THE HEURISTIC POWER OF AGAPISM IN PEIRCE’S PHILOSOPHY
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1. On the Relation between Ideality and Reality in Peirce
In the Introduction to his Philosophie der Natur, Friedrich Schelling already warned about the illusion that Kant’s critical philosophy had, finally and effectively, buried empiric realism, notwithstanding having replaced it by an empiric idealism. This comment of Schelling, somewhat surprising, does not seem to acknowledge a radical inflexion intended by the transcendental Kantian philosophy as regards a naïve realism associated with a «crude empirism», an expression, incidentally, he himself coined. Indeed, I consider that Schelling’s critique becomes understandable when we perceive it under the horizon of his philosophy of identity that seeks to dissolve all kinds of dichotomies between subjectivity and objectivity. Similar to Peirce and, on all accounts under this aspect, an inspirer of the starting point of Peircean philosophy, Schelling proclaims a genetic principle of unity for his philosophy, antecedent to any beginning of a polarization between subject and object. This principle will be consummated in his doctrine of Objective Idealism that, deriving from a principle of unity, is based on the eidetic common nature of reality and ideality. Then, it is through the prism of Schellingean Idealism that the common territory between empiric realism and empiric idealism appears, and this becomes Schelling’s object of critique. In fact, Schelling recognizes that both doctrines have something in common, namely, the inevitable polarization present in the subject-object relationship that, ultimately, Kant’s Copernican revolution had simply inverted: from the incognizability of das Ding an sich, to the transcendental forms that constitute the subject. In both, the common matrix of a strict nominalism can be discerned. And Schelling is, in light of his philosophies of Identity and Nature, a realistic thinker and, above that, the one who first reconciled realism and idealist wholly, even before Peirce had done in a more clearly logical manner.

Indeed, we emphasize that Peirce appreciatively credits Schelling with the foundations of his Objective Idealism; this doctrine plays the role of genetically depolarizing the subject-object relationship, at first in light of a substantial monism — i.e., affirming that ideality constitutes the ultimate ontologi-

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1 The item 1 of this essay has small parts of the paper Sobre a Identidade Ideal-Real na Filosofia de Charles S. Peirce, and the items 2 and 3 comprise the paper O Amor Criativo como Princípio Heurístico na Filosofia de Peirce. These parts have already been published in Portuguese in 2000 and 2005, respectively, in «Cognitio-Revista de Filosofia». Associated with a brand new text written for this essay, they now appear in English under formal authorization by «Cognitio».


3 This naïve realism, associated with a crude empiricism, was defended by Hume’s skepticism, and according to Schelling’s reading of Kant, constitutes the main object of analysis by Kantian philosophy.

4 In a letter to W. James of January 28, 1894, Peirce stated: «My views were probably influenced by Schelling - by all stages of Schelling, but especially by the Philosophie der Natur. I consider Schelling as enormous; and one thing I admire about him is his freedom from the trammels of system and his holding himself uncommitted to any previous utterance. In that, he is like a scientific man. If you were to call my philosophy as a Schellingism transformed in light of modern physics I should not take it hard».

5 CP: 6.605, 1893.
cal fabric of both subjectivity and the reality of a world that, for such subjectivity, places itself fundamentally as another or, in Peircean terminology, as second. Peirce, however, goes further: the genetic subject-object depolarization in his philosophy is not solely substantial, but also favors a symmetrization of logical rights between both; one that is provided by the validity of his categories indifferently to subjective and objective realms. This Herculean task will be performed by his three categories that, undifferentiatedly, will be valid both on the plain of the subjectivity taken logically, and on its objective expression; in other words, on the spheres of representation and of reality as such.

1.1 Reflections on Peirce’s Realism
The vigorous defense of a realism of scholastic extraction that opposes any form of nominalism is a recurrent theme in Peirce’s writings. A deeper understanding of this realism involves redeeming the ancient dispute of the universals that Peirce brings back. Peirce finds in Duns Scotus the paternity of his defense of the reality of generals. I consider this historic recovery of the issue fundamentally important when mentioning, within Peirce’s philosophy, the concept of realism. This is not an empirical realism in the sense criticized by Schelling, and which is designated by the term today, namely, a mere acknowledgment of the existence of an external world of things. Realism of a Scotist extraction affirms the reality of universals that relate to things in their individuality. Thus, when today we affirm a realism of mere acknowledgment of a world external to mind or language, we are, in light of the dispute of the universals as it was proposed by the scholastics, in effect solely adopting a nominalist position. Indeed, the question of the existence of an external world was never an issue for either nominalists or realists. They were interested in another problem, namely, whether universals are real or just a figure of speech. Peirce, incidentally, having provided a clear foundation of his Phenomenology, expounds in this science the experimental base of the belief in an external world, and he does so without polemizing the issue by exposing the external world in terms of a universal reaction against consciousness; it essentially contains the concept of otherness implicit in its category of secondness.

Also in his mature thought, Peirce improves his realism, deeming insufficient a realism of classes that, ultimately, only considers the correspondence between terms and their real generalities. In fact, in his endeavor of bringing the issue of universals back to the forefront, Peirce aims at a realism where real generality is represented by natural laws, taken as wide systems of real relations that can no longer be represented by mere concepts in their atomicity, but that require correspondence with theories that seek to describe the general conduct of complex objects, when taken as continuous phenomenical systems, and not just individual events. It is thus that the study of the logic of relations makes

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6 I created this expression to characterize the generalization power of Peirce’s categories, applied indifferently to man and Nature.
8 See BUCHLER (1939).
9 See, for an interesting approach to this theme, DILEO (1991).
10 See also, FORSTER (2011).
11 Indeed, a realism of classes would only consider closed sets of predicates. Peirce’s latter synechistic realism will take into account the possible logic-ontological relations among such classes, considering these relations as continuous systems.
Peirce reformulate more widely the question of universals, which then assumes the form: «Are any continua real?»

It is important to emphasize again that the final formulation of his system of Categories and the definitive introduction of Phenomenology in his Classification of Sciences, provide consistency to the Peircean project of conceiving a wide-ranging theory of the Real, a theory of the Object, which he calls «Scientific Metaphysics». This consistency comprises two fundamental axes, namely, Realism and Objective Idealism, as totally correlate and mutually necessary doctrines.

1.2 Reality and Ideality in Peirce’s Categories
Peirce’s realism is already effectively described in the phenomenological sphere. His proposal to simultaneously include the diversity of Nature and the unity of the qualities of feeling under the first category, already conceives them in a relation of categorial symmetry; i.e., as identical modes of appearing that heuristically suggest that they are under the same mode of being. The attempt of logical conciliation between appearing and being is already a realistic attitude, in my view. This conciliation will imply admitting a substantial connaturality, namely, a common substantial ideality. Indeed, what links diversity and unity is logical possibility. This common logic character permeates external and internal world alike. By doing so, Peirce brings something new to philosophy, something that is found only in Schelling: the explicit attribution of the classical concept of freedom to both objectivity and subjectivity, which will solve, with a plausible solution, aporias that plagued us for centuries: indeed, only the sharing of logical possibilities could promote it.

How is this symmetry outlined in the second Peircean category? How can one find this experience of reaction, both in the external and internal world? How can the particularity of reaction be interior? In other words, how can this supposed symmetry be maintained in the realm of secondness?

Indeed, Peirce affirms that the phenomenon of reaction against our consciousness is also ubiquitous, perhaps the most universal among them. It is the source of our entire notion of otherness and polarity, where one of these poles comprises the subject in determining its individuality: the consciousness of oneself derives immediately from the consciousness of another. This conceptual consideration has precedents in the history of philosophy, for example, in the second principle of Fichte’s Doctrine of Science, where this determination of individuality occurs through the experience of the reaction of a non-ego to an ego.

Despite Peirce’s disdain for Fichte’s extreme nominalism, a more attentive reading of the Doctrine of Science could have made him appreciate the anti-Cartesian thesis present in its three principles, where the determination of the

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12 NEM: 4, p.343.
13 Kent’s excellent work (1987) on Peirce’s classification of sciences is already a classic.
14 See DELANEY (2002).
15 «Suggest» here is to be taken as an adequate term in the realm of Phenomenology. Peirce insists that this science is not categorical in its propositions. But its conjectural nature that characterizes it as «the first science of philosophy» makes it abductively suggestive for a later theory of the Real.
16 See, for other perspectives, JACQUES (1992) and also MAYORGA (2007).
ego does not mediately derive from a Cogito, but rather has an experiential, phenomenological origin through its interaction with the non-ego\(^{17}\).

It is interesting to see how Peirce, notwithstanding his realism, does not seem to realize that it implies what I will call categorial symmetry — the undifferentiated validity of the three categories to the subjective and the objective world. Peirce’s analysis of an internal non-ego as a kind of otherness resident in the interior world, represented by the past that contains our experienced facticity, provides this internal non-ego with the same property that the external objects have, namely, to react against consciousness. As Peirce puts it:

If you complain to the Past that it is wrong and unreasonable, it laughs. It does not care a snap of the finger for Reason. Its force is brute force\(^{18}\). [...] for the past contains only a certain collection of such cases that have occurred [...]\(^{19}\). The past consists of the sum of faits accomplis [...]. For the Past really acts upon us [...] precisely as an Existent object acts\(^{20}\).

Thus, secondness symmetrizes a class of phenomena that permeate external and internal worlds, undifferently, in their form\(^{21}\). This symmetry is only logically feasible through the admission of the connaturality of the objects belonging to the internal and external worlds.

Finally, and perhaps more easily understandable, the symmetry inherent in the third category comes in the form of the Laws of Nature in the external world, and of positively judicative thought in the inner world. In fact, this notion of internal and external world has two prisms through which they can be seen, namely, having as reference the subject of experience, or having in mind the categorial nature of these worlds. In other words, natural law is external to consciousness, while thought is internal. However, under the second prism, natural laws are of an interior nature, without necessarily implying that this interior belongs to some transcendence. It is only of a logical nature and, evidently, metaphysical. One could, also, logically define internal nature as that which can only be known when it becomes external, namely, by the way in which it becomes a phenomenon. Internal nature, under this logical approach, always possesses modal generality, containing both Firstness and Thirdness: the former as possibility and the latter as necessity. Under this approach, then, the logical nature of Secondness is being external. It reveals what is naturally internal, as freedom and order. All phenomena are governed by Chance and by Law and, thus appear partially ordered or, to put it differently, partially random.

This viewpoint, which refutes the splitting between external and internal worlds and that, contrarily, places them in a continuum, nevertheless, does

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\(^{17}\) See AA I, 2 262 and AA 1, 2 266 in Fichte (1964).

\(^{18}\) CP: 2.84, c. 1902.

\(^{19}\) CP: 2.148, c. 1902.

\(^{20}\) EP2: 357.

\(^{21}\) This subject indeed suggests a future discussion that goes beyond the scope of this paper. This internal facticity, and its generalization of conscious and mainly unconscious symbolic structure, constitute the dynamic object of psychoanalysis, whose specificity is evidenced in each subject-patient.
not impede them from being distinguished without, however, separating them substantially as strangers to each other. Such viewpoint, on the contrary, constitutes a gateway to a more general approach to the Peircean realism-idealism. As long as metaphysics is grounded in logic, the clouds of dogmatism are dispelled and one can navigate heuristically through the theoretical possibilities of the explanation of phenomena.

It must also be stressed that the deepest understanding of Peirce’s categories, the reason for introducing them, their consequences, their ontological overlapping, in short, their meaning vis-à-vis the totality of the theoretical system of Peirce’s philosophy, can only be gained when one considers his cosmology. In particular, in the cosmogenesis, the continuum from which the universe emerges lies the birth of the categories, which emerge in the sequence of first, second, and third. This Peircean proposition enables us to see how the category of secondness arose from Firstness, and how Thirdness arose from secondness. In turn, Firstness has genesis in a germinal Nothing, perhaps one of the most interesting points of Peircean writings, spurring speculation on the nature itself of this Nothing²².

To enlarge upon these reflections will require an entire essay, all of itself. Hence, I here confine myself to observing the significance of Peirce’s realism and idealism.

1.3 Concerning a Synthesis of the Categories
From the point of view of metaphysics, the third category of the triad, Thirdness, constitutes the mode of being of the Laws of nature represented, under these terms, as real mediation between Chance and Existence and comprising, in this order, the real modes of being of Firstness and Secondness. The proposition of the categories within Phenomenology, by describing the modes of being of our human experience, already proclaims, as mentioned, the rupture of the subject-object dualism, since thought and natural law are formal correlates in the realm of Thirdness, similar to freedom, unity of consciousness and Chance, under Firstness, and otherness and existence, under Secondness. To make logically possible the categorically homogeneous subsumption of subjectivity and objectivity, the starting point of Peirce’s philosophy will have to refute, as emphasized, a mind-matter dualism, opting for a monism, on which I will comment later. Nevertheless, it is important to show how, from the point of view of categorical homogeneity, such monism is necessary, rejecting interpretations that, from a tacit viewpoint of a Cartesian dualism, seek unsuccessfully some kind of consistency between realist and idealist positions, both understood in a contemporary way, namely, as opposite doctrines.

Distinguishing reality from existence, like the scholastics, Peirce conceptualizes reality as the locus of ontological generality or, more precisely, of ontologically continuous systems in the form of the laws of nature²³. While reality is subsumed in the third category, existence is that mode of being of the particular, of the individual, characterized by the interacting duality of forces, situated under secondness. The individual materializes, or actualizes, the generality of the law under the form of a temporally ordered behavior, which is the

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²² See, for other perspectives, TURLEY (1977) and also, ESPOSITO (1980).
²³ See, for another approach, MICHAEL (1988).
condition of possibility of the predictive nature of thought generally, in practical life, and of science in particular. Law, under this consideration, contains an esse in futuro to which continuity is justly conferred.\(^{24}\)

The Peircean doctrine of Synecchism, or theory of the continuum, which under its formal aspect is the thesis of the continuity of reality, thus becomes a correlate of the author’s\(^{25}\) Realism. It is from within this Realism that Peirce will extract one of the supporting points for his Idealism.

1.4 Enhancing Objective Idealism

Some points on Peirce’s Objective Idealism merit further consideration. Let us recall that I consider a mind-matter monism a logical consequence of the categorial homogeneity of subject and object. Indeed, Peirce refuses, as mentioned before, the substantial duality between mind and matter as found in Cartesian philosophy, analyzing both alternatives of that monism. On the one hand, a materialist monism leads to insoluble questions as regards the category of Firstness. As we know, Firstness encompasses the mode of being of the unconditioned in the external forms of Chance, and internal forms of the qualities of feeling, which require a point of discontinuity in the continuum of time, represented by the present. The complex logical aspect of the relation between feeling and unity of consciousness, as characteristics of genetic heuristic states, is also fundamental for an understanding and development of his theory of Abduction. Under the aspect of Pragmatism, on the other hand, materialist monism, through an analysis of its practical consequences, will be also an ontological determinism, unacceptable in Peirce’s epistemological system, as this system requires the admissibility of an ontological principle of chance that calls for an indeterminism, whether as to reality or as regards the theories that seek to represent them.\(^{26}\)

Peirce, then, embraces a monism between mind and matter, in the sense of a primarily genealogic eidos, which subsumes matter as mind exhausted by invertebrate habits. This idea, extracted in full from Schelling’s Philosophy of Nature\(^{27}\), proposes a grading of life to the conception of mind. In fact, mind, conceived monistically by incorporating matter as one specialized phenomenon, will be permeated at its higher stages by more intense grades of randomness, due to the marked presence of Firstness in it. This randomness, which appears as variety in phenomena, will continuously and vectorially decrease from mind to matter, viz., from the generic eidetic character of mind to its specialized one, matter.

Thus, the equivalence between reality and ideality proposed by Schelling is fully adopted in Peirce’s philosophy. I refer, evidently, to an Objective

\(^{24}\) See also, MOORE (1968).

\(^{25}\) In this respect, in a passage of his work, Peirce states: «When we come to study the principle of continuity we will gain a more ontological conception of knowledge and reality» (CP: 4.62, 1893).

\(^{26}\) See for other perspectives, COSCULLUELA (1992) and also, BRAKEL (1994).

\(^{27}\) Schelling claimed in his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800): «Matter is indeed, nothing else than mind viewed in an equilibrium of its activities. There is no need to demonstrate at length how, by means of this elimination of all dualism, or all real opposition between mind and matter, whereby the latter is regarded merely as mind under a condition of dulness, or the former, conversely, as matter merely in becoming […]». 
Idealism that, in this way, is not confined solely to the ideality of the subject, once the Cartesian mind-matter dichotomy is overcome\(^\text{28}\).

1.5 Further observations on the overlapping of reality and ideality in Peirce’s philosophy

Emphasis must, once more, be placed on the fact that Peirce’s Idealism has already presented its credentials in the formulation of his Realism. Indeed, to assume the symmetry of the category of Thirdness for thought and law presumes an eidetic connatural unity for both or, in other words, which the texture of thought is possibly the same from the logically objective way of ordering of individuals in secondness. Here, again, there is a cosmological evolutionism whose intrinsic temporality places the human mind, gradually formed in light of a logic inherent in Nature, harmonizing a formal homology between reality and thought. Peirce also insists that the phenomenon of intelligibility of Nature by science deserves serious consideration as support to the idealist thesis. Idealism, thus, to my mind, has substantiality in the mind-matter monism and formality in Realism, with substantiality as the genealogic backdrop of formality, as the author’s cosmogenesis will reveal, through ontology\(^\text{29}\). This is none other than the background of the genetic vagueness of form in the realm of innerness. The growth of the representative form follows the vaguely defined vector that, according to Peirce, is the very sense of all the logic in his positivity.

It must also be stressed that the substantial identity between ideality and reality is the adequate theoretical environment for a correct interpretation not only of ontology, but also of Peirce’s epistemology. This identity, as we here already stressed, ensures annulment of the polarities that generate estrangement between subject and object.

In my view, when taken in their sense of existence or not of external things, realism and idealism are, in effect, irreconcilable\(^\text{30}\). Exemplarily, a radical subjective idealism in the style of Fichte or Berkeley, denies the existence of an external world independently of consciousness. The realism of «external things», in turn, assumes, when seen in the light of the realism of Peirce’s continua, the same antagonistic stance of a nominalism that confines, similarly, generality only as property of language. This bipolar dichotomy between idealism and realism, already classical in post-Cartesian philosophy, is characterized by a duality between nominalist doctrines of different garbs under the Peircean view, and this focus has steered the interpretation of the majority of commentators on the works of Peirce. The lack of focus on the real context of the author’s idealism-realism often leads to unjust accusations of obscurantism and inconsistency\(^\text{31}\).

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\(^{28}\) For an entirely different perspective see, SHORT (2010a).

\(^{29}\) Peirce’s Cosmogenesis, by totally initiating on the sphere of an eidetic unity, is considered an extravagant line of thought by some commentators, such as APEL (1981), p.156-157 and GALLIE (1975), p. 216.

\(^{30}\) This kind of consideration on the issue appears in classic commentators of Peirce, such as ALMENDER (1980).

\(^{31}\) See also GUARDIAN (2011) and DILWORTH (2011).
1.6 Some Important Consequences of Peirce’s Realism-Idealism

There are countless epistemological consequences resulting from Peirce’s realism-idealism. On the one hand, induction is confirmed as a logical figure, without the encumbrances caused by the indemonstrability of the reality of the laws. Indeed, Peirce does not seek a full demonstration of this reality: he assumes it as a condition of possibility for positive thought in general and predictive thought in particular, under his Fallibilism and Evolutionism. On the other hand, the homogeneity of the categories as to interiority and exteriority prevents one from setting a residue of incognizable world epistemologically against any representation. Under this viewpoint, the limits of cognizability are rightfully replaced by the limits of certainty — this clause deriving, first of all, from the combination of its objective idealism with its ontological indeterminism.

Still in the realm of a heuristic logic of discovery, there are notable consequences from the conception of Firstness, where the connatural eidetic substantiality between subject and object, assured by Objective Idealism, elicits a philosophy that conjectures on the genesis of the theories, a genesis that occurs against a backdrop of an absolute freedom of a non-time that is evolutionarily incorporated in temporality for the growth of form.

With a firm reference to the heuristics of Kantian schematism present in the Doctrine of the Method of the 1st Critique, the Peircean analysis of the heuristic power of the diagrams\(^32\), whose iconicity is not solely confined to the level of representation, being capable of being sanctioned as homology in relation to the reality of positive objects, leads to the unveiling of the form potentially present in the original argument of Abduction\(^33\).

It is equally noteworthy that, within Peircean metaphysics, the human faculties of thought, imagination and feeling can display their ontological genesis without resorting to a proscribed theology or to a special science, such as psychology that, according to Peirce, has nothing to add to questions placed by logic\(^34\).

Nor, within the core Peircean thought, the non-answer will be acceptable for questions of genesis: such incognizability proclaims an epistemic silence foreign to the author’s realism-idealism.

The essay *The Law of Mind*, in my opinion, supplements a theoretical picture that seeks to explain how ideas merge to shape new ideas. What is in the very nature of ideas that make them blend to reply heuristically to phenomena that have no credible representation in available theories? The answer to this question must first, we think, consider Peirce’s realism-idealism as the basic metaphysical environment of his philosophy, in which, we presume, an understanding of *The Law of Mind* can be deepened.

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\(^{32}\) On this specific topic, see IBRI (2006).

\(^{33}\) See THIBAUD (1975).

\(^{34}\) See, for example, CP: 2.51, c. 1902. Peirce affirms that some scholars «confound psychic truths with psychological truths» (CP: 5.486, 1907). I understand, from the author’s thinking, that *psychic truth* is that taken on the logical plane from phenomena of a psychic nature that may categorically support ontological hypotheses. In turn, *psychological truth* is situated in the semantic sphere of available theoretical models in Psychology, which is knowingly a special science that recounts aspects of phenomena subject to investigation.
2. Reflections on The Law of Mind

In 1892, Peirce published in «The Monist» (vol. II, pp. 533–59) the essay The Law of Mind, investigating the basic guidelines of the conduct of the mind and of the ideas developed in it. Actually, Peirce sought elements for his cosmology, linking his research to his doctrine of synechism, and using the concept of continuum in the flow of ideas that group to form more general ideas. According to Peirce, the law of mind is fundamentally designed as follows:

Logical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there is but one law of mind, namely, that ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectability. In this spreading they lose intensity, and especially the power of affecting others, but gain generality and become welded with the other ideas.

We have here a near-inevitable invitation to reflect on the dual sense of the word affect meaning, on the one hand, influencing and, on the other, loving. I call your attention to this dual meaning leaving, for the time being, the analysis of its possible consequences to be discussed farther along this paper. Let us see the development of Peirce’s thought in that essay. As regards the continuum of ideas, he places the following question:

We have here before us a question of difficulty, analogous to the question of nominalism and realism. But when once it has been clearly formulated, logic leaves room for one answer only. How can a past idea be present? Can it be present vicariously? To a certain extent, perhaps; but not merely so; for then the question would arise how the past idea can be related to its vicarious representation. The relation, being between Ideas, can only exist in some consciousness: now that past idea was in no consciousness but that past consciousness that alone contained it; and that did not embrace the vicarious idea. Some minds will here jump to the conclusion that a past idea cannot in any sense be present. But that is hasty and illogical. How extravagant, too, to pronounce our whole knowledge of the past to be mere delusion! Yet it would seem that the past is as completely beyond the bonds of possible experience as a Kantian thing-in-itself.

Evidently Peirce is asking a question with clear reference to synechism, namely, his doctrine of the continuum. In other words, he affirms that the link between ideas constitutes a consciousness of continuity. A past idea will not be in this consciousness availing itself of a substitution, but rather because of an

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36 EP1: 313.
37 EP1: 313; emphasis added.
38 EP1: 314. See, also, the excellent analysis of the stages of consciousness in Peircean philosophy in HOUSEY (1983).
39 See ZALAMEA (2012) and also BUCKLEY (2012).
actual occurrence, i.e., this idea is present and ipso facto must be present\textsuperscript{40}. Thus, time, which underlies consciousness, must ensure that the present is linked to the past by a series of real infinitesimal steps\textsuperscript{41}. The \textit{continuum} of consciousness must cover a lapse of time in which we are immediately conscious. It is not only continuous in the subjective sense, but also, as it is immediate during that infinitesimal interval of time, its object is, likewise, continuous\textsuperscript{42}. The feeling of continuity of consciousness is, simultaneously, the direct perception\textsuperscript{43} of the continuity of its content. In other words, Peirce tries to relate the propagation or expansion of consciousness in an interval of time during which it remains as such, to a systemic expansion or propagation of the ideas that make up its object within that consciousness. According to the author’s idealist realism, not only time but also space is continuous in itself as a real entity, and the objective relations that occur in both are of the nature of ideas within subjectivity. The \textit{continuum} of consciousness, during a time period that does not exclusively have the dimension of interior sense, or state of possibility of a perception, as Kant makes of it, correlates to the continuity of ideas that have, in the real object, the assurance of this \textit{continuum}. The question placed by the author, therefore, seems to convey an exclusive condition of time; if the real object is present before the mind, it is present with its relations that may be perceived by a consciousness. However, being before a mind is a spatial simultaneity between subject and object, since real relation is only revealed in an objective succession of instances, whose duration is the same for the consciousness that perceives. The ideas of an immediately past instant link themselves with the present idea in a natural succession. It is at this point that the mind must possess a criterion of relevance to identify the objective relations in representation; without it, there is no doubt that the apprehension of \textit{empiria} is blind. However, it is when this spatial coincidence between subject and object occurs partially or, even, does not occur, that present ideas—in the face of a particular real object that relates to others that are not there, or in the face of the content of past experiences—associate themselves and amplify themselves in a system that holds not only the continuity of time, but also the \textit{continuum} itself of its real reference. The Peircean question is, above all, how this occurs: what underlies the connection of ideas that is implemented as new knowledge? It is quite true that this question may have acceptable answers within idealist realism, which derives the human mind from the mind of Nature; for this very reason, that question of genesis is also a question of heuristics.

According to Peirce, the connection of ideas produces more general ideas, in an amplificatory process that consummates in an immediately present live feeling\textsuperscript{44}. In this idea of live feeling there is, in fact, a referral to the Peircean concept of quale-consciousness, which is fundamentally a single quality, and this unity is basic for the development of conceptual thought. This is not

\textsuperscript{40} EP1: 314.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{42} EP1: 315. ALBORN (1989) provides an interesting approach to Peirce’s ontological synthesis, through the solution that he gives to Zenon’s paradox.
\textsuperscript{43} Peirce has a complex theory of perception. The use of the word \textit{perception} and its derivatives here refers only to its common-language meaning. For a study of the theme, see HAUSMAN (2005).
\textsuperscript{44} EP1: 325.
the Kantian unity of apperception. It relates much more to the consciousness of the Schellingian infinite where the self is an absolute indetermination, that is, a depersonalization of consciousness that follows the feeling of unity. Under a Peircean viewpoint, quale-consciousness, as he calls it, is a consciousness absolutely present in its unity. The feeling, then, of this unity is a live feeling; it is what accompanies the unity of an idea complexified by the addition of others. This more general idea does not break that primary unity of quale-consciousness, since all component ideas are absolutely present in an interval of time in which such consciousness occurs. In this complex idea, there is also, in fact, a system of correlate ideas, an individual quality that derives from its systemic unity shown in the simultaneousness of that consciousness. This idea, therefore, cannot be perceived as mediation when it presents itself to the mind; the idea as such would require the presence of a second, its object, which would be distinct from it for that consciousness. Heuristically, however, as it is a new idea that arouses a live feeling of unity, it must be, in itself, mediation, whether for a real object or for an object that it, itself, built; in this latter case, the object is only a referent for it. In any case, that new idea does not have its liveliness because of its own independent quality, but because it presents itself as a solution for a novel problem; its unity and quality are due to its lack of differentiation with the object that is no longer other for consciousness. In the realm of eidetic connaturality of the object with the mind, this lack of differentiation, on the one hand, cannot be considered strange and, on the other hand, mediation, as such, plays the role of breaking the brute force of mere secondness, which appears thus when thought has not extracted from it the ideality that makes it reducible to a predictive concept.

To the questions placed by Peirce in *The Law of Mind*, these considerations do not, as yet, provide an answer, but they add that a new concept, under the tendency of growth of the mind, requires a focus on the object in its spatio-temporal relationship with consciousness, and that the presence of the former in the latter does not break its intrinsic primary unity. I borrow Schelling’s concept of eidetic unity temporarily, although Peirce has his own conceptualization, which, incidentally, does not conflict with Schelling’s; nevertheless, new elements can be perceived in this concept, deriving from Peircean cosmology.

However, before resuming Peirce’s essay, let us recall some points of this idea of unity of consciousness already expounded in a previous paper. What we have to stress is that quale-consciousness is a continuous quality of feeling that is undifferentiated from consciousness in itself. Besides this central aspect of its characterization, it is absolutely separated from time and, for this reason, it is a consciousness of full presentness, unconnected with the flow of temporality, due to its unconditionality; it neither originates from the past nor

45 See, for example, CP: 6.222–230, 1898.
46 It is based on this idea of life present in feeling that we assume that it is not of the nature of a habit. Habit, in the form of a concept, either conscious or unconscious, does not arouse this quality of liveliness in consciousness.
47 Incidentally, the word mediation applies, for the sake of conceptual strictness, as third in face of real otherness. Thus, when the object is built inside representation, there is no objective mediation, but only a subjective one, making the word a mere extension of the concept.
Ivo Assad Ibri, *The Heuristic Power of Agapism in Peirce’s Philosophy*

intends something for the future: «the now is one and but one»\(^{48}\). Thus, this state of consciousness is a continuum of possibilities; from it nothing necessary can be derived. It is, then, an indefinite feeling of freedom that occurs in an interior hiatus of time. But, the ontological expression of this phenomenon of interiority is precisely that principle of randomness in exteriority that Peirce calls Absolute Chance, responsible for the variety and spontaneity of nature:

That very same logical element of experience, the quale-element, which appears upon the inside as unity, when viewed from the outside is seen as variety\(^{49}\); [and] Wherever chance-spontaneity is found, there, in the same proportion, feeling exists. In fact, chance is but the outward aspect of that which within itself is feeling\(^{50}\).

In the Peircean cosmogenesis, the beginning of the universe occurred with a chaos of depersonalized feelings derived from the unity of a continuum of unlimited possibilities, of the nature of a quale-consciousness. In the context of Peirce’s objective idealism, the beginning of the universe is absolutely eidetic, in which that quale-consciousness assumes an ontological status. Within the realm of his philosophy, therefore, the objective identity flows naturally between the spontaneities of chance and feeling, as evidenced in this last passage of his work. Let us, at this point, recall Schelling, to whom the very substance of aesthetic intuition is that multiplicity and variety that immediately reflect life in Nature. It is, in fact, the vision of «relative idealism»\(^{51}\) that restricts the eidetic nature of feeling within subjective interiority, and certainly has no clear answer for the fact of strange and dead matter arousing live feelings in that interiority. As regards this point, Objective Idealism seems comfortably positioned for an answer:

I am bound to maintain that an idea can only be affected by an idea in continuous connection with it. By anything but an idea, it cannot be affected at all. This obliges me to say, as I do say, on other grounds, that what we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hide-bound with habits. It still retains the element of diversification; and in that diversification there is *life* […]\(^{52}\).

Or further:

People wonder, too, how dead matter can excite feelings in the mind […] I prefer to guess that it is a psychic feeling of red without us which arouses a sympathetic feeling of red in our senses\(^{53}\).
This blend of spontaneity, quality, diversity, chance, unity of feeling, life and growth occurs as a predication of the primordial \textit{eidos}, which is the all-pervading cosmic substratum, not differentiating, in this context, between exteriority and interiority. Within the realm of these considerations, Peirce discards any physical origin for the unity of consciousness:

The brain shows no central cell. The unity of consciousness is therefore not of physiological origin. It can only be metaphysical. So far as feelings have any continuity, it is the metaphysical nature of feeling to have a \textit{unity}\textsuperscript{54}.

The homogenesis between chance and unity of consciousness, as a redemption of cosmology, becomes elemental to the law of mind. To admit that ideas gather, forming more general ideas through a necessary rule, characterizes a mechanical determinism inadequate for Peircean philosophy. Thus, there should be some element of freedom and spontaneity responsible for bringing the ideas together in the mind. Let us see this further passage of \textit{The Law of Mind}:

Certainly, I cannot see how anyone can deny that the infinite diversity of the universe, which we call chance, may bring ideas into proximity which are not associated in one general idea. It may do this many times. But then the law of continuous spreading will produce a mental association; and this I suppose is an abridged statement of the way the universe has been evolved\textsuperscript{55}.

Clearly, we must understand this law of expansion in the light of the concepts of continuity and growth. As yet, however, there is no solution for the dual meaning of the word \textit{affect}. In short, how does that law promote this interaction between ideas? Although the mode of growth and continuity that weaves ideas in the human mind and in the universe as a whole is the same under an evolutionary trend, there still seems to be lacking an element that can encourage that generalizing interaction. So far, we know that an element of objective freedom brings ideas closer, and that they get together because that is the law of evolution that permeates the interior and exterior worlds. However, \textit{how} this association occurs requires, in my view, a study of the modes of evolution in Peirce’s thought.

2.1 \textit{Peirce’s Evolutionism: Agapism as Deepest Heuristic Fabric}
In the essay \textit{Evolutionary Love}\textsuperscript{56}, published in 1893 in \textit{«The Monist»} (Vol.3, pp. 176-200), Peirce examines the evolutionary theories that prevailed until then

\textsuperscript{54} CP: 6.229, 1898. In ECCLES (1977), pp. 361-370, there is an exposition of some theories on possible neurological causes of the unity of consciousness, totally rejected by the author for lack of scientific evidence. His own hypothesis rejects a physiological origin: «the experience of unity of consciousness is provided by a self-conscious mind (sic) and not by the neural machinery of the liaison areas of the cerebral hemisphere» (p. 362).

\textsuperscript{55} EP1: 327. The evolution of the universe, in Peirce’s view, occurs in the direction of the growth of thirdness, the category of the general ideas, considered, however, as a mode of being of ontological ground.

\textsuperscript{56} CP: 6.272-317, c. 1893.
and, while not refuting them, affirms that none effectively accounts for the **wholeness** of the evolution of the universe. His analysis focuses on the scheme of his three categories finding, in fact, that those theories do not meet his requirements, which are basically the same as those of his cosmology. Let us then move on to the study that the author makes of the evolutionary theories, starting with his view of Darwinism:

Let us try to define the logical affinities of the different theories of evolution. Natural selection, as conceived by Darwin, is a mode of evolution in which the only positive agent of change in the whole passage from moner to man is fortuitous variation. To secure advance in a definite direction chance has to be seconded by some action that shall hinder the propagation of some varieties or stimulate that of others. In natural selection, strictly so called, it is the crowding out of the weak

Apropos of this passage, it should be noted that Peirce criticized the unwarranted generalizations of Darwin’s theory during the nineteenth century, to the extent of saying that the then emerging political economy, wrongfully inspired by the notion of natural selection, legitimized the spirit of individual competition, in which the strongest is better adapted to the contingencies of reality and, so, overwhelms the weakest. Absolutely opposed to all forms of individualism, Peirce gave the epithet of «gospel of greed» to the science that proclaimed this type of conduct. On the Darwin theory the author adds:

The *Origin of Species* was published toward the end of the year 1859. The preceding years since 1846 had been one of the most productive seasons, —or if extended so as to cover the great book we are considering, the most productive period of equal length in the entire history of science from its beginnings until now. The idea that chance begets order, which is one of the cornerstones of modern physics (although Dr. Carus considers it “the weakest point in Mr. Peirce’s system”) was at that time put into its clearest light.

Peirce equally comments on the favorable reception Darwin’s work met owing to its ideas being those toward which the age was favorably disposed. The author then examines the necessitarian theory of evolution.

Diametrically opposed to evolution by chance, are those theories which attribute all progress to an inward necessary principle, or other forms

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57 EP1: 358.
59 EP1: 357. Peirce is ironic when commenting on the acceptance of the *hardness* of theories, such as utilitarianism, allied to individualism: *anaesthetics had been in use for thirteen years. Already, people’s acquaintance with suffering had dropped off very much; and as a consequence, that unlovely hardness, by which our times are so contrasted with those that immediately preceded them, had already set it, and inclined people to relish a ruthless theory* (EP1: 358).
60 *Ibidem*. The reference is to Paul Carus, then editor of *The Monist* and opponent of Peirce on this issue.
61 EP1: 358.
of necessity. Many naturalists have thought that if an egg is destined to go through a certain series of embryological transformations, from which it is perfectly certain not to deviate, and if in geological time almost exactly the same forms appear successively, one replacing another in the same order, the strong presumption is that this latter succession was as predeterminate and certain to take place as the former.\(^{62}\)

Peirce goes on to show that even the geosciences had supporters along this line of evolution:

 Those geologists who think that the variation of species is due to cataclysmic alterations of climate or of the chemical constitution of the air and water are also making mechanical necessity chief factor of evolution.\(^{63}\)

Clearly antagonistic, the necessitarist theory and the Darwinist doctrine are confronted with Lamarck’s evolutionist theory, which, according to Peirce, consists in *evolution by the force of habits*.\(^{64}\) Habit, however, is essentially an attribute of the mind that involves the idea of growth and generalization and reveals, in Peirce’s view, a dual aspect: on the one hand it establishes new structural features of conduct and, on the other, brings them in *harmony* with the general morphology and function of the animals and plants to which they belong.\(^{65}\) Peirce saw in Lamarckian theory an idea of *endeavor* toward the development of growth, and endeavor, since it is directed toward an end, is essentially psychical, even though it be sometimes unconscious; and the growth due to exercise [...] follows a law of a character quite contrary to that of mechanics.\(^{66}\)

It is from the analysis of these theories and from the idea of a tendency toward the expansion of that basic substratum of a mental nature, blending their elements in a *continuum*, that the author recognizes the need for three forms of evolution, which must admit the Darwinist and necessitarist theories and, simultaneously, amplify aspects of the Lamarckian theory. Bearing in mind the concept of *harmony*, Peirce sought a higher, solidifying, principle of evolution, to gather analogous elements, stimulating that continuous expansion toward growth. As extraordinary as it may seem to the author’s readers, it is from St. John’s Gospel that the author sought this evolutionary principle, substantiated in the idea of *Love*.

Everybody can see that the statement of St. John is the formula of an evolutionary philosophy, which teaches that growth comes only from love, from — I will not say self-sacrifice, but from the ardent impulse to

\(^{62}\) EP1: 359.
\(^{63}\) Ibidem.
\(^{64}\) EP1: 360.
\(^{65}\) Ibidem.
\(^{66}\) EP1: 354.
fulfill another’s highest impulse. Suppose, for example, that I have an idea that interests me. It is my creation. It is my creature; for as shown in last July’s *Monist*, it is a little person. I love it; and I will sink myself in perfecting it. It is not by dealing out cold justice to the circle of my ideas that I can make them grow, but by cherishing and tending them as I would the flowers in my garden. The philosophy we draw from John’s gospel is that this is the way mind develops; and as for the cosmos, only so far as it yet is mind, and so has life, is it capable of further evolution. Love, recognizing germs of loveliness in the hateful, gradually warms it into life, and makes it lovely. That is the sort of evolution which every careful student of my essay “The Law of Mind” must see that *synechism* calls for.

As a philosophical matter of the ancient Greeks and theological metaphysics, a contemporary resumption of the cosmic principle of Love could be predicated as exotic by offering, again, the unstable ground for a possible anthropomorphism. Totally immune to accusations of anthropomorphism, the legitimate Peircean philosophy, like that of Schelling, explores all the attributes of the universe of the mind under its primordiality, which is established by Objective Idealism: matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws. Indeed, the view of Love as a greater substratum of evolution is due to a systemic theoretical structure that permeates not only the author’s ontology, but also his entire philosophy. The only way this structure can be apprehended is by avoiding fragmented readings of his work. Further, it must be considered that such concept, in the realm of Peircean philosophy, is nevertheless the key for the solution of the semantic duality of the word affect, which, as we have said, has in love a possible sense.

Therefore, three modes of evolution must, somehow, harmonize with the three Peircean categories:

Three modes of evolution have thus been brought before us; evolution by fortuitous variation, evolution by mechanical necessity, and evolution by creative love. We may term them *tychastic* evolution, or *tychasm*, *anancastic* evolution, or *ananchasm*, and *agapastic* evolution, or *agapasm*. The doctrines which represent these as severally of principal importance we may term *tychasticism*, *ananchasicism*, and *agapasticism*. On the other hand the mere propositions that absolute chance, mechanical necessity, and the law of love are severally operative in the cosmos may receive the names of *tychism*, *ananchism*, and *agapism*.

Thus, *tychasticism* is associated with the first Peircean category of firstness; *ananchasicism*, as rule of mechanical necessity, with secondness, leaving *agapasticism* linked to thirdness, which, as we recall, plays the role of mediator, generalizer, and reducer of the brute force of the particular to the unity of a cosmic continuum that does not differentiate between interiority and exteriority in the modes of law and thought. In its agglutinative and continuous nature,
agapism is a principle that conciliates oppositions that have an inherent basic unity ensuring their connaturality, like the ideal-real unity in Schelling’s philosophy: «love cannot have a contrary, but must embrace what is most opposed to it».

Strictly on the plane that concerns us, represented by how ideas associate themselves, we already know that the act of chance plays the role of freely bringing them closer. It seems, however, that there is also, in ananchism, another dimension of the word affect, not only that of affection enclosed in the idea of agapism, but also that of necessary interaction, whether by affinity or logical opposition. In this case, the meaning of that word could be to affect by linking an antecedent to a consequent or, even, denying a consequent by logical opposition. It should be stressed that logical necessity is in the interior of the third category as a mode of operation of the law in secondness. It should be emphasized, however, that association of ideas has a genealogical sense, i.e., it refers to a mode of formation. As such, it is not surprising that the mode of evolutionary formation out of necessity, defined by the author as ananchism, is linked to the second and not to the third category. That dual semantic dimension of the word affect, thus, seems to satisfy agapism and ananchism from the freedom and spontaneity with which tychism brings ideas closer. It is from this approximation that the other two modes of eidetic association act, in which the principle of love effectively plays a heuristic role which, according to the author, presents itself in three aspects:

The agapastic development of thought is the adoption of certain mental tendencies, not altogether heedlessly, as in tychasm, nor quite blindly by the mere force of circumstances or of logic, as in ananchasm, but by an immediate attraction for the idea itself, whose nature is divined before the mind possesses it, by the power of sympathy, that is, by virtue of the continuity of mind; and this mental tendency may be of three varieties, as follows. First, it may affect a whole people or community in its collective personality, and be thence communicated to such individuals as are in powerfully sympathetic connection with the collective people, although they may be intellectually incapable of attaining the idea by their private understandings or even perhaps of consciously apprehending it.

This passage highlights the ideas of sympathy, which we have already emphasized, and of community, which, incidentally, are associated with the concepts of reality and truth within Peircean philosophy. Continuing this paragraph, Peirce states:

Second, it may affect a private person directly, yet so that he is only enabled to apprehend the idea, or to appreciate its attractiveness, by virtue of his sympathy with his neighbors, under the influence of a striking experience or development of thought. The conversion of St.

70 Ibidem.
71 EP1: 364; my italics.
72 The overlapping of these last three concepts not being an object of this paper may be verified by the reader in Peirce’s works W2: 238-239; W2: 241; W2: 251-252 and W2: 271.
Paul may be taken as an example of what is meant. Third, it may affect an individual, independently of his human affections, by virtue of an attraction it exercises upon his mind, even before he has comprehended it. This is the phenomenon which has been well called the *divination* of genius; for it is due to the continuity between the man’s mind and the Most High.

Evidently, in these three modes analyzed by Peirce, there is a tacit reference to ideas that represent a development of the mind, an advance of its production, a growth of its knowledge. There is, first of all, freedom permeating this heuristic activity of the mind, in an evident denial that there can genetically occur some rule of deductive structure that could provide the emergence of that which is, actually, new in the universe of ideality. Despite this genealogical freedom, the evolution of human thought cannot be attributed solely to random factors, as in the interior of tychism. According to Peirce, the proofs of agapism and synechism are engraved in history as spirits of an age in which an entire community blends to boost human culture.

3. Some Important Points as Conclusion
The agapism that I try to show here represents a fundamental principle on the structure of the universe, which correlates with Peirce’s heuristics. This heuristics not only runs parallel to our modes of conjecture, of finding true representations, but also to its more general plan, namely, the formation and growth of thirdness as a whole, as a tendency of the Universe. This consequence is associated by commentators of Peirce’s work to objective idealism, a lesser-mentioned doctrine, which affirms that there is only one primordial substance in the universe, ideality, an eidetic substratum that makes matter a form of special *eidos*, turning its laws of physical nature into special cases of mental laws, viz., observable in the psychic realm. The author’s synechism is associated with this idealism, certifying that one must fundamentally suppose continuities in Nature and, additionally, continuity between mind and matter, an essential thesis of that same idealism. These doctrines, thus, create a backdrop for an understanding of the author’s realism in its true conception and dimension, without any theoretical opposition to idealism as, incidentally, some commentators of the author’s work suppose. Both claim that something of the nature of ideality is essential in the universe: realism affirms the reality of the continua, or ultimately, the reality of thirdness; idealism ensures the eidetic nature of all continuity and creates the substantial environment where realism can be.

The transit of the signs between subject and object is now legitimized with this ambiance, providing a realistic and idealistic range for Semiotics. To try grounding it solely as a science of forms that precedes all possible ontology is, to my mind, to resort to an illicit resource within the Peircean philosophical system, in a kind of tacit transcendentalism, which ignores the fact that, in the

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73 Ibidem.
75 One can find other approaches to the issues we address in this chapter in, CHRISTIANSEN (2002); FINKELSTEIN (1994); HOOKWAY (1997); REYNOLDS (2002); SHORT (2010b); VENTIMIGLIA (2008); and TURLEY (1977).
76 As advocated by APEL (1980-1982).
relationship between sign and interpretant, the Object is triadically interspersed, and which is, doubtlessly, more than a mere referent of representation, if not its most important determination. Apart from this aspect of determinability, deriving from the point of real otherness of the object in relation to the sign, one must consider that in the hierarchy of Peircean sciences, Phenomenology precedes Semiotics: the science of signs presupposes a being in the world that can no longer be ignored by a transcendent consciousness that seeks in itself a formal ground for a shapeless world: such a search would represent a theoretical heresy in the face of Peirce’s realism and of the foretold phenomenological hypothesis of the symmetry of the categories on the sphere of the interior and exterior worlds.

With these considerations, the doctrine of Agapism adds to the myriad reasons that create the theoretical context in which Abduction would be justified. This is the challenge of the reading of Peirce’s work: the eyes and intelligence of his scholar should rest simultaneously on subject and object, not differentiating them under the prism of abstract forms. Another requirement is something not readily available in everyone’s spirit: a sense of poetry, an aesthetic sensitivity that will, ultimately, become the sharpest and strongest tool to penetrate the deepest meaning of his philosophy.

References


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77 See also PAAVOLA (2012).
78 On this point, see IBRI (2009).


