

# **The Sublime is What Forces Us to Think**

## **How the Kantian sublime informs the genesis of thought in Deleuze**

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Although Deleuze has written a whole volume on Kant, in the present essay I am paying close attention to a short and concentrated article of his on Kant's third Critique entitled, *The Idea of Genesis in Kant's Aesthetic*, because in it Deleuze highlights how the sublime experience is conducive to the aesthetic ought in Kant's architectonic system, and how the sublime experience is necessary to engender artistic creativity. I argue, that although Deleuze rejects Kant's thesis that there should be universal rules which determine thinking, he does take up Kant's ideas of there being various mental faculties or capacities, which need to work together to produce all forms of thought and creative output. The possible disharmony of the distinct faculties, the violence that one might commit over the other, as happens in Kant's sublime experience, becomes the violence in Deleuze's philosophy which engenders creativity and, ultimately, forces one to think.

Keywords: Kant, Deleuze, faculties, creativity.

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It is well-known that the works of Giles Deleuze have roots in his interpretation of previous philosophers, to whose mental portraits he dedicated the first decades of his career. However, these predecessors were not all seen as friends; in fact, the philosopher whose work challenged him for the longest time, Immanuel Kant, was referred to by him as foe<sup>1</sup>.

Although Deleuze has written a whole volume on Kant, the focus of this essay will be a short and concentrated article of his on Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, entitled *The Idea of Genesis in Kant's Aesthetics*<sup>2</sup>, because this article was written between the book on Kant and *Difference and Repetition* and in it, Deleuze highlights several of his findings, to which he returns when outlining his own philosophical vision.

Although Deleuze rejects Kant's notion of transcendental logic, i.e. the idea that there should be universal rules which determine thinking, he does accept Kant's ideas of there being various mental faculties or capacities which need to work together to produce thought or aesthetic ideas. The possible disharmony of these faculties, the violence that one might commit against the other, as happens in Kant's sublime experience, is a topic, which Deleuze takes on and elaborates in his later works.

I would like to present how the above article on genesis in Kant's aesthetics gives insight into the genesis of some key-terms in Deleuze's own philosophy but, also, draw attention to this work as a significant and original piece of interpretation, which offers

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<sup>1</sup> From *Lettre à Michele Cressole* cited in G. Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy - The Doctrine of the Faculties* (1963), translated by H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, The Athlone Press, London 1984, p. xv.

<sup>2</sup> G. Deleuze, *The Idea of Genesis in Kant's Aesthetics* (1963), in "Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities", V/3, 2000, pp. 57-70.

solution to several questions that have for long been the subject of ardent debate amongst Kant commentators.

Deleuze tackles the most important interpretive questions of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* from a systematic point of view, namely: how does the third *Critique* complete Kant's critical oeuvre? While solving this main issue he constructs an answer to a lesser but still puzzling sub-debate on why the sections of the *Critique of Judgment* follow each other in the order they do. That is to say, what explains that Kant exposes us to his theory of taste starting with the *Analytic of the Beautiful* followed by the *Analytic of the Sublime* and only subsequently performs the *Deduction of the Judgment of Taste*, finally finishing the aesthetic part of the third *Critique* with the sections on genius and art?

His answer to the architectonic question, in brief, proposes that the third *Critique* shows how an indeterminate relation between the faculties grounds their determined relations as described in the previous two *Critiques*. Furthermore, he takes Kant's description of the sublime and proposes that the way the faculties relate to one another in the sublime provides us with the model of how the faculties, which create specific hierarchical structures to fulfil their speculative and practical functions, may free themselves from the thus created structures and may reorganize their relations in a different manner serving new functions.

Seeing the description of the sublime as providing a key to a mechanism of reordering the faculties to function in new ways helps Deleuze explain why the sections of the CPJ follow each other in the way they do. I will now start unravelling the above interpretive issues. Subsequently, I will highlight how Deleuze's reading of Kant feeds into his own work.

In light of the above, I divided my paper into the following sections:

- I. Indeterminate accord as ground for possible cooperation between the faculties,
- II. The sublime as model for functional reorganization,
- III. Purpose as meta-aesthetic interest.

## 1. The indeterminate accord of the faculties as ground for possible cooperation

Contrary to the interpretive tradition which sees the harmony of the faculties as a particular joyous state of mind pertaining to judgments of taste, Deleuze claims that free harmony is a state of the faculties, which grounds all judgments<sup>3</sup>.

To an extent Deleuze may argue for his position relying on a close reading of the text since Kant himself stipulates that an accord between the imagination and the understanding constitutes the subjective condition of a cognitive judgment. In the *First Introduction* to the CPJ we read:

A merely reflecting judgment about a given individual object, however, can be aesthetic, if (before its comparison with others is seen), the power of judgment, which has no concept ready for the given intuition, holds the imagination (merely in the apprehension of the object) together with the understanding (in the presentation of a concept in general) and perceives a relation of the two faculties of cognition which constitutes the subjective, merely sensitive condition of the objective use of the power of judgment in general (namely the agreement of those two faculties with each other)<sup>4</sup>.

There are several other passages in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, where Kant compares determinate and reflective judgment, and emphasizes that the difference between an aesthetic reflective and a determinate judgment is that through determinate judgments we determine objects by bringing our sensible intuitions under concepts<sup>5</sup>, while in a reflective judgment we are faced with a particular representation for which we do *not* have a concept, thus we *search* for it. Kant's remarks have led several commentators to search for the connection between cognizing and reflecting, and to conceive of the aesthetic-receptive state as a state which is, on the one hand, a type of reflection and, on the other, some type of contribution to or preparation for determining judgment.

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<sup>3</sup> Ivi, p. 62. In *Kant's Critical Philosophy* Deleuze argues that the indeterminate accord of the faculties is reflective judgment itself. See: G. Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy - The Doctrine of the Faculties* (1963), cit., pp. 60-61.

<sup>4</sup> I. Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 1790, translated and edited by P. Guyer & E. Matthews, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000, 20: 224.

<sup>5</sup> Without going into detail about Kant's theory of how we arrive at empirical knowledge claims, in brief, what is at stake here is his conception that we arrive at judgments about empirical objects by bringing our particular. perceptual, sensible representations (intuitions) under concepts (universal, mediate representations based on rules).

Paul Guyer, in a fairly recent volume dedicated to *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy*<sup>6</sup>, divides various interpretive constructions of free play into three possible interpretive strategies, namely: (i) the precognitive (ii) the multi-cognitive, and (iii) the meta-cognitive approach<sup>7</sup>. In his rendition, the precognitive interpretation of the harmony of the faculties would envisage free play as a state of mind, which precedes bringing a sensible intuition under a determinate concept. On Guyer's picture most interpreters represent such a precognitive view, since they emphasize that the mind's engagement in free play occurs in a state when a sensible representation is being apprehended and comprehended, but not brought under any determinate concept. He assigns to this group the interpretations of Dieter Henrich, Donald Crawford, Ralf Meerbote, Hannah Ginsborg, Rudolf Makkreel, and Fred Rush.<sup>7</sup> A slightly different interpretive strategy is when the free play of the faculties is seen not simply as a precognitive phase, but as a state of mind where we perceive something to which we might apply a number of determinate concepts. None is compelling, however, and therefore it is possible to play with equally applicable conceptual possibilities. This would be the multi-cognitive reading, represented by Gerhard Seel and, arguably, Malcolm Budd<sup>8</sup>.

Guyer, however, raises criticism against both the precognitive and the multi-cognitive stances on two grounds: (i) the precognitive approach maintains that pleasure is experienced in a state of mind apt for making a determinate judgment, yet the judgment had not been carried out. The multi-cognitive approach maintains that pleasure is felt in a state of mind when multiple concepts might be applicable. But this poses the question: - why should we feel pleasure merely for being prepared to do a task, which has not even been carried out? Guyer makes this point with more precision:

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<sup>6</sup> P. Guyer, *The Harmony of the Faculties Revisited*, in R. Kukla (ed. by) *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006, pp. 162-193.

<sup>7</sup> *Ivi*, pp.165-170. Cf. D. Henrich, *Kant's Explanation of Aesthetic Judgment*, in E. Förster (ed. by) *Aesthetic Judgment and the Moral Image of the World*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1992, p.38. D. Crawford, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1974, p. 90; R. Meerbote, *Reflection on Beauty*, in T. Cohen and P. Guyer (ed. by) *Essays in Kant's Aesthetics*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1982, pp. 55-86. R. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant, The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1990, p.47. F. Rush, *The Harmony of the Faculties*, in "Kant Studien", 92, 2001, pp. 57-58.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. G. Seel, *Über den Grund der Lust an schönen Gegenständen: Kritische Fragen an die Ästhetik Kants*, in H. Oberer and G. Seel (hrsg.v.) *Kant: Analysen – Probleme – Kritik*, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1988, p. 344. M. Budd, *The Pure Judgment of Taste as an Aesthetic Reflective Judgment*, in "British Journal of Aesthetics", XLI, 2001, p. 255.

why should endless re-imaginings of cognitive possibilities come with pleasure? He notes that in some cases such an activity might be pleasurable, but in others frustrating<sup>9</sup>.

Guyer's solution to the problem, as he conceives of it, is to give a 'meta-cognitive reading' of the harmony of the faculties, insisting that the aesthetic judgment does not replace the determinate judgment, but is *additional* to it. In his reading «the pleasure expressed by a judgment of taste must be connected to the satisfaction of our underlying objective in cognition, namely, the unification of our manifolds of intuition»<sup>10</sup>. The merit of such meta-cognitive reading would be to show, how in a judgment of taste the requisites of the first Critique for making a determinate judgment and the requisites of the third, that the judgment of taste is based on pleasure, are both met. We see and judge that 'this is a rose' and simultaneously we also feel pleasure and judge that 'this rose is beautiful'. On Guyer's account, the pleasure comes from how our perceptions or intuitions of the particular rose satisfactorily come together to form a unified representation.

While all the above interpreters try to explain how the aesthetic state of mind, which Kant refers to as a merely reflective judgment, could be the subjective condition of all objective determinate judgments by comparing the cases of cognizing, i.e., getting to know an object with reflecting upon an object, Deleuze approaches the problem from a very different angle. He does not dwell on the relation between the cognitive and the aesthetic state. He does not make much of Kant's remark that «the power of judgment has no concept ready for the given intuition» and does not think that holding «the imagination (merely in the apprehension of the object) together with the understanding (in the presentation of a concept in general)»<sup>11</sup> should be something that follows from lacking a concept for a given intuition. To this extent, he agrees with Guyer that aesthetic pleasure cannot be explained if we approach it primarily as a lack (a lack of concepts). However, while Guyer argues for his own meta-cognitive stance still having cognition as an aim in mind, Deleuze leaves the cognizing paradigm behind. That is to say, Deleuze does not aim to show that aesthetic pleasure has anything to do with

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<sup>9</sup> P. Guyer, *The Harmony of the Faculties Revisited*, cit., p.177.

<sup>10</sup> *Ivi*, p.178.

<sup>11</sup> I. Kant, *First Introduction*, 20:224 (I. Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, cit., pp. 26-27).

successful cognition, since he does not share the beliefs coming from an analytic, philosophy-of-mind tradition which asserts that the purpose of the mind was cognizing.

Instead, Deleuze argues from a systematic point of view and says that what we need to compare is not a reflective judgment and a determinate judgment making a knowledge claim about our empirical experience, but any kind of judgment where the faculties are organized in relation to one another in a determinate manner with the state when the faculties are related to one another in an indeterminate manner.

Thus, what Deleuze contributes to the analyses of the harmony of the faculties is the idea that what we have seen in Kant's first two *Critiques*: the faculties cooperate with each other in a determinate manner, with one faculty in a leading role, strictly determining the operations of another faculty in order to complete a task. This is to say that in the first two *Critiques* Kant establishes that for a given task the faculties work together in a hierarchical manner. Namely, in the Critique of Pure Reason, we see the understanding determining the work of the imagination to arrive at determinate judgments concerning an object; in the Critique of Practical Reason we see the faculty of reason determine the understanding to arrive at a practical judgment. Deleuze argues that these determinate accords would not be possible if the faculties could not shift the way they relate to one another and re-establish their hierarchies in a new manner. In brief, the various hierarchical relations of the faculties are only possible if no hierarchy is stable, the faculties can shift and reorder themselves for the various activities of the mind<sup>12</sup>.

Although, Deleuze's argument has a certain logic to it, one could argue that if the faculties get disentangled from a previously established hierarchical state, such disentanglement does not guarantee that they do get attuned in some kind of an accord, not to mention pleasurable accord. Deleuze has to substantiate his claim with further arguments, which he does by analysing how the sequence of the sections in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* are organized and by considering the experience of the sublime as a model for the reorganization of the faculties or, as he puts it, the model for the genesis of a certain organization of the faculties.

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<sup>12</sup> G. Deleuze, *The Idea of Genesis in Kant's Aesthetics* (1963), cit., p.60. For an extensive analyses on how one faculty determines the operations of another, see: G. Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy - The Doctrine of the Faculties*, cit.

The most important observation about the sequence is that the section on the *Analytic of the Sublime* precedes the *Deduction of Taste*, and the reason for this, Deleuze argues, is that the model of experience encountered in the sublime informs the deduction.

## **2. The model of faculty re-organization provided by the *Analytic of the Sublime***

The faculty reorganization Deleuze has in mind, which happens during the sublime experience, consists of freeing the imagination from the guidance of the understanding and re-coupling it with reason.

The sublime experience starts with the sighting of a natural scene which the mind tries to cognize in its usual way. This means that our faculties attempt to proceed along the steps of the three synthesis of object cognition delineated in the *Critique of Pure Reason*<sup>13</sup>. Therefore, in Kant's terms, the mind attempts to apprehend, comprehend, and unify under a concept which it senses. However, in the case of sublime experience, the encountered scene is so enormous or so overwhelmingly powerful and chaotic that it cannot be comprehended in one image by the viewer's imagination. In cognitive terms, this means that while the mind is capable of adding up the details of the sighted scene, the sighted phenomenon is so vast, seemingly 'limitless' or 'formless' that it cannot be unified in any one image, i.e., it cannot be comprehended. As a consequence, the imagination fails to fulfil its task in cognition under the guidance of the understanding, as the routine case would be. In this failure, however, reason is already implicated since, in Kant's terms, it is speculative reason which figures that all objects must have limits and thus should be able to be comprehended as objects having a particular form<sup>14</sup>. It is reason which seeks to know the world as a re-presentable entity and thus, through the understanding, reason pushes the imagination to comprehend<sup>15</sup>. However, when this effort is produced in vain, something violent happens. The imagination's repeated failure to comprehend the scene leads to a feeling of being overwhelmed, exhausted and, ultimately, it leads to the moment of despair contained in the sublime. As Deleuze interprets it, despair pushes the mind to switch, the faculties to give up on cognizing,

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<sup>13</sup> I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), translated and edited by P. Guyer & A. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998, A99-110 (pp. 228-234).

<sup>14</sup> *Ivi*, A516-523/B546-551.

<sup>15</sup> I. Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, cit., 5:250-5:251.



and the failure to accomplish the impossible task becomes a presentation of precisely what the mind cannot do: it cannot know the infinite. As Deleuze points out, the imagination provides us with a negative presentation of the infinite<sup>16</sup>. However, this also means that the imagination is no longer partnered with the understanding, but with reason. Deleuze argues that the faculty pushed to its limit is also freed; the imagination failing to comprehend stops trying to comprehend and moves towards a new role. Unbounded apprehending activity becomes the symbol of an unbounded world; the mind's activity itself becomes the presentation of the idea of infinity<sup>17</sup>.

According to the dominant Kant interpretation, the fact that reason is ready with an idea for that which the imagination, guided by the understanding, cannot know, brings with itself the realization that reason, which can think the super-sensible, is superior to understanding and sensibility which can only cognize the empirical in a limited way. We can conclude that reason is our strongest power, the true precursor of the human vocation. The rational being triumphs over the sensible being.

However, in Deleuze's reading, there is a richer yield. The discord brought about by the confrontation with a sensible site which puts the imagination to its limit, will be the model for Deleuze's theory about what it is that forces us to think. Although skillful application of concepts may amount to an artful activity in its own right, as in the example of the doctor who already has the diagnosis for an illness, but needs to decide on the applicable cure in the light of contra-indications, such an artful case of determinate judgment, still does not necessitate activation of deeper, original, spontaneous powers. Original spontaneity, the original, active, creative power of the faculties only comes to light in reflective judgment. Only in reflective judgment, when «nothing is given from the standpoint of the active faculties; only a raw material presents itself, without really being "represented"»<sup>18</sup>, only in such cases can the active powers of the mind demonstrate their original creativity. Because vis-a-vis such raw-material, when the sensible given is presented but not yet represented or, in specifically Kantian terms, apprehended but not comprehended, «all the active faculties of the mind are exercised freely»<sup>19</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> G. Deleuze, *The Idea of Genesis in Kant's Aesthetics* (1963), cit., p.63.

<sup>17</sup> Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, cit., §§ 26-29.

<sup>18</sup> G. Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy - The Doctrine of the Faculties*, cit., p.60.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

In the interpretation of Deleuze, this free exercise of the mind's active or constructive faculties is exactly what Kant calls reflection and what, as Deleuze has shown, boils down to an indeterminate accord<sup>20</sup>, an accord where no faculty has a leading, determining role, thus the outcome of the reflective act can yield something creative, something new, be it an idea, an image, or a decision.

### **3. The *Deduction of Taste* is based on a meta-aesthetic interest: the shift from determining judgment to reflective judgment is made by reason**

The sections on the sublime in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* are followed by the *Deduction of Taste*. In the *Analytic of Taste*, Kant spells out how one of the defining features, one of the 'moments' of experiencing something beautiful, is that we expect our experience of beauty to be universally shareable. However, in the *Analytic*, Kant does not deduce what the a priori principle might be which gives rise to this expectation.

The task of the Deduction is to explain why an ought is attached to judgments of taste. Why is it that we expect universal acclaim for the music of Bach and Mozart? - muses Deleuze<sup>21</sup>. If the judgment of taste is subjective, based on pleasure, why should we expect it to be universal?

This claim for universal approval is what requires a deduction. What the deduction reveals is that the claim comes from an interest of reason. Although the judgment of taste is disinterested, the hope that nature could be harmonized with human purpose the finding that nature produces forms which are in accord with the pleasurable, and the indeterminate purposive relation of the faculties is in the interest of reason, such disinterested pleasure in nature gives hope that human purpose is realizable in an environment determined by causal, mechanical laws. What Deleuze adds to Kant's theory is that this free relation of the faculties is generated by reason in a similar way to its generation of the sublime.

In the CPK he puts the problem in the following terms:

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<sup>20</sup> It would be worthy to contrast in further research the standpoint of Deleuze's compatriot, Lyotard who insists that the accord of the faculties is but a promise with Deleuze's who insists that indeterminate accord of the faculties is the ground of their cooperation in determinate forms. Cf. F. Lyotard, *Leçons sur l'Analytique du Sublime*, Éditions Galilée, Paris 1991.

<sup>21</sup> G. Deleuze, *The Idea of Genesis in Kant's Aesthetics* (1963), cit., p. 61.

But is it sufficient to assume this free accord, to suppose it a priori? Must it not be, on the contrary, produced in us? That is to say: should aesthetic common sense not be the object of a genesis, of a properly transcendental genesis? This problem dominates the first part of the *Critique of Judgement*; there are several complex points in its solution<sup>22</sup>.

It is reason that frees the imagination from the yoke of the understanding and instigates it to return to its original, spontaneously schematizing activity, taking pleasure in the forms produced by nature. Imagination, reflecting on form, compares, superimposes, and playfully reproduces the received intuited form, and this spontaneous activity proves joyful. It is Deleuze's point that for such joy to acquire depth, an additional thought is needed, namely the thought that such beautiful forms are provided by nature. Reason's meta-aesthetic interest, the thought that nature has produced such beauty, the feeling that nature is in the end hospitable to mankind is what makes aesthetic pleasure universally expected and complete. If we recall Kant's insistence that we should distinguish between beautiful objects and beautiful views of objects, the latter being the case when we see something from afar, indistinctly, and our imagination invents the detail, or if we recall how Kant describes our disappointment that what seemed as birdsong turns out to be the performance of a skilful whistler, we see how great an emphasis Kant places on observing that beautiful form should be genuinely produced by nature<sup>23</sup>.

While, in the case of the sublime, imagination is freed from the understanding to present a negative presentation; in the beautiful, imagination is freed from the understanding to dwell in reflection on form. The move that frees the imagination from the guidance of the understanding, so that it would not remain in the domain of cognizing, is instigated by reason which superimposes on the determining activity of the understanding reflective activity, in other words the indeterminate, spontaneous, creative activity of the higher faculties. It is in the domain of aesthetic judgment, where not only reason's suprasensible destination is revealed, but also that of the imagination<sup>24</sup>.

Ultimately, in Deleuze's reading of Kant, the interest of reason, the purposiveness of the human mind to realize freedom in nature step in to bring about the unification of the

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<sup>22</sup> G. Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy - The Doctrine of the Faculties*, cit., p. 50.

<sup>23</sup> I. Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, cit., 5:243.

<sup>24</sup> G. Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy - The Doctrine of the Faculties*, cit., p. 51.

faculties. While a determinate accord between the faculties always has a specific functional role aimed at carrying out a particular task, the indeterminate accord in reflection is like the space between the various gears. In aesthetic reflective judgment, the element added to the indeterminate state is a form produced by nature which meets the original, spontaneous powers of the imagination, and the awareness that nature gives rise to such occasions wherein our mental powers can be realized is what provides the pleasure. However, in Deleuze's analyses, this time spent lingering with beauty is only possible because something frees the mind from its routine cognizing activity and puts it into the aesthetic reflective mode. It is none other than the interest of reason that enables this switch.

### **Concluding Questions for Further Research**

«What is it that forces us to think?»<sup>25</sup> Deleuze famously asks this question as he begins to spell out his own philosophy in *Difference and Repetition*. He investigates both key-terms of the question: A, what is it that forces? and B, what is it to think? As he takes up Artaud's confessions to elucidate the problem, we see that the problem of what amounts to "thinking" comes very close to the problem of being sensitive to circumstance when one should be engaged in determinate vs. reflective judgment.

Artaud said that the problem (for him) was not to orientate his thought, or to perfect the expression of what he thought, or to acquire application and method or to perfect his poems, but simply to manage to think something. (...) He knows that the problem is not to direct or methodically apply a thought which pre-exists in principle and in nature, but to bring into being that which does not yet exist (there is no other work, all the rest is arbitrary, mere decoration). To think is to create - there is no other creation - but to create is, first of all, to engender «thinking» in thought<sup>26</sup>.

The idea to engender thinking into thought, the idea to make thinking an act of creation is to arrive at Kant's moment of reflection, the moment when we have a particular but no determinate concept for it. What Deleuze calls «thinking» only starts when we realize that our concepts and our habitual ways of cognizing are insufficient. Yet, as we

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<sup>25</sup> G. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (1968), translated by P. Patton, Continuum, London-New York 1994, p.139.

<sup>26</sup> *Ivi*, p.147.

learn from Kant, the encounter with raw, indeterminate material, in itself, is not enough to go beyond a simple sense of being overwhelmed, – an exigent demand on the part of the thinker is necessary as well. Kant supplies this demand by giving us the image of a rational being who is free by virtue of being able to think according to rules, and whose highest vocation, therefore, is to think and act in accordance with their legislating reason. Once Deleuze replaces Kant's theory of human beings gifted with a priori modes of thought, which places them in two concurring realms – that of mechanistic and potentially chaotic nature, and that of purposeful reason – with his own theory of the univocity of being, the question must be asked: what draws one to think in Deleuze's own philosophy? What replaces the interest of reason when contemplating the indeterminate given in Deleuze's transcendental empiricism?

Could the Spinozian joyful affirmation of life stand in as meta-aesthetic interest in enabling the birth of creative thought? These would be areas to investigate in a further essay, exploring the sublime as the experience of the violence of one human capacity over the other, forcing one to think and create in realms which surpass the aesthetic.