Averintsev and the Formalist Tradition: Remarks on the Concept of “Literary Evolution”

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Abstract – Since the concept of “literary evolution” proposed by Yuri Tynyanov could not be applied to the late Soviet official literature, Sergei Averintsev using this concept examined the relationship between philosophy, sophistry, rhetorics and everyday consciousness in classical Greece. Tynyanov’s theory of “parallel series” turned out to be productive for the reconstruction of the tasks of the ancient philosopher and for the interpretation of Plato’s dialogues. According to Averintsev, Plato acted within the sophistic field, creating irreducible terminology and untranslatable phrases as a moment of the entire further evolution of Western literature. Consideration of Russian formalism as the context of Averintsev’s thought proves his contribution to the discussion of Platonism as a tool for posing philosophical problems and of the perspective of philosophy in the postcolonial discussion.

Keywords – Russian Formalism; Averintsev; Tynyanov; Plato; Rhetorics.
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1. Introduction. From “literary fact” to “literary evolution” at the background of Samizdat

The publication in 1977 in the USSR of a collection of articles by Yury N. Tynyanov under the thematic title Poetics. Literary history. Cinema became a turning point for the intelligentsia in discussing the nature of literature. The country’s underdevelopment of the scientific journal industry made the collections, such as Festschriften or libri amicorum, the main source of information on best practices in the humanities and social sciences for the general public who had no access to limited editions. The Nauka publishing house published collected works of academicians, which could then be used as a model by ordinary researchers. The collection of selected works of one of the leaders of the Russian formalists put him in a number of exemplary researchers, whom one can be equal to both in the development of argumentation and in the style of writing.

One of the core articles of this collection, “On Literary Evolution” (270-81), immediately found itself inside the field of discussions about literary development, set by both the works of Mikhail Bakhtin and the achievements of Soviet structuralism. Although Lotman’s views as the head of Soviet structuralists on the causes of literary development were subject to change, he clearly owed Tynyanov to understanding innovations in literature not as a renewal of aesthetics that immediately changed reading habits, but as a functional shift in the system, endowing old elements with new functions. In this position, just in the period, we are considering, the end of the 1970s, there were authoritative critics, but who wrote only in Samizdat, Viktor Krivulin (Krivulin), and Boris Groys (Groys), who saw in formalist and structuralist analysis a way to assert the cultural privileges of the text, and therefore cultural privileges of those who serve this text, just ignoring the actual motives for creating the text.

The subject of Samizdat will not be addressed in this article, since the radicalism of Samizdat’s criticism of structuralism and partial adherence to formalism were determined by a desire to return literary production to the simpler forms of 1920s, as cooperative and fairly independent book production (Markov, “Meaning”). Discussions were meant by Samizdat intellectual leaders, as Krivulin and Groys, to mimic the situation of direct feedback on a book, but free from the hierarchical system that the Soviet production of scientific literature implied: one had to learn to discuss a book because it was interesting. Averintsev took a different path: he dealt with literature from the distant past, but his hermeneutics was intended at identifying why books became interesting in those distant eras, why they received in that time discussion and interpretation. His hermeneutics was in this sense no less radically directed toward the free production of books and ideas than Tynyanov’s formalism (Markov, “Overcoming”), since while not denying cultural hierarchies and not going beyond official scientific production to Samizdat, he problematized the very situation of literary development, which turned out to be the result not only of a number of authoritative gestures, but also of the reader’s interest in the distant past and the writer’s ability to awaken
interest, even if the writer had made something unexpected. Such the unexpected for Averintsev, as we shall see below, was the philosophy of Platonism.

It is clear that the authors of Samizdat insisted on other mechanisms for creating texts than those that were supposed to be a dense environment of literary interaction at the time of the triumph of Russian formalism. The theory of Tynyanov and other formalists was really inapplicable to the world of late official Soviet literature, where the place of the writer in literature was determined by a series of selection and approval operations, and not by the actual action of the writer in the immanent literary system, and the system of censorship and the system of genre expectations of the reader made late Soviet literature doubly heteronormative (Markov, “Overcoming” and “Meaning”), although it worked in the world where Yesenin and Mayakovsky were. But there was another way to develop Tynyanov’s thought: to turn not to today’s official literature, but to the literature of the distant past, for example, classical antique, and apply to it all the same criteria that Tynyanov introduces to determine the parameters of literary evolution. So did Sergei Averintsev (Averintsev, Novoe 41-81) famous Russian polymath and eminent literary theorist, who applied Tynyanov’s categories to study the emergence of philosophy in the classical era, in Pericles’ Athens, where there was no shortage of literary genres and their mutual influence.

The main argument of Tyynanov’s article was that the elements of literary evolution should be considered solely according to their function, without isolating them as aesthetically valuable and without evaluating them. The very status of something as a “literary fact”, and not a fact of everyday life or social in a narrow sense, is determined by the ability of this fact to function in the literary system, acting as a source of inspiration or a source of evaluation and further struggle of positions in literature. So Averintsev argued that before the polemics of philosophical schools in antiquity, the fact of the very emergence of philosophy as an independent practice, which both inspires thought and requires to defend positions, was significant. The way Averintsev portrays the transformation of “wisdom” into “philosophy” is very similar to how Tynyanov described the transformation of a simple “fact” into a “literary fact”. How productive this similarity is for the theory of literature, I will find out.

2. Literary Review. Christian concepts and formalist criteria of individualisation in the fiction literature

The relationship between the thought of Averintsev and the thought of formalists has repeatedly become the subject of reflections of Russian intellectuals, especially those with a theological interest, who regard Averintsev as, first of all, a historian of Christian concepts. Olga Sedakova, giving tribute to the philological virtuosity of the formalists (139), noticed that, starting from the metaphysical interests of the Russian Symbolists, they did not think about those highest and general religious and philosophical concepts that could determine the aesthetics of an individual author and of a particular era or style. In Averintsev, Sedakova saw the most talented successor to the works of Vyacheslav Ivanov and Fr. Pavel Florensky (142), in whose works the style of the epoch was interpreted as a constructive derivative of religious and metaphysical presumptions. But she sees the advantage of Averintsev over the named figures of Russian religious modernism in the fact that Averintsev’s method allows one to describe not only epochs but also individual achievements of particular authors. Of course, the study of individual ways did not at all correspond to the aesthetics of Russian symbolism, where the allocation of impersonal principles and forces justified symbolism as a project, but it was quite consistent with the work of Russian formalists, according to them the aesthetic reform of one author not only influences other authors but transforms the very
qualities of the system, including number and orders and intensity of interactions within the system. Averintsev himself, comparing the formalists and Bakhtin (Averintsev, Lichnost' 60), whom he considered one of the models for his own activities, said that Bakhtin actually did not reject any of the provisions of formalism (this is, of course, an exaggerated statement), but only demanded a “third dimension” of aesthetic ideology.

Developing the idea of Sedakova, Yulia Balakshina ascribed to Averintsev himself “overdiscursive language”, in other words, the ability to apply not only the specified methods and tools, but also certain ways of expressing, as an analytical tool for an aesthetic object:

Without losing the severity and harmony in the development of thought, Averintsev, in the process of searching for the only possible expression in a given situation, could use various kinds of tropes, the rhythmic and intonational diversity of the language, and other expressive means, traditionally correlated not with scientific discourse, but with artistic (poetic) text. (116) 1

Another position was adhered to by Sergei Bocharov (20), who opposed formalism as a movement for the sociological typology of writers, which does not recognize the uniqueness of anyone, placing everyone in the ranks of traditions and reforms, and Averintsev’s method, which can explain the reasons for the “instant exclusivity” of Goethe or Pushkin. But here it is necessary to make a reservation that Averintsev himself explained in some detail the situation of culture in which the appearance of something with the status of unique and inimitable is possible. Averintsev wrote (Averintsev, Ritorika 225-7) more than once that in the canonical cultures of antiquity and the Middle Ages there were no fewer opportunities than in romanticism to legitimize the unique achievements of a writer, but not with the help of a direct and explicit indication of uniqueness as an essential property, but with the help of a technique close to apophaticism in theology and rule-based epideictic eloquence. The ancient and medieval critic could praise different aspects of the work, using the entire arsenal of rhetorical means, but it was with such intensive use of them that he made it clear that the most essential remains in the zone of silence.

Thus, it is possible to oppose Averintsev and the Russian formalists not by the criterion of typology or individualization, but only by one detail of the discussion. If the formalists were mainly interested in simply opposing the stylistically neutral and the stylistically colored, then Averintsev investigated the details and nuances of various styles. Thus, the development of Tynyanov’s ideas by Averintsev in the study of the origin of classical philosophy should be sought where he speaks about a specific style of philosophical work and a priori concepts of philosophy and theology, and himself applies a certain style.

3. Tynyanov’s ryad as oxymoron for Byzantine studies in the USSR

In the very title of Averintsev’s article, “Classical Greek Philosophy as a Phenomenon of the Historical and Literary Series” (Averintsev, Novoe 41-81), in which the method proposed by Tynyanov is most fruitfully used, Tynyanov’s main term “literary series” (Tynyanov, Poetika 270; Permanent 267) is directly used, albeit modified, turned into “historical and literary series”. Russian ryad for series means also “line” and of one root with the poryadok “order, discipline”, the narяд “finery” and “command” and so on. If Tynyanov meant by the literary series the immanent development of literature, then Averintsev means the acquisition by literature and philosophy as a form of expressing its identity, which cannot be interpreted otherwise than a historical event. Averintsev more than once takes Tynyanov’s own words

1 Here and after all translations from Russian are mine.
but modifies them based on his goals and stylistic relevance, so that we do not always recognize Tynyanov’s program in Averintsev’s text. At the same time, this program was expanded by Averintsev in the direction of metaphysical interest and he was able to answer those questions that Tynyanov could not.

Therefore, my method of analysis will not be a comparison of individual quotations of Tynyanov and Averintsev, but the study of how Tynyanov’s categories began to work for Averintsev to interpret the question of the nature and development of philosophy, which usually does not belong to the competence of philological science. Averintsev clearly believed that he had offered a convincing solution to this question that could not have been solved from within normative historical and philosophical research. Therefore, on the one hand, I analyze Averintsev’s style of thought, paying attention to unexpected features of expression, and on the other hand, I look at how the research plan proposed in Tynyanov’s article as necessary for the science of literature was implemented in Averintsev’s article.

The very title of the book New in contemporary classical philology (1979) edited by Averintsev was perceived as an oxymoron and emphasis: after all, it is impossible to single out “contemporary classical philology” as a subdiscipline that works by other methods than the normal classical philology. Although there were numerous shifts and turns in the science of ancient antiquities, participation in the reform of methods in itself did not allow scholars to speak of themselves as representatives of some kind of “contemporary classical philology”. For a wide reader, this name should have been perceived as an indication that the science of antiquity is not outdated, and that it is possible to discuss issues that are of interest not only to specialists from the departments of classical philology.

In this collection, Averintsev included two of his articles, which were supposed to attract a wide interest of the intelligentsia to this book. The first (5-40) was devoted to the disintegration of the mimetic image of antiquity, invented by Winckelmann and Schiller, in the period from romanticism to the emergence of multiculturalism and postcolonialism. Among the predecessors of the postcolonial approach, Averintsev even counted ultra-right intellectuals, such as the cultural philosopher Oswald Spengler and the poet Gottfried Bönn. It should be noted that in the book The Poetics of Early Byzantine Literature (1977), his undoubtedly great book not yet translated, Averintsev insisted that postcolonial processes took place during the transition from ancient civilization to Byzantine: for example, he believed that the reassembly of the state, carried out by Emperor Constantine, with the renaming of Byzantium to Constantinople, was a revision of relations between the center and the provinces (Averintsev, Poetika 32), he saw in the orientalization of the system of government, in particular, the Byzantine institution of eunuchs, the desire to move away from the previous functional distribution of responsibilities in the Roman Empire in favor of an idealized bureaucracy of the postcolonial type (43), finally, he compared one of the last ancient poets Nonnos of Panopolis and also the author of the Corpus Areopagiticum with Leopold Sedar Senghor (210), believing that these last Roman writers, like Senghor, put into the language of the colonialists that system of meanings and those modes of local ecstatic contemplation that were not implied by the previous orders of knowledge production in this language.

Averintsev was not alone in such brave comparisons: for example, Elena Rabinovich, who translated Claudius Claudian, compared his bilingualism with the bilingualism of Nabokov (16), believing that in both writers the language game associated with intellectual bilingualism dominates the orders of building beliefs: by this, she explained religious agnosticism of both authors. But in Averintsev I see a parallel with what Tynyanov begins his article with: Tynyanov considered the previous history of literature to be untenable because of its colonial character: «[L]iterary history continues to languish in the position of a colonial territory» (Tynyanov, Permanent 267). He said that both the colonial power and the
previous history of literature treated their wealth not as an immanent belonging, but as a resource for export and import, applying the psychological and historical contextualization of events in literature precisely for their conversion into a resource for history of ideas.

4. Constants of literary development: Averintsev tracings back to Tynyanov

Although Averintsev does not give a direct reference to the works of Tynyanov, he mentions his name as one of the inspirers of the research approach he proposed: «minds as deeply different as Yury Tynyanov, Lev Vygotsky and Mikhail Bakhtin taught us to see the very existence of literature as self-contradictory, dialectical, “agonistic”» (59).

The main idea of Averintsev’s article is simple: philosophy could never completely separate itself from the ritual practice of a solemn appearance and decorated speech, the special appearance of a sage or priest in front of the public, which later manifested itself in rhetorical decorated speech and in literature as the main way of working with the imagination and creating the imaginary. The literary necessity of expressive speech for the philosopher was a direct consequence of his position as the heir of shamans, priests, and sages, capable of connecting worlds in some kind of exceptional experience (62-6). Before becoming an instrument of wisdom, speech adorned with consonances was a performance that helps to perceive the appearance of a person with a special mission, like any other performance of a religious rite. The ancient Greeks simply secularized priestly speech as they just secularized ethics and politics, separating them from the initial cult regulation and subordinating both to instrumental goals. But in exactly the same way, Tynyanov argued that the isolation of facts as literary is always situational, and the perception of something as literary is determined not even by the function of the elements, but by the influence of the previous functions of the elements that determined the content of a particular genre: «we can also find many examples of how a form with indeterminate function can give rise to new functions and determine them. Additionally, there are examples of function seeking form» (274).

The approach stated in Averintsev’s article allowed the reader to experience with equal enthusiasm both works that are widely recognized as an example of performative speech, for example, Greek tragedy, and works that remain in the shadow of the experiences of a modern person, such as ancient elegies or solemn speeches. Averintsev set out to overcome the inertia of romanticism, which equates aesthetic experience with pathetic and melodramatic episodes. Averintsev contrasted his approach to the «well-known, but not so interesting statement» (59) of the dependence of Plato’s style on the style of the Sophists, and hence the orientation of philosophy towards literary fiction, which has already won the public’s trust. Averintsev insists on the exact opposite: the methods of the public invention are always situational, and can never be borrowed, in contrast to borrowing individual techniques. Considering only stylistic borrowings in philosophy, we cannot say about it not only as a social but also as a literary phenomenon. Whereas it is necessary to speak of it as a literary phenomenon simply because it managed to create its own audience, its listeners, adepts, and followers, capable of working within it. This is most reminiscent of the application to the ancient Greek category of publicity (politics) of Tynyanov’s reasoning about the autonomy of literature, which does not coincide with individual cultural patterns of behavior, even as strong as sophistic ones:

The content of these series changes, but the differential quality of human activities remains constant. As with all cultural series, the evolution of literature does not coincide, either in tempo or character (given the specificity of the material it is working with), with its various interrelated series. (276)
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If Tynyanov based his assertion on individual observations about the complex relationship between the conventions of Russian literature and Russian aristocratic culture, then Averintsev spoke about the uneven development of the series based on the internal nature of philosophy, which forms its own identities within the language, despite the fact that public techniques, in fact, a series of political the use of speech, have a completely different tempo than philosophical thought:

Reading Plato’s texts, it is almost possible not to feel the gap between the agility of his intellectual imagination and the slowness of the unwinding mechanisms of his contemporary philosophizing technique. (The dichotomies!) Of course, Plato was very interested in these mechanisms; after all, he put a lot of work to improve them, and the future of disciplined thinking was associated with them. But at every step, much more thoughts came into his head than he would have had to check, develop, think out, trace further from his hands: yes, just formulate; the thread of orderly reasoning was lost all the time. (55)

Throughout his article, Tynyanov defends the main idea that the translation of literary evolution into the field of familiar everyday concepts does not allow any reverse translation. For example, we can ordinarily understand a novel as a «large-scale prose» (273), but from this definition we will not reconstruct the actual history of the novel and any real reasons and patterns of this development. A retrospective analysis proceeding from those definitions that are given by our value habits and inertia of perception will tell nothing about the real nature of literature. This is the main thesis of Tynyanov’s article behind all the individual theses.

5. Untranslatable Platonism and the ustanovka in the literary evolution

To this lesson Tynyanov Averintsev owes his main statement about the fundamental untranslatability of Plato, where he comes close to the idea of philosophical untranslatables, now known to the world from the work of Barbara Cassin and her collaborators (Cassin, Dictionary). In this statement of Plato’s untranslatability, Averintsev disagreed even with his closest colleagues. Averintsev’s colleague and friend, Alexander Mikhailov, insisted that reverse translation is a necessary part of the development of literature, and the return of literary achievements in a new guise enriches literature. Mikhailov’s ideas are close to the teachings of Leopold Fischer (Agehananda Bharati) about the pizza effect, which the creator of this teaching himself extended to both aesthetic consumption and mystical practices. According to Fischer a.k.a Agehananda Bharati, an idea associated with deep experience is best perceived not when it arises as local, because then its significance can be questioned at any moment, but when it comes from another culture as already in demand in it, and thus turns out to be legitimizied as just put into practice. But it was Averintsev who argued that in the field of philosophy such a reverse translation is impossible. So, the word “idea” in Plato was used both in the general meaning of “appearance” or “surface”, and in the philosophical sense extremely far from this everyday use (48-9). But if we translate those phrases where Plato uses the word “idea” in a common sense, using the strict term idea, that is, trying to return the word to the initial range of meanings, then it will be simply barbarism and ignorance, “illiteracy or foolishness” (48). The terminological gamble, the transformation of a word into a term, was so unique that any generalization of it using a spectrum of meanings would turn to be Derrida’s “spectre” or Cassin’s “sophistical practice” (Cassin, Sophistical).

Averintsev argues that Plato’s inclination to rhetorical games with consonances and puns, inheriting the “Gorgian figures”, is an “atmospheric” fact (57), «in the atmosphere of a semi-conscious pun, more or less evenly diffused by Plato everywhere» (56), which does not allow talking about the degree of consciousness or unconsciousness of the reception, in other
words, in no way characterizing the individual heroes of the dialogue either as specific sophists exercising eloquence within the limits of the tasks set by Plato, or as heroes of the dialogic utterance, which can be characterized by a decorated speech. Averintsev avoids to speak about the characters: he only talks about whether the specific fabric of Plato’s speech, close to the spoken word, lends itself to translation, including the reproduction of this game. This subtraction of heroes also meets the pathos of Tynyanov’s article to abandon prosopography in literary history and the characters of authors, heroes and generally observed phenomena as causal explanations with being in literature. Averintsev answers the question about translatability of these puns in the negative:

Anyone who does not know the ancient Greek language simply has no chance of learning about this most expressive and characteristic feature of Plato’s attitude to the word. Translations do not convey it, which is understandable; play on words cannot be transferred to another language, and being sophisticated in composing your own puns in the manner of Platonic is an occupation, although tempting, but forbidden because it leads to a deformation of the philosophical content. (57)

The final thesis related to translatability concerns the reform that Plato carried out no longer in relation to the dynamic possibilities of speech, but in relation to static everyday concepts. Averintsev examines the example of the words εὐήθεια and εὐψυχία, which etymologically mean “good behavior” and “good mood”, but by the time of Plato in the urban speech of the Athenians they were already used in the erased, reduced and ironic sense of “unreasonable adherence to ancient customs”, “innocence”, “credulity”. Averintsev here completely follows the way Tynyanov studied literary clichés. Averintsev shows that Plato, thanks to his penchant for etymological play, rehabilitated these words by roots, forcing them to denote more abstract, but thus more noble concepts. Here Plato turned out, about which Averintsev no longer speaks, the predecessor of the allegorical method of the Neoplatonists, which required the abstraction of images in order to convey divine meanings with the help of simple and often seductive and profane words.

Thus, Averintsev’s article asserts that all the work to establish the boundaries of translatability and untranslatability has already been done by Plato, and nothing has been left to our lot. Thus, Averintsev and in the final thesis converges with Tynyanov, who asserts that any identity of the genre is impossible outside orientation (ustanovka, literary “established state”, I may also translate “intention” or “apparatus”), which determines the relationship of speech to reality, while the reality of our understanding of a word or surrounding reality cannot itself produce any speech as artistic/fictional: «This investigation should proceed from the constructive function to the literary function, from the literary function to the speech function» (282-3).

Tynyanov admits that the facts of everyday life, for example, a literary salon, can become a literary fact, but for the philosophical school according to Averintsev, this cannot be allowed, since philosophical institutions are predetermined by their function in advance. Averintsev talks about the crisis of philosophical schools in the transition to Christianity in the book The Poetics of Early Byzantine Literature, but this book requires a separate analysis, or better, a complete translation.

Finally, it must be said that Averintsev’s style sometimes reminds Tynyanov to the point of indistinguishability, he also operates with categories familiar to Tynyanov and Bolshevick’s era, such as “revolution” or “struggle”, but at the same time extracts from Tynyanov’s words that semantic potential that Tynyanov himself would not have extracted. For example, when recalling parallel series, and speaking about the parallels, he extracts from the series (ryad) the idea of order (poryadok) (see Section 3 on this Russian etymology), and from the idea of
irreversible transition the idea of liberty. We can say that Averintsev is playing Tynyanov’s theory as a scene or a pantomime, and one can only admire this:

After all, philosophy did not start from scratch; with all the difference in the central attitude, in specific moments, to completely separate its work from the work of the surmounted, but also absorbed by it “wisdom” is simply impossible, and if you take only the work of activating the word, then perhaps the difference between philosophy and pre-philosophy is rather quantitative rather than qualitative. But there is, of course, a qualitative difference between the two approaches to the word; it just lies in a different plane, which is time to remember. The transition from a pre-philosophical language to a philosophical one is indeed a revolution, but a revolution precisely because it is a two-sided, two-edged process, in which opposites combine and dialectically require each other. After all, any revolution, even a mental one, realizes itself simultaneously as a synthesis of old prohibitions and as the abolition of old connivances, as the arrival of unheard-of liberty, but also of equally unheard-of rigidity. Activation as such, without a commensurate increase in discipline, is, of course, the preparation of the revolution, the unleashing of the energies it needs, but not the revolution itself.

The Greek philosopher of the archaic and classical era does not only incite the word to increased mobility, but by all means brings it to a boil, to protruding from its own semantic shores. (65)

6. Conclusions

The concept of literary evolution, which was developed by Tynyanov in order to defend the autonomy of literature from “colonial” judgments about it as only a resource or illustration of private practices, was productively developed in the late Soviet era by Sergei Averintsev. Although Averintsev, unlike Bakhtin, Tynyanov, Vygotsky, and Lotman, did not enter the “canon” of Russian theoreticians cited in world scholarship, his thought deserves no less attention, and the main obstacle to the dissemination of his ideas in the world was his peculiar style, where not only the explicit method was introduced, but also nuanced observation, immediately expressed in speech matter and manner. This style is sometimes perceived as pretentious and essayistic. I argue that this style continues Tynyanov’s succinctness and conceptual vigor, simply when applied to more complex material, such as the relationship between sophistry and classical philosophy.

Averintsev gave one of the most convincing explanations in world theory of how sophistry and Plato’s cognitive program correlate, fully relying on Tynyanov and drawing abundantly from his theoretical constructions and his concise and energetic formulas. Of course, Tynyanov was not the only source of his thought, because Averintsev, as a professional classical philologist, had a huge tradition behind him. But in another article, included in the book New in contemporary classical philology, he showed the imminent dead ends of this tradition and the need to study it on new grounds. The renewed formalism became such a basis.

Averintsev, using the entire system of Tynyanov’s categories from the article “On literary evolution” when considering the origin of philosophy, showed that the uniqueness of philosophy as an institution and the impossibility of building parallel series, including by means of translation, reverse translation, or exhaustive interpretation, suggests that any the crisis of philosophy has not only internal, but also metaphysical reasons. Philosophy, once launched as the foundation of a number of literary strategies, but itself stemming from the

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2 This image was borrowed without citing from Fr. Pavel Florensky, who often identified the boiling, grace of Pentecost and energy or semantic abundance of poetic words.
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ambitions of priestly speech, in any crisis of such ambitions will need a new metaphysical launch of literary evolution. Christianity, according to Averintsev, became such a restart of intellectual life, including renewing the system of fiction: where the Gospel appeared, sooner or later various forms of novels will appear there up to the present day.

7. References


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