THE COMPETING POLITICS
OF AUSTRIAN GLOCALIZATION:
COVID-19, CRIME, AND (ANTI-)RACISM

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Abstract: Based on a carefully contextualised discussion of discursive and semiotic contributions to public debate in Austria during the politically charged summer of 2020, this article captures ideologically different, at times mutually opposed glocalizing strategies. The social sites and entanglement of "the global" and "the local" examined are the following: a parliamentary address in which neo-nationalist rhetoric is framed by global points of reference; local appropriations of the Black Lives Matter movement for the purposes of symbolic protest against public monuments commemorating problematic regional histories; and recent public debates in Austria that illustrate the glocalization of everyday politics. In each example, global contexts provide crucial momentum for the articulation of local concerns and mobilisations. The ensuing analysis helps illuminate some of the distinctly transnational, enabling conditions for ideological contest in Austria today. In methodological terms, the discussion demonstrates that an understanding of locally specific appropriations of a diversity of global flows demands ethnographic sensitivity, historical contextualisation, and local knowledge.

Keywords: Austria, nationalism, Black Lives Matter, glocalizing strategies, politics of representation.

At the height of the first peak of the Covid-19 pandemic, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz predicted that once the crisis was to abate, far-reaching, systemic changes would be inevitable. This would, so his prognosis continued, also involve a general "rethinking" of globalization (Kronen Zeitung 2020a). Kurz's statement can be read against the backdrop of some of the centrifugal political tendencies observed in the early stages of the pandemic, including the closing of national borders, citizens' repatriation alongside a virtual standstill for the tourist industry, and the temporarily failing supply chains

for much-needed protective medical equipment. Yet, this statement – typical of increasingly prominent positions that have come to criticise existing global production and distribution networks and to call for greater European autarky – may seem surprising for a politician at the forefront of the next generation of Europe's centre-right, pro-market parties. At first sight, Kurz's prediction may also have been read as indicative of how contemporary crises reveal contradictory dynamics between three political vectors that Nancy Fraser (2014) terms (neo-liberal) marketization, social protectionism, and emancipation: faced with the local impact of a global pandemic, Kurz and with him Austria's governing, bourgeois People's Party (ÖVP) appeared to be moving from its long-standing faith in the market (see Karner 2016) toward greater, nationally defined social protectionism.

Superficially plausible and sufficient though such an interpretation may appear to be, there was considerably more to – or behind – Kurz's statement than first met the critical observer's eye. When contextualised more carefully, Kurz's assessment can be shown to have also articulated, whether inadvertently or otherwise, a much wider, by now deeply engrained disquiet with "globalization". More accurately, Kurz here tapped into a prominent cultural "mood" (Geertz 1966) that experiences the local manifestations of our era's global inter-dependencies and transnational market forces as sources of anxiety, instability or even danger. In this article, I document other manifestations of this "mood", and diverse responses to it, which I locate in a deeply contested discursive field that the politics of counter-globalization partly co-constitute. Put more simply, what follows is a discussion of glocalization being debated and negotiated in Austria today. The emerging picture is one of deep ambivalence: current public concerns in Austria reveal competing forms of glocalization, whereby nationalist retrenchment and transnational solidarities vie for hegemony. This discussion shows that such ideological polarization in Austria's complex political field is underpinned by very different, mutually contradictory entanglements of "the global" with "the local".

My argument unfolds in a succession of steps. I begin with a theoretical summary of key-strands in the conceptual literature (i.e. on glocalization and the everyday) relevant to the ensuing discussion. A brief historical contextualization of current Austrian politics is then followed by, first, a methodological note and, subsequently, the presentation of three recent discursive episodes, in which contradictory Austrian experiences of glocalization have manifested. The episodes in question variously revolved around nationalist rhetoric about crime and migration emanating from Austria's Freedom Party (FPÖ); around the "Black Lives Matter" movement; and around responses to the politically charged summer of 2020 discernible in different parts of Austria's heterogeneous media and indicative of contrasting positions located on very different points along the ideological spectrum. The analytical question guiding the discussion in its entirety focuses on the wider conditions of possibility enabling contrasting forms of "glocalized" politics.

CONCEPTUAL CONTEX

By way of a conceptual grounding for this discussion, I propose a return to seminal contributions that have, over recent decades, offered understandings of globalization more nuanced than those contained in debates about its historical origins or the required geographical and systemic reach of transnational interconnections and global interdependencies (see Martell 2017). One such corrective is Charles Lemert's: building on substantive insights into our epoch's technologically enabled and economically exploited "time-space compressions" (e.g. Harvey 1989), Lemert (2015: 95) opts for a processual understanding of globalization that regards the latter as both a "process and [emerging] structures". This invokes long-debated questions concerning the kinds of processes and structures that characterize globalization today. Particularly relevant to what follows are political claims that globalization, at least in the cultural domain, is tantamount to growing standardization. Where advocates of the "homogeni-

zation-thesis" seek academic backing, they often invoke George Ritzer's work on *The McDonaldization of Society* (1993). By considerable contrast, one may embed the following analysis in Arjun Appadurai's influential counterargument. According to Appadurai (1990) globalization comprises several "global flows", namely those of people (ethnoscapes), capital (financescapes), technologies (technoscapes), ideas and ideologies (ideoscapes), and mediated information (mediascapes). Further, Appadurai rightly insists that the multiple "scapes and flows" (see Urry 2000: 208) spanning national boundaries – far from homogenising localities the world over – spur antagonisms; Appadurai's formulation (1990: 295f.) of the "forces of sameness and difference cannibalizing" one another encapsulates such an understanding of globalization that is processual and sensitive to its asymmetries, local appropriations and conflicts.

It is stating the obvious that thirty years after Appadurai's initial formulation, in our now fully blown, digital information age (e.g. Castells 1996), the internet and social media accelerate and multiply the global flows of technologies and ideas. Further, there are numerous other "global flows" – including those of natural resources, commodities and other material objects, signs and entire sign-systems, waste and environmental hazards (e.g. see Le Coze 2017) – to be considered. What is more, important recent scholarship has come to examine the infrastructural means and implicated transformations, particularly those brought about by the "containerization" of the global economy (Martin 2016), as well as its generally overlooked "backroads" (Knowles 2014). Common to much pertinent literature (e.g. Lyon, Back 2012; Levitt, Glick Schiller 2004) is a recognition that globalization is best captured from the vantage points of localities and through the interpretative lenses of those experiencing the global locally and diversely. This echoes Roland Robertson's influential accounts of glocalization as the "the reconstruction [of] home, community and locality" (Robertson 1995: 30) under new conditions. Building on this thematic strand, Ulrich Beck (2000: 46) added the concept of the "local-global nexus": this directs our analyses to multiple and multi-directional flows, it recognizes local ac-

tors as active participants in – rather than passive recipients of – transnational flows; and it acknowledges that cultural homogenization, a local re-assertion of particularism and concurrent re-entrenchment of contextually meaningful boundaries can sit alongside one another, however uneasily, in any one "local-global nexus". Beck's final book, his posthumously published *The Metamorphosis of the World* (2017), adds yet further insights. Particularly relevant to the following analysis is Beck's disentangling of political beliefs from "frames of action": thereby, Beck is able to show that nationalist retrenchment, for instance, whilst advocating a return to a narrowly delineated and ethnically exclusive lifeworld, relies (e.g. in terms of its political networks, information and communication technologies) on unmistakably global frames.

This also raises the question as to how to conceptualize "the everyday" and its political dimensions, be they generally recognized or not, under conditions of glocalization. For the purposes of the present discussion, mention must be made of classical, micro-sociological understandings of the everyday as comprising realms of activity, in which social actors' "standard-maintaining" routines reproduce – generally in non-reflexive fashion – existing social relationships, structures and institutions (e.g. Goffman 1990; Garfinkel 2004). By contrast, I here take my cue from correctives to such approaches. Such available alternatives historicize the quotidian (e.g. Lefebvre 2002) and recognize that struggles over resources, status, power, constraints and (temporary) freedoms lie at its very core (e.g. see De Certeau 1984; Karner 2007). Building on this, the present discussion's premise is that everyday life has to be seen in its specific historical moment and as intrinsically political, irrespective of whether or not its constitutive power-relations are explicitly recognized and widely thematized. Put more simply, the everyday is pervaded by historically established institutional structures and political asymmetries. In their lived relationship and response to such structures, social actors can fluctuate between overlooking and "naturalising" the relations of power and inequality impacting them, and then entering into moments or periods of explicit contestation and organized struggle (e.g. Bourdieu 1977: 168-169). Parts of

the discussion to follow help illuminate some recent, transna-
tional conditions of possibility for consciousness-raising and
politicization.

When synthesized with our thematic focus, issues pertain-
ing to the politics of the everyday crystallize in Thomas
Hylland Eriksen's anthropological reflections on "the relation-
ship between the global and the local". The latter, Eriksen ar-
gues, implicates not always easily co-existing dimensions: on
one hand, capital's growing "disembed[ing] from territory" in
an era of multinational corporations, transnational value
chains and global financial markets; concurrently, our epoch is
defined by far-reaching, systemic "interconnectedness" across
geographical distances. Third, and most directly relevant to
our later discussion, Eriksen reports "local appropriations of
global processes", or localizing strategies, such as attempted
"reembeddings" through identity politics that claim "cultural
'authenticity' and rooted identities." Taking stock of globaliza-
tion's uneven political consequences, Eriksen reflects on the
fact that "some walls are torn down and others appear. The
idea of an unbounded world has not been realized" (Eriksen
2015: 371-384).

What follows documents ideologically diverse and mutu-
ally opposed localizing strategies that are discernible across
different domains of Austrian (everyday) politics today. First,
however, further contextualizing work is required.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND A METHODOLOGICAL
NOTE

The literature on the aftermath to World War II and the
Holocaust, i.e. the darkest chapters in Austrian history, cen-
tres around several core themes. In addition to institutional
and economic reconstruction (e.g. Rathkolb 2005; Bischof,
Petschar 2017), post-1945 Austria faced the challenge of an
ideological nation-(re)building (e.g. Thaler 2001) in a context
hitherto dominated by pan-Germanic self-understandings that
had cut across much of the political spectrum. The post-1945
era was partly defined by continuing anti-Semitic sentiments

and exclusionary politics (e.g. Serloth 2016), the gradually growing hegemony of a new identity narrative of "Austrian particularism" in juxtaposition to the previously dominant pan-Germanism (e.g. Karner 2005a), and the opportunism of a quickly crystallising "victim myth" (e.g. Wodak, de Cillia 2007). Only decades later, in the aftermath of the "Waldheim affair" (i.e. concerning the wartime past of former UN secretary general and subsequently Austrian Federal President Kurt Waldheim, voted into office in 1986, see Mitten 1992), would Austria's self-ascribed victim-status give way to a wider acceptance of "co-responsibility" (Uhl 2006) for the events of 1938-1945. Concurrently, however, the post-war era saw growing affluence; the establishment of consensual democracy based on social partnership and the systematic, proportional division (*Proporz*) of the country's large public sector and parts of civil society between the two dominant parties (i.e. the Social Democrats and the ÖVP respectively); and correspondingly high rates of political party membership and "social peace" (Fitzmaurice 1991: 122; Brook-Shepherd 1997: 122). While the period in question would later often be nostalgically distorted as a period of calm, stability and prosperity, which the trope of post-war Austria as a purported "island of the blessed" (Liessmann 2005) transports most succinctly, the subsequent, post-1989-era undeniably saw far-reaching transformations in and impacting on Austria.

Some such changes related to the end of communism, practically just beyond the country's doorstep, and the fall of the Iron Curtain that had constituted Austria's eastern borders for decades. Other transformations went hand-in-hand with Austria's EU-accession in 1995. Concurrently, and along with much of the world, Austrians were beginning to experience the local impacts of widening economic globalization, digitalization, and comparatively rapid demographic changes related to (inward) migratory movements. The 1990s also marked the beginning of a neo-nationalist turn in Austrian politics. In the context of social change experienced as anxiety-inducing by many (see Karner 2005b), Austria's "third [ideological] camp" in the shape of the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPÖ) under the leadership of Jörg Haider managed to secure steadily

improving electoral returns throughout the 1990s. Combining anti-establishment rhetoric with nationalist protectionism that opposed migration and multiculturalism, Haider's gains – especially, though not exclusively, at the expense of the Social Democratic SPÖ – culminated in the controversial elections of 1999. When, following the complex search for a coalition, the FPÖ entered into a government with the ÖVP, this led to a series of temporary "sanctions" put on Austria by her then 14 EU partners and to vocal civil society opposition to the government in Austria (Fiddler 2018). The compromises of power soon led to tensions within the FPÖ, and eventually in 2005 to its splitting into the Haider-led *Bündnis Zukunft Österreich*[1] and the "old" FPÖ now under Heinz-Christian Strache (see Karner 2020a: 167-188). After Austria returned to successive grand coalition governments between the SPÖ and ÖVP, Strache's mobilization of EU-sceptical and Islamophobic sentiments (e.g. Bunzl, Hafez 2009) moved the FPÖ yet further to the right. This strategy succeeded, at least temporarily, in the aftermath of the much-discussed "refugee crisis" of 2015/2016 (e.g. Karner 2020b). The ensuing, 2017 national elections led to the next ÖVP-FPÖ coalition government, which subsequently collapsed, in May 2019, following the much-discussed and still unfolding scandal(s) triggered by revelations of undercover, highly compromising video-recordings of Strache in conversation on Ibiza with a pretend Russian oligarch's niece (Karner forthcoming). At the time of data collection and writing, in the summer of 2020, Austria is now governed by a new coalition government comprising Chancellor Sebastian Kurz's ÖVP and the country's Green Party.

Against this backdrop, this article is underpinned by an empirical focus on discursive and semiotic contributions to public debate in Austria during the politically charged summer of 2020. The latter constituted a recent moment, in which a variety of global or transnational issues were being debated nationally and locally (i.e. parts of the following discussion are guided by events in Austria's two main cities, the capital Vienna and Graz) with particular rigour and intensity. By way of a rationale, it is important to explicitly restate the events that made the summer of 2020 a suitable moment for data collec-

tion pertaining to questions of glocalization. Those events included, most importantly, the global Covid-19 pandemic; following an early spike in infections, Austria's lock-down came comparatively earlier than other countries' and was, in the early stages, widely considered to have been among the most effective responses by a national government. What is more, the government was, again in the early stages, being rewarded by unusually high rates of popularity and reported trust in its public health measures. As elsewhere, high approval rates began to turn as the crisis persisted. Concurrently, Austria's gradual "re-opening" coincided with the beginnings of a much-discussed parliamentary enquiry into the details surrounding the earlier-mentioned "Ibiza-scandal" that had broken a year earlier and that had led to the collapse of the previous ÖVP-FPÖ coalition government. Centred on the FPÖ's previous head Heinz-Christian Strache, the scandal(s) in question also had transnational dimensions that ranged from the place of the undercover recordings (i.e. Ibiza), the German investigative journalists who had brought the scandal to light, to the international entanglements and networks of a nationalist political party (i.e. the FPÖ) that had come to light with unusual clarity in the course of the scandal and its aftermath (see Karner forthcoming). Further, the ongoing Ibiza-scandal also interfaced with the political debates surrounding the pandemic (and a new rise in infections in the course of the summer): this crystallized in the FPÖ's and Strache's attempts to deflect responsibility for the potential corruption unearthed through the Ibiza-enquiry from themselves to the ÖVP as their former coalition-partner, on one hand; and the FPÖ's concurrent attempt to position itself as the main critic of the current government's "anti-Corona measures", on the other, in a context of growing pandemic-fighting fatigue. Moreover, and as the first discursive episode discussed below illustrates, the FPÖ was also seeking to re-invigorate its tried and tested political strategy of construing migratory movements as central problems and threats by discursively tying refugees and Muslim migrants to "criminality" (Krzyżanowski, Wodak 2009: 6-24). At the same time, and as the second cluster of episodes analysed below shows, glocalization was also assuming thematical-

ly and ideologically very different forms. Local receptions and appropriations of "Black Lives Matter" will show this most succinctly. Finally, the ensuing discussion will also demonstrate that an understanding of the workings of glocalization demands more than a capturing of public statements on global issues such as migration and human rights. Equally significant and revealing are further (public) responses, in the present case captured through diverse media materials and readers' letters to newspaper editors, to prominent national and local interpretations of global concerns and debates.

What follows is a discussion premised on an understanding of globalization as comprising a wide range of transnational flows, and of glocalization as subsuming politically very differently positioned and competing localizing strategies that respond to the global flows in question. This discussion thereby builds on, and significantly extends, existing literature that has shown Austria to be "a highly globalized country" – as illustrated throughout the country's twentieth century from the fin-de-siècle, Austro-Marxism, the Austrian school of economics, demographic change and EU-integration since the 1990s (Bischof, Plasser, Pelinka, Smith 2011) and that has detected a "specific Austrian glocalization discourse" (Exenberger 2011: 40). The examples that constitute my focus illustrate that discussions of glocalization need broadening beyond the production networks, commodities and signs of contemporary capitalism. Any of the multiple flows associated with contemporary globalization are (potential) objects of debate and reflection for contextually prominent glocalizing strategies. In keeping with the conceptual focus of this special issue, my central analytical question relates to the wider conditions "constraining and enabling" (Giddens 1984: 25) politically charged and contested forms of (everyday) glocalization.

NATIONALIST GLOCALIZATION

The local impact of global market forces and international economic actors has long constituted a prominent theme in Austrian public debate (Karner 2008). Similarly, there is wide-

spread recognition that Austria's past has been, and its present is being, shaped by a "global give and take", economically and culturally (Pelinka 2011: 22). Yet, against the backdrop outlined above, the summer of 2020 constituted a particularly pertinent moment, in which to examine some less frequently noticed entanglements of "the global" and "the local".

Some such less immediately apparent entanglement emerged from the first episode to be discussed here. This centred on Herbert Kickl (FPÖ), who was Austria's Interior Minister from December 2017 until the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition government's collapse in May 2019. The episode in question involved Kickl – now leader of his party's parliamentary group and widely seen as a hardliner within the nationalist FPÖ – addressing parliament on 7 July 2020. The immediate context to this were several days of much discussed, violent clashes between Turkish nationalists and (pro-)Kurdish demonstrators in Vienna's tenth district of Favoriten in late June.

Primarily addressing parliament and criticising his successor as Interior Minister, Karl Nehammer (ÖVP), Kickl clearly also had a wider audience of voters in mind and used this address to attempt to re-set the political agenda, after months of Covid-related discussions, by pushing the FPÖ's long-established focus on deriding migration and multiculturalism back to the forefront of political debate. It is worth quoting Kickl's speech at length:

At the risk of dragging most members of parliament out of their multicultural dreams […] and of my being labelled an "agitator" by do-gooders [*Gutmenschen*] who feel entitled to use the term, I would like to start with a list. Facts instead of fake news: 4 July, Salzburg, four Pakistanis and Afghans fight, a two-year-old girl is injured. 3 July, Linz, Iraqi brothers and an Armenian are sentenced to several years in prison for robbing a security van. 22 June – Wels, Linz, Vienna – 13 drug dealers arrested, the majority Iranian and Afghan asylum-seekers and refugees. 5 June – a life-sentence for an Afghan murderer of two. 29 May – trial of an Afghan citizen accused of robbery, rape and resisting police. Most recently, 4 July – a Chechen executed by another, not in Grozny but in Gerasdorf[2]. And then in Vienna, in what I call the "Stuttgarter days", from 24 until 26 June, leftwing extremist Kurds and PKK sympathizers[3] […] march-

ing through Favoriten where they clashed with Turkish nationalists
and IS-supporters: injuries and destruction of property included
[…]. This is not an exhaustive list, only a small selection based on
court files and police reports. The media report little of this, since
you have outlawed the mentioning of perpetrators' nationalities.
Well, why would our population want to learn the truth!? […]. All
these things have two common denominators. First, all these are cas-
es of imported violence perpetrated by foreigners or of multicultural
conflicts. Second, such things have no business in our beautiful
country […]. How far have we come when the Austrian population
is threatened by intra-Turkish battles fought on Austrian territory?
[…]. This is the result of a total failure in the areas of migration, asy-
lum and integration, a failure due to many years of the ÖVP's deci-
sions, in anti-Austrian complicity with the Social Democrats and
Greens. It would befit this political course if the Interior Minister
and parts of his staff moved out of the ministry and into the *Ernst-
Kirchweger-Haus*[4]. At first you belittled the problem, remember your
claims that "we do not have enough of a welcoming culture", or that
"the average migrant is more intelligent than the average Austrian"[5]
[…]. Staying with the case in Favoriten, *Herr Innenminister*: the
Turkish ambassador is laughing his head off, having just slandered
Christmas, he now receives the ÖVP's plea for help in the conflict
between Turks and Kurds. Are you alright, *Herr Innenminister*?
[…]. If you do this, and then perhaps invite the Grey Wolves[6] to
discussions, then this amounts to a declaration of bankruptcy for in-
tegration, a capitulation to Erdoğan […] and an official recognition
of an Islamic counter-society [*Gegengesellschaft*] […]. Needed in-
stead are immediate deportations for those involved in the clashes
who are not Austrian citizens […] for those who are asylum-seekers,
an immediate stop of their asylum-procedure and deportation; for
recognized refugees, a loss of their status and of course also deporta-
tion […]. As for neo-Austrians of Turkish ancestry, you need to look
closely, many of them got their Turkish citizenship back, through
backdoors […]. Zero tolerance, *Herr Innenminister*, that is what is
needed: not against housewives and pedestrians who need some
fresh air in times of Covid, but against bogus asylum-seekers,
Erdoğan-fanatics, and leftwing extremists (Kickl 2020, my transla-
tion).

This address worked on several noteworthy rhetorical lay-
ers. Some of them are anything but subtle. The over-arching
picture being painted here is one of Austrians allegedly threat-

ened, by foreign criminals, "on Austrian territory", and the concomitant claim that the FPÖ is the only political party capable and willing to protect Austrians against such allegedly ubiquitous but preventable "imported violence". The basic, underpinning structure is one of "positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation" enabling the construction of an "us-versus-them" discourse that in turn is, typically, the "foundation of exclusionary, prejudiced and racist perceptions" (Krzyżanowski, Wodak 2009: 23, 13). There is more to the argumentative structure to be noted: the ingroup thus constructed (i.e. Austrian citizens) is also (implicitly) portrayed as passive and helpless, in juxtaposition to the stereotype of "the" aggressive, violent and organized "foreigner". The transnational "flow" of people, and the local coming together of different "ethnoscapes" (Appadurai 1990) are here constructed as sources of intrinsic danger (i.e. "multicultural conflicts"). Typical of such claims are "metonyms" and "*pars pro toto* synecdoches" (Krzyżanowski, Wodak 2009: 23), whereby "a particular member or sub-category" is claimed to stand "for the whole category for the purposes of making inferences or judgments" (Lakoff 1987: 71). Seeking to accomplish precisely this through his "list", Kickl here employs rhetorical trickery that may be politically effective but is clearly tautological: his conclusion – that one of two "common denominators" of the crimes listed are their foreign perpetrators – is wrongly presented as an emerging insight, when in fact it is the very rationale for their selection and inclusion in the first place. Put differently, the argument here is circular and hence flawed – very particular criteria are used to select specific incidents, and it is then wrongly implied that what were in fact selection criteria only emerged from a purportedly random list of crimes, when the list was of course not random. Context (i.e. with regard to the specific crimes being mentioned; in terms of wider crime statistics over time, including those perpetrated by Austrian citizens) is also missing entirely here. As significant is Kickl's construction of close, associative "strands" and "argumentative connections" (de Cillia et al. 2020: 218-219), whereby empirically separate phenomena are rhetorically tied together as if they were inevitably part and parcel of another.

In this specific case, this manifests in Muslim migrants being portrayed as a generic threat, and asylum-seekers being partly conflated with "political Islam".

Much of this is in keeping with the FPÖ's tried-and-tested strategies of political mobilization. Less immediately apparent, and requiring more contextual-historical knowledge, was Kickl's cross-reference to the *Ernst-Kirchweger-Haus,* which most Austrians associate this with a far-left/anarchist sub-culture. Known to fewer is the biography of Ernst Kirchweger: a concentration camp survivor, Kirchweger became the first victim of political violence in the history of Austria's Second Republic, he died of head-injuries inflicted on him in 1965 by a neo-Nazi student; this happened in the context of clashes between far-right supporters, and anti-fascist opponents, of the anti-Semitic economic historian Taras Borodajkewycz (Adunka 2002: 32f.; Karner 2020a: 132). It is very doubtful that Kickl does not know this history. In the relative "best-case scenario", it would thus be shocking enough to see Kickl refer to the *Ernst-Kirchweger-Haus* merely as a way of deriding his (now) political opponents in the ÖVP. In a worse-case scenario (and without attributing intentionality), the question may at least be posed if this statement was another example of provocation through "calculated ambivalence" (Wodak 2016: 64), with which FPÖ politicians have subtly addressed multiple audiences, including their supporters on the extreme Right.

On an additional rhetorical layer, and most relevant for present purposes, are the workings of several, distinctly global cross-references, which are being "recontextualized" (de Cillia et al. 2020: 6) in the political service of a glocalizing strategy of unmistakably nationalist[7] bent. In the extract cited above, three such cross-references stand out: first, Kickl's claim to offer "facts instead of fake news", a clear inter-textual nod to US president Donald Trump's frequent attempts to polarize and to position his politics in opposition to "the liberal press". The second transnational reference Kickl employs is his likening of recent events in Favoriten to riots that had taken place in the German city of Stuttgart only a few days previously (see *Stuttgarter Zeitung* 2020); the sub-text is that conflicts "there" and "here" are analogous, but that at least in Vienna this

would have been preventable, given a different kind of politics. The third set of examples involves Kickl's frequent references to Erdoğan's Turkey, its internal conflicts and their influence in the diaspora, the dangers of "political Islam" and its purported inroads in Austria. Taken together, these invocations of global issues and discursive strands from "elsewhere" echo one of Ulrich Beck's (2017: 24f.) most powerful observations: his insistence that the world's current metamorphosis means that "successful local action" demands a "cosmopolitan frame", irrespective of political actors' explicitly held positions. This also applies to nationalist politics: its professed nation-centred outlook notwithstanding, neo-nationalism today derives significant organizational and discursive momentum from its embeddedness in larger, distinctly transnational frames. Kickl's address illustrates this: the transnational, global context – with some carefully selected points of reference, including purported comparisons and contrasts – is a crucial component of Kickl's nation-focused rhetoric. Put differently, specific, ideologically motivated readings of select global politics are part of the conditions enabling or driving the nationalist strategy in evidence here.

The discursive "net-result" is an account that opposes global migratory flows, which it closely ties to the transnational "flow" of criminality. The immediate political trajectory in the account above aims at discrediting the ÖVP and its current Interior Minister, whom Kickl depicts as ineffective, "soft" and – in a vein typical of the anti-elitism claimed by (right-wing) populism (e.g. Lazaridis et al. 2016; Karner 2020c) – as even working against the "national interest". Instead, Kickl calls for a very different political localizing strategy, one that (re)turns to the FPÖ's hard-line style of law, order and "zero tolerance". The primary problems Kickl claims to identify are clear and – in the FPÖ's view – interconnected: Turkey, migratory flows (particularly in the shape of asylum-seekers), and all internal political voices allegedly not tough enough on what Kickl subsumes in his account of the purported failings of multiculturalism.

THE GLOCALIZATION OF BLACK LIVES MATTER

The central argument developed here is that glocalization – or locally specific appropriations of a diversity of global flows – assumes politically very different forms, occurs at various social sites, and emanates from diverse points along the ideological spectrum. The following cluster of examples contrasts with and directly opposes the type of nationalist, yet distinctly globally framed rhetoric discussed above. However, a comprehensive understanding of the full "local-global nexus" (Beck 2000: 46) in Austria today requires us to analyse such ideological competitors and opponents alongside one another.

The second set of examples illustrating how else global concerns, issues and phenomena can be re-appropriated locally pertains to the Black Lives Matter movement, which gathered global momentum in the aftermath of George Floyd's brutal killing at the hands of police officers in Minneapolis in May 2020. As is well-known, subsequent weeks saw transnational, anti-racist movements calling for far-reaching institutional reforms and long overdue consciousness-raising concerning the long history of racist oppression and its continuation in different, institutional forms today. This included highly charged protests – some focused on the statues of historical figures implicated in the slave trade – in a number of European countries. Among the most widely discussed of such protests was the toppling of Edward Colston's statue in the English city of Bristol and the statue's subsequent being dropped into the city's harbour (see Farrer 2020). As the following, Austrian examples illustrate, the global issues and injustices highlighted by the Black Lives Matter movement can be, and indeed have been, interpreted yet more specifically in relation to other national and local histories.

Within less than two months of George Floyd's murder, there was ample evidence of positive Austrian receptions, endorsements and appropriations of the Black Lives Matter movement. One indication of this is depicted in Fig. 1 below, a photograph taken by the author at Vienna's *Donaukanal* in July 2020. The *Donaukanal* is a side-branch of the river Danube that separates Vienna's nineteenth-, ninth-, first-,

Fig. 1. *"Black-Trans Lives Matter" graffiti at Vienna's Donaukanal (photograph taken by the author).*

third- and eleventh districts on one side, from the city's twentieth- and second districts on the other. Along its central and busiest stretch, the banks of the canal have become – in the new millennium – a youthful and busy area (see Karrer 2011)[8]. Particularly during the summer months this is a place of outdoor bars, artistic production, community gardening, partying, leisure activities, and general sociability. Most conspicuous are the continuously "re-graffitied" walls either side of the canal, where artists' tags and more elaborate depictions sit alongside publicly displayed neighbourhood- and football-team allegiances, symbols of ethnic-diasporic identification, and political statements (i.e. generally from the Left). What is more, the walls alongside the *Donaukanal* have become perpetually over-written canvases for street artists' commentaries on current affairs, both local and global. One such recently added commentary now endorses – and adds to – the Black Lives Matter movement, by emphasizing that "Black [and] Trans Lives Matter" (see fig. 1).

Fig. 2. *Statue of Karl Lueger, mayor of Vienna from 1897 until 1910, and sprayed writings declaring it to be a source of shame (photograph taken by the author, July 2020).*

At the same time, less than a fifteen-minute walk from the place in question, near the city park and the boundary between the first and third districts, the most controversial mayor in Vienna's history had also drawn Black-Lives-Matter-inspired attention. Karl Lueger (1844-1910) is remembered for a series of municipal reforms and infrastructural projects, his spearheading and successful expansion of the Christian Social Party during the early era of mass politics, and – most pertinent – his notorious anti-Semitic agitation that would also

subsequently influence Adolf Hitler (e.g. see Boyer 1995; Schorske 1981: 119). Lueger's continuing architectural and topographical "presence" in the city has long been debated and led, in 2012, to the renaming of a part of Vienna's famous *Ringstrasse* from Dr-Karl-Lueger-Ring to Universitätsring. Yet, the square named after Lueger and its statue depicted above (fig. 2) had remained. Now, in the context of the global momentum built by the Black Lives Matter movement, which provided the global, enabling conditions for a new wave of criticism of Lueger's continuing memorialization, local protest took graphic form: i.e. in the shape of multicoloured, sprayed writings of the German word for "shame" (*Schande*) across all sides of the Lueger-monument (fig. 2).

Also noteworthy was the fact that such semiotic protest against the Lueger monument was more than an isolated, local event. The issue also drew considerably wider attention, for instance in a debate on national radio (OE 1 2020). There, some of the issues being raised were of much wider, indeed global relevance, such as questions about how to ethically represent and remember civilizational "ruptures", oppression and violence in museums and other public spaces. Related issues that also surfaced and were of much more specific, local relevance addressed the question as to whether an explanatory panel displayed next to Lueger's statue, which had been written by one of Austria's best-known historians, provided enough critical contextualization and was prominent enough (fig. 3).

A third and final example to be mentioned in this part of our discussion illustrates that Black Lives Matter impacted other parts of Austria, too, where it also led to some local protest against the uncritical memorialization of another controversial historical figure. The person in question had been the Styrian poet and medic Hans Kloepfer (1867-1944) who is regionally known for his poetry in local (West Styrian) dialect as well as for his public endorsement of Austria's annexation by Nazi Germany in 1938 (e.g. see Baur and Gradwohl-Schlacher 2008). Kloepfer's ideological leanings have been long-known. Yet, here again, it was only in the context of the Black Lives Matter movement and its global thematization of, and fight

Fig, 3. *Panel next to the Lueger-statue providing historical and biographical context (photograph taken by the author, 2020).*

against, racial oppression, that local protest against a sculpture of the poet in the Styrian capital (and Austria's second city) of Graz crystallized.

The following reporting of the incident published in Austria's most popular newspaper is worth citing, for it also cap-

tures how the aforementioned nationalist FPÖ responded to the protest:

> No stone remains unturned in the current racism-debate. Globally, there are arguments about monuments related to colonialism, statues are toppled […]. Now, this movement has arrived in Styria […]. Last weekend the monument of the controversial west Styrian poet Hans Kloepfer on the Schlossberg in Graz was targeted by unknown perpetrators: the sculpture and its pedestal were covered in red paint, "stop the silence" was written on it. The poet, who died in 1944 in Köflach, is controversial due to his pan-Germanic positions and his sympathy for national socialism […]. The [FPÖ] has offered 750 Euros for information leading to the perpetrators. Regional FPÖ politician Marco Triller explains: "Seen from today's perspective[9], Hans Kloepfer's political attitude was a gross miscalculation. However, that is as much part of history as are his extraordinary achievements as a doctor and poet. For us, his honorary citizenship and memorialization are unquestionable" (*Kronen Zeitung* 2020b, my translation).

At the time of writing, the sprayed sculpture has been removed (see fig. 4), presumably to be returned at a future date; whether this will be accompanied by a critically contextualising panel remains to be seen. The "Kronen Zeitung" account just quoted draws attention to how glocalization can give rise to, or accentuate, ideological polarization. We next turn to further examples illustrating diverse receptions of – and competing responses to – issues and phenomena discussed thus far.

GLOCALIZATION AND ITS EVERYDAY POLITICS

Our first episode, nationalist rhetoric framed in relation to transnational points of reference, occurred in a domain (i.e. parliament) unmistakably recognisable as political. The second set of episodes turned our attention to various everyday settings and operated with a broader definition of the political (i.e. as comprising *any* critical engagement with, or reproduction [inadvertent or otherwise] of, existing relations of power).

Fig. 4. *Pedestal of the Hans Kloepfer sculpture after its spraying and (temporary) removal (photograph taken by the author, July 2020).*

In the cases at hand, such everyday politics were also clearly underpinned by global phenomena. In this section, I continue to engage with everyday domains, in which glocalizing strategies manifest and are negotiated by a diversity of social actors. In terms of one of the conceptual strands outlined earlier, the sum-total of this discussion underscores the politics of everyday life as comprising multiple struggles over power and resistance (De Certeau 1984) as well as their transnational orientations under conditions of contemporary glocalization.

Local, Austrian responses to George Floyd's death included a demonstration of some 50,000 people in Vienna: to those at its forefront, Vienna's (young) African diaspora, it articulated the "pain of generations" and outrage at continuing

racist discrimination and "racial profiling" by parts of the po-
lice (Matzinger 2020b). In Graz, meanwhile, two of the city's
alternative media and part of a critical counter-public played
key-roles in local, Black-Lives-Matter-inspired protests. The
"Ausreißer" (2020), an open medium freely available at several
sites in Graz and other Styrian cities, expressed its "full soli-
darity with the protests by Black Lives Matter, in memory of
George Floyd and all victims of racist police violence" and its
"opposition to the criminalization of anti-fascist protests, al-
ways and everywhere". The city's "Megaphon", a monthly
street-magazine sold mainly by asylum-seekers at prominent
street corners in Graz, interviewed the 22-year old, Nigerian-
born organizer of a local Black Lives Matter demonstration,
which had been arranged via social media and attracted
10,000 people on 6 June: Precious Nnebedum explained how
after ten years in Austria, she still felt as though she was living
through a liminal stage (*Zwischenzustand*), that her initiative
was a response to systematic, structural racism, and that her
hope was for growing awareness – on the dominant majority's
part – of the continuing pervasiveness of everyday racism
(Reiter 2020).

Corroborating the earlier observation that glocalization
can entail or crystallize ideological polarization, rather differ-
ent responses to George Floyd's murder and receptions of the
Black Lives Matter protests were in evidence in some readers'
letters published in Austria's most widely-read newspaper, the
already quoted tabloid "Kronen Zeitung":

I absolutely oppose any racism […]. Yet my attitude has
changed somewhat over recent years, life in Austria is not as safe as
it used to be […] George Floyd's death does not leave me un-
touched. No human deserves this. Yet, I think the hysteria is exag-
gerated. Floyd was no normal citizen […] his list of misdemeanours
is considerable! Why do papers not report this? Would we in Aus-
tria demonstrate for a neighbour or stranger with this kind of biog-
raphy? Especially when demonstrating risks our health? (Kronen
Zeitung reader's letter, 21 June 2020: 38, my translation).

When an African-American is killed through police violence,
this must have the same consequences as when a white citizen is af-

fected. However, when this leads to worldwide demonstrations, loot-
ings and robberies, there is no logic to this. Neither can I understand
why Mister Floyd is celebrated as a hero, although he spent more
than five years in prison, also for threatening a pregnant woman with
a weapon. Heroes look different, and whoever reports this is consid-
ered a rightwing racist! I am much more concerned about what a
policeman said at a demonstration, namely that he would now worry
about stopping a black person for fear of the consequences (Kronen
Zeitung reader's letter, 15 June 2020: p. 24, my translation).

Some of the discursive features discussed earlier reappear
here, including the xenophobically stereotypical conflation of
migration or multiculturalism with criminality, (unsupported)
claims of media-bias, or a framing of a specific political posi-
tion (i.e. criticism of anti-racist protests) through another issue
(e.g. the Covid-19 pandemic). The second reader's letter
makes even bolder claims, some exaggerating (i.e. "worldwide
lootings"), other partly relativising and quasi-conspiratorial.
Read alongside the first discursive episode (i.e. Kickl's parlia-
mentary address) analysed above, such argumentative posi-
tions corroborate Andreas Exenberger's (2011: 40) observa-
tion that glocalization in Austria includes a "discrepancy be-
tween official image[s] of openness" and clearly exclusionary
"opinions and practical actions" in the domain of everyday
life. In the specific context at hand, yet other readers' letters
were quick to endorse a reading of the Black Lives Matter
protests as being about matters of material social inequality
(rather than racism), to project those onto Austria, or to argue
– contrary to the historical evidence (see Klenk 2020) – that
what happens in the US could not occur in Austria:

There are lootings, police cars are destroyed, famous Ameri-
cans' statues are toppled. The driving force is not just protest against
racism, but also social problems […]. Society is split between the
super-rich and the poor. The middle-class has vanished. The demon-
strations are not just against racism. The split between rich and poor
plays a major role. The middle-class is also disappearing in Austria.
Kurz and his colleagues, who look after the rich, must ensure this
does not continue, otherwise we will also have to expect massive
protests (Kronen Zeitung reader's letters (*a*), 16 June 2020: 32, my
translation).

As there are worldwide protests against racist actions by US police, another policeman shoots an African American without reason. As a former policeman, I simply cannot understand this. Do other countries not require psychological tests of potential police recruits? In Austria, such police action and misuse of arms is practically impossible (Kronen Zeitung reader's letter (*b*), 16 June 2020: 32, my translation).

The immediate context to such readers' letters must of course be born in mind, namely their publication in an exceptionally popular, tabloid newspaper with a long-established reputation for being EU-sceptical and on the Right of the political spectrum (e.g. Rittberger 2009). Yet, the paper also contains occasional counter-discourses, such as another reader's letter that strongly sided with prominent athletes' endorsements of the Black Lives Matter movement and which criticized a German referee's decision to book a player for revealing an undershirt calling for "justice for George Floyd" (Kronen Zeitung reader's letter, 14 June 2020: 40).

In the course of the summer of 2020, public debate in Austria turned yet more earnestly towards some of the wider questions that had also been raised, again transnationally, in the course of the Black Lives Matter movement. One recurring position tantamount to a caricaturing of demands to rethink established ways of representing painful historical chapters or tainted political figures was epitomized in the above-quoted regional FPÖ politician's defence of the Kloepfer sculpture in Graz and his accompanying warning against a "cancel culture", which purportedly threatened to "erase history" (quoted in Kronen Zeitung 2020b, my translation). In parts of the country's broadsheet press, meanwhile, complex questions about cultural representations, public debate and collective memory were being treated with considerably more nuance and, yet again, with important transnational input. Interviewed in the Viennese weekly "Falter", the internationally acclaimed German-Austrian novelist (and previous resident of New York) Daniel Kehlmann was asked about his assessment of the toppling of statues or the banning of racist films increasingly subsumed under the (problematic) term "cancel culture". Kehlmann's reading of the US in the post-George Floyd

era was that the country was deeply divided, that Black Lives
Matter had become a revolutionary movement, and that "can-
cel culture" reflected the fact that the history of racism, and its
continuing everyday violence, had never been properly, i.e.
critically, confronted. Asked about his signing of an open-
letter in the US critical of large media corporations' "policing"
of employees' politically "problematic" opinions on twitter,
Kehlmann explained this as criticism not of political correct-
ness but of an "increasingly radicalising demand for consen-
sus" intolerant of "the smallest difference"[10]. When asked
about the spraying of the Lueger monument discussed above,
Kehlmann expressed his support for such protest (Dusini,
Klenk 2020). Other Austrian commentators offered similar
nuance in combining strong support for the fight against rac-
ism with scepticism about some other manifestations of a long
overdue and urgently needed consciousness of racial oppres-
sion. "Profil" journalist Martin Staudinger (2020), for exam-
ple, criticized the BBC's decision to temporarily remove a
1975 episode of "Fawlty Towers" from its streaming pro-
gramme. This had been based on the depiction of racist lan-
guage in the episode in question. Staudinger argued for a nec-
essary return to contextualization and that the BBC had
wrongly confused representations critical of racism (i.e. such
as Fawlty Towers') with its purported (if advertent) endorse-
ment.

Elsewhere in Austria's broadsheet press, the case of the
Karl Lueger statue being sprayed triggered sophisticated dis-
cussions about the ethics of public memory and representation
with regard to local (and global) histories of exclusion and
discrimination. An article in "Der Standard" quoted art histo-
rian Werner Telesko who argued against the toppling of his-
torically problematic statues and, instead, for their critical
contextualization through artistic "interventions". Historian
Heidemarie Uhl added to this by stressing that decisions as to
whom to memorialize were inevitably contested, and that as-
sociated discussions needed to be prepared to face the moral
"ambivalence" of many historical figures (Griesser 2020). Pri-
or to this, artist Eduard Freudmann had argued for "more
courage to topple" problematic monuments. Insisting that

monuments and street-names represent "societal attitudes", Freudmann argued that the questioning of historical views publicly articulated was part of a confident democracy. In opposition to warnings against the purported "erasure of history", Freudmann pointed out that the obviously necessary renaming of various "Adolf Hitler squares" in and after 1945 had not erased history. Accompanying panels (such as the one depicted in fig. 3) do not suffice, Freudmann argued; and that streets named after historically problematic figures should be renamed first and their histories be acknowledged by contextualising, public information thereafter. Further, Freudmann endorsed a petition by Austria's Jewish Students' body and a socialist youth organization for the Lueger statue to be removed and to be placed in a museum. A remaining, then emptied pedestal could be artistically redesigned to contextualize and critically reflect on the local history behind it (Freudmann 2020)[11].

What is most significant about each of these examples to our present discussion is that they take developments and events "elsewhere" to then reflect upon their local relevance as well as about the wider political questions they pose. These were, in other words, glocalized debates about the politics of representation.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This article has examined competing forms of glocalization in evidence in Austria today. The specific examples discussed have spanned nationalist retrenchment; local support for the transnational Black Lives Matter movement, including context-specific appropriations of the critical revisiting of (historically tainted) public monuments; and wider public debates of the underlying questions – particularly pertaining to the politics of representation – that global events also brought to the forefront of Austrian discussions in the summer of 2020. Several key-insights emerge from the present analysis. First, recent events in Austria, national and local, underscore that what is needed here is a broad conceptualization of globaliza-

tion as comprising multiple transnational flows. Second, this
enables us to recognize glocalization as a similarly multi-
dimensional phenomenon, insofar as any global flow is a po-
tential object of local translation and re-appropriation. Third,
and this is the central argument emerging from this discussion,
glocalization can and does take ideologically diverse forms.
Viewed alongside and in contrast to the transnational solidari-
ties inspired by Black Lives Matter, the example of nationalist
rhetoric analysed as our first discursive "episode" above –
with its characteristic attempt to conflate migration, pluralism
and criminality – shows this most succinctly. Kickl's parlia-
mentary address was nothing if not nation-centred. Yet, and
this goes considerably beyond long-established understand-
ings of nationalist (or any identity-constructing) discourse as
requiring "otherness", Kickl's rhetoric derived significant
momentum from its particular, distinctly global points of ref-
erence and its ideologically motivated reading of those. Such
nationalist glocalization also corroborates the late Ulrich
Beck's (2017) observation that in our globalizing era even neo-
nationalism requires, in apparent contradiction to its explicit
premises, "frames" of action and discourse that are unmistak-
ably global.

Furthermore, the discussion above has also shown that re-
lated observations also apply to politically very different posi-
tions. Our understanding of what enables particular forms of
glocalization to take hold requires us to pay close attention to
contextually available and prominent flows and influences
from "elsewhere". More concretely, it was the sudden, global
salience of a growing awareness of racial oppression that made
the particular, local symbolic protests examined as my second
cluster of examples possible. The regional histories that have
come to be the object of protest and debate in Vienna and
Graz have long been known. Yet, it was only against the
backdrop of a global, anti-racist movement gathering momen-
tum after George Floyd's murder that protests against locally
prominent signs of the regional histories of anti-Semitism have
acquired a new frame and register of expression.

This discussion's final analytical step then illustrated that
while ideological polarization is part of Austria's current "lo-

cal-global-nexus" (Beck 2000), the latter is not exhausted by the former. Instead, glocalization also takes other forms, some of which – i.e. in the cases examined here – include ongoing and nuanced discussions about the politics of representation. Here, again, the discursive and argumentative entanglements of "the global" and "the local" were prominent: specific reflections on local issues thus take shape through intertextual reference to, or with analogical illustration through, global examples and phenomena. What is more, engagement with relevant public debates echoes conceptualizations of "the everyday" as a deeply political domain (e.g. see Karner 2007), in which (multiple) power structures are endured, reflected upon, and – at times – resisted. The current discussion can help refine such an understanding further by drawing attention to our era's glocalization of the politics of everyday life.

Finally, this article has also illustrated some of the methodological challenges involved in researching glocalization. In the absence of a singular, obvious or pre-established methodological paradigm for capturing prevalent, in situ negotiations of multiple global flows, what are needed are ethnographic sensitivity, local knowledge and careful historical contextualization. While this discussion has attempted to offer precisely as much, it is stating the obvious to concede that the emerging insights remain tied to the particular empirical contexts and episodes examined here. More research, in and beyond the settings described, is of course called for. The provisional or episode-specific understandings generated here in turn reflect the very character of glocalization, which – akin to globalization (Lemert 2015: 95) – is best regarded as a "process" and, at most, as emerging or partly crystallising structures implicating (globally and locally) shifting social realities.

NOTES

[1] Haider died in a car crash in the outskirts of Klagenfurt in October 2008.
[2] A town north of Vienna.
[3] The chronology of events claimed here is noteworthy and revealing of the FPÖ's position on the (far-)right of the ideological spectrum: Kickl's version thus in-

verts the actual sequence of events widely reported, which revolved around Turkish nationalists attacking pro-Kurdish, left-wing demonstrators (e.g. Matzinger 2020a).

[4] This is a house in Vienna's tenth district that was formerly owned by Austria's communist party and subsequently became a centre of anti-fascist, far-left and anarchist activism.

[5] Presumably this is a reference to earlier assessments, for example during the "refugee crisis" of 2015, that noted the high educational levels of many forced migrants. Kickl (mis)quotes this out of context, with the intention of imagining a collective insult against "the average Austrian", with whom he clearly sides against the ÖVP.

[6] Groups of far-right Turkish nationalists.

[7] The definition employed here draws on Ernest Gellner's classical account of nationalism as the attempt to make, or keep, "culture and polity congruent" (1983: 49); as a result, such perspectives commonly perceive "flows" or influences from the outside as problematic, unwanted or threatening.

[8] This area also lies in the immediate vicinity of the site of the terrible terrorist attack in central Vienna on 2 November 2020. This attack has since led to much discussion about the local manifestations of the international menace of radical Islamism.

[9] This formulation, i.e. "seen from today's perspective", has all the discursive hallmarks of what Ruth Wodak (2016: 118) terms a strategy of "relativization".

[10] For a related and not dissimilar argument about "cancel culture" and its silencing or repression of disagreement, instead of cultivating a culture of debate over competing perspectives, see Charim (2020).

[11] The discussions have continued, intensified and polarized since: a group of artists including Eduard Freudmann have sought to make the graffitied protests permanent, i.e. by turning some of the sprayed writings into golden concrete, and a group of organizations has been calling for a renaming of the square in question. There have also been reactions from the opposite end of the political spectrum, with far-right activists attempting to remove the protest letters from the Lueger statue. (ORF Wien 2020).

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