Alternative Possibilities in Frankfurt-style Cases
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13130/2037-4445/10807Abstract
In this article I will criticize the so called Frankfurt-style cases. These cases have been built with the purpose of denying that in order to hold a person responsible, it’s necessary this person could have done otherwise, namely there were alternative possibilities. I present here two arguments according to which Frankfurt’s cases did not succeed in this attempt. In the first argument I will focus, from and ethical and a logical point of view, on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, and I will show that the Frankfurt-style cases are not truly able to falsify it. The second argument is semantical and concerns the formulation of Frankfurt example.
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