000 Cossacks and 6,000 szlachta\footnote{Akty, otnosjashchiesja k istorii Juzhnoj i Zapadnoj Rossii, izdannye Arkheograficheskoj komissiye [in further mentions – Akty JuZR], t. 3 (1648-1657), SPb, 1862: 281, 404.}. These figures are tangentially corroborated by Wojciech Miaskowski’s diary of Ukrainian events in late 1648 - early 1649: he noted that many of «our traitors» (meaning the szlachta) joined the Cossack forces, and stressed that szlachta «uchodzą utriusque sexus, panny nawet»\footnote{Jakuba Michałowskiego ... księga pamiętnicza: 383.} [leave utriusque sexus, even young ladies]. Sources do not offer an exact estimate of the numbers, but everything points to the fact that they were quite substantial. In the Cossack registry of autumn 1649, Vjacheslav Lypyns’kyj has identified (not always convincingly) 1,500 representatives of 750 szlachta families\footnote{Lypyns’kyj V., Uchast’ shljakhty u velykomy ukrains’komu povstanni: 571 (index of names: 557-566).}. In addition, the amnesty offered to members of the szlachta by the Treaties of Zboriv (1649) and of Bila Tserkva (1651) also testify to the fact that many nobles joined the uprising: «Szlachcie tak religii ruskiej, jako i rzymskiej, którzy podczas zamieszania tego jakimkolwiek sposobem bawili się przy Wojsku Zaporoskim, Jego Królewską Mość z pańskiej swojej łaski przebacza i występek ich pokrywa»\footnote{Ugody polsko-ukraińskie w XVII wieku. Pol’s’ko-ukraïns’ki uhody v XVII stolitti, Red. i tłum. O. Aleksejczuk, Kraków, Wydawnictwo «Platan», 2002: 40 (Treaty of Zboriv). In the Treaty of Bila Tserkva: «...tych wszystkich ma okrywać admistitia, przy zdrowiach, honorach, kondycjach i substancjach swoich mają być zachowani» (p. 44) [...they are all covered by the admistitia, to continue in their livelihood, honours, conditions and substances].} [His Royal Majesty in his lordly kindness grants pardon and forgiveness to all szlachta of both Ruthenian and Roman faith who had in any way liaised with the Zaporizhia army in those skirmishes].

Lypyns’kyj conceptualized szlachta joining the uprising as a final and nationally-motivated decision driven by what he calls a «poczucie narodowej jedności»\footnote{Lypyns’kyj V., Uchast’ shljakhty u velykomy ukrains’komu povstanni: 94.} [feeling of national solidarity]. In truth, the situation could not have been so straightforward. Many szlachta that turned to Cossacks in the wake of the Battle of Zhovti Vody (April 15-16, 1648) explained later that they were forced into «Cossack captivity» in order to escape death or Tatar bondage. Whether this was true or not, not a skirmish passed without several szlachta switching allegiance to save their lives. For example, a memoirist notes that in July 1649, each day several soldiers escaped to Khmel’nyts’kyj from the famished Zbaraż fortress, where the royal forces resided\footnote{Relacje wojenne z pierwszych lat walk polsko-kozackich powstania Bohdana Chmielnickiego okresu «Ogniem i mieczem» (1648-1651), opr. M. Nagielski, Warszawa, Viking, 1999: 156. The same sometimes with indication of names: Relacja ekspedycyjnej w roku Pańskim 1649 przeciw Chmielnickiemu rytmem polskim przez Marcina Kuczwarewicza ... przełożona, Lublin, 1650. Quoted after the reprint: Arma Cosacica. Poezja okolicznościowa o wojnie polsko-kozackiej (1648-1649), 60}. The
opposite happened during the battle of Berestechko in July 1651, which resulted in a disaster for the Cossack army. In April 1649, that is before the first amnesty, there are mentions of a Volhynian noble who had just come back «from the free Cossacks, whom he had joined in their war efforts».

After the amnesty, in November 1649, the Cossack colonel of Ovruch Ivan Brujak was already a deputy of the starosta of Ovruch Vladyslav Nemrych and a soldier in his regiment; in Polissja in 1650 and 1652, however, he once again headed the Cossack movement. By 1652, the noble Pavlo Fylypovs'kyj, mentioned in 1648 as a Cossack sotnyk, had settled in his estate, threatening to kill his neighbour and rival as soon as another «war with the Lachy [Poles]» starts.

This panoply of shifting and changing proves that joining, leaving, or re-joining Cossack forces was not always a matter of «national» choice. After the initial shock, the szlachta grew accustomed to the war and tried to act according to the demands of the moment. Since many of the szlachta were forced to flee the war-torn territories, the moment was not conducive to loyalty to the Polish Crown. In his poetic description of the Battle of Pyljavit (September 1648), which was a disaster for the King's army, an anonymous soldier rhetorically asks, while describing the plight of the «chudych niebożat» [«famished poor devils»], fugitives like himself: «Czemuż Rzeczypospolita drogi im nie ścielie?» [why doesn't the Commonwealth pave the way for them?]. There was some ground to these complaints: when the szlachta from Kyiv, Bratslav and Chernihiv asked at the Election Diet of autumn 1648 that their families be sheltered in vacant estates on the royal lands, the issue was ignored. The author of a later pamphlet relates that the King said such words about the Belarusian fugitives: «Powiadanio, iż wszyscy pozabijano w tym województwie i w tym powiecie – a to jeszcze ich diabół nie wziął, że mi dokuczają» [They say that everybody in that palatinat and that powiat was slaughtered, so why don't they go to the devil and quit pestering me?]. Adam Kysil reacted to the indifference of the delegates at the Election Diet by stating that they have no choice but to fend for themselves.

62 Arkhiv JuZR, ch. 3, t. 4: 121-122.
64 Na «Trąbę» żołnierska odpowiedź w roku 1648. [S.l., 1648], in: Arma Cosacica: 80.
selves («nielza jedno o sobie radzić» [one should not care only for his own hide])\(^67\). No wonder, therefore, that the szlachta resorted to a variety of ways of dealing with the issue, including joining the Cossacks: by 1649, most colonels of the Zaporizhian Host and almost the whole of Khmel’nits’kyj’s Chancellery were Polish nobles\(^68\).

However, friends and relatives who found themselves on opposing sides did not break off all ties. The anonymous memoirist of the Siege of Zbarazh notes that a one-day armistice on July 24, 1649 was passed in «rozmowach przyjacielskich» (companionable chatter) between the besieged and their captors. The besieged, having been cut off from sources of information, asked their adversaries about news from home: «O domowe rzeczy pytali się niektórzy, aż za wał wyszedszy tabakąśmy ich częstowali»\(^69\) [Some asked about the goings-on at their home, they went over to the ramparts and treated them with tobacco]. The instruction of the Volhynian dietine for its delegates to the Diet (1655) provides another telling detail: the szlachta demanded that private excursions to the territories controlled by the Zaporizhian Host\(^70\) should be banned, which means that such outings, as well as the «confidential contacts» mentioned therein, were rather common.

The szlachta may have become used to war, but they grew tired of it too: during the course of the above-mentioned «rozmowy przyjacielskie» [friendly talks] of 1649, the opponents bitterly complained to each other: «compassio, że się krwią chrześcijańską niewinnie leje»\(^71\) [compassio that innocent Christian blood is being spilled]. However, the political elite’s take on the conditions of the truce might have differed considerably from the opinions of commoners from the war-ravished lands\(^72\): rumors of a truce


\(^{68}\) See biographical comparisons in: Lypynsk’yj V., Uchast’ shljakhty u velykomy ukraïns’komy powstanni: 211-223.

\(^{69}\) Relacje wojenne z pierwszych lat walk polsko-kozackich: 139.

\(^{70}\) Natsional’no-vyzvol’na vijna v Ukraïni: 345.

\(^{71}\) Relacje wojenne z pierwszych lat walk polsko-kozackich: 139.

spread faster than actual negotiations. The expectations linked to the upcoming treaty can be gleaned from a diary entry by the Orthodox gentryman Joachim Jerlicz, who, having spent the first years of the uprising in Cave monastery, by mid-1651 had settled in Volhynia. In the entry dated July 10, 1658, having briefly mentioned the Diet that started on that day, Jerlicz posits that the treaty was already settled and sworn on, and even goes so far as to recount its clauses. These «clauses» are but approximations of the upcoming treaty, and they depart drastically from preliminary clauses set out in the secret negotiations between Pavlo Teterja and Stanisław Bieniewski on July 5, 1658 (these negotiations, however, which had lasted for several months and started in Dubno [Volhynia] in March, could hardly have been kept secret from the local szlachta). In the Diet instructions compiled on June 22, on the eve of this agreement, by Kyivans, Bratslavians and Chernihivans (their joint dietine took place in Volodymyr, Volhynia) there were demands that their «komisarze z naszych województw naznaczeni byli» [that commissars from our palatinates be appointed] be privy to compiling clauses of truce with the Cossacks.

This means that the «Jerlicz version» of the treaty was apocryphal: a wide-spread concept woven from rumors and passed from hand to hand (for example, when preparing this «popular» version for publication, Vasyl’ Harasymchuk had used two other copies rather than the one from the Jerlicz chronicle). The clause most representative of the szlachta outlook of the times is not the amnesty for the rebels (as in the Teterja/Bieniews-

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Jerlicz J., *Latopisie abo Krynyckza roźnych spraw i dziechownych i terazniejszych czasow*: 214-217. Later, after the entries of February and March of 1659, the true text of the treaty as approved in Hadzach is included (p. 219-232).

Published: Harasymchuk V., *Materiały do istorii kozachchyny XVII wiku*, L’viv, L’ivs’’ke vididilenja Instytutu arkheohraflit, 1994: 85-87 [sources collected by Harasymchuk were set for publication in 1933, but repressions against Ukrainian historians put an end to any such plans; they were published from a type-written copy in 1994].

*Arkhir JuZR*, ch. 2, t. 2, Kiev, 1888: 34.

Harasymchuk V., *Materiały do istorii kozachchyny*: 121-123.
kij agreement) or the religious issue (as in the final version), but rather
the declaration of the establishment of the Ruthenian Principality: «Troie
woiewodztwa zawojowane Kijowskie, Bracławskie, Czernihowskie eriguntur
in Ducatum Russia, nakształt Xięstwa Litewskiego urzędnicy pozwoleni»78
[The three palatinates taken by conquest – the Kyiv, the Bratslav and the
Czernihiv palatinates – eriguntur in Ducatum Russia, should be governed
like the Lithuanian Princedom]. It bears repeating that the rumor of the
rebels’ intention to create their own «princedom» had been circulating
since the very first days of the uprising. As early as June 4, 1648, Mikołaj
Ostroróg wrote to Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński that Khmel’nyt’s’kyj «o Kij-
owie myśli, książęcem ruskim tytułując się»79 [is thinking about Kyiv and
calling himself a Ruthenian prince]; the anonymous informative letter from
Brodz dated June 10, 1648, stated that the Cossacks «po Białą Cerkiew i Zad-
nieprze wszystko chcą wziąć, aby wszystko Księstwo Ruskie mieli»80 [want
to grab everything as far as Bila Tserkva and Zadnieprze in order to pos-
sess the whole Ruthenian Principality]; in 1649, one of the spies noted that
Khmel’nys’t’kyj wanted to remain «przy udzielnem Księstwie Ruskiem»81
[having the appanage of the Ruthenian Principality]; the author of the
1651 anonymous pamphlet «Dyskurs o teraźniejszej wojnie kozackiej albo
chłopskiej» wrote that the rebels «sobie rzpltą nową kozacką albo Księstwo
Ruskie ... założą»82 [will establish a new Cossack Commonwealth or Ruthe-
nian Principality]; finally, the councillor (rajca) of Kazimierz, Marcin
Golin-
ski, noted rumors about the establishment of the «Ruthenian Principality»
at almost the same moment that the King gave out his first negotiation
instructions to Bieniewski (June 13, 1657)83. In all the aforementioned cases,
Polish rumors about the Ruthenian Principality are decidedly negative in
tone. However, the tone of the note in Jerlicz’s chronicle is markedly differ-
ent: despite the fact that the Ruthenian author had previously attacked the
rebels, his short description of the swearing of the oath in the Cossack camp
and the recounting of its text are generally approbatory. Could this mean
that he approved of such an outcome?

In preliminary agreements between Teterja and Bieniewski dated July
5, 1658 there is no mention of the «Ruthenian Principality». Neither does

79 Pamiętniki o Koniecpolskich. Przyczynek do dziejów polskich XVII wieku, Wyd. Stanisław
Przyłęcki, Lwów, 1842: 424.
81 Jakuba Michałowskiego ... księga pamiętnicza: 397.
82 Pisma polityczne z czasów panowania Jana Kazimierza Wazy: 9 (in this edition, the
pamphlet is erroneously dated 1648, even though it mentions the death on Prince Jeremi Wiś-
niowiecki, who died in 1651).
it appear to have been mentioned at secret sessions of the Diet commission on July 18–25, 1658, when these agreements were discussed; they only discussed the possibility of granting Cossack territories a «special status» (seorsivum statum) similar to that of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania84. The Palatine of Poznań Jan Leszczyński had similar views: in his memorial from July 2, 1658, he recommended the King and Senators «aby taka właśnie bela unia, jako litewska, aby naród nad narodem nie miał praerogatiwy»85 [that the union be similar to the Lithuanian one, so that neither nation could be held superior over the other]. In a way, such views also mirrored the beliefs of the King himself: for example, the Austrian resident noted after talks with him on July 14, 1658, that the peace treaty would most likely be drawn up on the Polish-Lithuanian model: «non ... per absolutam subiectionem, sed per quandam speciem accessionis et communio...»86. As a matter of fact, the final text of the treaty ratified at the Cossack council in Hadzaj87 mentioned the «Ruthenian Principality»; therefore, it is probable that this clause was included at the very last stage of the negotiations in September 16, 1658, when the Cossacks were represented by Jurij Nemyrych88. It is likely that Nemyrych, as the proponent of a federative political system, was himself the author of the «Ruthenian Principality» formula as used to describe the status of the Cossack state. On February 3, 1658, well before the Hadzaj council, Jan Leszczyński wrote to Bogusław Leszczyński that Nemyrych (related to the Leszczyńskys through marriage) «Kozakom perswaduje być jako Holenderowie albo Szwajcarowie»89 [is persuading the Cossacks to become like the Dutch or the Swiss].

It is likely that the «Ruthenian Principality» clause was influenced not only by Nemyrych’s political preferences, but also by his ambitions; after all, he was the richest, the most noble and the best-educated person in the Cossack szlachta leadership of the time. To paraphrase the Union of Lublin of 1569, the Treaty of Hadzaj stressed the voluntary accession to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth «iako wolni do wolnych, rowni do rownych y zacni do zacnych» [like the free to the free, equals to equals, and nobles to nobles], which, naturally, meant that the «Ruthenian nation» should, like the szlachta of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, have its own senator-level functionaries, «osobnych pieczętarzow, marszałkow, podskarbich cum dig-

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84 See also: Dąbrowski J. S., Ugođa Hadziacka: 72-74.
85 Harasymchuk V., Materiały do istorii kozachchyny: 77.
86 Ibid., 92.
87 Ibid., 112-119. The version that was (with some changes) ratified at the Diet of May 22, 1659, can be read in: Volumina Legum. V. 4: 297-300.
nitate senatoria»90 [its own keepers of seals, marshals, treasurers cum dignitate senatoria]. As we know, it did not come to marshals and treasurers but, by mid-December, 1658, Ivan Vyhovs’kyj had started making requests to the Crown Chancellor that Nemyrych be appointed Chancellor («o wielką pieczęć księstw ruskich» [of the great seal of the Ruthenian Principality])91. In the Diet of 1659, where the treaty was confirmed, Nemyrych took part as a Chancellor.

In its instructions for the Diet of 1659, the szlachta of the palatinates of Rus’ and Belz endorsed the treaty without paying great attention to its details92; the closer the szlachta lived to dangerous territories, the more they endorsed it: as is stated in the instruction from Halych, «im bliżsi jesteśmy sąsiedzi Ukrainy, tem mlsie i pożądańszie musi nam być uspokojenie z nią»93 [the closer neighbours we are to Ukraine, the more the peace treaty should be sought after]. However, Volhynians, Kyivans, Chernihivans and Bratslavians had more detailed views on the treaty. For example, the Volhynian instruction shows resentment to the fact that the «general public» remained uninformed about the conditions of the treaty94. This, of course, was just rhetoric, since at least two versions (the preliminary Teterja/Bieniewski version, as well as the version recounted by Jerlicz) must have been circulating in Volhynia; moreover, Volhynians could not possibly have missed the rumours that Volhynia would be turned over to the «Ruthenian Principality»95. The lack of sources makes it impossible to establish for sure what really bothered the Volhynian, Kyivan, Chernihivan and Bratslavian szlachta; they probably distrusted Bieniewski, who they still considered an upstart of humble origins, despite his rapid career.96. In any case, dietine instructions required Diet delegates to ensure that representatives from the above-mentioned palatinates be included in the «commission with the Cos-

90 Harasymchuk V., Materiały do istorii kozachchyny: 118.
94 Arkhiv JuZR, ch. 2, t. 2: 59.
95 See also notes by Golinski: Hrushev's'kyj M., Istorija Ukraïny-Rusy, t. X: 369.
96 See also the sarcastic note made by Jerlicz: Jerlicz J., Latopisiecz abo Kroyniczka: 214. Indeed, Bieniewski's career growth was truly breath-taking: before moving out with an embassy to Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyj, he received a nomination for the Volhynian Castellan on June 11, 1657, straight from his previous modest station of the Luts'k judical functionary (which was, moreover, 'technical' rather than honorary).
sacks», so that «o kraje ukraiinne obywatele traktowali ukrainnis»97 [Ukrainian citizens should negotiate the fate of the Ukrainian lands].

Anyway, regardless of their political doubts or affiliations, everyone wanted peace. The Ruthenian professor of the Zamojski Academy, the converted Catholic Vasyl’ Rudomych noted precisely in his diary the rumors about negotiations regarding «upragnionego pokoju» [the longed-for peace]; on August 6, 1658 he even started a text about «o miłości bratniej Polaków i Rusinów»98 [brotherly love between Poles and Ruthenians]. Such views might have been shared by Rudomych’s «colleagues», the Kyiv-Mohyla collegium professors and Kyivan Orthodox leaders overall. Signs of their accord with hetman Ivan Vyhovs’kyj came in late 1657, when the church council elected Lutsk eparch Dionisij Balaban, whose candidature was supported by Vyhovs’kyj and the King, as the next metropolitan after the death of Syl’vestr Kosov99. Alas, since the election statement has not survived, we do not know what representatives of secular szlachta and Kyivan church leaders took part in this council, which was not sanctioned by the czar or the Muscovite patriarch100.

Dionisij Balaban’s affiliations were self-evident. After all, though with certain reservations, he took part in discussing the proposition for a united council with the Uniates, presented to the king in late 1658101; it was he who received the Cossack embassy’s oath that they would keep to the agreements at the 1659 Diet; many saw him as the head of the united church, if ever a Kyivan patriarchate was to be established under the jurisdiction of the Pope102. When describing his conversation with the metropolitan on July 30, 1659, Vasyl’ Rudomych underscores that they talked «o najmilszej sprawie unii» [about the most desired affair of the union]. After that he became even more fervent in his search for proof for the compilation of the text about «the brotherhood» of Poles and Ruthenians, which he had started a year earlier103.

Harder to establish are political affiliations of the second major player on the Orthodox Church scene of the time, archbishop of Chernihiv La-

99 For example, in his letter to Balaban from June 13, 1657, permitting him to go to Kyiv in order to take part in the council, Jan Kazimierz voiced hopes that the hierarch, once elected, would look after the Commonwealth’s best interests: Natsional’no-vyzvol’na vijna v Ukraïni: 399.
101 More about these negotiations see in: Mironowicz A., Prawosławie i unia za panowania Jana Kazimierza, Białystok, Białoruskie Towarzystwo Historyczne, 1997: 149-189.
103 Rudomicz B., Efemeros czyli Diariusz: 130-132.
zar Baranovych, the most influential Kyivan church leader. He was a cautious man, especially when cast in the epicenter of the Cossack uprising. Baranovych is often stereotypically cast in historiography as the proponent of the Muscovite agenda in Ukraine, though the views of this enigmatic leader still remain poorly investigated. So far, there have only been two attempts to examine Baranovych from different perspectives: the articles by Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel and by David Frick. Frick persuasively demonstrates that Baranovych's worldview was shared by many of those who grew up before the war and, therefore, perceived that the Polish and the Ruthenian cultural worlds were indissolubly linked into a Commonwealth, a shared «Sarmatian» world. Frick notes that even in the later poetry by Baranovych (first and foremost the collection _Lutnia Apollinowa_, 1671) «we find the image of a _Rzecz Pospolita Trojga Narodów_, a Commonwealth of Three Nations – Poland, Lithuania, and Rus’ – as Ruthenian polemics had long been asserting for their own purposes, and as the architects of the Treaty of Hadjach had planned».

Even some quarter of a century after the Treaty of Hadjach, in _Notiy pięć: Ran Chrystustowych pięć_ (1680) Baranovych wrote: «Ruś a Lachi – cewka złota, nie trzeba w niey rozwijać złota od iedwabiu, bo to pospołu chodzić ma oboie; samym złotem nie mogleby nic zrobić, bo tęgie, nie da się użyć na szycie, trzeba do niego iedwabiu» [Rus’ and the Lachs are a golden bobbin. Gold should not be unwound on it from silk, for they are both required together. You can’t use gold alone to make thread, since it is stiff. It cannot be used for sewing without the addition of silk].

Baranovych (Chancellor of the Kyiv-Mohyla collegium since 1650) was ordained an eparch of Chernihiv and Novhorod-Sivers’kyj on March 8, 1657, in Iaşi: as many researchers suggest, Syl’vestr Kosov, who at the time was a metropolitan, strove to distance himself from this decision, taken by the Muscovite patriarchate. As a deputy on the metropolitan chair after the death of Kosow, Baranovych blessed the insignia of hetman Ivan Vyhovs’kyj on October 27, 1657; however, the ceremony did not take place in the metropolitan Cathedral of Saint Sophia, where Khmel’nys’t’kyj’s insignia were

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106 Ibid., 28.

107 Ibid., 46.


consecrated earlier, but on his «own turf», in the Epiphany church of the Brotherhood monastery, that is, in the Kyiv-Mohyla collegium\textsuperscript{110}. Some conflict between Kyivan hierarchs, undocumented in surviving sources, is hinted at, not only by the place of this consecration, but also by a later episode: on November 19, 1658, it was not the deputy metropolitan Baranovych, but the Cave monastery archimandrite Inokentij Gizel' who took the oath of loyalty to the czar from the hetman’s representative (since Vyhovs’kyj himself did not arrive in Kyiv, purportedly due to illness)\textsuperscript{111}. If Gizel’ was indeed, as some suggest, the author of Synopsis (1674), which showed considerable loyalty to Moscow, this could serve as further proof of Giovanna Brogi-Bercoff’s hypothesis that there were important differences in views between Gizel’ and the Kyiv-Mohyla collegium representatives regarding the supremacy of the Muscovite czar, prospective contacts with the Poles and possible closer relations with Rome\textsuperscript{112}.

The assumption that Lazar Baranovych had «covertly influenced» the Kyiv-Mohyla professors’ loyalty to the Treaty of Hadjach is indirectly corroborated by the choice of personalities who were more influential in the Collegium in 1657-1659, while negotiations were still underway, power was still shifting, and the treatise was not yet finalized. From August 1657 till August 1658 the collegium was headed by Jan Jozef (the latter was the name he took with his monastic vows) Meszczeryn/Meszczers’kyj\textsuperscript{113}, a Belarusian noble with a somewhat convoluted biography. Having been educated in the Smolensk Jesuit collegium, he became a nobleman in the court of Władysław IV; later he fought as a mercenary in the Thirty Years’ War, and, having returned, fought with Rakoczi. He took monastic vows at the beginning of August in 1657\textsuperscript{114}; the date coincides suspiciously with the death of Bohdan Khmel’nycyt’s’kyj, and he became the Chancellor of the Kyiv-Mohyla collegium as a relative of Ivan Vyhovs’kyj through marriage (the hetman’s brother Kostjantyn was married to Meszczyrn’s sister). The fact that Meszczers’kyj was one of the King’s «ambassadors» in Kyiv following Khmel’nyts’kyj’s death is further proved by his prompt resignation from the Chernihiv archimandrite chair: having received the chair in the autumn of 1658, he resigned on July 7, 1659, right after the Treaty of Hadjach was confirmed. He explained this decision as follows: «teraz od tegoż Króla IMci, pana m[ego] miłościwe[go], i wszytkiej Rzeczytej ad varias legationes vocowany in gravissimis Reipub[li]
According to Kojalowicz, he even went so far as to tell his former Jesuit professors that «cuculus non facit monachum»; Meszczerny’s further career as a soldier can be traced through the Prussian campaign and the battle with the Muscovite army near Slobodyshche (1660). When negotiations for the Treaty of Hadjach were almost finished in autumn 1658, another student of Baranovych, Ioanikij Galjatovs’kyj, became the Chancellor of the Kyiv-Mohyla collegium. He was forced to leave Kyiv in 1664 in the wake of his conflict with Mefodij Fylymonovych, Baranovych’s opponent and his successor as Kyivan metropolitan deputy; he was offered sanctuary by the bishop of Lviv Atanasij Zhelibors’kyj, once an active mediator between the royal court and Vyhos’kyj. In a dedication to Zhelibors’kyj in his book Keys to Understanding (1665, published in Lviv), Galjatovs’kyj characterizes the Cossack uprising as an «internal war in our fatherland», and among Zhelibors’kyj’s other virtues mentions the fact that he succeeded «with wise words» when «he sent an embassy ... to Ukraine to appease the Zaporizhian Cossacks».

No direct information on how other Kyivan church leaders reacted to the Treaty of Hadjach survived. Indirect proof of approbation can be found in a later (1669) denunciation against Feodosij Sofonovych, the hegumen of the Golden-Domed Monastery of St. Michael, a fellow student and friend of Baranovych: the author of the denunciation calls Sofonovych «the biggest traitor» and accuses him of contacting Vyhos’kyj and helping Dionisij Balaban become a metropolitan in 1658. If this is taken into account, it seems telling that Sofonovych’s chronicle (written about 1673–1674) describes the Treaty of Hadjach, as Jurij Mytsyk puts it, «with unnatural conciseness» describes the Treaty of Hadjach, as Jurij Mytsyk puts it, «with unnatural conciseness» describes the Treaty of Hadjach, as Jurij Mytsyk puts it, «with unnatural conciseness» describes the Treaty of Hadjach, as Jurij Mytsyk puts it, «with unnatural conciseness» describes the Treaty of Hadjach, as Jurij Mytsyk puts it, «with unnatural conciseness» describes the Treaty of Hadjach, as Jurij Mytsyk puts it, «with unnatural conciseness». The author does not call the treaty a betrayal, moreover, he underscores the possible attainment of «liberties» and blames the lack of success on the fact that the king broke his promise «potom toje ot krolja ne stalosja kozakom» [later on the king would not give that to the Cossacks].

Because of the lack of sources, it is now hard to tell which clauses of the Treaty of Hadjach were commended the most. It seems that each reader was

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117 Ėjngorn V., Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii v XVII v. Snoshenija malorossijskogo dukhovenstva s moskovskim pravitel’stvom v tsarstvovanie Alekseja Mikhailovicha, ch. 1, Moskva, 1899: 229.
119 Akty JuZR, t. 8 (1668-1669, 1648-1657), SPb, 1875: 15.
120 Mytsyk Ju., Hadjats’kyj dohovir 1658 r. u vysvitlenei ukrains’kykh litopysiv, in: Hadjats’ka unija 1658 roku: 270.
looking out for what was most important to himself. Without any doubt, for professors of the Kyiv-Mohyla collegium the most important promise regarded the possibility of their collegium becoming a university – most likely, they themselves had «lobbied» this clause\textsuperscript{122}. For the petty Orthodox gentryman and former monk Joachim Jerlicz, the most important points were the ones pertaining to the church: he dwells on them when recounting the ratification of the treaty at the Diet of 1659, where «religia grecka uspokojona i unija zniesiona wiecznymi czasy»\textsuperscript{123} [the Greek faith was appeased and the union was rescinded forever]. Of course, most szlachta fugitives had practical reasons for triumph, as they had a chance to return to their homes. It may be that some undocumented sentiment linked to the pre-war notion of the «third nation» of the Commonwealth had proliferated at the time. The Polish-Galician noble Mikołaj Jemiołowski hints at just such a sentiment: according to him, the most salient feature of the Treaty of Hadjach is that it gave power to Ruthenians in «Ukrainian» palatinates: «kanclerz, podskarbi, marszałek aby także Księstwa Ruskiego był, a z tych każdy Rusin»\textsuperscript{124} [the Ruthenian Principality should have a chancellor, treasurer and marshal, and all of them should be Ruthenians]. Political declarations of szlachta leaders affiliated with the Cossacks (such as Nemyrych, Vyhovs’kyj or Teterja), meanwhile, celebrated their escape from «the Muscovite tyranny» and their return to the usual Commonwealth world of szlachta liberties; as Jurij Nemyrych had eloquently put it at the Diet of 1569, «We were born in freedom, raised in it, and now, free, are returning to it»\textsuperscript{125}.

Subsequent events, as we know, dashed all these hopes. Jerlicz noted that after the Battle of Konotop (1659) and the start of Tymofij Tsytyszura’s rebellion, szlachta were once again being slain, even though they «już cale ufali onych przysiędze, że pokój stanoł, i do domow swych jachali z Wołynia»\textsuperscript{126} [believed the oath that peace came, and started returning from Volhynia to their homes]. This was the beginning of one of the darkest pages in Ukrainian history of the 17th C., the so-called Ruin. The szlachta and the hierarchs of «royal» Ukraine went their own separate ways, getting farther and farther

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{122} More on this see in: Jakovenko N., Kyiv’ski profesory za lashtunkamy Hadjats’koï uhody (pro sprobu peretvorennja Mohyljans’koï kolehiï na universytet), in: 350-lecie Unii Hadziackiej: 305-326.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Jerlicz J., Latopisiec abo Kroyniczka: 233.
\item \textsuperscript{125} «In libertate nati sumus, in libertate educati, do tejże i teraz liberi przystępujemy». Quoted after: Barłowska M., Mowa poselska Jerzego Niemirycza, in: W kręgu Hadziacza: 322.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Jerlicz J., Latopisiec abo Kroyniczka: 232.
\end{itemize}
from the Cossacks, whereas the Kyivan hierarchs and the Kyiv-Mohyla collegium professors started demonstrating real or forced loyalty to Moscow. Each group had strong reasons for changing its views. Among such reasons, I should mention lack of confidence in their ability to change the course of events, disenchantment with Cossack coalitions with «the enemies of the Holy Cross» (Tatars and Turks), the belief that legitimate and righteous authority could come only from an anointed sovereign, and moral weariness with bloody wars.

While persuading the Senate commission to accept the clauses of the Treaty of Hadiach in 1659, Stanisław Bieniewski had purportedly reassured the Senators as follows: «Samorząd Rusi jako odrębnego księstwa także długo nie potrwa. Kozacy, co teraz myślą o tem, wymrą, a ich następcy już nie tak gorąco będą przy tem obstawać i powoli wszystko wróci do dawnego stanu»127 [Self-government of Ruthenia as a separate principality will not last long. The Cossacks think it will soon die out, and their heirs will not be such ardent supporters of the idea, and everything will return to the way it once was]. The Volhynian Castellan was right not only about the Cossack leaders, but also about the enthusiastic szlachta. The instruction of the Volhynian dietine had started demanding denunciations of the «Ruthenian Principality» as early as 1661; the Kyivan szlachta shared their views, despite having been more enthusiastic supporters of the Treaty of Hadiach128. However, even this support had waned with time. By the end of the 17th C. the szlachta were no longer treating the new generation of Cossack leaders as «prodigal brothers»: the instruction of the Kyivan palatinate to the Diet delegates in 1692 called Semen Palij «dux malorum et scelorum artifex», and accused him of intending to resuscitate the Treaty of Hadiach129.

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The battle of Konotop on June 28, 1659 has gained particular resonance as a historical event in the independent Ukraine since the historical narrative has begun to be re-examined and ‘reconstructed’ in a new political climate. This has been possible since the theme of historical confrontation between Ukraine and Russia became free for discussion after many centuries of taboo. Interest in the subject has grown and progress in historiography may be acknowledged thanks to several new works published in recent years: these have provided a well-grounded picture of the event, while also raising a number of questions that still need to be investigated for a correct interpretation.

The chronicles of the Cossack period have been constantly quoted in historiographical works up to the present time. They still have both a literary, and also a certain evidential value and allow details to be added to the historical mosaic. I will focus here on the description and evaluation of the Battle of Konotop in the chronicles of the Cossack nobility (starshyna), trying to analyze their content, the completeness of the information provided and the role they play in today’s research.

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Scholars have long discussed the nature of these works and whether they actually belong to the category of chronicles or annals. At the time, the authenticity of the facts described was repeatedly confuted by other sources, to which the Cossack writers had no access. As researchers note, «the traditional term “annalist” or “chronicler” is inappropriate for defining the representatives of Ukrainian historical thought of the 17th-18th centuries; writers such as F. Sofonovych, S. Velychko or P. Symonov's'kyj say nothing of the anonymous author of the History of the People of the Rus»². Each author tended to describe his own social vision of history and this is the main feature of almost all works of that period. For example, the authors of three fundamental works – the Eyewitness (Samovydets'), Velychko and Hrabjanka, have three different positions in their attitude towards such issues as the autonomous Hetman state, the tendencies of the nobility and their aspirations for privileges, and a more general, all-Cossack position, close to the people³. Thus, the genre we are examining includes works written by authors from the same social class, the Cossack intelligentsia, which, however, feature noticeable differences in social thought.

The Eyewitness chronicle is considered an important historical source, and the military treasurer and priest Roman Rakushka-Romanovs'kyj (1622?-1703) is widely acknowledged as its author⁴. This chronicle describes the events of 1648-1702, yet it is truly unique in its description of the period after 1672 when the author was both a witness and a chronicler; before this date he used other sources, acting more precisely as a historian. Unfortu-nately, there is no information indicating whether in 1659 the Eyewitness was effectively close to Konotop where the battle took place⁵. However, as O. Levyts'kyj noted, it is worth remarking that in the chronicle the description of events on the left bank, in particular the siege of Konotop, is more detailed than the description of events on the right bank⁶.

Written in the early 18th century, the Chronicle by the Hadjach Colonel Hryhorij Hrabjanka (?-1737?) covers the history of the Cossacks from their beginnings up to 1709. This work is a compilation and scholars consider it more

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⁵ Ibid., 17-19: movement of R. Rakushka-Romanovsky in these years is described as follows: «1658 as Nizhyn sotnik he participates in renewal of union between Vybov's'kyj and Crimean Khan. After this Romanovsky’s trace is lost, and only in 1659 he appears as regimental judge. We see him in the delegation from Nizhyn to Moscow. 1660 Rakushka-Romanovs'kyj is Nizhyn sotnik…» (p. 21).
⁶ Ibid., 16.
as a literary than as a historical artifact. It became popular in its own time (as testified by the existence of nearly fifty manuscript copies) and became the basis for other compilations, including the anonymous work entitled *Brief description of Malorossia*, which probably refers to the 1730s. The *Lyzohub Chronicle*, supposedly based on the family book of the homonymous Cossack family, contains significant similarities with the two works mentioned above. The editor of the second copy of this Chronicle, V. Antonovych, refers it to the 1740s. He remarks that the events before 1662 are described in the same way as in the *Lyzohub Chronicle* and in the *Brief description*, and assumes that the author of the former took this part of the chronicle from the latter.

The *Chronicle* by Samijlo Velychko (1670?-1728?), written by all evidence in the 1720s, is one of the three most prominent works in this genre along with the chronicles of the Eyewitness and Hrabjanka. Velychko’s work is a most notable literary artifact, though its historical worth has been acknowledged by some scholars, but put in serious doubt by others. The author himself was critical about his own description of events and warned about possible mistakes; at the same time, he considered some of the facts narrated in his sources as non authentic, and suggested looking at Cossack chronicles, which he considered more authentic. Velychko was not very knowledgeable about Ivan Vyhovs’kyj’s epoch, but some of his descriptions are worthy of historians’ notice.

The *Chronicle of the Polish Land* (Krojnika zemli polskoj), written in the 1770s by Feodosij Sofonovych (?-1677), a leading figure in the Kyivan Metropolitanate, cannot be considered a Cossack chronicle. However, from several points of view, it is similar to some of them, first to the Eyewitness chronicle: some resemblance in the description of the events of 1648-1672 even allowed historians to suggest the existence of another source which has not come down to us and has remained unknown to modern historiography, but may have been used by both authors. Another chronicle was

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10 Shevchuk V., Samijlo Velychko: 12, 15-19.


written by a representative of the Cossack nobility, the Kyiv colonel Vasyl’ Dvoretz’kyj (1609-?). The Chronicle of the Dvorets’kys has much in common with the work by Sofonovych. The author was a direct participant in the conflicts that took place between 1648 and 1654, and was a staunch supporter of Russia. His work is based on the text of the Krojnika and appears to have been created in Kyiv at the same time as the latter\(^3\). It is worth adding that Rakushka-Romanovs’kyj, Sofonovych and Dvoretz’kyj, unlike other known or anonymous authors, were contemporaries of the battle of Konotop in which the army of the Tsar fought the Cossacks.

The Hadjach agreement, ratified on September 16, 1658, formally annulled the submission of the Cossack lands to Muscovy and put them under the authority of the Polish King as a third autonomous component to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Immediately after the treaty was signed, Vyshovs’kyj had to use force to get rid of the pro-Russian opposition within the country. The leaders of this opposition, Martyn Pushkar and Jakiv Barabash, were defeated in internecine struggles or killed soon after. The armed confrontation between the Hetmanate and Russia began in autumn 1658 when the Tsar’s Army, headed by Prince Grigorij Romodanovskij, arrived to support the opposition against Vyshovs’kyj. The Tsar’s forces were joined by a number of Cossack military units: the Eyewitness mentions the Myrhorod and Poltava regiments (mistakenly including the Lubny regiment), while Velychko writes about the «brigands (dejnyky) of Pushkar», who escaped the massacre. Hrabjanka indicated that the number of soldiers in the Russian army was 20 thousand: this figure is confirmed by modern historiography. At the same time Vyshovs’kyj fought an unsuccessful campaign against Kyiv, while the main events took place in the north, where the Hetman regiments of Nizhyn, Chernihiv and Pryluky were active under the command of Hryhorij Huljanys’t’kyj.

The attack by Muscovite forces was terrifying: in his letters Huljanys’t’kyj testifies that the Russians turned out to be worse than the Turks\(^4\). Significantly enough, the violence and brutality of the Russians was also criticized by Velychko, Hrabjanka and other authors, who were hostile to Vyshovs’kyj, but at the same time did not spare criticism towards the deeds of the Russians and of their Cossack followers. Velychko ascribes the violence against civilians to the Cossack opposition, which he calls «nechestyvi syny dejnyky»

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\(^4\) Mytsyk Ju., Het’man Ivan Vyshovs’kyj: 46-47.
(«the offspring of godless bandits») and to the Sloboda Cossacks who, «having permission from Romodanovskij, attacked Ukrainian settlements and villages and, without any respect or charity, robbed and harassed people, often killing them, and razing everything to the ground»15. Hrabjanka too writes about punitive actions by the opposition: «All these armed men, enraged at the misdeeds of Ivan Vyhovs’kyj, behaved harshly with the people supporting him and burnt several towns, namely, Lubny, Pyrjatyn, Chornukhy and some others» (the author of Brief description adds «Horoshyn»)16.

The description of this first phase of the war, when Russian and Cossack opposition forces joined and initiated actions, includes the episode where Velychko narrates in detail the killing of Ivan Iskra, a potential leader of pro-Russian Cossacks, and the destruction of his troops by the Cossacks of Skorobahat’ko. The facts happened in Lokhvitsja in January 165917. The Lyzohub Chronicle also contains information on this event, while Hrabjanka and the author of Brief description omit the fact, as does the Eyewitness.

The defence of the Northern territory of the Hetmanate was headed by Huljanyts’kyj: after several battles with Russian troops he was forced to retire into Varva, where he remained under siege. The Eyewitness writes that Romodanovskij was repulsed from below Varva by Vyhovs’kyj after a 6-week siege18. Velychko describes these events in greater detail, recalling that here Russia strategically acknowledged Ivan Bezpalyj as a ‘friendly’, loyal Hetman. He also writes about the counter-attack by Huljanyts’kyj’s forces along with the Tatars sent by Vyhovs’kyj: the attack inflicted significant losses on Romodanovskij, who had to withdraw to Lokhvitsja19. Hrabjanka insists that after several weeks, «as winter was approaching and it was not a suitable time for the siege, the Tsar’s army moved away from Varva and went to its winter quarters. The boyar Romodanovskij spent winter in Lokhvitsja while the Hetman Ivan Bezpalyj spent the whole winter in Romny»20. It is interesting to note that modern historiographers reject the authenticity of the story of the cessation of the siege by Cossack-Tatar forces21, while the withdrawal of Romodanovskij’s forces is connected with negotiations and a temporary truce between Vyhovs’kyj and Moscow22.

20 Litopys hadjats’koho polkovnyka Hrabjanky: 119.
21 Sokyrko S., Konotops’ka bytva 1659 r.: 12.
22 Bul’vins’kyj A., Konotops’ka bytva 1659 roku: 15.
Early in 1659 Romodanovskij was surrounded by the troops of Colonel Jurij Nemrynych in Lokhvystsja. The Eyewitness and Velychko wrote that the attack on the town was unsuccessful, but that the city nevertheless remained under siege by the Cossacks. According to the Eyewitness, in this period Vyhovs’kyj obtained military support from «several thousands of soldiers». Velychko writes of Cossack and Tatar forces under the command of the Hetman. It should be noted that the Cossack army included Serbs, Valachians, Poles and Germans, though historians think that the external military support to the Cossacks was relatively negligible23.

At the same time, Vyhovs’kyj used his united Cossack-Polish-Tatar forces to attack Zin’kiv, where the Zaporizhian opposition was concentrated. Yet the action remained unsuccessful. After this, according to Velychko, he «was very irritated and retreated from Zin’kiv, and when he saw that Vepryk, Rashavka, Ljutenka and Myrhorod did not support his treasonable position, he acted outrageously and burnt them» and returned to Chyhyryn24. The Eyewitness also mentions the failure of the attack against Zin’kiv, the devastation of numerous «Ukrainian towns» and the retreat to Chyhyryn. Hrabjanka, apparently, used other sources: when describing the siege of Zin’kiv he writes that Vyhovs’kyj was supposed to release Sylka if he surrendered the town; according to Hrabjanka, Sylka agreed with the proposed conditions, but the Hetman did not keep his promise: «[Vyhovs’kyj] seized Zin’kiv, placed Sylka in irons, and allowed the Tatars to rob the town and numerous other settlements and villages – Hadjach, Vepryk, Rashivka, Ljutenka, Sorochnyntsi, Kovalivka, Baranivka, Obukhiv, Bahachka, Ustyvytsja, Jares’ky, Shyshak, Burky, Khomutor, Myrhorod, Bezpal’chynci, and others too»25. There are grounds for doubting this part of the description, since some episodes in Vyhovs’kyj’s epistolary heritage testify to the participation of Sylka in the battle of Konotop on the Russian side and his capture by the Cossacks26. Moreover, contemporary research has proved that the Hetman achieved military victories over the opposition in such towns as Hadjach, Khorol, Sorochnyntsi, Hrun’, Vepryk, Rashavka. There was no battle over Myrhorod, where Vyhovs’kyj entered as a result of negotiations; the chronicles have no information about the Hetman’s victory of Perejaslav in February 165927.

23 Mytsyk Ju., Het’man Ivan Vyhovs’kyj: 47.
25 Litopys hadjats’koho polkovnyka Hrabjanky: 119.
27 Mytsyk Ju., Het’man Ivan Vyhovs’kyj: 47.
In late March 1659 the Russian forces, stronger than before, invaded Ukraine for the second time under the command of prince Aleksej Trubetskoy, with the participation of the voevodes Romodanovskij and Fëdor Kurakin, the princes Semën Pozharskij and Semën L’vov, and Bezpalyj.

The actual number of occupying forces is still debated: the Eyewitness writes that Trubetskoy came with «a great army totaling over one hundred thousand men», while other authors generally write of «numerous» forces, and underline that mainly cavalry was sent against Vyhovs’kyj; the anonymous author of the *History of People of the Rus* wrote about an army of 30 thousand men accompanying Trubetskoy\(^{28}\). The same doubts remain in modern Ukrainian historiography: scholars put the numbers at anything between 35/50 to 100 thousand soldiers\(^{29}\).

According to Velychko, the Russian forces were able to escape the siege in Lokhvystsja thanks to the arrival of new forces. Huljanyts’kyj took position near Konotop with the regiments of Nizhyn and Chernihiv, while the colonel of Pryluky Petro Doroshenko encamped near Sribne. Pozharskij defeated Doroshenko, forced him and his Cossacks to run away and destroyed the town of Sribne: «This prince came here, captured the town of Sribne without difficulty, killed local citizens and captured some of them with all their belongings», Velychko writes\(^{30}\). Thus, the victory over Doroshenko’s detachment was consciously characterized by cruelty. The resonance the description of the tragedy of Sribne had in historiography as an example of Moscow’s punitive strategies is undoubtedly due to the literary talent of Velychko, the chronicler.

The siege of Konotop started on April 21, when the Muscovite troops reached the outskirts of the town and forced the Nizhyn and Chernihiv regiments headed by Huljanyts’kyj to seek refuge in the fortress. The authors of the chronicles give no information about the date of the Russians’ arrival or of their battle with the Cossacks; only Velychko writes that the troops left Lokhvystsja on April 16 and started the 9-week siege when they arrived near Konotop. According to the Eyewitness, Trubetskoy «sieged Huljanyts’kyj from the Seeing-off Sunday to Saint Peter’s day, nearly twelve weeks». Incidentally, in the description of the Battle of Konotop, for the first time the Eyewitness occasionally uses numbers and dates instead of indications from the religious calendar. Thus, Romodanovskij is said to have gone to Nizhyn on «May 8», a khan reaches Vyhovs’kyj «June 24», the Hetman starts the bat-


tle on «July31 28», the siege stops on «July32 29». The next date in this chronicle appears in the description of the events of 1662. To be sure, using dates does not, in itself, indicate any greater degree of precision or authenticity: precisely in the description of this event numerous mistakes testify as much. However, it may be presumed that the Eyewitness was able to make use of sources that other chroniclers knew nothing about. At the same time, the fortuitousness of using numbers to indicate dates in the text of the Chronicle demonstrates that the author only had sporadic access to those different sources.

On the other hand, it has to be acknowledged that, in comparison with the other chronicles, the Eyewitness gave the most complete description of the siege: he provides information about the stratagems used by the Russians during the attacks, the astuteness of those defending the town and the losses of the Russian army. Historiography considers his records to be authentic, while the description of the siege of Konotop is almost absent in other chronicles; only Velychko briefly mentions the attacks on the town and the Muscovites’ losses. There is practically no information about the number of people inside the fortress; modern Ukrainian historiography puts the number at 4-4.5 thousand soldiers and citizens during the siege.

The Eyewitness is the only author who writes about the Russian campaign against the Cossacks in Borzna, which took place during the siege of Konotop. The events are described in very similar terms to the ones of Sribne: «... the Cossacks were unable to withstand the assault and escaped to Nizhyn; the prince and his army seized Borzna, they killed some of the people, captured others and burnt the town»33. After capturing Borzna, Nizhyn was besieged, yet Romodanovskij could not do much harm to the Cossacks and their allies, and retreated.

Modern scholarship has integrated and interpreted the actions carried out by the troops of the Tsar in Borzna and in the surroundings of Nizhyn: their conclusion is that Romodanovskij underestimated the importance of Nizhyn. It was near this town that the troops of Vyhovs’kyj concentrated in May 165934.

Again it is the Eyewitness who offers a detailed description of preparations for the final battle, when Vyhovs’kyj joined together his Cossacks and

31 Correct: June.
32 Correct: June.
33 *Litopys Samovyatsja*: 79.
the Crimean allies to start the attack: «Vyhovs’kyj gathered all the Cossack regiments and was supported by the Nuraddin of the Sultan; he rushed to Krupych Pole, where he was joined on June 24 by the Khan himself with his numerous hordes». The Cossacks of the Hetman and the Tatars made an oath of allegiance for mutual struggle against Russia. Vyhovs’kyj moved in the direction of Konotop on Tuesday, June 27:

«At the end of the negotiations – the Eyewitness continues – they went to Konotop and created good points of access near the river Tynycja. When they were about to cross over to the village of Sosnivka, they engaged in fighting almost the whole day and caught a prisoner for interrogation, while the Russians did not manage to catch any prisoners. This crossing was a good mile away from Konotop, here they made an outpost, then they scattered away»35.

All these events are described in the same way by contemporary historiography.

Velychko also describes the fighting at the crossing on the day before the battle, when the Russian troops «waited [near Konotop – O.R.] for the Hetman Vyhovs’kyj, who, however, unexpectedly arrived near Konotop with a great number of Cossacks and with Tatar forces having already defeated a considerable part of the Russian army near Shapovalivka. Then he approached Konotop, left all the Tatars and some Cossacks for protection on the other side of the river Sosnivka …»36. Both the Eyewitness and Velychko write about Cossack and Tatar forces advisedly hidden near Konotop.

Hrabjanka asserts, that «unexpectedly [to Russians – O.R.], the Tatars had already joined the Hetman. He was also joined by a numerous Polish army headed by the crown Hetman»37. Dvorets’kyj writes: «In the year thousand six hundred fifty nine, the month of June, on the ninth day, Ivan Vyhovs’kyj brought the Khan and his numerous hordes with treachery: he had reassured prince Trubetskoj about peace, then joined the Cossacks with the Khan and went to liberate Huljanys’kyj from the siege of Konotop»38. The texts quoted show that all the authors point out that the arrival of such large numbers of troops and the maneuvers of Vyhovs’kyj were totally unexpected by the Russians. Dvorets’kyj’s judgement about the Hetman’s cunning behaviour probably reflects his hostility, caused by the offences he had

35 Litopys Samovydtsja: 80.
36 Velychko S., Litopys: 251. The editors of the Chronicle explain that the defeated Russian patrol had gone out to catch a prisoner for interrogation (footnote 926).
37 Litopys hadjats’koho polkovnyka Hrabjanky: 120.
suffered from Vyhovs’kyj during the siege of Kyiv, when his wife and children were captured: he only found them 18 months later. Duplicity dominated Vyhovs’kyj’s deeds, no more than that of all the actors of the historical scene of the time. We know from epistolary documentation that, at the same time, representatives of the Hetmanate and Muscovy had several diplomatic contacts to reach a truce while continuing military operations.

Recent historiographic debate concerns the number of Russian and Cossack forces. The figures given for Vyhovs’kyj’s army in modern Ukrainian research are very different, ranging from 20 to 60 thousand Cossacks (including mercenaries), who were joined by a number of Tatars ranging from 30 to 60 thousand. The number of Russian soldiers and of the Cossacks allied with them in opposition to Vyhovs’kyj supposedly amounted to 50 thousand men, including the 15 thousand cavalry who were sent to the place of the crossing.

Chronicles do not help in defining the number of soldiers; they only indicate the numbers indirectly. The Eyewitness writes:

«On the second day, 28 July, early in the morning on Wednesday, Hetman Vyhovs’kyj aligned the Cossack army and Polish troops and rushed to Sosnivka, while the Khan with his hordes moved to Pusta Torhovyt’sja; when approaching the crossing near Sosnivka, Vyhovs’kyj met numerous forces of the Tsar, including prince Grigorij Romodanovskij, prince Pozharenij [Pozharskij – O.R.] and other commanders belonging to both infantry and cavalry, and there was a battle near this crossing that lasted several hours».

Sofonovych also describes mounted cavalry and foot soldiers while Dvorets’kyj mentions only cavalry.

Velychko writes that Vyhovs’kyj hid in an outpost and attacked the Muscovites by surprise; the Russians did not expect the attack itself and did not know the real consistency of the Hetman’s army:

«Trubetskoy and Romodanovskij with their army saw that Vyhovs’kyj’s forces, which attacked them, were ten times smaller than the Russian troops; they withstood the sudden attack but did not expect more troops.

39 Ibid.
42 Sokyrko O., Konotops’ka bytva 1659 r.: 53, 56; Bul’vins’kyj A., Konotops’ka bytva 1659 roku: 33-34.
43 Correct: June.
44 Litopys Samovydtsja: 80.
from Vyhovs’kyj’s side, nor did they expect any cunning from him, so they sent against him prince Simeon Pozharskij with more than ten thousand reiters and other cavalry.\(^45\)

Pozharskij’s forces started attacking, while Vyhovs’kyj, according to Velychko, started retreating. Captive Cossacks warned the prince about the existence of great Tatar forces, yet Pozharskij «inflamed by the ardor of Mars» decided to attack. Velychko continues: «...unexpectedly Vyhovs’kyj’s numerous Cossack and Tatar forces came out from their hiding places and struck hard at the Orthodox Christians without giving them any chance to recover; they annihilated all of them covering the field and filling the river Sosnivka with dead bodies.»\(^46\)

In contrast to Velychko, the Eyewitness does not write about any treacherous retreat on the part of the Cossacks, he only describes the attack by hidden Tatar forces: «The Khan with his hordes struck in the rear on the Konotop side, defeated the enemy and in the space of just one hour killed more than twenty or thirty thousand of the Tsar’s men.»\(^47\) Thus, the chronicles offer different opinions about the treacherous nature of the Cossack maneuvers, and this issue divides contemporary researchers, who offer different historiographic reconstructions of this phase of the battle.\(^48\)

The last phase of the war around Konotop is represented by Trubetskoj’s retreat to Putyvl’: according to the Eyewitness, Velychko and some Kyivan authors, the retreat was relatively harmless for the Russians and the Cossacks headed by Bezpalyj, while Hrabjanka mistakenly writes about a defeat of the Tsar’s forces during the retreat. According to recent historians, both sides suffered heavy casualties during the retreat and the pursuit.\(^49\)

The Eyewitness is the only author who gives an approximate estimation of the number of Muscovites slain, suggesting a loss of about 20-30 thousand men. All chroniclers point to large numbers of victims, for example Dvorets’kyj writes: «Relying on his [Vyhovs’kyj’s – O.R.] deceptive letters, the Russians with their horses went too far away from their camp in the fields, and he [Vyhovs’kyj – O.R.] treacherously attacked them with numerous Tatars, and killed and captured a lot of Muscovites.»\(^50\) Hrabjanka omits the details of military tactics, yet his description is the most tragic: «Meeting him in the field, the Russians fought for a long time but, having no support, after the

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\(^45\) Velychko S., *Litopys*: 251, footnote 909.  
\(^46\) Ibid.  
\(^47\) *Litopys Samovydtsja*: 80.  
\(^49\) Sokyrko O., *Konotops’ka bytva 1659 r.:* 62.  
\(^50\) Mytsyk Ju. A., *«Litopisets» Dvoretskich*: 229.
withdrawing of their leader, there was no escape for any of them but death»51. Dvorets’kyj’s record is authentic while Hrabjanka describes an exaggerated variant of this event; however, if we take into account the destiny of the prisoners killed after the battle, Hrabjanka can be considered to be correct.

As far as the issue of the victims is concerned, some historians, basing themselves on the documentation given by Trubetskoj, put the exact number of the dead at 4769. However, the information given by various witnesses varies between 8 and 50 thousand deaths (including those killed after the battle). The chronicles have no information about the Cossacks, mercenaries and Tatars killed, but modern historians estimate a number of between 3 and 10 thousand52. Only the Eyewitness mentions about one and a half thousand men surviving the siege in the Konotop fortress.

The chronicles give no information about the execution of those Russian soldiers who were captured. Vyhovs’kyj wrote about the Khan’s order to kill all prisoners in a letter to Potocki53, yet many of these were hidden by the Tatars in order to demand a ransom later54. The Eyewitness and Velychko describe the execution of Pozharskij; several historians repeated Velychko’s record, where the Prince’s death and the defeat of the Muscovite army were considered to be a kind of triumph of justice: «This is how he [Pozharskij] and his troops were rewarded with devastation and blood – God allowed that – for the bloodshed of the innocent citizens of Sribne and for Pozharskij having devastated the city; indeed the soldiers would only have been able to escape to their camp near Konotop if their horses had had wings!»55. As witnessed by chronicles and confirmed by historians, there is no doubt that the real causes of the defeat can be attributed to Vyhovs’kyj’s skillful military tactics and to the Russian commanders’ lack of information. After the battle of Konotop, Vyhovs’kyj’s ‘stratagem’ remained in collective memory as a proverbial expression, as testified by the author of the History of the People of the Rus: «To outwit somebody as Vyhovs’kyj did with Russians»56.

I will try to draw some conclusions. The description of the battle near Konotop in the chronicles written by representatives of the Cossack nobil-
ity continues to be interesting for historiography, also in the light of recent reconstructions of this event based on newly discovered and more authoritative documents. Historians sometimes still include descriptions from the chronicles: the latter offer interesting details and help to interpret the events correctly by putting the facts in their social context.

Thus, the chronicles give a good idea of the real tragedy and of the social impact of the events. For example, without Velychko’s and the Eyewitness’s comments, the annihilation of Sribne and Borzna would probably have been lost in the long list of the other towns destroyed by the war. Other elements described in the chronicles offer noteworthy supplements to the description of historical events. For example, Velychko’s detailed description of Iskra’s death testifies to the importance of his potential role in Muscovite policy in Left-bank Ukraine. The tardy and somewhat lukewarm assistance given by the Russians in this situation, as described by Velychko, testifies to Moscow’s attitude to its Cossack allies.

All the authors are highly critical of the complete lack of respect for civilians on the part of all the armies involved, and of the immense sufferings that were inflicted on a peaceful population. Nonetheless, in all the works mentioned, Vyhovs’kyj is considered responsible for the Cossack actions, while inhuman behaviour by pro-Muscovite Cossacks is criticized, but explained as a revenge for the sufferings caused by the Hetman. The chronicles tend to grant some degree of legitimacy to the actions of the Russian military elite, though only Velychko explicitly writes about Romodanovskij personally giving permission for plundering or ordering to stop it57. By all accounts, all the authors are influenced by Vyhovs’kyj’s widespread unpopularity among ordinary Cossacks and mainly by his ideas of uniting Ukraine with Poland.

In his description of the tactics of the Russian army and of the battle itself, the Eyewitness writes only about the troops under the command of Romodanovskij: no mention is made of the Cossack troops that opposed the Hetman and fought as a separate force. Velychko mentions the Cossacks of the opposition and the appointed Hetman of Left-bank Ukraine, Ivan Bezpalyj, who was acknowledged by Romodanovskij and completely subservient to the Muscovite elite; evidently no autonomous self-sufficient Cossack alternative to Vyhovs’kyj could exist in the Hetmanate’s territory without Moscow’s support.

Moreover, it is remarkable how divergent information in the chronicles still influences modern descriptions of the events connected with the battle around Konotop. As already mentioned, such issues as the various strategies adopted in the battle or the undefined number of the opponents’ military

forces are still the subject of debate. Due to the lack of reliable documentation, modern historiography continues to refer to the numbers given by the chronicles – e.g. 20 thousand Russian soldiers in autumn 1658 or 100-thousand in spring 1659. The variability or lack of information in the chronicles is sometimes exploited even in our days to give biased interpretations of history: a case in point is a publication in which the Cossacks themselves, rather than Vyhovs’kyj, have been held responsible for executing prisoners after the battle, a fact that was ignored by the chronicles58.

In comparison with the other chronicles, the Eyewitness gives a more detailed and exact description of the Cossack maneuvers against the Russians on Left-bank Ukraine, of the siege of Konotop and of Vyhovs’kyj’s preparation for battle; he also talks about the total destruction of Borzna and skirmishes near Nizhyn. Velychko, however, gives no detail about Vyhovs’kyj’s transfer from Nizhyn to Konotop; nothing is written either about the relations between Vyhovs’kyj and the Tatars before the battle. Velychko however has better information about the movements of the Russian army between Lokhvysja and Konotop, and about the strategic decisions of the Hetman’s enemies. Moreover, the description of the events is written as if he had seen the Russian generals with his own eyes while quoting their words. The conclusions we may draw from all this are, first: that the two authors had sources of different geographical origin at their disposal and, second: in many cases the two descriptions function as complementary historical accounts. The Chronicler by Dvorets’kyj, on its part, offers other complementary information, which is not devoid of interest. Hrabjanka’s work is known to have more epic and literary importance, though certain details – such as the list of towns conquered by Vyhovs’kyj – are very important.

Thus, the Cossack chronicles are of considerable help in reconstructing the Konotop war and the battle itself. They continue to provide unique testimony for the description of numerous episodes of this war, and the information they transmit is in many cases confirmed by other well known historical sources. Moreover, they strengthen the evidence of the weight that the Battle of Konotop had as an important victory, which contributed to the development of the Ukrainian nation’s historical memory and identity. Though it did not basically change the military and political situation of the Hetmanate, the battle remains a key event at the beginning of one of the most tragic periods in the history of the Ukrainian lands.

58 Ul’janov N. I., Proiskhozhdenie ukrainskogo separatizma, Moskva, Indrik: 59; this author describes the execution of prisoners as follows: «...Cossacks gathered 5,000 Russian prisoners in a field and slaughtered them». 
The Hadjach Union, signed in September 1658 and ratified by the Polish-Lithuanian diet in May 1659 was an unprecedented event in the history of the Polish and Ukrainian Nations. After ten years of bloody fighting both sides settled the compromise solution, creating the Commonwealth of Three Nations. They were forced to use such a measure because of the common threat from Russia. The Cremlin policy brought about changes in the so far attitudes of Warsaw and Chyhryn and this made the two capitals ready to compromise. The anti-Russian platform of agreement, which definitly shifted the balance of power in this part of Europe, was to become an important test for the Hadjach treaty. Ivan Vyhovs'kyj and his retinue knew, that the Tsar’s court would not consent a return of the Cossacks under the King’s power, since this would have signified a lessening of Russian positions. Nobody in the Cremlin would agree to a loss of the territorial achievements won in 1654-55, and a Polish-Cossack cooperation would have brought exactly to that result. So it was decided to submit Ukraine once again by all possible ways, especially by sending there military forces and conquering the revolted provinces. Thus, the possibility of giving the new union a permanent character depended on military cooperation between the Commonwealth and the Zaporizhzhian army, assisted by the allied Crimean Tatars.

The Treaty of Hadjach was the result of the Russian danger that menaced both sides. After the death of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyj in 1657, the court of the
Tsar attempted to achieve full subordination of Ukraine taking advantage of the need of the new hetman to receive recognition of his election by the Tsar. At the beginning everything went smoothly, according to Vyhovs’kyj plans. The General Council in Korsun’ had entrusted the power to him and this deprived the Russians to interfere with manoeuvres in Ukrainian politics. However, the revolt of the Zaporizhian Sich, which decided to take advantage of the new situation and regain power against the hetman, gave the Tsar the possibility to interfere in internal dissension between Cossacks. Somewhat later, the Zaporizhians who were under the command of Iakov Barabash, got reinforcements from Martyn Pushkar, who was colonel of the Poltava regiment since 1649 and dreamed of arriving to hetman’s power. The rebels appealed to the Tsar for help, accusing Vyhovs’kyj of high treason. At this point the court in Moscow had the chance to pressure the new hetman, attempting to force him to accept conditions that restricted the autonomy of Ukraine and the hetman’s independence which Russia considered too broad. In return they offered him the recognition of his election.

The Cossacks, on their part, were afraid of the Commonwealth and its ally, the Crimean Khanate: they aimed at conquering Ukraine taking advantage of the internal dissensions caused by the death of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyj and of the rebellion of the Sich. In order to win the sultan’s support and his agreement to use Tatars against their former ally, Polish diplomacy informed Stambul that a war had broken out between the Cossacks and Russia. The Ottomans ordered the Khan and the Pasha of Sylistra, who had the authority to command armies of Moldavian and Valachian hospodars, to attack Ukraine together with Polish forces, immediately after the break of civil war in the country. In the same time Poles begun to concentrate their troops in Kam’janets’.

Vyhovs’kyj and his retinue, on their side, were obliged to renew the alliance with the Crimean Tatars, which had been the Cossack’s allies years before, by several circumstances: the policy of Moscow, the aggressive attitude of the Commonwealth, the course of the events (especially the rebellion in the Sich and Poltava) and the fact that Sweden – the new and only ally they could count on – was at a very great distance. The new situation, in turn, induced Vyhovs’kyj to attempt to improve Ukraine’s relationships with the Commonwealth, which was the ally of the Orde. The intent was to use the King as a kind of mediator, who could persuade the Tatars to help the hetman against his opponents. There were different reasons for trying to improve the relations with the Polish court. The Cossacks wanted to keep the Poles away from Ukraine in the moment of still worsening internal

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situation among Ukrainians; they also aimed at winning a potential ally if relations with Moscow would be to worsen in next future. The Hetman could not permit himself to to disregard the possibility of a reopening of Polish-Russian negotiations in the short time: such a possibility had to be avoided at all price, since it might cause great damage for Cossacks². This latter reason soon lost its weigh, because at the turn of 1656 and 1657 Russians attempted to force the Commonwealth to ratify the treaty of Niemez, which had been signed in 1656. However, the King and his advisers disagreed, and this made a reopening of the conflict apparently unavoidable. As a consequence, Polish politicians decided to reach an understanding with Vyhovs’kyj, who was to face still growing troubles.

Contacts between the two sides did not look well at the beginning. After the collapse of the Radnot Coalition, the Commonwealth wanted to exploit the turmoil in Ukraine. At the end of August 1657, the Moldavian hospodar Jerzy Stefan informed Vyhovs’kyj of the Crown Hetmans’ order to concentrate the troops in Kam’janets’ Podol’sk, after the Poles had been informed about the death of Khmel’nyts’kyj and the difficult position of the Cossacks. The Hospodar informed of secret dealings between Poles and Rákóczi as well³. However, Jan Kazimierz hoped that Vyhovs’kyj would recognize his power and no military action was put into effect. When the situation in Ukraine stabilized, both sides signed armistice on April 21, 1658. The division of territory by the rivers Sluch and Horyn’ in Volhynia⁴ was the only result of the diplomatic negotiations carried out by the Volhynian castellan Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski and the Cossacks. For the latter it was a success, because they won a temporary peace on the western and northern frontier. Since both sides were threatened by Moscow, serious negotiations between Warsaw and Chyhyryn were reestablished and the Union of Hadjach became its fruit.

During these negotiations the Commonwealth did not hesitate to make use of some kind of demonstration of power. When senators and nobility accepted to begin debates with the Cossacks at the so called ‘Warsaw convocation’, it was decided to move more troops near Horyn’, in order to

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² Ibid., 190.
persuade the other side to accept the proposed agreement. Soon Polish and Lithuanian troops started coming to Volhynia and joined other detachments, which were quartered there since before. These manoeuvres brought considerable complications in the negotiations. Vyhovs’kyj interpreted them as a preparation to attack Ukraine. Stanislaw Bieniewski himself, the most important Polish negotiator, warned that this could lead to breaking the truce. He went on declaring that the decision of quartering Polish-Lithuanian troops were caused by a misunderstanding of the words spoken by Vyhovs’kyj’s plenipotentiary Teodozy Tomkiewicz: as a matter of fact the latter asked the Polish troops to be ready to move towards the truce line, but only after the clear signal from the Cossack’s capital Chyhyryn. For the hetman, the threat of a Polish aggression became a justification for opening negotiations with Poles in the eyes of the «black people» (czerni). At the same time it was a kind of protection against Poles, who could otherwise take advantage from worsening internal situation in Ukraine.

There were some incidents on the western frontier of Ukraine, which caused tensions. In November 1657 Ivan Serbin, the Bratslav regiment’s colonel, moved his troops from Lachovychi to Kremenets’, to enlarge the territory subordinated to the Zaporizhian army. In the same time a few Polish companies attacked, without success, Medzhybizh to destroy the garrison of the Cossacks. The truce was broken by both sides in several occasions. In January 1658 colonel Samuel Kmicic alarmed the Lithuanian hetman Paweł Jan Sapieha, that a few hundred Cossacks crossed Horyn’, and added that «more and more troops will arrive in the region. The commander declared that the Lithuanian divisions which had quarters near the truce line did in no way cause a breaking of the truce».

Such actions were undertaken by colonels quartered near the frontier: they aimed at winning control over the territories between the Sluch and Horyn’. The Cossacks garrisons, which officially were ordered to stay in the estates of the nobles to protect them from attacks from enemies, had very similar motivations. Vyhovs’kyj and

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8 P. Sapieha to S. Bieniewski, Kamieniec Litewski 15th January 1658 r., in: PKK, t. III: 263.
his retinue assumed, that garrisons were brought in at the request of the estates’ owners, like Samuel Leszczyński, and they would not be withdrawn. By that way the Cossack hetman could control places like Kostjantyniv (Kostantynów), Zaslav, Medzhybizh, Ostroh, Stepan’ and Korets’⁹. From their side, Cossacks often complained about the actions of Lithuanian troops, because they often invaded the territory between the rivers. When Samuel Kmicic reached Horyn’, peasants fled away in masses from the village of Stepań, and Kostjantyn Vyhovs’kyj, who called himself colonel of Pinsk and Turov colonel, was extremely worried for the inhabitants of the principality of Slutsk and Polissja. Bieniewski, who feared that this could bring negotiations to failure, suggested to both the Crown Hetman and the Lithuanian Hetman to take troops entrusted to them back to the camp¹⁰.

Frictions were frequent not only in Volhynia, but in the Pinsk area too. During Rákóczi’s invasion many local nobles put themselves under Khmel’nyts’kyj’s protection. However, when the danger passed, a group of nobles attacked the men who had suggested that measure and their leader, the marechal of Pinsk Łukasz Jelski. They also sent away from Pinsk the Cossacks envoy, colonel Ivan Hrusha, who was there since the turn of August and September. This was possible because Hrusha had a small retinue and the nobility was supported by Lithuanian troops from the division of Pawel Sapieha¹¹. Vyhovs’kyj refused to accept these events and tried several times to convince Bieniewski to order the Lithuanians to give that district back to the Cossacks.

From the very beginning military issues were integral part of negotiations. As mentioned above, Vyhovs’kyj wanted to exploit the threat of a Polish-Lithuanian agression to justify his diplomatic contacts with the envoys of the King. On the other side, the concentration of troops in Volhynia made his position difficult because it might bring to dangerous frictions. The Zaporizhian hetman had to repress the revolt of Martyn Pushkar and the demonstration of power from Polish side risked to increase anti-Polish attitudes and to lead to an armed conflict. In March 1658 Bieniewski met with Pavlo Teterja, the hetman’s envoy, who presented Vyhovs’kyj’s conditions¹². First, the King was asked to make peace with Sweden – even with detriment for the Commonwealth – before the Tsar might do the same

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thing: If this condition was not accepted – it was said – perspectives for future Polish-Ukrainian agreement were menaced. Second, the royal court had to persuade the Khan to send immediate help for the Cossacks. Third, Polish forces were asked to be ready to intervene, though remaining at distance from the border. Teterja asked for mobilization of noble levée en masse probably from territories near Ukraine, as a kind of help against Moscow. Bieniewski expressed the opinion that «it would not go without that, because secret dealings should be supported by arms».

The negotiations finished with an extension of the truce, but this did not stop the military incidents. In May, while fighting against the rebels on the other side of the Dnipro, Vyhovs’kyj wrote to Bieniewski with harsh words: «now, instead of mutual frankness, we receive information, that they are preparing forces against us. Some of the nobles threaten us in circular letters, that we will not reign in Ukraine much longer».

Thus, military factors played a very important role during the Polish-Cossacks negotiations which led to the Hadjach Union. On the one hand, Vyhovs’kyj made all he could to prevent Polish-Lithuanian armies from marching in Ukraine in the time of a heavy internal crisis, on the other he exploited the permanent threat menacing the western border to justify his contact with Bieniewski in the eyes of a part of the Cossacks and of the Kremlin. During the Diet Austrian envoys in Warsaw informed their authorities about the situation. Since Vyhovs’kyj did not have absolute power over the Cossacks – they wrote –, a part of his plans were to arrive to a secret agreement with the Poles. After this would happen, the King’s armies were to approach the Ukrainian border; then, the hetman and his followers, might give exaggerated information about the Polish power and pretend to be afraid of it, thus having the possibility of convincing the «black people» (czerń) to accept the agreement with the Commonwealth as the only viable solution to a difficult situation.

More important from the Cossacks’ point of view was renewal of the alliance with Crimean Tatars. First, Ukraine was seriously threatened by

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I. Vyhovs’kyj to S. Bieniewski, from the camp near Półjezierze 20th May 1658 r., in: PKK, t. III: 301.

Anonymous letter (Fr. Lisola?) to the Emperor, 8th August 1658 r., in: Herasymchuk V., Materialy: 103-104.
their activities. In August 1657 information came to Chyhyryn that Tatars prepared an aggression on the southern frontier with the collaboration of Poles. Moreover, Cossack diplomacy was making efforts to improve relations with the Khanate, but this did not stop incursions in Ukraine, and at the beginning of December a diplomatic mission from the Khan came to Warsaw with the proposal of a common expedition against Cossacks and the liquidation of their state. The hetman was soon informed about significant concentration of Tatar forces. They were ready to march into Ukraine, as soon as news about the outburst of the civil war would arrive. Vyhovs’kyj decided to make an alliance with the Khanate to prevent the realisation of these plans, at the same time winning a new ally against rebellious Cossacks. The alliance with them turned out to be very effective. It permitted the hetman to defeat Pushkar and Barabash with their regiments, who did not recognize his authority. The very presence of the Tatars in his camp strengthened his position among Cossacks. Without these reinforcements it would have been very difficult to hold the command, and his victory in Poltava gave him a chance to unite the country and reject the Russian pretensions. He however recognized, that the Tatar help would be not enough to oppose successfully the Russians, so he decided to reach an agreement with the Commonwealth, which was also the Tatars’ ally and at the same time Moscow’s foe.

Thus, by the end, the Hadjach Union was signed in spite of all difficulties. It included some military points. First, the Cossacks’ register was to count 60,000 men «according to their ancient liberties under the authority of the Ruthenian Hetman». The same paragraph mentioned that the hetman had the right to recruit «mercenary soldiers», who were to stay under his command. They were to be paid from taxes approved by the Diet and raised in territories included in the Ruthenian Principality. The Hetman had the power to give that army the right to food supply in the royal and ecclesiastic estates located in the territory of the principality. These soldiers were to be equivalent to crown and Lithuanian armies (the so called komputowy), with the only difference that their commander was civilian officer of the highest range in the principality. The problem of the «mercenary soldiers» was not a subject of negotiations in Hadjach, since it has been discussed earlier. In the second half of August, the Warsaw court received the following information:


17 I. Vyhovs’kyj to S. Bieniewski, from the camp near Półjezierze 20th May 1658 r., in: PKK, t. III: 301.
«Vyhovs’kyj needs an independent state, just like it is in Lithuania, and his second demand is to have the right to recruit German soldiers, what is not possible in Lithuania, [so that they may] become rather independent allies than citizens of a united body of the Commonwealth.»18

The treaty included a very important statement: Polish and Lithuanian soldiers were prohibited to enter the territory of the principality. If their presence was necessary, the troops should be commanded by the Ruthenian hetman.

There were clauses about a possible war with Tsar as well. Vyhovs’kyj was afraid to be obliged to take part in a Polish-Russian conflict, while the Commonwealth, engaged in the North against Sweden, was unable to give sufficient support to the Cossacks. This was the reason why the treaty included the clause that:

if the King, together with the crown and Lithuanian lands, begins an offensive war against Moscow, the Cossack army will not have the obligation to participate in such conflict19. But if the Tsar does not want to return the Commonwealth its provinces and attacks it, all the forces will join and fight together, the army of the crown and Lithuania, and the Ruthenian Zaporizhian army, under the command of its own hetman.20

This was an attempt to please those Cossacks who did not approve the alliance with the Commonwealth and were afraid of a conflict with the Tsar, which could bring tragic consequences for Ukraine and the Zaporizhian army.

Military matters, however, did not represent a really large part of the text of the treaty, although they in principle were fundamental for the consistency of the agreement itself. The common anti-Russian front, which was the main impulse compelling both sides to sign an agreement, would have required the full commitment in the conflict.

As a matter of fact, the Hetman was perfectly aware that the perspective of a return under Polish rule would rise strong resentment among Cossacks. He therefore attempted to negotiate the best possible terms for the latter, at the same time making concessions to the Poles. Thus, the text of the treaty

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18 J. Leszczyński to the King, Warsaw 5th September 1658, Czart, 388, k. 488, in: Kubala L., Wojny duńskie: 532, dodatek X.
19 That clause was later deleted from text of the treaty. Herasymchuk V., Materiały: 117, footnote 88 (p. 135).
20 Ibid., 116-117.
included the following secret proclamation: «Deklarację wielmożnego Jana Wyhowskiego, hetmana wojsk zaporoskich, na punkta niektóre w commisiej pod Hadziaczem zawartej opisane, przy kończeniu tejże commisiej dana»21. Vyhovs’kyj declared that he would cut the number of registered Cossacks by half just after the end of the war against Moscow. It was not possible to do this immediately, because «present times need that a higher number appears in the treaty, otherwise, ordinary soldiers, removed from the register, may cause difficulties». In return, he demanded to give him exclusive command of the troops raised in the principality. He was not sure of the fidelity of the Cossacks, hence he organized his personal guard, whose duty was to suppress all rebellions and to strengthen his position in the Ruthenian principality.22

Vyhovs’kyj also asked the King to send him as soon as possible «foreign troops» – calculated between one and five thousand men – «for internal security and a quicker evacuation of the Russians from Kyiv». He was aware, that the alliance with the Commonwealth meant war with Russia and wanted to strike first, in spite of the relatively high level of unpopularity of such plans among Cossacks. In August he wrote to the King, that he hoped to establish union between the Commonwealth and the Cossacks, and expressed his readiness to begin war against Russia in the name of Ukraine's freedom, with the aim of easing the transition to the King’s service: «Russians want to win the power over Ukraine by tricky ways – he maintained –, May God defend us against it; if Ukraine turns down their authority under my leadership, it will be very difficult to bring her back after»23. At the end of August the King wrote to the commissaries charged of the negotiations with Russia, that «we had received information, or rather Vyhovs’kyj’s declaration, that he wants to begin open war against Moscow and frankly help us»24. After the Hadjach Union, when the court received information about the Cossack march into the Russian state’s southern provinces, the King and his councillors counted, that «Cossacks and Tatars forces, which marched with 100,000 men into Muscovy pursuing Romodanski [Romodanovskij], who had remained in Belgorod, will be able (according to their promises) to reach the capital, and this may give us better conditions for a peace».

However, the royal court did not realize, how much Cossacks had changed after the time of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi. Tore apart by internal social conflicts, deprived of a charismatic leader, they were not able to fight

by themselves against Russia. On her side, Sweden engaged in war against Dania and this circumstance suggested Jan Kazimierz to concentrate Crown forces in Royal Prussia in order to win back lost fortresses, while engaging the Lithuanian army, Cossacks and Tatars in the war against Moscow. He decided to act that way, because the Swedish King, who in the previous time was not willing to begin parleys, «reportedly» became «more willing» at present²⁵. From the point of view of the Polish elites, the eastern front represented only a secondary issue. The general opinion was that the change of power balance brought about in the region by the Cossacks’ shift of loyalty, would persuade Moscow at least to resume negotiations, if not to bring back to the Commonwealth the territories conquered before. Negotiations were supposed stop Russian military activity in Lithuania. The most important attacks against Russia were to be launched in Ukraine by Cossacks forces. Vyhovs’kyj was also to support Paweł Sapieha’s division which fought on the Lithuanian left flank, backed by soldiers enrolled by levée en masse (pospolite ruszenie) and Cossacks forces, commanded by colonel Ivan Nechaj. These forces were to attack the Tsar’s army, which was near Vilnius²⁶. Simultaneously, both sides were to open negotiations: their course depended on military successes²⁷. Such plan were based on several premises. First, it was thought that the Cossack’s transition to King’s service would incline Moscow towards compromise. Second, there always was hope that joint Cossack and Tatar forces may be able to force Moscow to make peace: this brought great expectations for the offensive Vyhovs’kyj planned to bring against Russia in autumn, and induced to adopt the more offensive variant of action (the Lithuanian army, supported by part of Crown forces, was to conquer back Belarus); in their imagination, the King’s counselors saw Cossack banners already on the Muscovite city walls. Third, it was assumed, that Cossacks would take over most of the tasks on the eastern front with a but small Polish support. Fourth, it was expected that the conflict in the East would last short time thanks to the overwhelming forces of the Commonwealth, and that it would be soon possible to engage joint Polish and Cossacks forces against

²⁵ John Casimir to the Khan, camp near Torun?, bd (after 3th November, when it was announced in camp about battle of Werki), Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie (in further mentions – AGAD), Archiwum Koronne Warszawskie (in further mentions – AKW) dział tatarski, k. 62, t. 40, n. 372: 6; ibid., k. 62, t. 41, n. 373: 2-3.

²⁶ Jan Kazimierz to commissaries, camp near Thorun, 8th November 1658, Czart. 151, n. 124: 541-549; Czart. 401: 145-146. They were to be supported by crown hetman S. Potocki’s division. See: Dąbrowski J., Polsko-moskiewskie rokowania pokoju w 1658 roku, in: Rzeczpospolita w latach Potopu, red. J. Muszyńska i J. Wijaczka, Kielce, 1996: 102.

Sweden. Moreover, the Polish part thought that Cossack-Tatar incursions would impede the success of the negotiations between Sweden and Russia, that had been initiated in autumn 1658 in Valiisaari near Narva: in that situation – it was thought – the Cremlin could be saved not by the small Swedish army, but by the peace with the triumphant Commonwealth.

Vyhovs’kyj was aware that, after the union had been signed, military collaboration of both sides became the most important issue. Therefore, in the hetmanate the support by Polish army was considered crucial. This was the reason why Ivan Kovalevs’kyj, one of the Cossack envoys who were on the way to Warsaw with the most important Polish negotiators, Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski and Ludwik Kazimierz Jewłaszewski, take advantage of the occasion to meet also with Grand Crown Hetman Stanisław Rewera Potocki. In the name of Vyhovs’kyj he asked him for Polish reinforcements. The Cossack hetman made any effort to have closer relationships with the Polish commander, because he badly needed his consent for reinforcements and recruitment of mercenaries in Poland.

For the King’s court it was clear that to support the Zaporizhian hetman was a priority. Indeed, John Casimir ordered Grand Crown Hetman to send to Ukraine part of his division already in November, as soon as the Cossack envoy Teodozy Tomkiewicz sent to Toruń the information that hetman «came back from Moscow with the Tatars, but without any great success and, while they [Tatars] returned to their country, he sought asylum in Chyhyryn, being uncertain of his fate, because he was afraid of his men». The hetman thus asked for military help against rebellious subjects, who were willing to change sides once again and to join the party of young Jurij Khmel’nyts’kyj’s followers. To tell the truth, news were exaggerated, but in Ukraine the Polish army was badly needed as a clear sign of the correctness of the previous decision to cast the Cossack’s lot with the Commonwealth.

The question, however, was whether the Polish-Lithuanian state had the possibility to give such help at that moment. Winter approached, part of the army – Jerzy Lubomirski’s division – still was engaged in Royal Prussia. True, after the end of the campaign against Rákóczi in 1657 the division of Grand Crown Hetman was spending its time bivouacking in Volhynia, Belz and Ruthenia provinces. Unfortunately, however, these troops were not really available, because of pay arrears since the beginning of 1658. A special commission appointed by the Diet that year established that state’s debts

28 M. Prażmowski to commisaries, camp near Thorun 15th October 1658, Czart. 151, n. 111: 495-497.
31 Ibid.
towards the army counted more than 12 million zlotys\textsuperscript{32}. The military commission, which should meet in Lublin at the beginning of January to solve this problem, was not gathered because the treasure was empty and soldiers’ delegates declared a military «confederation» under the leadership of the Military Supervisor Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski. Thus, it was impossible for the Polish court to support Vyhovs'kyj with adequate reinforcements.

In Lithuania the situation was even more dangerous. The Lithuanian army had to fight against Russians, at the same time repelling Swedish thrust against Courland and Samogitia. After the defeat in Werki and return of Jurij Dolgorukij’s army towards Smolensk, the Lithuanians divided their forces. The left wing went to the northern front, letting the right wing division to fight against Russians. However, the Lithuanian army faced the same problem as the Crown army: soldiers started to demand their pay and Grand Lithuanian Hetman Paweł Sapieha had to stop his activities. When news came about Vyhovs’kyj aborting raid against Moscow and his return to Ukraine, it became clear, that the grand strategy of a common Cossack, Tatar and Lithuanian strike against Smolensk – let alone Moscow – could not be executed\textsuperscript{33}. Above all, Lithuanians were reluctant to engage in negotiations with Cossacks, because they feared that any alliance with them would not only make negotiations with Moscow more difficult, but persuade Russians to engage in a war, which was to be destructive mainly for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Sapieha mistrusted Cossacks also because his estates in Belarus were under their control: Stary Bychów (Bykhaŭ) was Ivan Nechaj’s headquarter.

So, from the very beginning the military cooperation between Ukraine and Russia was very frail. An unsuccessful expedition to the borderlands of Russia in September, and two attempts to conquer Kyiv (defended by a few thousands strong garrison commanded by Vasilij Borisovich Sheremet'ev) ended in failure. Hard fighting with the army of Grigorij Romodanovskij\textsuperscript{34} beyond the Dnipro brought to no result and proved that Cossacks were not able to defend themselves against Russian aggression without help from Commonwealth, even with Tatar support. It has to be acknowledged that Tatars participated in all expeditions of the Hetman. In July the Orde appeared in Chyhyryn under the command of kalga Ghazi Girei (later joined by nureddin Aadil Girei), while simultaneously the main part of the Tatar


\textsuperscript{33} More about this topic in: Kasazhėtski K., Kampanija 1660 hodu ŭ Litve, «Arche», n. 6, Minsk, 2006 (In this place I would like to thank the author for making Polish version of this book available to me).

\textsuperscript{34} Cf. Babulin I. B., Bitva pod Konotopom 28 ijunja 1659 goda, Moskva, 2009: 5.
force prepared for an Ottoman campaign in Transilvania. Tatars took part in the unsuccessful expedition to the southern frontier zone of Russia in September 1658. An episode of this campaign shows how dangerous the situation was and gives evidence of the reasons of the Tatar support for Vykovs’kyj: when the hetman delayed the march of all his forces into Russia proper, Tatars became impatient and began to take iasiri not only in the enemy’s lands, but in Ukraine as well. This had a very bad influence on the Zaporizhian and was one of reasons that induced Vykovs’kyj to interrupt the expedition and sent Tatars back with the only exception of 2,000 men. However, Tatar reinforcements under Selim Girei’s command took part in the expedition against Russians in winter 1659.

Its importance notwithstanding, Khanate’s support could not ensure the victory for Cossacks. So Chyhyryn badly needed the presence of Polish and Lihuanian armies in the eastern theater of war. To make it possible, Vykovs’kyj begun to convince the King to make a peace with Sweden. In his opinion success or failure of the Hadjach idea depended from this point. Swedes were waging war with both the Commonwealth and Russia: on the one hand this impeded the former to concentrate all efforts in the East, on the other it engaged a considerable part of the Russian army, thus restraining Moscow from intervention in Ukraine. The ‘Swedish card’ helped the Hetman to resist easier against Russian forces. Moscow’s military potential could be neutralized, if the Commonwealth and Sweden would come to terms quickly. Simultaneously this could break the peace negotiations between Stockholm and Moscow, which were started in May 1658. This kind of reasoning induced the hetman to pressure Warsaw to finish the war in the North as soon as possible, even at cost of some concessions: not only would peace between Sweden and Russia would liberate Moscow from a war on two fronts, but it would allow Sweden to engaged against the Commonwealth in a more energetic way. Moreover, the end of war in the North would permit the Tsar to engage all his forces to bring Ukraine back under his rule, while Polish-Lithuanian forces would be engaged in Royal Prussia and Courland and would not be able to bring help to Cossacks. It should be remarked also that Moscow, forced to fight on two fronts – the Baltic and Lithuanian-Ukrainian – simultaneously, had to make a choice on which front to engage. Probably, for the Tsar, the question of ‘gathering Russian lands’ was to be considered more vital, and Moscow might abandon her

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35 Bul’vins’kyj A., Ukrains’ko-rosijs’ki vzajemyny 1657-1659 rr.: 259. Small Tatar forces participated in the unsuccessful siege of Kyiv, commanded by Danilo Vykovs’kyj.

36 Ibid., 276, 288. At the beginning of December Kiev voivode V. Sheremetiev estimated the its numer at 6,000 men, V. Sheremet’ev to Tsar, Kiev 31st January 1659, in: Akty JuZR, t. XV, n. 6, cz. IV: 297.
'Baltic policy' and the idea of getting access to the sea, and be obliged to begin negotiations with Sweden. Thus, the most important goal of Cossack’s diplomacy became to reach an agreement between Sweden and Poland, and to induce Charles X Gustav to stop negotiating with the Tsar. Unfortunately, the plans of the Hetman failed. On the one side, the conditions offered by Sweden were unacceptable for Poles, on the other the King and his council considered the Northern front as more important and were not ready to loose any part of Royal Prussia. So, peace was impossible. It remains also questionable, whether the end of hostilities in Prussia and Samogitia at the turn of 1658-1659 would have brought substantial help for Vyhovs’kyj: the army had not been paid since several years and it would rather join Jaskólski’s confederation than go to fight in Ukraine.

At the turn of 1658 and 1659, however, help for Cossacks was extremely necessary, as testified by Vyhovs’kyj’s letters. He feared that the Cossacks may change side to the Tsar’s benefit and made use of this argument to pressure the Polish court to send help and engage more actively in the eastern war. He wrote to crown chancellor, Mikołaj Prażmowski:

I will be glad, if some cavalry troops come with Łączyński’s dragoons. Otherwise, considering our frustrated hopes, I do not know, how to pull the people’s hearts to the King and the Commonwealth. Now I resist with my forces only and the enemy was defeated so many times, as he attempted to launch an attack. Soon my troops, which were sent by me beyond the Dnipro to suppress the civil war, which was instigated by the enemy, are going to succeed. However, promised reinforcements are badly needed to strengthen the people’s loyalty to the King and the Commonwealth, otherwise it will be very difficult to induce men to defend the border, which has been cleaned with support of the Khan.

Vyhovs’kyj needed Crown forces in Ukraine to oppose Russians who were taking offensive, and to give a clear sign that Commonwealth considered an agreement with Cossacks as substantial. It was especially important for the «black people» who strongly opposed the perspective of a return of Ukraine under the dominance of Polish nobles. Crown reinforcements, like mercenary troops, could strengthen the hetman’s position, weakened by lack of military success. Irritated, he begun to seek help in different ways. As Vasiliji

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37 Wójcik Z., Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza, Warszawa, 1959: 35-36; Horobets' V., Hadjs'ka uhoda 1658 r.: 107; idem, Ėlita: 197.

38 I. Vyhov'skyi to M. Prażmowski, camp near Rzyszczew 15th January 1658 r., in: PKK, t. III: 318.
Sheremet'ev reported from Kyiv, at the beginning of December Vyhovs'kyj was supposed to have sent to Turkey an embassy led by Anton Zdanovich, asking for help and offering his subordination to the Sultan\(^{39}\). The contacts with the Ottomans were basically successful, but unfortunately it was too late: letters containing informations about Turkish and Tatar reinforcements arrived only in April 1660, when Jurij Khmel'nyts'kyj already was the new Zaporizhian hetman. He sent the visir’s letters to the Tsar! They show, however, that Vyhovs'kyj was aware of his uncertain position and looked for an alternative to the alliance with the Commonwealth, in case the latter could not (or was not willing to) support Cossacks against Moscow, or in case the alliance with Poland would turn out to be not favorable for the Cossacks\(^{40}\).

When it became aware of the situation, Warsaw decided to sent a part of the division of the Grand Crown Hetman. On November 16 these troops had gathered near Luck in Volhynia and marched towards Kyiv\(^{41}\). According to the sources, the rest of the division, «under the command of the hetman’s lieutenant colonel Machowski, spent the rest of the year doing nothing substantial in their quarters near Sluch and Horyn’, and became a heavy burden for all Poland and Volhynia»\(^{42}\). Andrzej Potocki was charged with the command of the troops sent to Ukraine\(^{43}\), formed only by cavalry: 26 companies of Cossacks, 3 of Valachians, 5 of Tatars and the dragoons regiment of colonel Józef Łączyński\(^{44}\). The whole amounted to about 3600 soldiers\(^{45}\). In the middle of December the King informed the envoys he had sent to negotiate


\(^{43}\) Majewski W., Andrzej Potocki (zm. 1663), in: Polski Słownik Biograficzny (in further mentions – PSB), t. XXVII: 770-773

\(^{44}\) Summariusz krótki podanych recognitiei wojskowych do Skarbu Rzeczypospolitej Koronnej przez Wielmożnego J.M.Pana Andrzejza z Potoka Potockiego obożnego koronnego, winnickiego etc. starosty w Warszawie die 7 lipca 1660 anno, AGAD, Archiwum Skarbowe Koronne, dz. 86, ks. 46: 151-153. Akty JuZR, t. XV, n. 6, cz. IV: 303-304 (Colonel Michał Szemberk’s confession). Dragoon’s regiment took a part in the siege of Toruń and probably in the first half of November was sent from there to Ukraine. See: Nowak T., Obleżenie Torunia w roku 1658 r., Toruń, 1936: 93. Author mentioned it among Polish troops, located near Toruń on 6th November to mention it afterwards no more. In Summariusz are mentioned to: Stefana Piasoczyński’s dragoon’s company and other od Polish infantry. For J. Łączyński see his biogram, in: PSB, t. XVIII: 313-314.

with the Tsar’s plenipotentiary as follows: «with God’s help Russians will be under pressure soon»; he expected the voivode of Vilnius [Paweł Jan Sapieha, Grand Lithuanian Hetman] to continue the actions as planned and join his forces with colonel Nechai’s Cossacks. Cossacks were expected to attack together with Tatars and with the forces sent by the King46.

The beginning of 1659 seemed favourable for the allies. On the Lithuanian front Samuel Kmiecic and Samuel Oskierko’s troops started cooperation with the Cossacks of Nechaj. It was announced that hetman Sapieha was to come soon with all his army. Crown reinforcements appeared, giving hope for future. Unfortunately, soon all changed for the worse. The troops of the Tsar crushed the Kmiecic regiments and the voluntary companies who supported them; later they defeated in the battle of Miadzioł the joint forces of Władysław Wołowicz and Mikołaj Judycki. This was a really severe blow for Lithuanians47.

In Ukraine, the winter offensive of the Cossacks ended in fiasco, though they were supported by the regiment of Andrzej Potocki’s and the Tatars of Selim Girei’s. They could not dislodge Russians from Left Bank Ukraine and regain control in the area, which remained faithful to the Tsar. Moreover, Vyhovs’kyj was informed that Aleksej Trubetskoy was approaching the Ukraine border with his army. At that moment much depended on the possibility of receiving military support from the Commonwealth, not only to fight against Russians, but also to strengthen the hetman’s weakening position48.

The Tatars realized how serious the matter was and supported the Cossack’s efforts to secure Polish reinforcements. They asked the King to send an army to Ukraine. In Winter 1659 visir Sefer Gazi Aga wrote to crown chancellor Mikołaj Prażmowski as follows:

Twice we sent reinforcements for Cossacks against Moscow and we have sent now good troops again [...]in the name of Khan, all beys, murzas and orda I ask you to persuade the King and senators to send forces to Lithuania as help for Cossacks as soon as possible [...] If you will not send troops for Cossacks to aid against Moscow, it would be regarded as a hostile act towards Crimea and we would be in great enmity.49

46 Jan Kazimierz to commissaries, camp near Toruń 12th December 1658, Czart. 151, n. 134: 585-586.
47 About the Lithuanian campaign see: Kasazhėtski K., Kampanija 1660 hodu.
48 The reasons were: controversion about ratification of Hadjach treaty, lack of military success and threat of strong, as was supposed, Russian army’s intervention in Ukraine. Vyhovs’kyj was willing to raise his prestige, so he formulated the idea, according to that presence of Polish army near Dnepr would not be enough and King should come personally, see: I. Vyhovs’kyj to B. Leszczyński, Chyhyryn 9th April 1659, Bossol. 189: 1073.
49 Sefer Gazi aga to M. Prażmowski, Bachczysaraj bd, AGAD AKW dz. tatarski, k. 62, t. 81, n. 413: 2.
Khan Mehmed Gerei IV, who just started preparations for the Ukrainian campaign, formulated a very similar request:

It would be good and useful that Your Grace the King order Grand Crown Hetman to come with all his forces to aid the Zaporizhians, or, instead of him, Jerzy Lubomirski, Crown Field Hetman. We just inform Your Majesty [...] that we need infantry and artillery more than cavalry, and I very much ask for that.50

Thus, the Crimean Khanate was more and more engaged on Cossack’s side in its struggle against Russia. Tradition, interest and policy dictated such behaviour. The secutiry of the Khanate itself was put in danger if Russians were able to subordinate Ukraine, exactly as the position of the Kremlin was menaced by the alliance of Tatar with Cossacks. The Khan wrote to the King in these terms: «If the treacherous and astute Muscovite invade Ukraine and take it under his power, if – God prevent – he subdues it with the Cossacks, this would cause great pain in Poland and would perturb the Khanate as well»51. In other occasion he argued: «if Muscovite armies were to capture Ukraine – God defend us – this would be very harmful to you and we would not have peace either»52.

The Khanate realized that aid for Vyhos’kyj was necessary, otherwise Moscow would bring Ukraine once again under its power and bring Russia dangerously closer to the Khanate’s border and strengthen it in fight against the Polish-Tatars coalition. The Khan wrote to the King with some anxiety:

There are a few thousands Cossacks, which are faithful to Moscow, so if, God defend, the Zaporizhian hetman will be defeated even in small degree, these Cossacks, like others who are supporting him now, quickly will surrender to Moscow, persuaded by its false promises. We reported to you through our envoy that Russians have distributed some leaflets among Zaporizhians and make szerńi more rebellious. This should be avoided, in order to make impede the enemy to become more powerful.53

The bey of Perekop too was inclined to a stricter cooperation between Tatars and Cossacks. After his return from the winter campaign he reported to Vyhos’kyj: «I reported to the Khan all the friendliness you show to him and to the whole Orde all the times»54.

50 Mehmed Gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, Suren 15th March 1659 r., ibid., t. 78, n. 410: 2.
51 Mehmed Gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, bmd (1659 r.), AGAD AKW dz. tatarski, k. 62, t. 86, n. 418: 2.
52 Mehmed Gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, Bakhchysaraj 14th May 1659, ibid., t. 75, n. 408: 2.
53 Mehmed Gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, Suren 15th March 1659, ibid., t. 78, n. 410: 2.
54 Karacz bey do I. Vyhos’kyj, Suren bd (April 1659), ibid., t. 83, n. 415: 2.
The return of Selim Girei and Karach bey’s Tatars from Ukraine and rumours about new, substantial Russian forces appearing near Ukrainian borders persuaded the Khan to send Vyhovs’kyj new reinforcements, led by nureddin and Szirim bey. Gazi Gerei was dispatched to the Azov region to launch a diversionary raid. Crimean diplomacy tried by all means to incite Calmuks to rebel against Moscow and still strived for Polish aid:

It would be honest and useful that the King orders the Grand Crown Hetman to come with all his forces to aid Zaporizhians, or instead of him, Jerzy Lubomirski, Crown Field Hetman. We only reported to Your Majesty [...] that we need infantry and artillery more than cavalry, what I am asking for.55

Following the Cossack’s requests ad taking in account the threat coming from Moscow, the Ottoman Porte agreed that Crimea may intervene with all its forces to rescue Vyhovs’kyj and his followers. The Khan begun to prepare an expedition to Ukraine56. The main forces under the Khan’s personal command were to come with aid to the Zaporizhian hetman, the ordes of Nogai were to launch an attack against the towns in the Belgorod region and territories situated at the east of the Don57.

While looking for help to repulse the Russian aggression, the hetman tried to change some clauses of the Hadjach Union during the extraordinary Diet, which had begun in the middle of March. Among his propositions some points concerned the army. It was asked, among others, to reassess all decrees endowed by the parliament on military discipline and to give the Ruthenian hetman the same power over the army as the Crown hetmans’. Taxes collected for military purposes from Ukrainian districts and controlled by the royal administration, should be paid to the Ruthenian treasure in order to provide for mercenary soldiers for the principality. Since the process of organization of the treasure and tax system required time, the hetman asked the Crown Treasure to pay for reinforcements for three years. In return Zaporizhian army promised to support the Commonwealth with forces twice bigger than the Crown troops, which were to be sent to Ukraine58.

55 Mehmed Gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, Suren 15th March 1659, ibid., t. 78, n. 410: 2.
56 RWM: 261. An agree was won by Cossack’ envoys, Herman Hapanovich and a Stomatenko, who stayed in Stambul at the turn of Winter and Spring 1659. It was necessary, since simultaneously the Ottomans were engaged, among other things, in Balcan conflict (against Rákóczi and his allies) and counted on Crimean aid.
Unfortunately, the Poles disagreed with all the propositions of the Cossacks. The position of the Commonwealth improved considerably in the last few months, so that the court begun to withdraw from some of the clauses of the primary treaty, among others such important issues as the liquidation of the Brest Union. The number of registered Cossacks remained 30,000 men, as it has been established by the Hadjach treaty, but the formula was added «or how the most noble Zaporizhian hetman inscribes in his register following the needs». This gave the hetman the possibility to change the number of registered Cossacks according to the situation; on his side the Hetman could keep under his command 10 thousands mercenary soldiers, paid from taxes voted in the Diet and gathered in the principality.

Indeed, Warsaw understood that the Cossacks could not be left without help, since this might end with their complete defeat or with a change of loyalty. Thus, the council of war in May decided that all the divisions of Grand Crown Hetman, numbering 17 thousands men (10 500 cavalry, 4300 dragoons, 2700 infantry) would support Vyhovs’kyj. Unfortunately, because of problems with providing for their pay, the court was not able to dismantle the confederation of Jaskólski before September and could not persuade the soldiers to march in Ukraine.

Tatars did not disappoint Vyhovs’kyj. In May, the Khan’s envoy Suliman aga reported to the King about his intention to give personal support to the Cossacks with all his forces. He insisted with the King to send the Crown army in Ukraine and to march personally into Lithuania to support the local army and attack Moscow too. He threatened: «So if you will not give any reinforcements to us [...] we inform you, that you yourselves would break our friendship».

Jan Kazimierz recognized that the situation was very serious. He assured the Khan that Crown forces would march in Ukraine together with Suliman aga and ordered Lithuanians to start war activity against Moscow. He promised that all Crown forces, with infantry and ordnance, would go to Ukraine as soon as treaty would the Crown army, nor the Lithuanian troop could bring any help to the Cossacks. Only Tatars were able to sustain Vyhovs’kyj with substantial aid. This appeared very clearly during the Khonotop campaign,

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61 Mehmed Gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, Bachczesaraj 14th May 1659, AGAD, AKW, dz. tatarski., k. 62, t. 75, n. 408: 2; ibid., t. 86, n. 418: 2.

62 Jan Kazimierz to Mehmed Girei IV, Warszawa bd. [1659.], ibid., k. 62, t. 17, n. 348: 3; k. 62, t. 42, n. 374: 3-4. The King justified himself before Khan, saying that he would continue his fight against Sweden and maintained that peace was very close. He promised that, immediately after a treaty would be signed, all Crown forces, with infantry and ordnance, would go to Ukraine, with aid from his allies.
where only a very little part of the Polish troops took part in action (sub-units and probably the dragoon regiment of Józef Łączyński). What is more interesting, Andrzej Potocki’s companies did not participate. Vyhovsk’yj was afraid about the security of his back and preferred to leave them near Kyiv to blockade the garrison. Tatar’s reinforcements, numbering about 30-35,000 men, come to rescue Vyhovs’kyj and their presence was crucial to win the battle over the part of the Russian army which was formed by the divisions of Semën Pozharskij and Grigorij Romadovskij. According to one relation, the Orde commanded by the Khan entrapped Pozharskij’s forces, encircling and destroying them. In the next phase of the battle, Tatars supported Cossacks by hitting the soldiers of Romadanovskij in the back: that action decided the fate of this stage of the battle. The presence on the theater of action of the extremely mobile Tatar cavalry permitted the allied army to gain great advantage from better understanding and better knowledge about the dislocation of the Russians and terrain where they were. Nimble Tatar troops were able to reach information about the enemy, at the same time making it almost impossible for him to take prisoners and receive informations. During the battle they proved their usefulness by entrapping part of Russian forces, encircling and attacking them from the back. The author – or probably authors – of the battle plan, took the best advantage of their characteristic way of dealing: skillful maneuvering and speed. It should be remembered, however, that in both actions Tatars had decisive advantage of number over the Russians.

In spite of the spectacular victory in the battle, the hetman continued his efforts to win Commonwealth’s military aid. After the battle an embassy led by Krzysztof Łasek, the colonel of the hetman’s mercenary forces, was sent to Warsaw. The envoys were to pass on an official announcement about the victory and insist on receiving military and financial help from Poland. The Hetman demanded the Crown army to be dispatched to Ukraine, while the Lithuanian forces were to make a diversionary attack against Russians in Belarus. Vyhovsk’yi was particularly irritated by the fact that the Lithuanians did not intervene to rescue colonel Nechaj who was besieged in Stary Bychów (Bykhaŭ).

He was followed by Crown Master of the Camp, who wrote to Jan Kazimierz:

> The Zaporizhian hetman badly needs foreign troops; since the foreign soldiers remain obedient, it is necessary to send him dra-

63 See: Babulin I. B., Bitva pod Konotopom: 15.

goons and, if possible, about 3,000 men infantry as well as soon as possible. My regiment, or rather squadron, is there, others are nearby; order them, Your Majesty, to march, and the hetman will be content with that. Otherwise, God defend us, he may look for the other solution, about which he wrote to me in the letter, which I am sending now to Your Majesty. It is sure, that Hammaty, his envoy to the Ottomans, was warmly received.65

Such opinion was common to many people. As Colonel Tomasz Karczewski reported, Cossacks openly said that, if the King did not send stronger forces, they would break down the weak crown regiments: «For God’s sake, the King has to think about Ukraine: thanks God and without our aid, the situation of the hetman improves, it is not good that there are no troops of our’s there.»66

However, the state of the Crown army, although it had improved, did not allow to come to aid to the Cossacks. The Hetman knew about the difficulties caused by the army’s confederation, so his envoys brought a letter addressed directly to the Crown soldiers. The King’s court looked at this initiative with favor and even insisted that the envoys hurry up with the letter of the Kievan voivode [Vyhovs’kyj] addressed to the army, which may bring some good effect in the soldiers’ attitudes, the more so if they will tell personally the soldiers how much affection Vyhovs’kyj and his Cossacks demonstrate for common Fatherland, which was liberated by them from the enemy; this may be an example for the soldiers and incite them to similar actions for common good.67

It remains unknown whether the Cossack’s envoys arrived to L’viv and had an influence on the dissolution of the confederation. The latter lasted until the beginning of September, and as a matter of fact it delayed the rise of military aid for Cossacks during their fight against Russia. This had catastrophic consequences not only for Vyhovs’kyj himself, but mainly for the Hadjach Union. The hetman begun to lose the support of the Cossack elite. By the end of August a rebellion led by the colonel of Perejaslav Tymofij Tsytsjura and by Vasyl’ Zolotarenko broke out in the regions beyond

65 A. Potocki to Jan Kazimierz, camp in Rutek 4th August 1659, in: PKK, t. III: 362. Hammaty was probably a merchant of Greek origin, who organized the Ukrainian custom system in B. Khmel’nyts’kyj’s and I. Vyhovs’kyj’s time. Sometimes he was sent on intelligence missions.
66 T. Karczewski to K. W. Pac, camp near Busk 20th July 1659, ibid., 357.
the Dnieper. They asked for help from Vasilij Sheremet’ev and Aleksej Trubetskoy. Thus, all Left Bank Ukraine returned under the Tsar’s regime. The Right Bank found itself in very difficult, though not hopeless situation. The rebels could count only on the support of the weakened Kievian garrisons, while the Russian forces near the Ukrainian border – at least in the first phase of events – seems not to show interest in meddling in Ukrainian internal strifes. Soon arrived also informations about the quieting of the crown army in Ukraine. Their aid was indispensable, since Vyhol’skyj was perfectly aware that Trubetskoy would not wait idle and soon would support the rebels. An attack to the Right Bank was to be expected and there would be no chance to oppose the Russians successfully.

Unfortunately, time was passing and the Crown army did not show any desire to support the Cossacks. In the second half of September, as the situation worsened, the Cossack elite, which up to this moment remained faithful, forced Vyhol’skyj to resign and elected a new hetman, Jurii Khmel’nyts’kyj. At the beginning this did not imply a break with the Commonwealth. The possibility of keeping control over Ukraine depended on the quick arrival of the Crown’s armies to Ukraine. Andrzej Potocki and Ivan Vyhol’skyj, who probably knew the situation the best, wrote again to underline the need of showing a concrete presence of Polish troops. The latter particularly insisted in the request to bring them as soon as possible in Ukraine. He wrote to Stanisław Potocki:

The only thing to wait for is the King’s instruction, so that you order the troops, which should have been sent to Ukraine long time ago, to march towards the border. This would permit to win back the pleb, which is greedy for new thing and even if it does not remember its oath, it would be faithful to King and Fatherland, seeing the king’s army readiness.

Other witnesses reported about the need of using bigger forces too.

But there was no sign, that such solution would be executed. Though at the beginning of September the army’s confederation was dissolved, Grand Crown Hetman delayed the beginning of action. His division was supposed to join forces with the Master of the Camp about 29th September (Saint Michael’s day), but the plan was not executed. Stanisław Potocki sent

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68 One of the reason of these events was fear of Russian conquest of these territories. Nobody doubted, that the Kremlin never would let Ukraine slip from its hands.


70 „If Cossacks had received our substantial aid, many of them would have been friendful to the King,” T. Karczewski to NN, camp near Kotelnia 18th October 1659, Czart. 2105: 182.
only 12 companies of cavalry on the 9th of September. A few days earlier, Crown Field Secreatry Jan Fryderyk Sapieha, who was not satisfied with the order to lead Polish auxiliary corps to Lithuania, had expressed his desire to march to Ukraine with help for Potocki and Vyhovs’kyi. On the 25th of September he set out from L’viv leading 3 regiments of cavalry and a few pieces of ordnance, to reinforce the troops of the Master of the Camp, which were very weakened: already at the beginning of August the Master had reported «that there are only about 1,500 serviceable men».

Sapieha and Potocki joined their forces between 17th and 25th October, too late to have any influence on the Right Bank Cossack elite, who decided to begin negotiations with Russia.

May the indecision of Crown hetman be considered surprising? He was influenced by the bad state of his troops, even after the confederation had been dissolved. Andrzej Potocki persuaded him to act with care: «come to Zaslav as soon as possible – he wrote – and send to Ukraine men who are ready near Zaslav. It seems to me, that it would be better, if you remain in Zaslav, not going far away until you may gather a dozen or so thousands of infantry and good ordnance».

Stanisław Potocki had similar thoughts: he declared that the reason for his inactivity was, that he still waited for infantry and ordnance. As a result, the Crown army remained inactive all the time when the fate of Ukraine was at stake.

The fall of Vyhovs’kyj was essentially caused by the attitude of the Commonwealth towards the Cossacks and the Hadjach Union. The abandonment of the original agreement, the exploitation of the Cossacks’ difficult situation to enforce on them concessions in matters that were very sensitive...
to them (e.g. the Brest Union or the Ruthenian Principality’s enlargement),
the Polish indifference towards their troubles – all this undermined the
trust of the Cossack elites to the agreement with the Commonwealth and,
by that way, to his leader. When they decided to sign the treaty and recog-
nize the King’s authority, the hetman and his retinue knew how unpopular
the treaty was among Cossack society. They were forced to do that by the
course of events and the growing aggressiveness of the Tsar, who wished to
restrict Cossack autonomy. Both sides, Polish and Cossack, had a common
purpose and a common enemy. The treaty was based on this fact, but both
sides lacked good will, trust and faith in a deed that remained unfinished.
The question of the return of the Polish nobility to their estates was con-
troversial, and the hetman was right in delaying the decision in this mat-
ter for better times; the Tsar, however, used this issue as a pretext to raise
feelings of uncertainty among the czerni. At the same time, contrary to the
great hopes and the expectations of the hetman, the Commonwealth did not
support Ukraine in the war against Moscow. It is understandable that the
Cossacks felt exploited by the court in Warsaw and treated as a mere screen
between Poland and the Russian army. Left to themselves, they were not
able to hold off Russian aggression indefinitely. Beyond the Dnipro it was
very clear who would become Moscow’s target at first turn. In order to avoid
the possibility «that Moscow and Cossacks [faithful to her] may say that they
were taken by the sword»79, the local elites changed their loyalty. This was
the beginning of the hetman’s end. His position in the army depended on
the success of his policy, it depended from the deeds of the Commonwealth.
However, the Polish court did not want to engaged itself in direct conflict
with the Tsar and begin armed activity before the war with Sweden would
be over. The King recognized the seriousness of the situation and the neces-
sity to give Cossacks some help, since they acted as a cover against Russia.
However, the complicated internal position (the confederation of the unpaid
army, the effort of the Lithuanians to end war in the east as soon as possible
and their reluctance to the idea of union with the Cossacks) hindered any
effective action, what determined Vyhovs’kyj fate. Without Polish aid the
hetman did not have enough force to guarantee his country’s security when
Russian aggression and internal opposition became stronger80.

One of the best Polish experts of Ukrainian matters, the Volhynian cast-
tellan Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski had a clear perception of the situ-
tation, as it appears from his letter to the bishop of Cracow Andrzej Trzebicki:

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79 Petrovs’kyj M., Ukrain’s’ki dijachi XVII viku: Timish Tsytsgura, in: «Zapysky istorychno-
80 Horobets’ V., Elita: 207-208.
I understand that you know about the change of the situation in Ukraine, caused by the cursed confederation of the army. Our Fatherland was paralised in the moment when it needed all her forces at the most. We have decided Vyovs’kyj’s fate pushing the Commonwealth again in troubled waters and giving the enemy, the Muscovite Tsar every reason to rejoice.81

About the cause of his own fall, Vyovs’kyj wrote that

some of the commanders, though they have many times received orders from the King to bring me help, have only tried to keep me quiet with letters, but have never executed the orders and do not execute them now. It would have been much better to receive a clear statement that they were not in condition to send reinforcements rapidly, because in that case I would have taken the situation in my hands myself, I could have left the Tatars in the regions beyond the Dnipro or sent for fresh troops to Crimea, or could have gathered Tatars in the field, trusting in God, that rebels would not become dominant. But I was quietened with promises of quick aid, when I was in Polonne, Chudniv, Koteljna, I put all my trust in this hope, believing, that when they would came, neither Russians would be able to gather their forces, nor rebels would dare to attempt to destroy us.»

The Hadjach Union survived less than a year. Its failure was caused mainly by military reasons, especially by the mistaken estimation of the course of events on the Northern front, and by the exceedingly optimistic evaluation the Polish politicians gave of the Cossacks’ possibility to fight with success against Russian regular forces. The Tatar aid, though valuable, was not sufficient to balance the lack of Polish and Lithuanian regular troops. This would have been not only a concrete support for the Zaporizhian army, but a very clear sign, that the court of the King considered their Ukrainian ally as important partner.

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The Hadjach Union between the Commonwealth and Ukraine, declared on 16 September 1682 and solemnly ratified and sworn in May of the following year, turned the Commonwealth into a federation made up of the Kingdom of Poland, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Grand Duchy of Rus’.

latter was to be a Cossack country comprising the voivodships of Bratslav, Chernihiv and Kyiv.

The Hadjach Union gave rise to the «Commonwealth of Three Nations», which was to have a commonly-elected monarch, a sejm (Parliament) as well as a common foreign policy. A newly-emerged «Ruthenian Duchy» with its own judicial system as well as a separate administrative system was to be governed by a hetman of the Rus’ army accountable only to the king.

Issues of confessional denomination were key to the resolutions behind the formation of the Union. The Cossacks’ opposition to the Church Union was unrelenting and led to the Hadjach resolutions including a clause about it being eliminated throughout the Crown lands and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Moreover, the Orthodox metropolitan of Kyiv and five Orthodox bishops were guaranteed seats in the Commonwealth parliament. The Union also introduced equal civil rights between Orthodox and Roman Catholic believers.

Despite being a work of indisputable political wisdom, the Hadjach Union remained a dead letter, responsibility for its failure being equally shared by both parties to the negotiations. However, its resolutions were later to become fundamental for further attempts to work out a new agreement between the Commonwealth and the Cossacks.

This article aims to explain how the Commonwealth’s attitude to the idea of reviving the Hadjach Union evolved in the period mentioned.

In Autumn 1659 certain fateful events took place in Ukraine: Ivan Vyhov’s’kyj gave up the hetman’s mace (the bulava, the emblem of the hetman’s authority) and power passed into the hands of Jurij Khmel’nys’t’kyj, whose main political action resulted in the resumption of the Perejaslav Agreement. This was the final blow for the Hadjach Agreement and it soon became clear that, in the given situation, conflict between the Commonwealth and Moscow was only a question of time.
As early as November the Russian Army, under the command of Ivan Khovanskij, launched an offensive in Lithuania which led to the capture of Grodno (Hrodna) and Brest. Another Muscovite army, under the command of Vasilij Sheremet’ev, headed for Ukraine. On its part, the Polish Court declared war against Sweden: unable to launch any decisive military operations on the Russian front, the king tried to win over the Cossacks by means of agreements. The Volhynian castellan Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniawski was sent to Ukraine for negotiations. Despite considerable efforts, he failed to sever the link between the Cossacks and the Tsar. As Piotr Kroll puts it: «The Cossacks, balancing between those two countries, trying to retain their self-reliance, had to stick to the Perejaslav resolutions because the Commonwealth was unable to defend itself on its own, hence, it could not help the Cossacks». Only after the end of the conflict with Sweden was the Commonwealth in a position to send significant military forces to the Ukrainian theatre of military operations.

The defeat of Khmel’nyts’kyj’s Cossacks in Slobodyshche (Słobodyshcze) and the setback of Sheremetyev’s troops in Chudniv (Cudnów) were decisive for the whole campaign, and for subsequent events: they made the superior officers of the right-bank Cossacks aware of the need to start negotiations with the Commonwealth. On the second day after the Chudniv victory of 15 October 1660, the colonel of Chyhyryn Petro Doroshenko reached the Polish camp with a letter from Jurij Khmel’nyts’kyj: the Cossack hetman declared his readiness to start immediate peace talks, promising to place himself once again under the protection of the Commonwealth. Doroshenko also stated that the Cossacks were not enemies of Poland, and that their main reason for coming to Slobodyshche was to sever relationships between Tsytjura and Moscow.

On receiving the Crown hetmans’ permission to start negotiations, Cossack envoys came to the Chudniv Camp the very same day. Among others, the delegation included Mykola Khanenko, Ostap Hohol’, Hryhorij

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4 P. Kroll, op. cit., 352.
Leshnyts’kyj, Ivan Kravchenko and Herasym Kaplons’kyj.9 The delegates for negotiations on the Polish side were: the Bratslav voivode Michał Czartoryski, the Halych castellan Aleksander Cetner, the crown standard bearer Jan Sobieski, the Sandomierian master of the table (stolnik), Jan Szumowski and the L’viv (Lwów) standard bearer Andrzej Sokolnicki.10

The talks began in a friendly atmosphere with the Polish commissioners reassuring the participants that «nothing would be imposed that might be perceived by them [the Cossacks – MD] as difficult; they will retain their traditional freedoms and privileges, as they were granted to the Zaporizhian armies by the Kings and the Commonwealth according to the ancient law».11

The situation changed diametrically, however, when the Cossack representatives realized that the intention was to restrict the Hadjach Agreement. As we can read in the report about the Polish-Moscow War, the Zaporizhians «[…] were adamant that it [the Hadjach Agreement] had to be maintained in its entirety and in every detail, because it had been confirmed by the sworn oath of the King and the Commonwealth».12 The negotiations came to an impasse caused by the reluctance of both sides to solve the conflict with a compromise. Hence, the Polish hetmans decided to call a council of all the senators, officials and representatives of senior commanding staff present.

It is worth noting that, to solve the Cossack question, the participants expressed the same two ideas that had divided the Commonwealth’s nobility for several decades. One idea, expressed by most of those taking part in the council, was that the Cossacks should be subdued by force and that their fight for independence should be viewed as a simple rebellion; this reflected the tradition of the 1638 constitution, which considered the Cossacks as «peasants who had turned into plebs» («chłopy obrócone w pospólstwo»).13

This part of the nobility felt outraged when the Cossacks, who had lost the war, mentioned some kind of rights: «Long-lasting peace – their representatives maintained – should not be based on mercy for them, because these people scorn mercy. It should be based on blood and on the destruction of the rebels. We have enough forces against Sheremet’ev and Khmel’nysts’kyj, as the latest battles with them have shown».14

Only a minority was inclined to look for a policy of consensus, in search of new juridical solutions that could combine the specificity of the Cossack

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10 Wojna polsko-moskiewska: 93.
11 Ibid.; 94.
12 Ibid., 94.
14 «Przeto nie na pobłażaniu będącym u tego narodu w pogardzie, ale na krwi i zniszczeniu buntowników należałoby budować trwały pokój. Jest bowiem dosyć sił na Szeremeta i na Chmielnickiego, czego świeżym dowodem były walki z obywdoma» (Wojna polsko-moskiewska: 94).
community with the statehood of the Commonwealth. Both crown hetmans Stanisław Potocki and Jerzy Lubomirski supported this option. They «showed neither arrogance nor bitterness», in spite of the bad results in war, they spoke of the Cossacks as «future companions in arms, born within the boundaries of the same kingdom and common defenders of the same fatherland». In their opinion it was better to win the Cossacks’ favour as this would strengthen the Commonwealth in the war with Moscow, enabling the exhausted Polish troops to spend the winter in Ukraine, thus improving their efficiency and military readiness.

The hetmans’ argumentation won, but, on the issue of recognizing the Hadjach Agreement as a whole, it was remarked that the situation was quite different from previous peace agreements, because this happened when the Cossacks revolted and broke the holy peace, to the great shame of the Commonwealth. These arguments were opposed to the expectations of the Cossack delegates. Two other points of the Chudniv agreement are worth noting: one stated that the Zaporizhian troops would abandon the Tsar’s protection and immediately proceed to take over the fortresses in Moscow’s hands; the other stated that the Polish hetmans would keep one or two Cossack regiments under their control in order to support the Commonwealth’s army near Chudniv.

Finally, both sides agreed to sign an agreement restoring the Hadjach Agreement, except for the points that referred to creating a Duchy of Rus’ in the Ukrainian lands. That decision was up to the King.

The sejm summoned in Warsaw on 2 May 1661, which was dominated by the fight to re-organize the country, also had to reconsider the issue of

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15 Ibid., 93.
16 Kroll P., Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudowna: 385.
17 Wojna polsko-moskiewska: 95.
18 Ojczyzne spominki w pismach do dziejów dawnej Polski, Diariusze, Relacje, Pamiętniki służyć mogące do objaśnienia dziejów krajowych, udzię popierane historyczne do panowania królów Jana Kazimierza i Michała Korybuta oraz listy Jana Sobieskiego marszałka i hetmana wielkiego koronnego, z rękopisów zebranych przez Ambrożego Grabowskiego, vol. 1, Kraków, 1845: 166.
Ukraine. Its fundamental task in this matter was to officially ratify the Chudniv Agreement and to pass a final resolution about the Duchy of Rus’.

Indeed, settling relations with the Cossacks was a vital matter for the Polish court. The army was completely unreliable at that time, and the security of the state was becoming increasingly unstable. In such a situation, the only operative force in the war with Moscow had to be the Cossack regiments. It was important to gain the Cossacks’ support to elect a new king *vivente rege*, as many planned to do: a letter written to marshal Lubomirski by the Polish referendary Andrzej Morstin in March 1661 testifies to this issue. In his letter he underlined that it was not true that the Queen had negotiated the reform of the voting system with the Cossacks, or that she had tried to persuade them to support the King’s designs. However, he wrote that the Cossacks would support the King’s ideas if they received confirmation about these points of the Hadjach agreement at the next parliamentary session.

The battle for confirmation of the October 17 Agreement had already started in March at the regional councils before the debate in Parliament. A further analysis of the instructions given to the nobles’ deputies proves that the majority of the regional councils had given their consent to ratification, though with some restrictions. Overall, they advised the deputies to pay particular attention to its resolutions and to make sure that they did not violate the liberties and privileges of the nobility in any way. Indeed, the instruction of the Średzko council of 28 March 1661 contains this characteristic clause: «Concerning the approbation of the Pacts with the Cossacks, the deputies should make sure that there is nothing that infringes our rights and liberties».

Moreover, the deputies demanded that the lands of the Crown and of the nobles should not be given to the Cossacks, and that the prefectures and other lands seized by the Zaporizhians should be returned to their previous

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20 The whole question related to the *sejm* is discussed by Ochman S., *Sejmy lat 1661 -1662. Przegrana batalia o reformę ustroju Rzeczypospolitej*, Wrocław, 1977.
23 The term indicates the man in charge of receiving complaints and petitions, and delivering them to the chancellors who presented them to the king.
25 Ibid., 231.
26 «Circa approbationem Pactorum z Kozakami pilno Ichmość Panowie Posłowie attendent, aby tam co szkodziwe prawom i swobodom niestanęło naszym» (Instruction of the Średzko voivodship from 28 March 1661, Biblioteka im. Raczyńskich w Poznaniu (in further mentions – BRacz.), MS 231, vol. II: 15).
owers. Similar demands were also included in the instruction of the councils of Łęczyca, Lublin, Luts’k, and Halych.

The Mazovian nobility had a different attitude to the Ukrainian problem. They felt that scaling down the oppression and exploitation of the Ukrainian population was the most effective way to stop new rebellions and they demanded that all the revenues from Ukraine should go into the State’s coffers.

Some local councils also referred to the question of changing the points with the Cossacks. The Lublinian nobility advocated: «moderatia or melioratia» of the Agreement on the condition that the sejm would consider this suitable. The Halych council justified the need to revise the Hadjach resolutions as a consequence of the latter having been violated by the Cossacks, who had taken up arms against the Commonwealth.

The problem of the Duchy of Rus’ was raised in the instruction of the council of Luts’k and Zhytomyr. The Volhynian nobility suggested trying to ignore the thorny problem of the Duchy of Rus’, unless this led to breaching the Agreement with the Cossacks. On their side, the Kyivan nobles expressed their agreement to liquidating the Duchy of Rus’, suggesting adequate compensation from the Polish Commonwealth. At the 1661 session of parliament only Hieronim Wierzbowski, voivode of Brest and Kujawy, spoke about the Cossack issue. He reminded the House that the Cossacks had breached the resolutions of the previous sejm and suggested not ratify-

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27 Ibid.
28 Instruction of the Łęczyca voivodship from 28 March 1661, BPAN Kr., MS 8327, Teki Pawińskiego (in further mentions – TP), n. 10: 866.
29 Instruction of the Lublin voivodship dated 28 March 1661, ibid., MS 833, TP, n. 6: 218ff.
32 Instruction of the general sejm of the Mazovian Duchy dated 28 April 1661, BPAN Kr., MS 8334, TP, n. 17: 154.
33 Instruction of the Lublin voivodship dated 28 March 1661: 218.
34 «Lubo Rzpta rozlania krwie dalszemu w Ukrainie zabiegając paktami hadziackimi pokój zawarła była, iż jednak major stąd crescit belli molles a chiwa do buntów rebelliantów porywcośc wzgardziwszy Reipublice beneficio sumpsit arma przeciwko panu i ojczyźnie [...]», Instruction of the Halych sejm dated 21 May 1661: 176.
35 Instruction of the Wołyń voivodship dated 28 March 1661: 90.
37 Instruction of the Wołyń voivodship dated 28 March 1661: 90.
ing the previous agreement with them. The deputies were also against the instructions that the Cossacks sent to the June 24 session of parliament. Finally, the sejm approved the Agreement of Chudniv, confirming the decisions of Hadjach, though one very important point was modified: the question of the Duchy of Rus’ was removed, never to be mentioned again.

Removing the most important point of the Hadjach Union ruled out any chance of a positive solution to the Ukrainian question. The Chudniv Agreement became a dead letter because most of the nobles cared more about their own positions and privileges than about any real chance of normalizing the situation in Ukraine and regaining the lands beyond the Dnipro.

In the opinion of Janusz Kaczmarek, the act ratifying the Chudniv Agreement was the final blow for the idea of the Commonwealth of Three Nations. However, ensuing events showed that the modification of the Hadjach Union at the 1661 sejm did not mean the disappearance of the Hadjach idea of creating a «commonwealth» composed of three «peoples», a Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian federation. As Taras Chukhlib puts it, when all was said and done, the majority of the Cossack officers still demanded that the Zaporizhian Army be considered the third part of the Commonwealth along with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. They also demanded that the full privileges of the Great ‘Prince’ of Rus’ (kniaz’ ruskii) should be left in the hands of the leader of the Cossack Ukraine, i.e. the hetman.

The Cossack hetmans’ numerous attempts to return to the provisions of the Hadjach Union demonstrate the correctness of this thesis. A new proposal to settle political relations between Chyhyryn and Warsaw is testified by an instruction given to the Cossack deputies for the ordinary session of the Warsaw parliament in Autumn 1664. Many of its points

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38 Quoted after Ochman S., Sejmy lat 1661-1662: 72.
39 Among other things, the Cossacks demanded confirmation of the Hadjach pacts, guaranteeing freedom of Orthodox worship and the cancellation of the Union, guaranteeing liberties and rights to «the nation of Rus’», amnesty for the soldiers and everyone in the Cossack army, and an increase in the register to 70,000 men. See: Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Branickich z Suchej, n. 124/147; 114-116; Ochman S., op. cit., 56ff; Istoriya ukrains’koho kozackva: 261.
43 Instructia na seym walny Warszawski, w roku 1664 dana ode mnie, Hetmana, y wszystkiego Woyiska Je’Kr. Mci Zaporoskiego posłom naszym p.p. Michajlowi Radkiewicowi, oboźnemu generalnemu, Samuelowi Frydrychowiczowi, pułkownikowi Białocerkiewskiemu,
were very similar to the Hadjach provisions, especially where «the Freedom of the Army» was concerned. Among other things, the Zaporizhians demanded that all the churches and foundations in Poland and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania should be returned to the Orthodox Church (point 3). The metropolitan of Kyiv was to be chosen by Orthodox believers (point 6), and privileges should be granted to «Kyiv academies and schools» (point 8). In addition (point 10) the deputies asked for permission to establish an academy in Mohylew (Mahilëŭ), they demanded that the houses and farm-owners should have the same privileges as the szlachta in the Crown and Great Principality of Lithuania, and that a soldier who dared to trespass into a Cossack property was to be judged as an aggressor (point 16). They also postulated that Cossack courts should be independent and that «free election» (libera electio) of the hetman should be registered by common law. A newly-elected hetman was to be confirmed by the king, who had the right to appoint his own candidate: the latter was to be chosen from the Zaporizhian Army (point 23).

The sejm of 1664/65 was so overwhelmed with the problems provoked by the conflict with Jerzy Lubomirski that it failed to consider the Cossack problem. Only after Piotr Telefus broke the sejm, did the Cossack deputies present their postulates at an official audience, which failed to find agreement between all the deputies. A note made by one of its participants relates that the Cossacks mentioned «the Orthodox Church, the Academy and many other matters distant from one another».

Again, the vitality of the Hadjach idea in the mind of the Cossack officials is testified by an instruction with which the representatives of the Zaporizhian Army arrived in Warsaw at the first ordinary sejm of that year in March 1666. Connections with the Agreement from 1658 are suggested not only by its structure, but also by the order of the postulates included.

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46 Instrukcja wyraźna od nas wszystkiej starszyzny, oboźnego, sędziów generalnych, pisarza i asawłów, pułkowników, atamanii, towarzystwa i czerni wojska JKM wiernie przychylnego zapor. teraz z jednostajnej rady naszej łysińskiej, zwołana na 22 II 1666 r. na sejm niniejszy do Naj. JKMPNM i wszystkiej Rzpltej posłom naszym powierzona, BCz, MS 402: 615-634; Krykun
Thus the first six points concerned safeguarding the common rights of the Orthodox Church: the Cossacks demanded the elimination of the Brest Union, the restitution of the Church in Lublin to Orthodox believers and the guarantee of seats in the Senate for the Kyivan metropolitan and bishops. Points 7-8 defined the status of the «Kyiv schools», the next points (9-10, 12) postulated a restoration of privileges and liberties for the Zaporizhian Army, point 11 referred to the Cossack register, in point 12 it was demanded that the Cossacks living in His Majesty’s lands, noble and spiritual, should not suffer in liberties or in property (nulla praeiudicia oppressionem et calamitates) on the part of heirs, prefects and tenants. Point 14 defined the status of the Cossack hetman, and finally point 18 postulated that the Chyhyryn prefecture, in its former size and with its former appendages, should be confirmed by a new privilege and by the constitution as the seat for symbol of power, the mace (bulava).47

Again, the sejm summoned in the spring of 1666 failed to pay due attention to the Cossack question. Only the Sandomierian castellan Stanisław Witowski pleaded to stop the internal fight, so that the King could later direct all his forces against the rebellious Cossacks and force them into obedience, in order to be able to move against Moscow.48 On 18 April Cossack envoys read their instruction in the Senate. In addition to the desiderata included, they demanded the withdrawal of Polish garrisons from Ukrainian towns and the nobility from their lands. The Poles’ response was to assure the Cossacks that their due rights would be recognized and that a commission would be sent to consider their postulates.49 Equally vague was Jan Kazimierz’s answer concerning the Cossacks’ requests included in the instruction. Claiming that he lacked the proper powers to satisfy their requests, he promised to propose them again in the following sejm.50

Only the defeat of the Tatars, who were allied with the Cossacks, at Pidhajtsi (Pol. Podhajce) in 166751 led to the signing of a temporary treaty, which normalized relations between the Commonwealth and the Cossacks. The analysis of the content of the Pidhajtsi agreement, signed on 19 October between the hetman Doroshenko and the great marshal and Polish field

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48 Dąbrowski J. S., Polskie elity wobec Kozaczyzny oraz Moskwy: 82.
49 Ibid.
50 Krykun M., Instrukcija poslam vijs’ka zaporoz’koho: 320-349.
hetman, allows us to find references to the Hadjach resolutions. Sobieski agreed that «the Cossacks and their futor-farms should be free» and undertook not to allow the Polish army to enter any towns or villages «where Cossacks belonging to the Zaporizhian Army live»,52

It is worth noting that the Commonwealth recognized the Cossacks’ right to exert power over the territory which in fact was under the rule of Petro Doroshenko. However, Sobieski did not have full powers to satisfy the Cossacks’ demands. Hence, any future question or postulate was to be settled later, during the next sejm. As Zbigniew Wójcik puts it, this was «another document destined to remain worthless in the long run, once again empty words, which were not supposed to be kept».53

The victory won by the hetman Sobieski over the Tartars and the Cossacks at Pidhajtsi and the ensuing treaty were received with satisfaction by the nobility, as shown by the regional councils held in Średzko, Proszowice, Lublin, Warsaw and Łomża. Only the Szaków council forbade its representatives to give their approval in case the articles contained «some nuisance for the Republic» («co nocivum Reipublicae było»).54

The ordinary sejm assembled in Warsaw on Tuesday 24 January 1668. The deputy chancellor Andrzej Olszowski recommended appeasing the Cossacks and trying to get them into serving the Commonwealth by giving Doroshenko the insignia of the hetmanship and endowing him with the district of Chyhyryn. The parliament however, completely failed to address the Cossack problem.55 Chancellor Olszowski insisted that it was crucial to come to an agreement with the Cossacks because of «the Tartars’ suspecta fides», but his words fell on deaf ears. Only after the sejm, at the state council, was the question of how to keep the Cossacks in obedience actually discussed. In the end, Sobieski only managed to obtain an agreement for setting up a committee in which Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski56 was to take part.

Meanwhile Doroshenko reinforced his power on the right-bank Ukraine and sent envoys for the coronation sejm of 1669: they were to demand acceptance of the postulates that had been sent already for the election council. Their content indicates that the Cossacks’ intention was to restore the Hadjach Agreement.57

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53 Wójcik Z., Jan Sobieski 1629-1696: 144.
55 Ibid., 125.
56 Dąbrowski J. S., Polskie elity wobec Kozaczyzny oraz Moskwy: 89ff.
57 Instrukcja od Doroszenki i wojska zaporoskiego dana na sejm koronacyjny do króla i stanów posłom Iwanu Demidenku bylemu oboźnemu wojskowemu i Sawie Kowielskiemu pi-
Doroshenko’s envoys arrived when the sejm had already ended, so the Cossacks’ petitions were examined by the senate council. The latter decided to appoint a committee to meet their demands. The members of the committee, however, were not appointed until after the sejm held in Spring 1670. The members included, among others, the voivode and commandant of Chernihiv Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski, the castellan of Wołyń and Puńsk, the starosta of the Lipnica district Jan Franciszek Lubowiecki, the Kyiv stolnik (responsible for serving the royal table) Jerzy Maniecki, the judge (podsędek) of Kyiv Jan Olizar, the marshal of Upick Krzysztof Bálozor and the starosta of the districts of Bratslav and Sinnica Stefan Piaseczyński. They were provided with an instruction containing clear references to the Hadjach resolutions, but the main points offered few chances of any positive consideration of the Cossacks’ key requests. The talks started on 3rd May in Ostróg. The Cossacks were represented by the military judge Herman Hapanovych and the general scribe Michajlo Vozhevych.

The instruction prepared by Doroshenko for the Ostróg committee consisted of 24 points. These basically resumed the points of the two previous documents, but put greater emphasis on the need to fulfill the conditions of the Hadjach Agreement. As they had already done twelve years before, the Cossacks demanded that the Commonwealth respect their rights to practice the Orthodox religion without restrictions wherever the Ukrainian language was spoken, that it recognize state institutions, centres of education, and the demarcation of the territory for the Zaporizhian army within the boundaries of the voivodships of Kyiv, Bratslav and Chernihiv.

These demands made it impossible for the negotiations to succeed. Attempts to exert pressure on Doroshenko by attacking the town of Bila Tserkva in the Kyiv province were fruitless, as was the advice given by hetman Sobieski, whose envoy Olszowski suggested preparing the forces needed to continue the war with the Cossacks. The Commonwealth did not want to give up Ukraine, but neither did it prepare an appropriate army to take it by
force. The Polish government chose a third way, namely starting talks with the hetman Mykhajlo Khanenko.61

On 2 September 1670 an agreement was reached that ensured that the Cossacks would return to the Commonwealth fold, that they would not seek «protection» from another foreign monarch, send envoys without the king’s consent or raise any rebellions; moreover, the nobility and the clergy were to get back all their properties in Ukraine. In return for agreeing to these conditions, the Cossacks were granted religious freedom, recognition of their previous rights and free election of their hetman.64 This agreement was confirmed by the sejm in autumn 1670. From the Cossacks’ point of view, it was a clear defeat and, as a consequence, it radicalized divisions and increased conflicts within Ukraine.

The idea of settling relations between the Cossacks and the Commonwealth on the basis of the Hadjach resolutions was revived, along with the election of Jan Sobieski to the Polish throne. The new king managed to win back most of right-bank Ukraine at the end of 1674. This greatly influenced Doroshenko’s position. The concrete threat of losing the command of the hetmanate forced him to start conciliatory steps with Sobieski. In a letter of November 1674 the Cossack hetman asked for protection for Ukraine and her inhabitants.65 The Polish camp, however, was soon weakened by the desertion of the Grand Hetman of Lithuania Michał Kazimierz Pac. At the same time talks with Moscow about the possibility of bringing together their troops proceeded very slowly in Andrusovo (Andruszów) and induced Sobieski to start negotiations with the Cossacks.

Talks between the Orthodox bishop of L’viv Josyp Shumljans’kyj (Józef Szumlański) and the podstoli (a deputy serving for the royal table) of Chełm Stanisław Morsztyn were held in Chyhyryn. They mainly concentrated on the issue of the demarcation of territorial and political borders which were to be reallocated from the whole of the Commonwealth,66 for the Ukrainian hetmanate. The points were based on the conditions of the agreements of Zborowiec (1649), Hadjach (1658) and Chudniv (1660).

Besides denominational matters concerning the request to convert members of the Uniate Church to Catholicism, the key point was the demand to restrict the territory of Ukraine to the voivodships of Kyiv, Bratslav

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64 Ibid.
and Chernihiv. The fact that the latter and most of Kyiv were subordinated to the Russian Tsar made the Cossacks’ demands unrealistic. Moreover, Doroshenko demanded an amnesty, the destruction of any resolution and letter violating the freedom of the nation of Rus’, confirmation of Cossack and Orthodox privileges, the withdrawal of the garrison from Bila Tserkva, the installation of a Cossack garrison in Kyiv and the return of the Metropolitan’s cannons and liturgical objects.

Most of the Cossacks’ requests were clearly unacceptable and were de facto refused. However, considering the serious threat of a Russian invasion in Ukraine, Sobieski decided against breaking off the negotiations. In his answer sent to Chyhyryn, he underlined his favourable disposition towards the Cossacks, promised further support for their demands and declared that the whole issue would be discussed at the coronation sejm.

It is worth noting that from that time on, Jan III lost all hope of finding a solution to the ‘Ukrainian question’, compatible with the interests of the Commonwealth with hetman Doroshenko. Ignoring the fact that Doroshenko was still the ‘legal’ hetman of right-bank Ukraine, the king very soon (4 April 1675) nominated colonel Ostap Hohol’ as the appointed (nakazny) Cossack hetman. In February 1676 Hohol’ took part in the celebration of Sobieski’s coronation, during which he was made a noble, along with most of the Cossack officers.

During the coronation sejm, there was a debate about how to keep the Cossacks at the service of the Commonwealth. The king presented his plan for the defense of the country against the Turks. On a secret session of the two Houses he proposed using the Jewish capitation tax (which was previously assigned for the purchase of fur coats for the Tatars) to pay the Cossack companies (sotny). In order to reinforce ties between the Cossacks and the Commonwealth, Sobieski addressed the Zaporizhians with a promise to observe and to confirm the Cossacks’ former liberties.

His generosity towards the Cossacks appears to have stemmed not only from the need to reinforce the Polish army with Cossack detachments, but...

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67 Ibid., 25.
68 Ibid., 26ff.
also from Sobieski’s plan to increase the influence of the Commonwealth in the regions beyond the Dnipro, in the hope of winning back the left-bank territories lost in 1667: «Kozaków zaporoskich zdoło się także w służbie zatrzymać – the senate resolution said – nie tylko, że ich usus w obozach ale ut representem dominium Rzeczypospolitej w Ukrainie».74

Sobieski felt that a conflict with the Ottoman Empire was inevitable. Therefore he increased his efforts to solve the question of the Cossacks. In July 1682 he sent his courtier Bazyli Iskrzycki (Vasyl’ Iskryts’kyj) to Dymir. Iskrzycki’s task was to encourage the Cossacks, who had had no hetman for over three years after Hohol’s death in 1679, to call a council to discuss whether they should offer their help to the Polish king in the fight against the Turks. Following the instructions of the king, Iskrzycki promised not only to restore all the former liberties and privileges of the Cossacks, but also to grant equality for the «Greek religion».75

The plans to settle relations between the Commonwealth and the Cossacks were based on the agreements of 1658 or 1660. However, they had one fundamental flaw: they lacked any idea of independence for Ukraine and definitively nullified the Hadjach concept of the Commonwealth of Three Nations.76 The attempts made from the late 1660s to restore the Hadjach Union were doomed to fail. In the end, the decisions taken by most of the nobles failed to win over even those of the Cossack officers who were more inclined to cooperate with the Commonwealth. Blinded by their own selfishness, the leading nobles failed to recognize the need to acknowledge the liberties and rights that the Cossacks had gained through the Hadjach pacts, which had made them partners and ‘co-owners’ of the Commonwealth. The aristocratic government only ever consented to an agreement with the Cossacks when they were under threat and, even then, in the most restricted terms possible. Thus, they were increasingly inclined to settle Polish-Cossack relations according to pre-1648 rules.

74 Quoted after Perdenia J., op. cit., 17.
75 Chukhlib T., Het’man i Monarxy: 281.
76 Wójcik Z., Jan Sobieski 1629-1696: 307.
Research on the historical context of the Konotop Battle has many aspects, one of them being perception, in Western Europe and, first of all, in Italy, of Ukraine and Cossacks, of their relations with Poland and Muscovy. Let us try to understand this using examples of several works of historical literature of the 17th century, the ones that D.S.Nalyvajko defined with the eloquent term, «the literature of facts». What is meant is works that seemingly describe specific historical facts but are openly or covertly fictionalised.

It can be said that by the early 17th century, a rather stable tradition had formed in Italian literature of depicting Polish-Ukrainian lands and their population, based in the first turn on M.Miechowski’s treatise, *On Two Sarmatias*, rather well-known in Italy, and numerous compilations stemming from it. There, «Rusia» («Red Rusia», «Black Rusia», «Podolia», etc.) is constantly described as «the new land of Canaan», its fantastic fertility underlined, as well as great numbers of game, birds, and fish, with corn growing on its own, fish being born from the dew of the skies, a fir-tree branch that lies on the ground turning into precious stone within several years, etc.; these and similar statements are repeated in work after work, including not only compulsory cosmographies but also reports by Venetian ambassadors or Papal Nuncios, i.e. eyewitnesses. Descriptions of «miracles» here take maybe more text than descriptions of cities and fortresses. The matter is not that the miracles depicted are absolute inventions (it is known that Ukrainian soils are really rather fertile) but due to the authors’
bias and emotions real data is noticeably transformed up to a complete fancy. The Venetian ambassador, P.Duodo, speaks of ghosts in Lithuanian woods, G.Lippomano and A.M.Graziani tell that in «Rusia» they saw a miracle of miracles, swallows that spend winters on the bottom of lakes and rise from there in spring. The ghosts and the swallows seem original while other elements of Ukrainian «miracles» make their way from one work to another with little change. Starting from 13th-15th centuries, and more so from late 15th century, Ukraine was perceived as a faraway land at the boundary of Europe bordering on the totally alien Tartar-pagan world (later, the Turkish world was added.) Thus, a set of features, and a range of characteristic topics and plots, as well as the interest in miracles which just have to be in a faraway land; i.e. there has to be what the native Europe lacks: boundless steppes, absolutely impenetrable woods, strange beasts, etc. At the same time, the lands of «Rusia» are connected to the ancient Ecumene, so Ovid’s grave is found there. The main thing is that the population, not least thanks to M.Miechowski, is bestowed with traits of ancient Sarmatians and Amazons as seen according to the literary tradition. This preambule leads to the angle that should be used while considering the depiction of Cossacks by Italian writers, ambassadors among them. In 17th-century texts, the Cossacks pose as multiethnic people, often with a brigand past, but Christian people nonetheless; brave and gallant, immune to the idea of amassing wealth, living, without wives or children, on the Borysthenes’ isles, and enmical towards Tartars and Turks. At the same time, in other mentions of Cossacks by A.Guagnini or by G.Botero, parallels in depicting Cossacks and Tartars are noticeable: armed with longbows and spears in a clearly «Sarmatian» way, bravery, lack of whimsicality and exceptional endurance on the march, etc. It is noteworthy that each of these features, when taken separately, can correspond fully or partially to historical reality but taken together and presented in a literary way, clearly or subconsciously defines the Cossack community as an exotic phenomenon, by virtue of being different from habitual social life, and so interesting and worthy of attention: a free Christian army virtually on the boundary between European and Asian universes, combining European features (staunchness in Christian faith, anti-Pagan mood) and Barbarian (anarchy in many spheres of life, ex-


cept for the military hierarchy and discipline, cruelty and inclination for destruction during wars.) However, it was in early 17th century that noticeable shifts had emerged in literature related to Ukrainian topics because, in view of historical circumstances, the topic of «Antemurale», of a Christian union against Turks, became ever more timely. Thus, two aspects prevail in Italian literature of the first third of the 17th century: the Cossacks’ activity, and the religion issue. While earlier Cossacks were regarded as a people or a military entity per se, and multiethnic at that, the topics of Cossacks and Rus’ lands are closely intertwined in the 17th-century literature. As for the religion issue, it is noticeable to which extent a greater or lesser pro-Catholic inclination of each author influence their interpretation of historical events, as well as of Cossacks in general. For instance, in the literature of «pre-Khmel’nyts’kyj» period, the image of «Cossack, the Christian knight making war on non-Christians» is clearly prevalent over the image of a Cossack who is a Barbarian, a schism adherent, and a brigand. The well-known Letters by P. Della Valle may be considered the apogee of such romanticized perception of Cossacks, and the author’s personality is especially important in this case. Thus, della Valle writes that love for «ancient knowledge that reached the West» pushed him to lengthy travels, as well as the desire to trace the paths of former travelers, Bacchus, Heracles, Jason, Alexander, Ulysses, Aeneas, Columbus, Vasco da Gama, Magellan, and Vespucci; as we see, both mythological and real characters acquire a similar level of reality for della Valle. Among other things, the traveler had the aim of involving the ruler of Persia together with Cossacks of Polish Kingdom in an anti-Turkish union, so he perceives Cossacks, on the one hand, as an «Antemurale» politician, and as an erudite of the Renaissance type, as a person who knows ancient classics, on the other. Della Valle also states that Cossacks have various origins, they are not a single people, they are

...Christians who, without women, without children, without home, not recognizing any ruler over them, live far from cities, in places protected by woods, mountains and rivers and submit, almost as our brigands, to some of their leaders, and live on what they gain by sword. This is what distinguishes them from brigands: they do not rob or plunder the lands of those rulers whose realms they inhabit, when they are at peace with them. Moreover, often they serve them honestly and loyally during wars. However, they are constantly training in attacks and piracy on land and sea, inflicting damage on their closest enemies, i.e. Turks and other Pagans.

5 Ibidem, 192-193.
It is noteworthy that the author stresses romanticising nuances in the Cossacks’ image he creates, toning down their «Sarmatian» cruelty from already existing descriptions. He stresses the «nobleness» of Cossacks who honour peace treaties and sometimes go to war for no fee, not plundering lands of a ruler who gave refuge to them: i.e. they are not brigands. Their love for freedom, independence from family, anti-Muslim character of military action, predominantly Christian faith of the Cossack community: all this resembles, even if in a remote way, the image of a classic Crusader knight. In a rather detailed way, della Valle tells how Cossacks go to their sea raids, in what numbers, in what type of boats, and in an emotional, even emphasized, way retells their successes in naval battles with a Turkish flotilla, making expressive eclusions:

...as far as I understood, they promise to capture Constantinople one day saying that for them the liberation of that land is very important, and that there are prophecies that clearly point to this. Whatever happens, they have an exceptional power these days on the Black Sea, and they lack little to become its absolute masters... As far as I am concerned, taking into account their situation and their customs ... they will, in due time, create an exceptionally strong Republic, because it was on this principles that glorious Spartans or Lacedaemoneans started; same as Sicilians, Carthaginians, and similarly Romans, and the Dutch in our times6.

A conclusion may be made that della Valle really, as he testifies, visited the places he tells about in person, and knows about Cossacks not only from third parties. Compared to other Italian texts, Letters have more specific details. So even more interesting is the way the specifics of meeting Cossacks and of anti-Turkish plans are still combined by della Valle with his adherence to the established literary tradition. Thus, as a typical European author, he stresses «exotics»: what is meant is Cossacks living in the place «inaccessible» for their enemies where as if Nature itself protects them with marshes and flooding rivers. Della Valle comparese Cossacks to ancient Romans and first of all to Spartans, stressing unusual military gallantry and their stoic way of life. While doing this, the author does not omit «the topic of strong drinks» present in virtually all texts on Polish-Ukrainian subject; however, he describes the Cossacks’ drinking with soft humour. Della Valle’s descriptions of capture and plunder of Turkish settlements by Cossacks are practically devoid of barbarian-negative connotation. The «Providence» motive characteristic of the Baroque era’s literature is also present: the au-

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6 Ibidem, 193.
Author tells of the existence of prophesies of future dominance by Cossacks at the Black Sea (Guagnini’s «Turkish» book in «Sarmatia» also tells about this) and, in the first turn, of the liberation of Constantinople from «the unfaithful». Considering the importance of the symbolism of Constantinople as a former Christian capital and «the second Rome», one can understand the epic character of the task of Cossacks, as seen by della Valle. His clear sympathy and interest to Cossacks are thus dictated, on the one hand, by his personal acquaintance with some of them and real possibility of Cossacks’ participation in the anti-Turkish project that the author was nurturing. However, all this, along with more contemporary and less heroic comparison of Cossacks to Barbary pirates or Uskoks, is projected against the traditional «matrix» of the image of stoic warriors, Sarmatians, Romans, Carthaginians, Spartans, or Slavs in general, as depicted by M.Orbini in The Kingdom of Slavs.

It is interesting that over several decades the basic elements of this matrix in descriptions of Cossacks will stay the same; however, authors’ trends in depiction of Cossacks will change significantly. In deeds, the greatest number of pages devoted in Italian literature to the fact of Ukraine and Cossacks, touches upon the times of the Khmel’nyts’kyj War: the events in Poland had an enormous impact on European politics, since they concerned the complicated tangle of relations between Poles, Cossacks, Tartars, Turks, Muscovites and Swedes. The histories by M.Bisaccioni, A.Vimina, V.Siri’s Mercury, G.G.Priorato’s The History of Emperor Leopold, and later History by P.Gazzotti have much in common: the flow of events, at first glance, is the same; the literary tradition is common; compilation of sources is legitimate. However, it would suffice to compare Histories by Bisaccioni and by Vimina to understand that the subjective nature of their authors’ perception makes these works rather works of historical fiction than of fictionalized history.

A.Vimina, as is known, was an unofficial ambassador of the Venice Senate to Khmel’nyts’kyj with the aim of finding a common language in military action against Turks. As a personality, Vimina approaches della Valle: his letters testify to a keen interest in travel and gaining knowledge of far-away land as such. His 1651 trip to Poland and Ukrainian lands, and his personal acquaintance with Khmel’nyts’kyj resulted, in the first turn, in The Report on Cossacks, published later but, judging by quotes of contemporaries (Priorato, for example), possibly known earlier in hand-written copies. The Report demonstrates clear approchement of the topics of Cossacks and of Ukraine as a land, and also the eloquent fact that Vimina as a witness who

was an attentive person, judging by the letters, uses a lot of clear quotations or interpretations, even if adding specific details. His manner of narration shows the emotions of a «first discoverer» of exotic Barbarian lands but ‘filtered’ through those that were described by the ancients: so Vimina does not forget to mention Ovid’s grave supposedly situated in this land, as well as to quote from his Pont Elegies telling of the Barbarian wilderness of these land and its inhabitants. His lengthy description of the richness of Ukrainian lands almost completely follows Miechowski’s treatise.

Speaking of Cossacks having a recent origin from exiles and refugees, Vimina nevertheless reminds his readers that this land had always been populated by «the most belligerent people» of Rus’: «because they have to often repel attacks by Tartars, and they considered it necessary that all the subjects were taught to handle weapons well and be ready to properly face and repel invasions by the Barbarians»; here we have evident topos of «Sarmatian past» and of existence «at the boundary of enemy’s world», and in this case the term «Barbarians» relates to the Cossacks’ enemies. The matter, again, is not to which extent the fact of Cossacks’ belligerence reflects reality but in that it clearly suits the author’s imagination better than many other facts. The Renaissance aesthetics of positive perception of «Spartan values» leads Vimina, just as it leads della Valle, to comparing the Cossack «republic» (he defines the Cossack system in this way) to Lacedaemon:

…it is easy to draw a conclusion about the customs of these people who never crossed their land’s boundaries, except maybe for war, and among whom even the noblest remain rough and severe. They look simple on the outside, but they do not at all come across as awkward in reality, they demonstrate the flexibility of reason, they quickly grasp the essence of a conversation, they are knowledgeable about affairs of the state and show quite an experience in this... I would say that this Republic could be compared to the Spartan republic, if Cossacks respected sobriety in the same way as Lacedaemoneans. One can see how they overcome hunger, thirst, hardships, and lack of sleep. All this they experience to the utmost during sea expeditions where they, according to their words, have sometimes to fast for three days, surviving on stale bread, garlic and onions, as well as during their land expeditions where they campaign like Tartars, satisfying their needs with a small amount of panicum that they take with them on their horses. They drink water from puddles that are not clear and smell unpleasantly, and ground is their bed.

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As can be understood from Vimina’s text, these courageous and enduring «barbarians» would be completely like Spartans if only they respected sobriety. Presenting vivid pictures of Cossacks’ drinking (at home, not during campaigns!), Vimina stresses another traditional topos: Cossacks do not have wine culture, they drink _horilka_ and mead; again, a marker feature is stressed that often distinguishes a «barbarian» from a «European» in the literature of fact by Vimina’s predecessors. In connection with this, Vimina stresses another cliché motive wide-spread as early as in Middle Ages: he writes that Cossacks would rather go to a tavern than to a church, recreating a symbolic juxtaposition «tavern (alien, barbarian people) vs church («own», European people). In an original way, Vimina combines the motive of drinking with the motive of Cossacks’ «Spartan» contempt of luxury, because Cossacks give all valuable trophies for drinks:

…it is evident that rich trophies are not everything, and here Cossacks have only one preference – freedom. It seems that they do not value wealth at all because they are satisfied with little: the principle declared by Seneca, though he did not adhere to it himself; while amassing valuables he wrote that people become richer not increasing their wealth but decreasing their greed\(^\text{10}\).

Cossack dwellings provoke the author’s «description enthusiasm» as they fit beautifully with the «Spartan» way of life. «Parallels» with the ancient world or, rather, with its myth, are not limited to the above-said and to quotations from Seneca: the information on Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyj is similarly full of classical parallels. He is an ideal war leader, with simple manners that soldiers like, same as the strictness of well-deserved punishment. He is a «Spartan» and a stoic in his everyday life: any luxury is practically absent in his residence. The author’s logical conclusion is: Khmel’nyts’kyj introduced this simple non-luxurious way of life in order to remember his origin and not to become blinded with pride, as tyrant Agathocles did in his time (and there’s a proper quotation in Latin.) In his letters-reports, Vimina presents more interesting observations of both everyday-life and political nature about Khmel’nyts’kyj, and while speaking of him with respect and gratitude for hospitable reception, still does not elevate him to the level of ideal characters from the ancient world. However, Vimina does not mention details from his letters in _The Report_; probably, because of political considerations, as there he mentioned Khmel’nyts’kyj’s rather critical, if not contemptuous, attitude towards the Polish King. In any case, Vimina the Catholic describes the ‘schismatic’ Khmel’nyts’kyj with sympathy and comes out as a rather

\(^{10}\) _Ibidem_.

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tolerant Catholic in general. In his report, he demonstrates his interest towards the Cossack society as to a new reality that opened up for a learned person, as well as clearly humane sympathy gained by «barbarians» with their «simple gracefulness». In general, the analysis of the text of The Report leads to the conclusion that Vimina tries to accommodate live impressions within the image of exotic, belligerent Barbarian Eastern land created by his predecessors.

As D. Caccamo put it, Venetians saw in Cossack society the process of formation of a new autonomous body fighting for recognition of its sovereignty. As for the cultural aspect in Venetian literature, a new concept of «Barbarism» took root based on Ukrainian-Cossack matter, stemming out of the discovery of the Sarmato-Ruthenian world, Barbarism that corresponds with Tacitus’s model as a free conquest of the world through natural strength and positive personal traits. Thus, Vimina’s next, large-scale work The History of Civil Wars in Poland, can be viewed in this respect. It tells of the events of 1648-52. The very first impression is the author’s inclination towards a narration as objective as possible, and a drier tone than in The Report. However, facts are being fictionalized here as well. The author’s concept is that a war, even more such a fratricidal war, is a disaster. So the story of events in Poland is constructed in such a way as to become a matter for reflection over causes and consequences of cataclysms, over human imperfection, and on the fate at the universal level. Vimina draws a poetic generalization that Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyj’s personal grudge against Koniecpolski became an embodiment of a more universal offense that people inflicted on God by «injustice, exploitation and offenses». And one can expect «that even rivers of blood would not be enough to extinguish this fire...»


Vimina A., Historia delle guerre civili di Polonia divisa in cinque libri, Venetia, 1671.

Ibidem, 2-3.
ally every episode of «Cossack cruelty» in the work is later compensated for by a similar episode about Poles. At the same time, Vimina applies the term «Barbarian» both to Cossacks and to Polish nobility. One should not talk just about a coincidence of historical facts independent of Vimina who just wrote them down: M.Bisaccioni describes those same events interpreting them nonetheless from a pro-Polish, pro-Catholic, monarchic viewpoint. Let us assume that A.Vimina intentionally put corresponding stresses in his work in order to show all the complexity and destructive nature of a civil war where there is no «white» or «black». The image of the Hetman, which used to be in the centre of attention of other historians, too, appears to be controversial as well: while he is a «simple and strict» war leader of the ancient sort in The Report, he is «an educated barbarian» in History, cunning, double-faced, power-loving but moderate and reasonable in the first turn.

Vimina’s vision of Ukrainian-Muscovite relations is one of the aspects of Ukraine’s image. In his Report on Muscovy, published together with The History of Civil Wars, the author is fully aware of Muscovites and Rus-Ukrainians being akin and having joint historical beginning, same as he is aware of the fact of rather old historic division into various political units and their different development. In Vimina’s notes on Muscovy, where he later also went as an ambassador, a sober view of the tyrannical way of rule is felt, of the cult of the Tsar, the servility of subjects. In The History of Civil Wars he expresses, albeit from third parties, the conviction that the situation of Ruthenians who are Polish subjects can only become worse in case of union with Muscovy: «... under Muscovites Ruthenian peasants would soon feel that instead of improvement of their lives they could expect only worsening, if they find themselves under the yoke of the Prince of Muscovy who is unable to get satisfied with the constant increase of his enormous wealth, and this is why he undresses his Subjects and juggles with his Ministers...»14. In M.Bisaccioni’s History of Civil Wars of Recent Times, written and, what is most important, published a lot earlier than Vimina’s work15, the author bestows the same evaluation on agreements between Cossacks and Muscovites; however, it is more emotionally marked: for Bisaccioni, the union with Muscovy is Khmel’nyts’kyj’s mistake and, simultaneously, a well-deserved punishment for the evil and cunning «Cossack Ulysses» (this is how Bisaccioni presents the Hetman):

...abandoned by Tartars, he tried to find support with Muscovites... allowing the Tyrant into his own home... These nego-

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14 Ibidem, 92-93.
15 Bisaccioni M., Historia delle guerre civili di questi ultimi tempi [...] IV edizione ricorretta [...], 2 vv., Venetia, 1655.
tations gave some hope to Poland that expected a split of that nation as many were against the Muscovite dominance... The Grand Prince had already envisioned himself the master of entire Ukraine without the need to raise his sword... Khmel’nyts’kyj almost repented while proving that he recognized the rule of the Tsar but wanted to retain the command of the Country and the army. These are the underwater rocks of a riot who, fleeing one evil, runs into a worse one. To seek support of the great means to become small and lose freedom... Seeing that Muscovites put into Registers everything that Ukraine had, both the population, and animals, cities and settlements, and estates, Bohdan, engulfed by envy..., began to seek union with Tartars again... looking for where to find support, from among Tartars, Muscovites, and Poles he chose a monster who wanted to ruin all humanity16.

It seems interesting that Bisaccioni arrived at this conclusion virtually right after the Treaty of Perejaslav: we are quoting the 1655 edition. In M. Bisaccioni’s work, Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyj becomes an anti-hero of a Shakespearean sort: this is a tragedy of traitor-rioter upon whom Fate measures a worthy punishment, he finds himself in such a trap that seeks help from a «monster», either from the Muscovite tyrant, or from Pagan tartars. According to Bisaccioni, the reason for the tragedy is the fact that Khmel’nyts’kyj, being a person not born for power, got power in his hands and became drunk of it. Bisaccioni describes the same flow of events that Vimina does but he puts stresses of a royalist and expressly «caste» politician; thus, readers receive a different portrait of Cossacks and the Hetman. For instance, Bisaccioni draws a clear-cut parallel between Cromwell’s England and Khmel’nyts’kyj’s Poland-Ukraine, i.e. he generalizes the uprising against a King. He cannot totally ignore oppression of Cossacks and peasants by nobility but speaks of it in a very covert way. On the contrary, he constantly notes that it was an enormous mistake to give weapons to peasants, i.e. Cossacks, from the very start, because they are wild animals, curs; and so now they have to be «thrown food» in order to calm them abit:

...if somewhere else people shad to rise because of bad attitudes towards them from the side of royal ministers, here, where the subjects were justly ruled according to the laws of there alm by the Crown ministers and the impeccable King himself, the reason for cruel riots lies only in the Barbarian nature of Cossacks, in whose breasts pride and arrogance prevailed, and even if there is any guilt with the Republic or the King, this is only the guilt

16 Ibidem, 392-394.
of those who first gave weapons to people sooner wild than civilized and humane... 

In previous works, even addressing Cossacks’ battles with Turks, Bisaccioni presents Cossacks negatively, as «people without brakes». Virtually everywhere in the work, the Cossack victories are explained by helpful weather and landscape, while Polish victories are due to their military advantages and the King’s perfection. It can be said, in general, that with Bisaccioni both Cossacks and their Hetman become embodiments of destructive, anti-civic force, a vivid example of what happens when commoners are given the privileges of patricians: «There is no mistake bigger in politics than to give power to a person of lowly origins..., because he who was not born for power does not use it within the boundaries of the allowed; so those warlords, full of pride, more than once craved battles with Lord benefactor...». By the way, both Vimina and Bisaccioni begin the history of the Khmel’nyts’kyj War from Khmel’nyts’kyj’s conflict with Czaplinski (Koniczepolski in Bisaccioni’s work). However, Vimina stresses that this was, so to say, the tip of the iceberg, and that Khmel’nyts’kyj’s grudge was just a small part of the general «offence» and oppression of Cossacks and peasants by the nobility. Bisaccioni does not agree at all that «commoners» had real reasons for dissatisfaction, and he describes the conflict in a completely different way (an argument because of the stay of Czaplinski’s soldiers in Chyhyryn) and defines the main factor of the destructive war as the principled mistake of those who from the very start thought of arming «Barbarian» Cossacks. The idea of defending the cause of the entire Cossack nation, of the return of old privileges is just beautiful words of the cunning Khmel’nyts’kyj who becomes a «tyrant», not a liberator. As we see, Bisaccioni’s work contains a consistent destruction of positive elements of the Cossacks’ «Sarmatian» image. Only some episodes in the description of the Battle of Berestechko are an exception: the well-known story of a nameless Cossack who battled on his own against the enemies who surrounded him in a boat, refusing to surrender to the King himself and to save his life. However, given all the novelties and literary refining by Bisaccioni of a great number of actual events, even if subjectively perceived, there still are many clichés in the work, connected to the image of «Barbarian» country and people. One should perceive Bisaccioni’s work through the prism of the author’s mentality, that of a royalist and devout Catholic, adversary of any uprisings that ruin everything that is civilization by his standards. Bisaccioni’s work is tied both to the literary tradition of depicting «Barbarians», and to thematic-and-storyline topoi.

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17 Ibidem, 272.
18 Ibidem, 273.
of tragedies and dramas of the «Shakespearean» sort. However, alongside this, there is a statement about state-building intentions of Khmel’nyts’kyj and Cossacks.

In V. Siri’s Mercury, an original «almanac of contemporary events» by genre, the «rehabilitation» of the established image of Cossacks takes place. With all the specific details and with descriptions of battles with their participation, he is again inclined towards «classical» generalizations and allusions: a belligerent nation that on small boats contains the powerful Ottoman Empire on its own while inflicting a lot of trouble on it. Siri does mention some financial disagreements with Polish leadership but «in the name of the King whom they all respected», as well as by reminding of «numerous important services provided by invincible warriors to the Republic» and «their known bravery that made Turks shiver as far away as Constantinople» the matter was settled and Cossacks remained with Poles because at stake were «the interests of Christian faith, the good of the State, and their own glory, until then unblemished». In Volume XII, where he writes about the Khmel’nyts’kyj War, Siri gives a lot of space to descriptions of Ukraine and history and everyday life of Cossacks but this narration, in fact, repeats the lines of Vimina’s «Report» and, as the author himself admits, the texts of «The Scythian-Cossack War» by J. Pastory and «The History of the War of Cossacks Against Poland» by P. Chevalier19. Here, one can read about the richness and fertility of soils, and about Ovid’s grave, and about Cossacks’ military qualities, and about their rule’s similarity to that of Sparta. Siri is drawing the reasons for the Khmel’nyts’kyj War from the nobility’s despotism and does not spare colour in order to describe the oppressed state of peasantry:

…it can be said that Polish Nobility enjoys something like an Earthly Paradise while their subjects experience all the trials of Purgatory; because if they have a cruel master, they live worse than criminals on galleys. It is this cruel slavery that becomes the reason for their frequent uprisings when they fight for their freedom with great vigour, and the most desperate ones flee to Zaporizhzhja, the camp of th Cossacks of the Borysthenes... this enormous fire was born of a tiny spark, and this really great movement started from a small push, as happens usually20.

Evidently, the compiled picture of the history of Cossacks and the realities of Ukrainian lands, created by Siri, is complicated: it contains both stereotypes and actualized specifics, from «Sarmatian-Spartan» qualities to stressing roughness and strictness of Cossacks’ and peasants’ everyday life, from

19 Siri Vittorio, Del Mercurio, overo Historia dei correnti tempi [...] XII, Parigi, 1672.
20 Ibidem, 984-985.
notes on Cossacks’ inclination to raiding and bloodshed to the changeable character and unreliability of their politics. Khmel’nyts’kyj is given a detailed portrait devoid of Bisaccioni’s «negativism»: his intrigues are justified by circumstances. Even speaking of his «impertinence and pride» towards Poles, the author reminds that he could «raise eighty thousand Cossacks at the same time... and create a separate state under the protection of the Turkish Sultan»21 thus being aware of state-building ideas of the Hetman. Generally, Siri’s Khmel’nyts’kyj may be defined as a controversial but charismatic person. In general, this author, in his depiction of Khmel’nyts’kyj and Ukraine, focuses on the already mentioned «Tacitus’s» motive of «regaining old liberties» and tries to be balanced in his depiction of «warring sides». In The History of Emperor Leopold by G.Gualdo Priorato22, «Cossack-Ukrainian-Polish» episodes come out as prequel to the Polish-Muscovite conflict. The Khmel’nyts’kyj War does provide a rich matter for reflections on birth of uprisings, on advantages and disadvantages of this or that state structure; understandably, in a History dedicated to an Emperor, the author clearly from the start denotes the topic of excessive lawlessness of Polish nobility and their insufficient respect to the person of the King as reasons for the fratricidal war. At once, he states that the Cossack rising was provoked by lawlessness and despotism of the nobility. Giving the history of the very notion of «Cossack» the author unequivocally identifies Cossacks as «Ruthenian» people, retells the story of the organization of Cossack community in order to protect borders against Tartars, of giving privileges to them, creates an exemplary image of a Cossack who tills the land with a sword at his side and takes his entire family to war with him, which is a clear echo of the traditional idea of Sarmatians and their Amazon wives. Thus, in general we see the repetition of major traits of «Sarmatian portrait». The author’s stance is rather eloquently shown in the following phrase: «While Polish gentry are enjoying laziness and luxury and go in for arguments and suits among themselves, both free and registered Cossacks stand on guard for the Republic». And later:

Because they came to know the rights of a separate Nation, their own political institutions and other such things, inquiries of their Deputies and articles of the Hadiach Treaty contained many controversies and were destructive for their institutions, so they demanded cancellation of this treaty and were going to demand, during the forthcoming Sejm, an increase in their benefits and privileges as an army...23

21 Ibidem, 571.
22 Priorato Galeazzo Gualdo, Historia di Leopoldo Cesare, […], in Vienna d’Austria, 1670.
23 Ibidem, 2,2: 149.
As we see, the same events present another different picture when presented by another author: the King and Cossacks are a positive factor while the corrupted nobles are negative. Following Siri, Priorato is using the theory according to which the Cossack rising was agreed with the King in order to deal with the nobility who did not allow Władysław to organize an anti-Turkish campaign:

...the Cossacks were the King’s most loyal subjects, and deadly enemies of the nobility because, as was said earlier, the nobles treated them worse than they would treat slaves, and it was impossible to gain justice for violence, murder and other atrocities committed by nobility in relation to those poor people...The Cossacks do not want to submit to alien commanders but only to those from their own people, always brave and courageous soldiers, irrespective whether they are from land tillers or from shepherds. Before we go on with our narration, it is noteworthy that the role of Cossacks was very significant in all the most glorious campaigns of the Great Władysław that he undertook in the times of King Sigizmund, his father.

With the aim of constantly stressing that all the problems of Poland are created by nobility, Priorato moves some events: so, Cossacks join forces with Tartars after Poles capture Kyiv and their Patriarch (not earlier), etc.; a conclusion comes to mind that most of these «author’s amendments» are aimed at direct or indirect justification of actions by Cossacks and the King. Not a word about the Battle of Berestechko; besides, King Władysław as if does not die and remains present constantly, although even before the story of the reasons for the uprising there was a story of the death of the King that supposedly untied Cossacks’ hands; in any case, if not to approach the text from the objectively-historical viewpoint but to consider it as a historical-and-literary matter organized by its author with a certain aim in view, it will look rather whole and understandable. This is a sidewise discursion in the story of Polish-Muscovite conflict, and Priorato explains that the Muscovite and other enemies got a pretext and an opportunity to attack Polish lands due to disagreements and arguments in the nobility’s circles and their confrontation with the King. In this context, even an originally fictional story of Khmel’nyts’kyj looks natural: he appears to be a son of a miller,

...he had famous victories over Turks and Tartars on his record, and he had a high reputation serving under command of General Koniecpolski. They say that this General, when thinking

24 Ibidem, 1679, 1.6: 600.
about Khmel’nyts’kyj’s actions and watching his appearance, prophesied that in the future he will become God’s punishment for the Republic. The prophecy materialized which will be narrated later. When Khmel’nyts’kyj’s father died, he asked for the King’s permission to rebuild his father’s broken Mill and to add three or four little houses to it in memory of his father. He was allowed to do this considering his merits, and the construction was completed. Colonel Iarinski stated that water from the Mill inflicts damage on his estate. He started demanding from Khmel’nyts’kyj that he destroy the Mill. Khmel’nyts’kyj replied that he built it according to the King’s permission. The Colonel replied that the King may do what he wants with his possessions but not with those of others. They went from words to actions. The Colonel ordered the Mill to be burnt, and many say that he treated this Khmel’nyts’kyj’s wife and son brutally. The Cossacks felt so offended by this unheard-of violence that, being, as was told earlier, sworn enemies of Nobility, they decided to take revenge for injustice inflicted upon the Miller, by killing all Poles whom they could find, expelling everybody who did not belong to their Religion from their land thus dealing a deadly blow to the entire Polish Nobility... it can be said that one water Mill had spawned many blood mills, many provinces were ruined and thousands of souls were destroyed, innocent as well. The Senators of the Kingdom, deeply indignant about those barbarians’ actions, begged the King to join their campaign against the rioters. The King refused, reproaching them for the burning of the Mill, described earlier25.

In the end, the King, whose stand was becoming ever more susceptible in the eyes of nobility, joined the campaign, although he wished, according to the author, an other way of solving the conflict, being aware that «... the Cossacks’ hand sheld the doors through which Tartars and Turks could enter the Kingdom. However, the Cossack cruelty towards women and innocent children cried out for merciless revenge...»26. As we see, Priorato makes the «King-Cossacks-nobility» conflict a personal conflict between Khmel’nyts’kyj and «Iarinski» (probably meaning Czaplinski) that presumably started because of a mill. It seems to me that Priorato became interested in the story of the mill (if of course it was not a result of his literary fancy based on some uncertain rumours) because of its «parable» nature and an opportunity to suggest a new development to the metaphorical image «from a smalls park, a great fire» (Khmel’nyts’kyj’s personal grudge as, infact, the reason for the uprising), already established in previous stories of

25 Ibidem, 603.
26 Ibidem.
the Khmel’nyts’kyj War, as well as the ominous image of the «bloodmill» of carnage and ruination born of a common water mill. The «Khmel’nyts’kyj-Poland’s Doom» is present, as it was in works of predecessors, but it is being treated in an original way: allegedly, Koniecpolski himself prophesied his future ruining role. We note that while other historiographers cited Khmel’nyts’kyj’s personal grudge as one of numerous offences and ill-treatments of Cossacks, so it was not hard for him to launch the uprising, Priorato as if shifts accents here as well: Cossacks had been suffering from nobility’s lawlessness for a long time but it was offence against Khmel’nyts’kyj that they perceived as the drop that filled the cup, as «unheard-of violence» requiring revenge from the entire Cossack community; wasn’t it because «Iarinski’s» action had not just offended Khmel’nyts’kyj but was also proof of a nobleman’s contempt towards the will of the King? This could explain the naïve, at first glance, reason due to which the King, in Priorato’s book, at first does not agree to join the nobility’s campaign against Cossacks who, according to the author had already ruined a lot of Polish lands and killed a great number of innocent people: he reproaches them with «the burnt mill»; i.e. the incident with the mill per se justifies the mass bloodshed? Of course not: it is that the mill becomes for the writer a metaphor of the nobility’s violence and its disobedience to the King. As can be seen from a quote, the author does not hide the barbarian cruelty of Cossacks even to «innocent souls». As other writers do, the author mentions the Cossacks’ «weathercock» behavior: they are used to change their allies and «turn to every wind as witnessed by Turks, Swedes, Transylvanians, and Poles themselves». Thus, Priorato’s image of the Cossacks is far from being idealized but because the role of the «negative force» is accorded to nobility who caused the destruction of the Kingdom by their violence, disagreements and disrespect to the King’s will, it can be said that Priorato explains the reasons for the Cossack protest with full understanding and sympathy and by all available means underlines Cossacks’ loyalty to the King as a positive factor. In the same key, conflicts between Cossacks and Muscovites are explained: they are the King’s subjects and do not want to submit to the Tsar. Thus, in the rather rich in detail description of election of Yuri Khmel’nyts’kyj as Hetman in Korsun’ in 1661, Priorato stresses that Cossacks do not agree with Muscovite statutes and «cruelties» and that they want to be under «fatherly hand» of the Polish King:

The wojewoda, in a half-hour speech described first of all His Majesty’s fatherly concern about the People... He unfolded before their eyes their mistakes and errors they had made in many cases in various times, bad advice and the traps they had fallen into that they approved of. In conclusion, he said that the King
has forgotten and buried everything under the perpetual Amnesty. They applauded this speech vigorously. Some thanked God and the King. Others blamed their leaders for enticing them for their private interests. There was no lack of those who swore to kill with their own hands those who will just think about an uprising in the future, whether this would even be their father or brother. They resolved to cancel and repel all the Statutes and orders by the Muscovite.27

The History tells of those Cossack detachments that continued to fight Poles but at the same time an example is given of Cossack ambassadors to the Polish Court who state that they joined the Muscovites in war not of their own will but because they were forced to do so, and they offer as proof the fact that they «moved slowly». Thus, the author’s stand is evident, while historical facts become the painting by an artist who mixes colors in a rather subjective way.

It can be stated that in all the works mentioned above Ukraine and Cossacks, just as Ukrainian-Polish-Muscovite relations are described through the subjective prism of their authors’ vision, with a greater or lesser degree of fictionalization. The same events and characters acquire different, sometimes juxtaposed coloring. Sustainability of characteristic «Barbarian-Sarmatian» features in depiction of Cossacks can be marked; they are present even in the work by M. Bisaccioni who clearly destroys the image of «Christian knights» of whom his predecessors made heroes. In any case, while taking into account the scale of works of literature mentioned above, general information on Ukrainian land and their population, beyond the battle theme, look like an almost total tribute to the established literary tradition that even writers who were witnesses to events do not want to change. The interest towards Ukraine, provoked by «Cossack» wars, is gradually waning, and Ukraine’s image in Italian literature remains «hermetically sealed» on topoi set by Miechowski, and on the generalized image of «Cossack-Sarmatian».

The political situation happens to have curious influences on historical events. Events, which contemporaries did not perceive as important, after centuries became seriously attractive not only for historians, but for the journalists and general public as well.

Such a metamorphosis has happened with the Konotop battle, which took place in June 1659 in Ukraine. The battle in itself did not bring any change in the fortunes of the Ukrainian Hetmanate; it influenced even less Russia. Even its winner, Ivan Vyhovs’kyj, was not able to keep his power.

So, it appears strange, that many serious, respected historians permitted to get involved in a useless discussion about the importance of the Konotop battle together with newly brought to light ‘experts’ of Ukrainian history. The major discussions are going on about the losses of Russian troops. One side presents numbers coming from Polish sources that are definitely increased, the other insists on the information given by the Rozrjad, the official tsars’ reports. Some Ukrainians consider Konotop to be an ‘outstanding victory’, some Moscow historians try to present it like a ‘small’ victory or, ‘not quite’ a victory.

The history of Ukraine was not taught at the Historical departments in the Soviet Union¹, and this fact still has its negative influence on mod-

¹ An amazing example may be found in I. Babulin, who vehemently criticizes the great historian S. Solov’ev for writing about the mourning dresses Aleksej Mikhajlovich supposedly wore after the Konotop defeat. Babulin insists, that mourning was not because of the defeat, but because of the great losses of the Russian elite (Babulin I., Bitva pod Konotopom 28 ijunja 1659 goda, Moskva, 2009: 43). Such a dispute has all the aspect of a pure sophism, indeed.

² The Department of History of the Leningrad State University was a lucky exception.
ern Russia. There is still a certain amount of my Russian colleagues that seem to have deep gaps in their knowledge of historical events concerning Ukraine. This is the reason why they still recur to the old Soviet clichés: they consider all Ukrainian hetmans simply as traitors. All the tsars, on their sides, are also presented as ‘bad guys’ because ... they were too slow in punishing the ‘traitors’. On the contrary, the ‘rebels’ – viz.: the Cossacks, who rebelled against the hetmans – are presented as ‘good guys’ *a priori*, the fact that they ended up killing Russians notwithstanding, as it happened for example with both Tymosh Tsytysjura or Ivan Brjukhovets’kyj). Such Soviet clichés are curiously mixed up with the imperial traditions, which proclaims the rule, according to which Russian rulers are always right.

Both sides, Russian and Ukrainian historians, have problems with the analyses of the sources and knowledge of documents. For example, Babulin is using the Polish *Rhyme chronic*: it is a quite interesting, but very controversial source, requesting a very careful approach. For some reasons Babulin ignores all other Polish materials – diaries, letters, reports (*relacji*). Maybe, he simply doesn’t know the Polish language3. In opposite, he criticizes the Ukrainian historiography for using ‘narrative sources’.

From our side, we believe that only by using and analyzing the whole complex of sources we can find out the truth. There are many cases in which the official reports of Russian *vojevods* included evidently inaccurate, false or even fantastic information. Moreover, there is no doubt that the Russian official documents represent only one side of the documentary material and of the narration of the event. Therefore, they should be considered as a basically subjective source of information. In comparison, the Polish reports (*relacji*) seem to be at least no less important (Babulin for some reason calls them ‘narrative’). The narrow usage of sources created such a strange situation, that in none of the most recent studies of the Konotop battle one is able to find any kind of analysis of the European reactions to the event4.

Instead of serious research, we often have to deal with a number of old clichés, more similar to political propaganda or to a poor paper written by a student rather than to a scholarly publication. For example, Babulin writes that Vyhovs’kyj attracted a great number of representants of *starshina* by intrigues and bribes5. Could he have named at least one example of ‘intrigues’ and ‘bribes’? Meanwhile, by this ‘attraction’ Babulin means Vyhovs’kyj’s legitimate election by *starshina* at the *Korsunska rada*, after which the

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3 He even ignores such an important source as the memoirs of K. Peretjatkovich and the whole of the inestimable publication of the Polish documents by V. Herasymchuk.

4 Only Ju. Mytsyk notices (unfortunately without any references) that the Konotop battle had a wide European reaction and that even official reports about this battle were published (Mytsyk Ju., *Het’man Ivan Vyhovs’kyj*, Kyiv, 2004: 50).

5 Babulin I., *Bitva pod Konotopom*: 3.
Pushkar’s uprising (Pushkar, by the way, attended this rada and voted for Vyhovs’kyj) could be considered just as a revolt (in Babulin’s terms – mutiny, mjatezh) against the legitimate ruler, against the legitimate authority of the Ukrainian Hetmanate. By the way, after this rada Vyhovs’kyj was acknowledged and approved as hetman by tsar Aleksej Mikhajlovich.

It is easy to detect a ‘double standard’ of evaluation in many recent works of Moscovite historians. Some Russian historians explain Vyhovs’kyj’s success at Konotop by the support of Tatars. They consider the alliance with the Tatars as a ‘bad’ step. However, we know that precisely the alliance with Tatars was the main reason of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyj’s victories in 1648, an event generally considered as most positive in Russian historiography. Babulin states that the separate (national) goals of Vyhovs’kyj were supported only by a narrow part of starshina and not by the whole population of Ukraine. It is easy to encounter this statement by simply recalling that the same may be said about every country of Early Modern Time. The ideas of Peter the Great were not at all shared by the Russian serfs. The French peasant didn’t understand the goals of Richelieu. As we know, such a peasant even didn’t have any idea that he was French.

Historians follow the old Soviet tradition in order to create a negative image of Vyhovs’kyj. They call him an «ex-shljakhtych» (ex-nobleman). First: there is no way for a nobleman to be an ‘ex’! Second: it should be noted that Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyj, his sun Jurij and most of his colonels, including Ivan Bohun, Hryhorij Lesnyts’kyj and the others, were all shljakhtychi, noblemen.

Babulin states that Ukraine didn’t have «an economic basis, a well-organized army or a constant internal support of the population for the development of a state system»6. This is quite an amazing statement. The historian probably is not familiar with the wide historiography extant on each of those issues, with the many monographs and research articles, which are based on a deep analysis of archive materials. Just to mention a few: the works by I. Krypjakevych concerning the General Treasury of the Hetmanate, the studies by V. Mjakotin and V. Barvins’kyj7 on the Ukrainian tax system during the rule of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyj, of the land-ownership and of the administrative (including the judicial) system of the Ukrainian Hetmanate. Instead of using such fundamental works, Babulin relies on the pseudo-scholarly book by A. Smirnov, who has no kind of knowledge whether of the historiography, nor of the documents8. Should this be considered pure

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6 Babulin I., Bitva pod Konotopom: 4.
7 Mjakotin V., Ocherki sotsial’noj istorii Ukrainy XVII-XVIII vv., vyp. 1-3, Praha, 1924; Barvinskij V., Zametki po istorii finansovogo upravlenija v Get’manshchine, Kharkov, 1914.
8 Smirnov states that “the foundation of the agricultural civilization was destroyed” in
ignorance or holy naivete? If there wasn’t any «economic basis», how could than the culture of the «Ukrainian baroque» appear, that very culture which later became the basis for Peter’s ‘enlightenment’ of Russia?

As far as the «regularly organized armed forces» are concerned, one should notice, that it was Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyj, who had broken down the Commonwealth’s military machine. And that Commonwealth was the very state, with which Russia could not compete, being forced to sign the Polanowski treaty with its great territorial losses!

Writing about the implanting of vojevody in Ukrainian cities, Babulin states: «After these steps, which were absolutely necessary indeed, there was no military defeat, no new betray of any hetman which might have taken Kiev and Left-Bank Ukraine away from Russia»9. Again we have a testimony of the enormous ignorance of the author. Indeed, in 1667-1668 it was exactly the appearance of vojevody that provoked the general uprising of the Left-Bank Ukraine, which was followed by the massive massacre of Russian garrisons. As a result, the Hlukhiv articles of 1669 prohibited the presence of Russian vojevody in Ukrainian cities and their role was limited to military issues.

Such fantastic mistakes are spread all over Babulin’s work. He writes: «When the rank and file members of the revolt got the recovery of sight, the Zaporozhian Army almost unanimously forced Vyhovs’kyj to give up the hetmanship ...»10. The author probably has no idea, that Vyhovs’kyj was dismissed by the decision of the rada of the Right-Bank starshina, particularly by those members, who took place in the Konotop battle on Vyhovs’kyj’s side. The newly elected hetman Jurij Khmel’nyts’kyj decided to renew the union with Russia – but this time according to the terms of the Zherdov articles11.

So, I actually am not able to understand the reason why, in this kind of publications published in Moscow, the authors seem to consider the Konotop defeat of Russian troops as their personal grief.

The representation of the events of 1658-1659 as the ‘Russian-Ukrainian war’ seems to be a no less simplification. This term has been introduced by the Ukrainian historian A. Bul’vins’kyj12. These years marked the begin-
ning of the very complicated period called Ruine. Ruine had many different aspects and it would be an extreme simplification to explain the events of that period just by the ‘betrayal’ of Vyhovs’kyj or by the Muscovie invasion. Everything was much more complex.

The Ukrainian Hetmanate was a strange mixture of the free democratic Cossack traditions with the glorious Ukrainian baroque culture. This mixture survived the strong oppression of the Polish Catholic reaction, survived a struggle that lasted half a century\(^3\), and created a new political elite that became the carrier of a new identity. Even before 1648 the Ukrainian peasants were the freedom-loving motor of the colonization of the South-Eastern lands of Ukraine. After 1648 all peasants became free (and remained free until the end of the 18-th century). The juridical system of the Ukrainian Hetmanate was based on the Lithuanian Statute and the Magdeburg Law. As a matter of fact, when 1654 it accepted the sovereignty of the Muscovite tsar, the Zaporozhian Host had little in common with Russia, which shared the Orthodox faith, but was a totalitarian, non-enlightened state, based on the work of serfs.

Moreover, the recent deep interest in the details of the small battle, which in no way may be considered a key event, seems strange while the political side of this event has not yet been studied in depth.

In 1657 the struggle for power started in the Ukrainian Hetmanate. This happened as a result of the death of the strong autocratic and popular leader of the whole nation, who was able to unite his country and to win the liberation war. The death of such leaders most often leads to disturbances. Still, we know very little about the history of the different political groups of the starshina in the times after Khmel’nyts’kyj. Which were their goals? Historical investigation remains poor on the subject. For example: Which was the role of Danylo Vyhovs’kyj and how did his plans correspond to his brother’s plans? Who was the leader of the Right-Bank colonels? who stayed behind them? why did they oppose military action just before the Konotop battle, thus forcing Vyhovs’kyj to use Tatars in the Konotop battle?

Muscovite historians try to present all the events of Vyhovs’kyj’s hetmanate as the ‘Cossacks’ revolt’. This position corresponds to the position of some Polish historians, who don’t want to acknowledge the statehood of the Ukrainian Hetmanate. Muscovite historians completely ignore the ideology and mentality of Vyhovs’kyj and his supporters. It was a narrow group of people, but their broad European views are quite impressive. In

\(^{3}\) Already by the end of the 16th century the struggle of the Ukrainian Orthodox brotherhoods and educational centers was united with the efforts of such Cossack leaders as Severyn Nalyvajko and Petro Konashevych-Sahajdachnyj.
their documents they applied to European countries and international law. The idea of the Polish Commonwealth as a ‘triple state’ was a utopian one, but still a masterpiece of the Ukrainian baroque political thought. And it is a great pity indeed, that such aspects of the question still remain unknown by the majority of the Russian historians of today and attract quite little attention in modern Ukrainian historiography.

Taking all the mentioned facts in consideration, we are regrettably obliged to acknowledge that the Konotop battle jubilee has been quite a bloody battle in itself (fortunately, in the case of historiography, it remained only metaphorically bloody!), but it has been substantially useless!
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Titoli della collana

1 | Liana Nissim  
*Vieillir selon Flaubert*

2 | Simone Cattaneo  
*La ’cultura X’. Mercato, pop e tradizione.*  
*Juan Bonilla, Ray Loriga e Juan Manuel de Prada*

3 | Oleg Rumyantsev and Giovanna Brogi Bercoff (eds.)  
*The Battle of Konotop 1659: Exploring Alternatives in East European History*

4 | Irina Bajini, Luisa Campuzano y Emilia Perassi (eds.)  
*Mujeres y emancipación de la América Latina y el Caribe en los siglos XIX y XX*
The battle that took place near Konotop in late June 1659 was a continuation of the Muscovite-Cossack war, which began in the fall of 1658, soon after the signing of the Union of Hadiach. Cossack and Tatar detachments trapped a significant portion of the Muscovite army, leading to enormous Russian losses. The unprecedented defeat of the previously invincible forces caused panic in Russia, but Muscovites’ capacity to turn defeat into political victory, and the fratricidal struggle in Ukraine, known as the “Ruin”, left most of the Cossack lands on the Right Bank of the Dnieper uninhabitable.

Konotop is a classic example of a battle won, but a war lost. Mariusz Robert Drozdowski, Ksenia Konstantynenko, Piotr Kroll, Serhii Plokhy, Oleg Rumyantsev, Natalia Yakovenko and Tatjana Yakovleva-Tairova, the authors of this collection, hail from Poland, Italy, USA, Ukraine and Russia. They consider the military, political, social, and cultural context of the battle and also investigate its treatment in historical and literary writings from the early modern era to the present. They approach their topic from the point of view of various disciplines, traditions, and schools of thought. Their essays expand our understanding of the battle, its outcome and legacy in unexpected and historiographically productive ways.