Abstract
Cognitive poetics has often investigated only literary reading practices. This article examines how one particular method of cognitive poetics, text world theory, can be used to understand the cognitive reading practices based upon Christian hermeneutic systems of temporality. To differentiate religious rhetoric from persuasive public rhetoric, the article examines text and discourse worlds in 1980s British Labour Party rhetoric, in the rhetoric of the Sermon on the Mount, and in Catholic social activist rhetoric.

Keywords
Cognitive poetics, text world theory, religious discourse, public rhetoric.

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1. Introduction
Since its inception, cognitive poetics has applied the empirical findings of the cognitive sciences to the process of reading literature. To do this, practitioners have developed a number of highly developed methods. In fact, these “methods,” although systematic, are numerous and hard to categorize. Often, one aspect of cognitive processes is applied to the reading of literature to understand a particular psychological effect of text. These basic processes often include cognitive script- and schema-development, figure-ground relationships, linguistic iconicity, and metaphor, to name a few areas of methodological interest. More elaborate systematic methods involving a number of cognitive processes and procedures also exist. These include systems of narrative analysis, the interpretation of irony, and the construction of rich fictional worlds based upon time and place, to name just a few elaborate methodologies.

One central tenet of cognitive poetics, as practitioners admit, posits an ideal, unified reader of literature, which helps keep cognitive poetics focused on literary critical concerns, not social or linguistic concerns (Stockwell Cognitive Poetics 5-6). This ideal reader helps researchers typify working knowledge on syntactic through pragmatic and rhetorical phenomena and contexts. However, this unified reader has led to attacks on cognitive poetics as simply American New Criticism (i.e. closed text close reading) cloaked in cognitive terminology, or, because cognitive poetics posits a well-trained, unified reader, it has also been criticized for being unable to respond to readers informed by unique social and cultural experiences. This would include readers not well studied in the interpretation of literature, and this would also include hermeneutic traditions that have goals other than literary production, such as religious hermeneutics derived from different textual and cultural traditions with purposes based in religious faith or instruction. Max
Louwerse and Willie Van Peer summarize this criticism, intimating that this line of argument suggests that what readers engage in when they encounter literary texts are processes very much tied to individual and social norms and values, to identification [...]. Many people would argue that under such conditions it is not easy to employ empirical methodology, because the processes going on are invisible to the eye, they are subjective in nature, and depend upon value orientations. We do not deny such characteristic of these phenomena, but we do disagree that they in any way prohibit the use of empirical methods. (423-24)

Despite these attacks on cognitive poetics, it remains a formidable tool for the study of reading practices in any discourse. Cognitive poetics has grown beyond its original application to literature; the use of cognitive poetic methodologies on the reading process for advertising, informational, and mixed media discourses is now quite common.

This article will use one particular method of cognitive poetics, text world theory, to suggest that cognitive poetics can, indeed, be used to evaluate a variety of social or cultural discourse. This article will examine how religious discourse constructs worlds differently than public discourses, which I will define as secular, political, and persuasive-activist in nature.

Moreover, this article seeks to model how these differences in text world construction are informed by cognitive schematic knowledge unique to religious hermeneutic traditions. To provide a narrowed study of religious and non-religious discourses, this article will evaluate three examples of anaphora: a 1980’s Neil Kinnock anti-Thatcher political speech, the New Testament’s Sermon on the Mount, and the public Catholic social activist rhetoric of Dorothy Day.

Political rhetoric such as Kinnock’s and public activist rhetoric such as Catholic Day’s rhetoric are historically situated forms of rhetoric with proposals for action that are mapped onto immediate political urgencies. These two types of discourse, while containing instructional material that could be mapped onto other situations in the past or present, are very specific and highly “built” and contain more specific commands as well as objects and events when compared to religious rhetoric that is based not in argument, but absolute Truth, such as the Sermon on the Mount. Public (secular, political, persuasive, activist) rhetoric’s more specific commands, events, and objects typically apply to the more specific and identifiable problems of the immediate historical moment. The example of religious discourse examined here, the Sermon on the Mount, however, tends to offer a less “built” world in terms of its types and locations when making proposals for action. Undoubtedly, this is because the instruction is absolutist in nature and does not have a specific destination or expiration. For its community of readers, it can be and should be mapped onto all circumstances. This is in opposition to the public rhetoric of Kinnock and Day. Their rhetoric’s function pertains to certain acts and measures of governance or the public sphere in the present or near future, not to the absolute and eternal interests of religious discourse.

The methodology of cognitive poetics known as text world theory can provide insights into linguistic modality and the modal worlds of knowledge, obligation, and hypothesis on the part of the reader. This article will begin with a focus on text world theory’s examination of modal function which privileges context over a prescriptive linguistic function. This privileging of context situates the idea of linguistic modality as context-conditional. In the examples of anaphora examined here, modality’s connection to possibility and obligation typically construct and constrain the possible worlds addressed by
text world theory. In defining one such changed area, modality, one small step is taken toward outlining the processes of religious reading through cognitive poetics.

2. Text World Theory: An Introduction

Text world theory incorporates the experiential principles of cognitive linguistics. Its progenitor, Paul Werth, began building text world theory in the late 1980s until his death in 1995. The theory rests in an interest in “accounting for the cognitive processes behind the production and interpretation of all forms of human communication” (Gavins, Text World Theory 6). Since Werth’s death, text world theory’s methodology has been consistently reevaluated, most recently in Joanna Gavins’ Text World Theory: An Introduction (2007), and the theory has been applied to texts as various as want ads, poetry, recipes, and many other forms of human communication.

Like many other forms of cognitive linguistics, text world theory uses cognitive principles to understand an ideal reader. Text world theory, however, is based in discourse, not text. Thus, text world theory is highly interested in how the context of a text’s production contributes to both production and reception. Due to its ability to account for context, text world theory has often been used in pragmatics, for example, in analyzing face-to-face conversations. However, the theory has a history of describing the way that possible worlds’ logic, sometimes of a physical nature alternative to real physics, can be built by a reader. I suggest that this ability, text world theory’s ability to understand alternative logics, makes it a suitable candidate to investigate the supernatural foregrounding of theological possibility.

While a wholesale introduction to text world theory would be too timely and not required for the constraints of this article, I will discuss how the theory handles the “building” of representational models of possible worlds—the absorbing, qualifying, and constructing of supernatural possibilities. Such possibility leads directly into a discussion of modality’s specific functions in religious discourse.

In Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction, Peter Stockwell reminds us that fictionality isn’t simply an aspect of literature; fictionality founds literature that is “religious, lyrical, autobiographical, political, [...] or that recounts real events” (92). Possible worlds are built through default semantics, propositions, and possibilities based upon our actual worlds. When evaluating the truth-value of an utterance, we compare it to our actual world. However, the actual world is just one of many possible worlds; in other worlds it is possible that Germany won World War Two or that there has been a World War Three where Earth has been invaded by Martians. As Stockwell points out, “a very few sentences are ‘obviously’ true; those which present analytic truths or universal assertions that are necessarily true by definition” (Cognitive Poetics 93). Sentences from possible worlds that do not correspond to our actual world can be true in their own possible world. In order for a statement to be true, it must be non-contradictory with the other statements building the possible world. For instance, it cannot be true in science fiction that Martians can build ray guns and Martians cannot build ray guns. Either they can, or they cannot. Likewise, in religious discourse, either Jesus can walk on water, or Jesus cannot. Limiting the logical possibilities helps build a possible world that does not correspond to our actual world but does share a consistency that we expect of our actual world. Any non-natural statements of a fictional possible world cannot break the rule of the excluded middle where a statement must be true or false (Stockwell, Cognitive Poetics 93). There is no middle ground where a statement can exist as both possibilities or neither.
As possible worlds are built by governing rules, propositions build into a state of existence an alternative logical possibility to the actual world. Yet possible worlds deal only with logic and have little to say of reading experience. Thus, they must be adapted to the discourse world, which involves both the text’s logical, possible world as well as the more dynamic cognitive interaction that a reader has with the text on the discourse level.

Text world theory makes a distinction between the discourse world and the text world. In the discourse world, a reader can validate the statements of the text as either true or not true. On the text world level, a reader cannot evaluate the statements as true or untrue; the text world is only a constructed “mental representation” (Gavins, Text World Theory 35). The best example of this arises from fiction and the untrustworthy narrator. The untrustworthy narrator may provide facts meant to mislead the reader. Here, the reader is not able to participate in the “fact-checking” that the fictional narrator may have access to—this lack of participation defines the text world. The reader can build a mental representation of the possible world. However, there are limits to the reader’s ability to understand all operations and events in that world. While the text world is always related to the discourse world, the text world may be constructed from a variety of communicational functions: to order, to inform, to argue, to question, to personally express, to deceive, etc. Thus, the text world and discourse world will align according to their communicational function and the writer’s purposes.

For a discourse world to exist, both a speaker/text and a listener/reader must be present. Thus, the discourse world is defined by the communicative situation, not the literary one. Narratives or textual statements that can be validated are part of the discourse world, which means that the discourse world is the mediating domain for reality as well as projected fictions. As Joanna Gavins points out, the differences between the text world and discourse world rest in ontological differences. Gavins states that

> discourse world entities are real people, belonging to the same domain of existence as we do. In face-to-face communication, we are able to ask questions of other discourse-world entities, clarify information and negotiate the contents of our text-worlds openly. In the discourse-worlds of written communication, where we are unable to question and clarify directly, we nevertheless understand our co-participant to be a real person. (Text World Theory 76)

Naturally, a reader or writer can question this real person if need be; they exist on the same ontological level: both are actual people and conscious beings, as opposed to a fictional character who is not a cognizant being and who offers information which cannot be verified. A reader’s ability to question a text’s statements because the text was created by an actual person, or, oppositely, to be only an eavesdropper because the communicant is a literary creation, defines text world theory’s division of ontological levels. The major distinction between text worlds and discourse worlds depends upon the ability to check information. Text worlds cannot be fact-checked with an actual person, but discourse always can.

3. Religious Hermeneutics, Temporality, Cognitive Theology, and Text World Theory

Religious hermeneutics, even if narrowed to the single tradition addressed in this article, Christian hermeneutics, is a vast enterprise spanning millennia and millions of scholarly
If a well-developed hermeneutic tradition such as religious hermeneutics informs cognitive poetics, then connection between these two traditions must be limited to particular hermeneutic qualities that influence readers’ schema and mental models. My focus will be on the unique relationship between the past, present, and future of Christian hermeneutics and its commitment to salvation and an eternal Heaven, and I’ll explore this unique temporal system through the use of modality in text world theory.

Christian theologian George Montague captures the essence of Christian temporality in the following, and in doing so he differentiates basic temporal schemas of ordinary cognition from those informed by Christian hermeneutics. Montague explains that

Because of the covenant promise, conditional though it was, Israel was pointed to a future. [...] Not only the institutions but the events of the past would be repeated on an even greater scale. [...] Primordial time is really a description of end-time. The ideal past, now lost, is a portrait of the ideal future. The oracles were true, the promises were available, but the kings did not live up to them. Result: They were transferred to the future. (17-18)

Christian temporality is one where the present and future, as well as the past, are not separated. Religious figures such as Jesus and God exist as they always have in a timeless manner. Present events are not just reminders or portents of, but of the same essence of the past and present. Eric Auerbach concurs in his seminal *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature*. Auerbach also outlines the difference between secular and Christian ideas of temporality. Auerbach posits that

an occurrence on earth signifies not only itself but at the same time another, which it predicts or confirms, without prejudice to the power of its concrete reality here and now. The connection between occurrences is not regarded as primarily a chronological or causal development but as a oneness within the divine plan, of which all occurrences are parts and reflections. Their direct earthly connection is of secondary importance, and often their interpretation can altogether dispense with any knowledge of it. (73)

Auerbach captures the chronological or causal inference that is the basis of ordinary cognition, but not Christian hermeneutic temporality, and Auerbach separates the divine from the earthly as well. Taking Montague and Auerbach’s assertions together, practitioners of cognitive poetics can develop a solid foundation to examine how religious texts build temporal relationships differently than secular texts. This difference in temporal systems is a staple of Christian hermeneutics and has been written on extensively by numerous theologians, including George Montague (17-18) and Henri de Lubac (17-19), and prominent literary theorists, including Eric Auerbach (73) and Frank Kermode (48).

One linguistic location of temporality is modality. In systemic functional linguistics (SFL), M. A. K. Halliday has noted religious discourse’s ability to change linguistic function. Halliday labels such an occurrence *systemic indeterminacy*. The cause of this indeterminate linguistic function is attributed to “emotional” discourses, and Halliday uses Biblical religious discourse to support his claims (173). I will detail Halliday’s examples later to demonstrate how SFL’s systemic indeterminacy can inform uses of cognitive poetics that explore not literary or expository reading, but religious reading and interpretation. For the moment, it is enough to notice that the eminent functional linguist of the age has noted the importance of the modal in religious discourse.
Before proceeding with an interpretation of text, I would like to discuss one major principle of cognitive research into religious belief, minimal counterintuition. Cognitive religious research has discovered that only one or two supernatural premises are foregrounded in any particular religious interpretation; the rest of the schematic objects and processes creating the interpretation (or “world”) default to ordinary cognitive schemas and real-world agent-environment relationships (Barrett 86-89). That is, religious interpretation is built from a principle of minimum departure. Unusual phenomena are possible if foregrounded in cognition, but the limits of cognition produce a background that defaults to typical, natural activities and possibilities. Text world theory works from a similar principle of minimum departure, in which all possible worlds are built from default “real world” possibilities and cognitive schemas until a text provides other-than-actual possibilities. These alternative, supernatural possibilities appear in religious discourse, but have been studied previously mainly in literary genres or imaginary “dream” worlds (Stockwell, Cognitive Poetics 96; Semino, Language and World Creation 64; Ryan 181). This overlap of a shared principle of minimal departure in cognitive research on religious belief and in text world theory supports a fusion of these two lines of research. Additionally, because text world theory begins its methodology in possible worlds and, as I’ll introduce in depth momentarily, spatial-temporal location (Gavins, Text World Theory 36), it is a perfect match for measuring the differing temporal systems of religious and public discourses and their attendant cognitive processes.

4. Text World Theory and Community Reading Practices

Text world theorists have long noted the ability of a reader to integrate unusual or idiosyncratic phenomena and information, and this would include religious belief and experience that do not correspond to real-world possibilities. Gavins notes that discourse worlds are generally agreed upon, but “personal baggage” such as memory, motivation, intention, and experience can alter the negotiation of the discourse and text world (“Snow White” 130). Catherine Emmott links previous knowledge and experience to reader choice in negotiating meaning in a text. Emmott states that

[...] basic level perceptual schemata play a role in the creation and tracking of these “text-derived” knowledge stores and in their utilization in inference-making. The role of the reader lies in managing these different sources of information and in determining when to draw on them in the process of reading. [...] Whether inferences are made is likely to depend on how central the events are to the action. (177, 179)

Naturally, the different sources of meaning are attributable to experience as a member of a discourse community, and readers can “manage” their interpretation through the knowledge they allow into the reading process. Events and actions can be given symbolic meaning and a mental representation can be built according to any discourse community of which the reader is part.

A discourse community’s peculiarity and idiosyncrasy can be accounted for in text world theory. Elena Semino has argued that “text worlds can be described on the basis of the kinds of impossible elements they contain” (Language and World Creation 61). The rhetorical, typological and hermeneutic practices of a discourse community are, to some degree, derived through the repetition of such practices—the repetition of certain “impossible elements” which mark or define the discourse community. On the level of the
individual reader, adopting the reading position based in community beliefs and practices delineates certain textual features as a trigger for these new “possible worlds” with their own rich cognitive schemas. H. G. Widdowson has argued similarly, saying “a different existential order” (qtd. in Semino, Language and World Creation 8) corresponding to the possible, not the actual or physical, can be enacted because of a text.

Manfred Jahn’s work in cognitive narratology and imagination connects the internal act of reading with the external act of reproducing the codes and narratives of one’s discourse community. Jahn stipulates that a process of internalization takes place when a narrative is realized as a mental representation. However, the logical counterpart of this process is a process of externalization. According to Jahn, such externalization is aided by imagination. Jahn associates imagination with a number of routines that allow for the reproduction and rehearsal of the mental representations from interiorization. Jahn suggests drafting a story for possible actual production as well as remembering, daydreaming, and similar mental activities as two forms of externalization (201-02). This process is cyclical (200) and links reception and production (203). Thus, an ideology rests in a reader even whether they are in the act of telling or reading. I find this particularly important when distinguishing literary reading practices from religious reading practices. Cognitive poetics has focused on literary reading, but Jahn’s theory more adequately captures how a religious reader can produce texts bearing the influence and ideology of religion. This emphasis on production is not seen in cognitive poetic analyses which emphasize literary reading practices, which are not a primary discourse to anyone; therein, this emphasis on production focuses on the self as “living” from or “constructed by” an ideological position and primary discourse community that is interested in universals, not circumstantial problem-solving, as with political problems and debates.

This differentiates my work from that of work similar to Michael Burke’s work on literary parable, where Burke does not infuse his work with the hermeneutics of Christianity when discussing Biblical parable. Burke treats Biblical parable as didactic, but states that “[w]e should be careful here not just to term religious stories as parables, since fables and allegories also fall into this category. The common link here is the projection of stories [...]” (116). Burke’s concern is not with religion, but with genres (literary or otherwise) that parabolically project by actual world standards. However, the hermeneutics of Christian temporality differs from those of literature. The field of cognitive poetics must be careful not to mistake a potential contextual factor of religious hermeneutics—Christian temporality—as something not potentially related to the deixis of reading. As Richard Coe argues,

[r]hetorical structures [generate appropriate information and] are in this sense the social memory of standard responses to particular types of rhetorical situations and subject matter. [...] Those who fail to recognize forms, perhaps because they are from another culture or subculture, not part of the community, often misinterpret function, hence meaning. (268-69)

Because reading a religious text as part of a religious discourse community also generates appropriate information in the form of the community’s hermeneutics, outsiders to a hermeneutical community may misunderstand the hermeneutical cues and dynamics of text; the religious authority extant in the hermeneutics and reading purpose of Scripture or Doctrine is part of rhetorical structure and situation, but only for the members of the religious community. As Peter Stockwell has suggested, our hermeneutics define our po-
etics (“Literary Theory” 149), and this is certainly true of a religious hermeneutic schemas expressed through cognitive poetics.

When text world theory involves particular religious hermeneutics in its text world considerations, then religious hermeneutics and the cognitive assumptions they create inform text world theory: the actual world and ordinary cognition are the basis for all possible worlds, but supernatural elements marked as conceptually different and given a truth-value through absolutist religious logic are absorbed into the processes and procedures of cognition and interpretation.

5. World-building and Function-advancing Language

Text world theory, as with all cognitive poetics, uses bodily experience as the reference point for the frames of knowledge accreted through everyday experience. The emphasis on the body means that our basic interpretative processes begin with time and space. Thus, deixis, the term for the study of such relations, is the salient feature with a starting point labeled the *origo*, the “I,” the notion of self, the zero-point of subjectivity that is the basic reference point for constructing a mental representation of a text. These deictic elements surrounding or pointing to the self are known as *world-building elements*. World-building elements can be seen as marking the spatial boundaries of the mental representation of the text world and include locatives, spatial adverbs, demonstratives and verbs of motion (Gavins, *Text World Theory* 36). For example, the following ideas are all perceived in relation to the origo.

- locatives: on the roof, down the road, upstairs
- spatial adverbs: far afield, here, there
- demonstratives: these, that, those
- verbs of motion: went, came, ambled into

Time and space are not the only deictic markers, however. Pronouns and other referents are also part of deixis and are objects that help to construct mental representations and “build” a world in the listener or reader’s mind. For example, a sentence such as *I rode a bike* nominates certain objects as present and important in the ongoing context of communication, and a sentence such as *I was yelled at* suggests a social relationship based on hierarchy with a self that was yelled at and an unknown actor that did the yelling.

To help define the world-building process, text world theory borrows from Systemic Functional Linguistics to help define specific types of world-building. There are three basic types of *relational processes* in text world theory.

- intensive processes: \( x \text{ is } a \ y \)
- possessive processes: \( x \text{ has } a \ y \)
- circumstantial processes: \( x \text{ is on/at/with } a \ y \)

Each of these processes can occur in one of two modes, attributive and identifying, respectively. The attributive mode labels one element of the sentence as an attribute of another.

- attribute mode: The stadium was full.
  The stadium (carrier) was full (attribute).
The identifying mode has one element of the text world identifying another element:

identifying mode:  
This is a good thing.  
This (identified) is a good thing (identifier).

The above sentences are both intensive because x is a y, and they are intensive attributive and intensive identifying, respectively.

A less relational aspect of world-building is simply the labeling of time, location, objects, and enactors. For example, time can be the distant past, the recent present, the immediate future, and other time frames. Location can be derived from any possible location in any possible world. Objects are any references added to the world. Enactors are text-world entities that guide the reader and may exist in the discourse-world as well, but enactors are functionaries of the various conceptual levels of discourse and may change in different versions as a text’s purpose and ontological level (text-world versus discourse-world) change.

Function-advancing propositions are typically the foregrounded actions that propel a discourse forward. These propositions contain an actor and action. Thus, they are dynamic and usually convey a change of state, as opposed to world-building elements, which simply populate (exist) and convey the limits or borders of a text world. Function-advancing propositions also borrow from Systemic Functional Linguistics and evaluate propositions as material event processes. These material event processes often contain a goal in addition to an actor, although they need not contain a goal. Likewise, a specific actor may not be identifiable. Thus, they can be labeled as intention processes and supervention processes. Intention processes contain an actor, as in the following:

intention process:  
Mike broke the window.  
Mike (actor) broke the window (goal=window).  
Mike ran.

In a sentence such as Mike ran, no goal is included, although a goal may exist later in the text, such as to get to another location. While this is not discernible through this sentence-level analysis, text world theory’s interest in context can account for such long-term goals.

Opposed to intention processes, supervention processes do not have any “deliberateness” behind them.

supervention process:  
The building crumbled.  
The airplane blew up in midflight.  
Mike died.

Supervention processes have nothing deliberate or intentional in their action and/or change of state. A sentence such as Mike stumbled is also a supervention process because Mike most likely did not intend to stumble.

During this article’s analysis of three text types ranging from the political to the religious, world-building elements will be an important indicator of a text type’s purpose and an identifying feature of how it projects its world for different instructive purposes. Likewise, function-advancing propositions will be an important feature as notions of agency and goals also help identify differences in text type.
6. Three Modal Worlds

In relation to world-building elements and function-advancing propositions, I would like to introduce three types of possible worlds because of their relationship to a) textual and discourse knowledge and b) hypotheticality, which are the two major discriminating criteria for differences in the political, public, and religious rhetoric analyzed here.

In general, modal auxiliary verbs and modal worlds denote the speaker’s attitude toward the subject matter. These modal worlds are related directly to linguistic modals expressing speaker knowledge, obligation, and possibility.

Epistemic worlds represent how much a participant can evaluate a text’s reliability and often address the “gap” between text worlds and discourse worlds—that is, the ability to fact check. Linguistically, they are related to statements such as *The sun will come up tomorrow* or *I can arrive on time*, statements that certify to varying degrees the reliability of various happenings in the world.

Deontic worlds express degrees of permission, obligation, duty, and requirement on the part of receiver. Gavins uses a vehicular instructional manual as an example (*Text World Theory* 99) of possible worlds where the reader is driving a Volkswagen and where the reader/driver should or should not perform certain driving actions.

Deontic modality is often expressed through auxiliary verbs, as in phrases such as *You may be excused from the table early* (permission), *You should attend your grandmother’s ninetieth birthday party* (obligation), or *You must report for military duty on the first of next month* (obligation). As can be seen from these examples, the degree of permission and obligation are not simple and are relative to the context, the event, and the social deixis—the dynamics of the relationship between the sender, receiver, and action.

Boulomaic worlds express hypotheticalness and desire. Thus, they are future-oriented and/or imagined, and they are linguistically related to modals such as *hope*, *wish*, and *desire* and modal adverbs such as *hopefully*, *regrettably*, and others expressing a hypothetical world in the past or future. Boulomaic worlds’ major feature is a separately constructed modal world distinct from the current, original text world. Examples of boulomaic worlds can also start with *if*, as in *If I leave the refrigerator open, the pears will mold*. These boulomaic worlds are often not realized at the time of their creation (Gavins, *Text World Theory* 94), whether embedded as a subworld in a lengthier text or whether functioning as a world of their own, as is the case in the anaphora examined later in this article.

7. Modal Worlds and Systemic Indeterminacy

If boulomaic worlds are mainly a future-oriented world (as well as potentially an alternative world that is no longer attainable once desired in the past, as with *regret*), and deontic worlds can also be future-oriented, then each would seem to be an operative function in religious discourse. Religious discourse is highly instructive in nature and therefore creates both a desired world for the religious reader and a world which the reader is commanded to adopt by God the divine authority as instructor. This overlap of the boulomaic with the deontic is not unique to religious discourse; however, religious discourse is unique in that the two are consistently present in religious reading experience, whereas in the upcoming examination of a political speech by Neil Kinnock, the speech’s modal worlds are better delineated, as can be viewed by a switch from epistemic modality to deontic modality for rhetorical effect (Gavins, *Text World Theory* 121). Thus, the
context of political discourse would appear to affect modality less than religious discourse’s emotional context affects linguistic modality.

Religious discourse’s ability to change the function of modal verb auxiliaries has been noted by M. A. K. Halliday. Halliday, working in systemic functional linguistics, titles such a break down in linguistic function systemic indeterminacy. The semiotic system overrides any determinate linguistic regularity in function. Halliday himself uses a passage from Genesis to prove his point. The underlining and bold print are Halliday’s emphasis.

Now Noah was a good man and this pleased God. But all around him, Noah’s neighbors were lying and fighting and cheating and stealing. This made God sad. ... In time the earth was filled with people once again. And God was happy. (as qtd by Halliday 173)

Halliday says of systemic indeterminacy that

the world of our experience is highly indeterminate; and this is precisely how the grammar construes it in the system of process type [...]. Thus, one and the same text may offer alternative models of what appear to be the same domain of experience, construing for example the domain of emotion both as a process in a “mental” clause (this pleased God; cf. also God liked this) and as a participant in a “relational” one (this made God sad; God was sad). [...] There are a number of experiential domains, such as emotion, that are given such a multifaceted interpretation by the grammar of transitivity. Such domains are experientially difficult to come to terms with, and the grammar solves the problem by offering complementary models for construing them. (173)

The religious reading process is undoubtedly one of these “experientially difficult” domains where the boulomaic and deontic worlds overlap in what undoubtedly qualifies, by Halliday’s example, as an emotional context surrounding the religious reading process. Similarly, cognitive narratologist David Herman has noted of the cognitive paradigm that “linguistic system phonology, morphology, syntax, and pragmatic itself does not exist except as instantiated in the (minds of the members of the) speech community that uses the language” (9). Thus, a discourse community and its semiotics instantiate the functionality and determinacy of language by their semiotics’ own standards. This is certainly true when a member of a religious community reads by that community’s standards.

Moving from Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics to text world theory’s research on indeterminacy, Paul Werth has noted that hypothetical modal worlds complicate linguistic functionality and systemic determinacy. In his research into the various uses of the modal would, Werth suggests that traditional labels of habitual past and conditional future do not use only would, as would be expected in systemic determinacy of would’s linguistic function. Moreover, Werth finds that modal “labels can only be coherent in the context of a coherent model of temporal, psychological, and locational proximity” (87). Werth’s pronouncement again places modality as determinate upon local, contextual, and psychological conditions, reminding us of both a discourse community’s peculiar hermeneutics and text world theory’s ability to address such peculiarities.

Werth’s work also addresses one relevant aspect of epistemic modal worlds in religious reading. Werth suggests that the modals know and believe express degrees of speaker conviction of so-called fact (101), and Werth gives the following examples. The first is of religious conviction. The second is vernacular.

I know my savior liveth.
I don’t believe we’ve met.

Werth points out that the first example involves the unverifiable, but suggests conviction, while the second example “is much more measured and ‘sensible’” (101-02). Noting that know and believe receive their determination from the agent’s willingness to “vouch for” the sentence’s subject or complement, Werth argues that the proposition is emotional, not intellectual, with the above usage of believe (102). Thus, Werth’s explanation of systemic indeterminacy once again touches upon the emotional aspects of religious discourse, as did Halliday’s explanation.

Werth concludes that interpretation for complements depends on the content of complement, the reliability of the speaker, and the availability of evidence (102). I would add that each of these is context- and situation-dependent as well. Werth’s work is important to this article’s upcoming analysis of anaphora for two reasons: first, he settles the notion of epistemic worlds in religious reading; the religious reading process, because it is instructive, has a high degree of epistemic knowledge. In short, for religious readers, God does not lie when giving instruction, and those readers know this when reading the Bible. To believe is to know, as Werth demonstrates above. Thus, if religious reading is taken as instructive, it is also taken as highly epistemic. No gap exists between the text world and discourse world, unless the reader chooses to discredit the absolutist advice of God on their own secular moral grounds—but this means the reader has exited the discourse community of belief. Second, Werth affirms Halliday’s modal systemic indeterminacy through text world theory, with each researcher attributing the indeterminacy’s cause to emotion and religion.

8. Text Worlds and Public Rhetoric: Both Religious and Political

The upcoming sections will examine the three discourse types to gain further insight into religious language and systemic indeterminacy, to further a discussion of world building and modality in political anaphora begun by Joanna Gavins, and to evaluate what aspects of religious language and systemic indeterminacy may disappear when religious language is used for public (political, secular, persuasive, activist) purposes. All of these discussions help outline how a religious literacy contains its own unique forms of modality systematically different than functional linguistic work.

I will compare and contrast the three texts by the following criteria: first, the types of modal worlds extant in and expected of each text type based on its rhetorical function; second, the world-building elements, function-advancing propositions, historical situatedness, and historical concerns of each text’s rhetorical urgency according to rhetorical purpose; third, I’ll draw conclusions about how rhetorical function involves what Halliday defined as “emotion,” which makes systems indeterminate, with emotion affecting modality and therefore creating the text’s systemic determinacy and indeterminacy. The overall purpose will be to illuminate aspects of religious discourse through comparison with political rhetoric and Catholic social activist rhetoric. I must also briefly clarify my definition of anaphora, which means something different to linguists and rhetoricians. My definition of anaphora does not deal with reference and antecedence on the linguistic level; rather, anaphora is a rhetorical figure using repetition of a word, clause, or phrase at or near the beginning or end of successive statements or sentences.

The first example of anaphora is a 1983 political speech given by Labour Party parliamentarian Neil Kinnock. The speech has been examined in detail as an example of an-
aphoric *variatio* by Joanna Gavins, and I’ll draw upon the relevant parts of her analysis to ground political anaphora’s linguistic and rhetorical premises. For a full analysis of the following speech, see Gavins’ *Text World Theory*, pages 118-123. Here is Kinnock’s famous political speech in its entirety:

> If Margaret Thatcher is re-elected as Prime minister, I warn you.  
> I warn you that you will have pain—when healing and relief depend on payment.  
> I warn you that you will have ignorance—when talents are untended and wits are wasted, when learning is a privilege and not a right.  
> I warn you that you will have poverty—when pensions slip and benefits are whittled away by a Government that won’t pay in an economy that can’t pay.  
> I warn you that you will be cold—when fuel charges are used as a tax system that the rich don’t notice and the poor can’t afford.  
> I warn you that you must not expect work—when many cannot spend, more will not be able to earn. When they don’t earn, they don’t spend. When they don’t spend, work dies.  
> I warn you not to go into the streets alone after dark or into the streets in large crowds of protest in the light.  
> I warn you that you will be quiet—when the curfew of fear and the gibbet of unemployment make you obedient.  
> I warn you that you will have defence of a sort—with a risk and at a price that passes all understanding.  
> I warn you that you will be home-bound—when fares and transport bills kill leisure and lock you up.  
> I warn you that you will borrow less—when credit, loans, mortgages and easy payments are refused to people on your melting income.  
> If Margaret Thatcher wins, she will become more a Leader than a Prime Minister. That power produces arrogance and when it is toughened with Tebbitry and flattened and fawned upon by spineless sycophants, the boot-licking Knights of Fleet Street and placemen in Quangos, the arrogance corrupts absolutely.  
> If Margaret Thatcher wins—I warn you not to be ordinary.  
> I warn you not to be young.  
> I warn you not to fall ill.  
> I warn you not to get old. (Kinnock qtd. in Gavins 118-119)

In her analysis, Gavins notes the hypothetical nature of Kinnock’s future Britain is found at both the linguistic and conceptual level (118). She describes Kinnock’s speech based in anaphoric figures as “a single hypothetical situation [that includes] a great deal of world-building and function-advancing detail” (119). I will treat other examples of anaphora in this article by similar means, that of one possible world of incremental detail—as opposed to individual worlds comprised of one prose line that contain very few world-building elements.

Of large importance is Gavins’ analysis of conditionality in anaphora. (*Conditionality* is a linguistic-level form of hypothetical modal worlds.) In traditional rhetoric, conditionals in the anaphoric form of *variatio* are separated into two components: the *protasis* and the *apodosis*. The protasis is the hypothetical situation that sets up an alternative reality, and the apodosis foretells the consequences of the world hypothesized in the protasis. However, the protasis and apodosis needn’t appear in a specific order. Kinnock’s speech above inverts the chronological consequence by sometimes giving the consequence first, as when warning that when fuel charges are used as a tax system, one will be cold. The conditionality is of great consequence because of the highly built world with specific in-
formation and a historical context as well. The attacks on Thatcherism’s social and economic agenda are very specific. The apodosi such as “I warn you that you will be quiet. [...] you will have defence of a sort. [...] you will be home-bound” and others are themselves not highly built and could be easily consequent of and projected onto multiple situations where one will be quiet or homebound. However, the “I warn you”, protasi of these lines contain many objects that are limited to the economic and governmental policy worlds. Items such as “pensions,” “benefits,” “unemployment,” “fares,” “transport bills,” “credits,” “loans,” “mortgages,” and the “bootlicking Knights of Fleet Street” are ideas, objects, people, and a place that limit the application of the “I warn you” protasi. As we shall see, the highly built world of political anaphora is one major difference from the religious world built in The Sermon on the Mount. I suggest this increase in political world-building is due to the historical urgency and situatedness of political speeches, and an intentional dearth in world-building in religious instruction exists because texts are often metaphorical or vague for easier application and projection onto a multitude of past, present, and future historical moments of moral crises.

The second major difference, and one that impinges upon systemic determinacy and indeterminacy, lies in political rhetoric’s purpose. Political rhetoric is persuasive (human-measured, arguable, non-absolute) and therefore does not rely on any absolute authority such as the authority of God or the supernatural. Persuasive discourse’s degree of deontic obligation is lower than that of religious discourse taken as authored by the supernatural. For example, Paul Chilton’s work in political discourse discusses intention and capability as primary factors in pragmatic and psychological credibility (32), and Leda Cosmides and John Tooby have similarly identified source-tagging as an important evolutionary psychological adaptation for the identification of trustworthy information in uncertain environments (70). Thus, politics and its sources are of a different ilk than religious discourse.

To build a case for world building in political discourse, Gavins suggests that Kinnock’s speech begins with function-advancing propositions that expand the epistemic world through possessive relational processes—i.e., having problems in the hypothetical Thatcher dystopia. As the speech continues, however, the possessive relational processes give way to intensive relational processes such as being cold and being quiet. Gavins argues that this changes the epistemic mode of the speech to “equally strong expressions of obligation” (121)—the deontic mode. Upon examination of the Sermon on the Mount, Kinnock’s own modal world-switch is discernable because Kinnock is bound to a greater extent to systemic determinacy. That is, the haves denote epistemic modality while the has denote deontic obligation. Thus, political speech, because of its persuasive purpose, does not combine simultaneously the deontic and boulomaic, as religious discourse can because of its intentionally instructive purpose and authoritarian authorship.

However, I do not want to draw too large of a conclusion about political speech and modality. Gavins notes that in Kinnock’s anti-Thatcherism speech, Kinnock’s personal belief seems powerful enough “to blur the boundary between epistemic and deontic modality” (121). I concur that political convictions can be highly deontic. However, they remain sophisticated, historically-situated, and, for the most part, modally systemically determined, as we see in Kinnock’s speech.

In opposition, the religious discourse of Sermon on the Mount builds its world differently, and its world building parallels the unique temporal system of Christian hermeneutics.In Matthew 5 of the King James Bible, Jesus ascends a mountain and delivers his famous Sermon on the Mount. In 5.1 Jesus ascends the mount. I shall begin with Mat-
Anaphora, Possible Worlds, and Temporal Schemas
Liberty Lee Kohn

And he opened his mouth, and taught them, saying,
Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted.
Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.
Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled.
Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.
Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.
Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God.
Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness’ sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake.
Rejoice, and be exceedingly glad: for great is your reward in heaven: for so persecuted they the prophets which were before you. (Matthew 5.2-5.12)

Rhetorically, the instructive nature of the text can be gleaned from 5.2’s “and taught them,” although this is not entirely different than Kinnock’s purpose. I suggest the third-person comment on Jesus’ purpose helps define the deontic modality of this passage, but the deontic modality is implicit because of the unquestionable nature of the Bible itself as absolute in its authority for people who are part of its religious community.

To begin discussing the Sermon on the Mount, I would briefly point out the changes in pronoun usage from the third person to the second person (5.11-12). This slow change also redirects the early statements on the poor in spirit, the meek, etc. into instructional material for the reader to be poor in spirit, meek, etc. in order to garner the rewards of heaven. Thus, the world built is one where the reader must, by 5.11-12, realize their own agentive self as a world-builder and is obligated to adopt the status of earlier propositions such as being poor in spirit, meek, merciful, a peacemaker, etc. to live by Jesus’ word.

The linguistic choice of a relational process (“Blessed are”) to represent the hypothetical is also a rhetorical choice with sustained linguistic indeterminacies. Although the syntax is inverted, the anaphora of 5.3 through 5.11 are intensive relational processes. I offer 5.3 through 5.5 as examples:

The poor in spirit are blessed.
They that mourn are blessed.
The meek are blessed.

This inverted syntax of intensive relational processes continues through 5.11. These statements are the protasi, the hypothetical condition that must be met for the consequences of the apodosis to become true. However, if the protasi are hypothetical deontic worlds, then they exist as if or when worlds, and the label of intensive relational processes does not hold. Because of the deontic obligation to follow instruction, and also because of the boulomai wish-world that constitutes entrance to heaven and other qualities of eternal salvation, the statements in a systemic functional linguistics would be as follows.

If (or when) one is poor in spirit, then the kingdom of heaven is theirs.
If (or when) one mourns, then one shall be comforted.
If (or when) one is meek, then one shall inherit the earth.

This pattern continues through 5.10. Because of the mix of deontic obligation and boulomaic promises of heaven, we have a particular kind of systemic indeterminacy in the Sermon on the Mount. What appears to be an intensive relational process in the protasi (“Blessed are”) functions not as a relational process, but a deontic hypothetical condition one must achieve in order to receive the apodosi’s boulomaic world of heaven.

Thus, we reach an important difference between political public and religious rhetoric, or, to be more particular, political and religious temporal systems. In this particular form of religious rhetoric oriented toward salvation and its temporality, the protasis is deontic and the apodosis is boulomaic: Note 5.3 through 5.11 of the Sermon on the Mount. In such a system, completing the obligation provides the wish-world. The deontic protasis creates systemic indeterminacy by turning intensive relational processes, which are typically direct statements, into hypotheticals meant to create obligation. Jesus uses direct statements, yet their determinacy is hypothetical in function. The conditional construction known as variatio (protasis + apodosis), a form of anaphora, allows for the deontic and boulomaic relationship. While this form of anaphora is available for use in political rhetoric, the essentialist basis of religious interpretation changes the relationship between present and future, and modality functions differently.

Note that the boulomaic apodosi often do contain the modal shall and therefore create the future in predictable function. However, 5.3 and 5.10 render this boulomaic world in the present tense, not the future tense. This change in function, a form of systemic indeterminacy, is due, much like the pronoun usage, to the anaphora’s ability to produce a future world because of the plethora of future tense shalls, forcing a reader to interpret the present tense “theirs is the kingdom of heaven” as a future-oriented boulomaic promise as well. In terms of the functional aspect of functional linguistics, in anaphora, frequency may produce indeterminacy in typical function. In the case of the religious rhetoric of the modal function of Sermon on the Mount, anaphora overrides typical modal function and produces (in 5.3 and 5.10) a future-oriented boulomaic modality through present-tense modals.

Before ending discussion of this highly deontic discourse, I would like to point out the lack of world-building elements compared to the Kinnock speech, namely the economic and political world-builders such as pensions, benefits, unemployment, fares, transport bills, credits, loans, and mortgages. As previously suggested, this is due to the lack of specific historical circumstances prompting the Sermon on the Mount. This sparsely-built world would be typical of instructive religious maxims and religious discourse in general, for highly built worlds are not easily mappable or congruent with other environments and contexts.

In support of religious texts having sparsely-built worlds, Gavins has argued that world building is one feature indicative and important to genre identification (“Snow White” 134), and Burke states that there are two intertextual triggers in the reading process. The first is linguistic foregrounding, and the second is the pragmatic realm, which Burke defines as having historical, contextual, or genre-based triggers (121). Purpose and genre dictate the quantity of objects and concepts in the possible world. Burke further notes that with such knowledge comes formal constraints upon the reading processes. In the case of the Sermon on the Mount, the religious purpose, constructed through a lack of world-builders, creates a genre that constrains reader’s expectations and interpretation.
by triggering appropriate religious schemas and intentions. Similarly, it avoids the political by lacking the specificity of Kinnock’s political speech.

To continue this discussion of a lack of world-building elements in The Sermon on the Mount, the under-built world in the Sermon on the Mount seems to offer a paucity of certain types of historical and contextual information that differentiates the biblical, instructive anaphora from the political warnings of Kinnock’s speech. Gavins has noted that in literary narratives actions and events often take prominence once the initial deictic boundaries of the text-world are established. In such cases, the function of these elements is to propel the narrative forwards. The function-advancing elements of an instructive text, on the other hand, are likely to feature a greater number of imperatives, and so on. (“(Re)thinking Modality” 81)

Kinnock’s speech is derived from an epistemic modality that is highly literary because of the “gap” between the discourse world and text world. That is to say, his discourse is not absolute, but persuasive. Not all his facts can be checked. Unlike religious discourse, not all of Kinnock’s dystopian hypotheticals are destined to become truths, and a reader or audience activates a hypothetical schema to evaluate these claims. The political, dystopian, and therefore “fictional” nature of Kinnock’s speech requires more world-building, as Gavins ascertains of literary narratives in general. The reader’s procedural knowledge is low, and the hypothetical possible world must be built before being capable of instruction and persuasion through fear and warnings. The Sermon on the Mount contains a greater number of function advancing imperatives, as Gavins suggests of instructive texts, because Jesus’ absolute credibility allows him to obligate his discourse community in underbuilt hypothetical worlds. These future-oriented religious possibilities of admission to heaven do not have to be highly built because of a reader’s procedural and previous knowledge, which are dependent upon the well-known and absolute (not potential) existence of Heaven, at least to the religious believer.

Returning to Christian hermeneutics, I would suggest that the Christian temporality must be included in a discussion of the Sermon on the Mount as well. The boulomaic world needn’t be a distant or future-oriented world; rather, it can be enacted on a daily basis, as the theologian Montague explains. Thus, one can read the Sermon on the Mount’s apodosis’s future-oriented modals as worlds that happen simultaneously when one achieves the deontic world in the present. In this sense, the boulomaic is always potentially present. Thus, we see that Christian hermeneutics offers yet another form of systemic indeterminacy—one where the wish-world is not distant, separate, or alternative to one’s lived reality, but enacted through religious experience and cognition on a perpetual basis. If, as theologian George Montague clarifies, there is no “here and there” (23) in the Christian religious reader’s idea of heaven and earth (as opposed to the Platonic separation of a non-material and material realm), then the boulomaic world can exist in the here and now in a heaven-on-earth scenario. Thus, the idea of the boulomaic as a future-world marked by a set of linguistically determinant functions (future modals, for example) is compromised, and the systemic function of boulomaic modals can become indeterminant, existing in both future-oriented and present-oriented modals, as when one theoretically inherits the earth in the present moment, not the distant future.

I would now like to transition to public writings of the Catholic faith. Started in the United States of America in 1933 as a response to the Catholic church’s perceived social inactivity during the Great Depression, Dorothy Day’s The Catholic Worker was a grass
roots paper combining religious purpose with sociopolitical purpose. Day and her co-conspirators wished to address the same social problems of the decade as the socialists, but to address such problems without the communist’s ideological baggage of atheism.

Returning to cognitive poetics, differentiating which aspects of Day’s public rhetoric resemble political worlds, such as in Kinnock’s speech, and which resemble the religious absolute worlds, as with the Sermon on the Mount, will provide a framework in which only religious discourse speaking of salvation or the eternal, not the earthly, produces systemic indeterminacy and the unique world building exemplified in the Sermon on the Mount. In doing so, I can outline when aspects of a religious schema falter due a movement away in purpose or authority from religious reading purposes or religious experiential purpose. I’ll begin by looking at small strands of anaphora in Day’s own writing. I’ll then include the closing of one non-anaphoric essay so as to provide a more in-depth answer to questions involving deontic and boulomaiic modality. The following excerpt is taken from the first issue of The Catholic Worker, dated May 1933. In my following analysis, I will continue to use italics when analyzing data from Day’s essay, rather than quotations, to remain consistent with this article’s previous text world theory examples, as well as the conventions of text world theory in general. Also, I will be using bold print, as opposed to quotations, when emphasizing terms that share theoretical links. 

For those who are sitting on the park benches in the warm spring sunlight.
For those who are huddling in shelters trying to escape the rain.
For those who are walking the streets in the all but futile search for work.
For those who think that there is no hope for the future, no recognition of their plight—this little paper is addressed.

It is printed to call their attention to the fact that the Catholic Church has a social program—to let them know that there are men of God who are working not only for their spiritual, but for their material welfare.
It’s time there was a Catholic paper printed for the unemployed.
The fundamental aim of most radical sheets is the conversion of its readers to radicalism and atheism.
Is it not possible to be radical and not atheist?
Is it not possible to protest, to expose, to complain, to point out abuses and demand reforms without desiring the overthrow of religion? (“To Our Readers” 1-2)

The above anaphoric passage has a less emphatic purpose than Kinnock’s “I warn you” and the Sermon on the Mount’s religious obligation. Day writes to inform, to “call attention to” the church’s involvement in material and social matters. Thus, the purpose is already similar to that of Kinnock’s political speech. Day is not interested in matters of salvation or Christian temporality; rather, The Catholic Worker is sociopolitical in nature. In the first three anaphoric lines, we see no conditionality or hypothetical world. The world Day presents is the historically-situated world of the Great Depression. The enactors of the first three lines—those who are sitting, huddling, and walking—portray neither the hypothetical worlds of the Sermon on the Mount’s salvation nor Kinnock’s dystopia. The function-advancing processes and circumstances create a text world resembling the actual world of May 1933:

are sitting (intention process) on park benches (goal) in the warm spring sunlight (circumstance)
are huddling (intention process) in shelters (circumstance) trying to escape the rain (goal)
are walking (intention process) the streets (goal) in the all but futile search for work (circumstance)

In the fourth line, there is a change from physical movement (sitting, huddling, walking) to mental processes, *For those who think* [...]. This focus on mental material processes is constant in Day’s essay. Geoff Thompson suggests that mental material processes are about “undergoing [as opposed to acting] and involve at least one human participant: the participant who has the mind in which the process occurs” (92-93). Thus, Day’s rhetorical strategy of mental processes—a one participant affair—confirms the lack of deontic modality, which would require a second, more forceful participant creating obligation, not one participant slowly persuaded through their own reflection.

In the fifth line, which breaks from the anaphoric repetition, we see again the mental process in Day’s rhetorical strategy. Rather than commanding her communist reader to be theist and her Catholic reader to be socially-minded, Day foregoes the deontic mode and chooses instead mental material processes that suggest the reader’s potential growing inner awareness, as opposed to an awareness developed from an external source, from deontic obligation. This resembles the persuasive, source-tagged elements of public political rhetoric, not absolutist religious rhetoric. In the fourth line, we see the paper calling their attention. Although the paper is an actor “calling,” the emphasis on attention continues the mental process theme. This focus on the reader’s mental processes continues with Day’s phrase *to let them know*, also in line five.

Thus far, Day’s rhetorical strategy foregoes both hypothetical worlds and deontic modality. In lines 8-9, the final two lines presented above, Day does build a hypothetical world where it is possible to be both radical and theist. Her statement *Is it not possible to be radical and not atheist?* allows for the communist to accept religion and the religious to become socially active. Thus, the more indirect rhetorical strategy of mental processes has shifted to Day’s more direct creation of a boulomaic world of Catholic material interests. We see this through the brief anaphora of line nine, with its function-advancing propositions *to protest, to expose, to complain, to point out*, each of which suggests to the reader actional material intention processes in the boulomaic world, as opposed to the mental process of the reader “undergoing” an awareness in the actual world—Day’s earlier rhetorical strategy. Note that this rhetoric also skips any mention of salvation, heaven, or the world beyond; thus, this rhetoric does not repeat the rhetoric of the Sermon on the Mount, wherein present and future worlds, as well as their modal tenses, were collapsed into one and became systemically indeterminant or where action on earth is connected to action toward or the simultaneous existence of Heaven.

To underscore Day’s rhetorical strategy in Catholic public discourse, I would like to include the final two paragraphs of an essay from the following issue of *The Catholic Worker*, dated June/July 1933. The essay is entitled “The Listener.”

Although the Communists may not as yet be aware of it, they witnessed in Union Square on May Day the inception of a new struggle for social justice. A germ of more than mere passive interest was planted in the minds of many who either read The Catholic Worker or saw its headlines displayed.

As soon as the worker realizes that the Church Militant is interested in man’s welfare as well as his soul, he will stop to consider before embracing Communism and its atheistic ideas. The Scriptures, history, tradition and common sense will tell him that without God there is neither happiness, security or prosperity, either in men or in nations. (2-3)
We again see in the above paragraphs an emphasis on mental processes—may not yet be aware of it, they witnessed; as soon as the worker realizes; he will stop to consider—I would even suggest that the metaphor planted in the minds also references the mental process. Thus, Day’s rhetorical strategy is similar to her previous essay: The communist must come to an understanding of the church’s ability to address the material as well as the spiritual. Day suggests this new world of social justice already lives for the Catholic, but is an unrealized mental representation and epistemic world for the communist. The opening lines of each paragraph underscore that Catholic social interests are a reality to the Catholic, but not the communist: Although the Communists may not as yet be aware of it and As soon as the worker realizes each suggest that the epistemic world and mental representation of the church as a social force for the social-minded Catholic is not yet a possible world for others such as the communist.

Thus, one’s ideology constrains one’s mental representations and epistemic world. Laura Hidalgo-Downing notes that initial work on ideology appeared in Roger Fowler’s Literary Criticism. Hidalgo-Downing updates the research into ideology, stating that

[a]s explained by Fowler, world views typically reproduce ideologies, in the sense that language, as a tool for the classification and interpretation of reality, constructs “common sense” versions of how things are or should be in the world(s) we inhabit. This indirect relation between human mind and reality, domains which are mediated by language, is stressed by recent cognitive approaches to the study of linguistic phenomena. (69)

Material mental processes, then, are deployed rhetorically to underscore that differences in ideology inhibit the transition from a hypothetical boulomaic world to an actual world, but also that it is the material mental process that would allow the communist to remain radical but accept theism because of its social activism.

However, this relationship between mental processes, ideology, and rhetoric most likely works by degrees, as modality and possibility do. The interpretations and comparisons of anaphora in public political, religious, and religious activist rhetoric I’ve offered here are only a start and require further investigation. Beyond these observations, I will only suggest that the web of relations will, as with all texts, be context and situation dependent.

Despite her religious impetus, Day’s admittedly material historical interests as well as her layperson status deny her the rhetorical usefulness of a high degree of deontic modality through religious absolutism, i.e., the word of God. Thus, social, political, and public rhetoric may lose the authority of absolutism because of entrance into the social and political in the hands and mouth of a layperson. We do see a change to a higher degree of deontic modality in the final sentence of Day’s “The Listener,” where Day cites the authority of the Scriptures (as well as history, tradition, and common sense) and their holy authorship to “tell” the reader the obligation inherent in reality, rather than leave it to their mental processes to “realize” her purported truth.

9. Conclusions
Both Day and Kinnock have similar epistemic worlds because of the gap between the discourse world and the text world that exists in sophistic rhetoric that utilizes hypothetical worlds. To build a hypothetical world without the epistemic guarantee of divine authority places one’s audience in an epistemic dilemma. To argue convincingly with per-
suasive force in public does not guarantee one’s future wish-world will become enacted, unlike religious discourse, where meeting such conditions guarantees one’s entrance into heaven. Such is the more distant relationship between discourse world and text world in public discourse, which marks the epistemic distance between political and religious uses of hypotheticality.

However, the right to build hypothetical worlds of utopia or dystopia are not exclusive to religious anaphora or discourse. While Day foregoes such rhetorical practices, Kinnock’s invention and arrangement depend upon hypothetical worlds. Yet Kinnock’s hypothetical worlds tend to resemble the epistemic worlds and world-building of fiction. Again, this is because of fictional and political discourses’ epistemic distance from religious epistemology.

Moreover, it would appear that systemic indeterminacy is also an effect of more “emotional” or absolute religious discourses. Both Kinnock’s speech and Day’s essays are systemically determinant in function, despite containing the hypotheticality that sustains systemic indeterminacy in the Sermon on the Mount. Determinacy may also be influenced in degree by purpose and the amount of historical situatedness extant in the purpose. The Sermon on the Mount, instructive and absolute, builds worlds sparse in object and concept, most likely to make it transhistorical and easily mappable onto many circumstances, activities, and eras.

Lastly, a link exists between mental processes, ideology, and hypothetical boulomaic worlds. As seen in analysis of Day’s essays, mental processes allow a participant to come to an understanding of the boulomaic, therein hoping to persuade the public to action so that the boulomaic world becomes the actual world. In religious discourse such as the Sermon on the Mount, the boulomaic already exists and is available in the present, deontic world. The boulomaic and deontic—the future and present—are one in the same in time and space, if one is a believer.

These relationships between public and religious, as well as temporal separation or overlap, will vary according to text and context, but clearly cognitive poetics and religious hermeneutics share common ground and can mutually inform each other’s interpretive theories. Specific interpretations such as the one provided by this article will be as essential as grand theories if the relationship between cognitive poetics and hermeneutics is to bloom.

10. Works Cited


