Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior

Editorial Letter

2019-01-01T06:41:51+00:00

Kripke’s Modal Logic: A Historical Study

2019-01-01T06:41:52+00:00

In a very short time Saul Kripke provided a suitable and rigorous semantics for different axiomatic modal systems and established a series of related results. Many key ideas were already in the air in the late Fifties, but it was Kripkean articles’ merit to system atically introduce comprehensive devices and solutions. Later on, the spreading of possible-worlds semantics massively changed the approach to modal logic, which enormously increased in popularity after that. Since Kripke’s work in modal logic is central to the development of the discipline, the aim of this essay is to present the fundamental results published between 1959 and 1965. Indeed, it was in such a brief and early phase of his career that Kripke was able to conceive the main novelties that would become central to the subsequent academic debates about modality. Here, their presentation will follow the original historical progressive introduction. Particular attention will be given to the interconnection between articles, their similarities in structure and the unified analysis produced by means of them. It actually appears quite impressive that, already in 1959, Kripke seemed to have planned all the developments he would present, one after the other, in the following years. First, an overview of the background where Kripke’s ideas start to rise is given. Then, each text’s results are individually briefly analysed.

A Formal Analysis of the Best System Account of Lawhood

2019-01-01T06:41:52+00:00

In this work I attempt a reformulation of Lewis’ Best System Account, explicitating the underlying formal conception of scientiﬁc theories and trying to deﬁne the concepts of simplicity, strength and balance. This essay is divided in three sections. In the ﬁrst one I introduce the Best System Account of natural laws and formulate the need for its improvement. In the second section I outline a formal framework where the notions of deductive system and scientiﬁc theory can be deﬁned precisely. In the last section the notions of simplicity, strength and balance are analyzed. To conclude I argue that the framework proposed does indeed provide the precision required. In addition, it also oﬀers interesting insights on the plurality of concepts of simplicity, strength and balance, and on the general enterprise of formalizing scientiﬁc theories.

Una teoria della razionalità: il modello BDI

2019-01-01T06:41:53+00:00

In quest’articolo propongo un’analisi di una teoria della razionalità, il modello Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI), con l’obiettivo di stabilirne la fecondità teoretica. Interpreto il modello come il risultato dell’indebolimento di alcuni principi cardine della teoria della scelta razionale: se questa è di natura normativa e considera agenti altamente idealizzati, il modello BDI è invece motivato dallo scopo di dare una caratterizzazione cognitivamente plausibile delle azioni degli individui e inserisce nella deﬁnizione di razionalità aspetti non normativi. Per questa ragione, la teoria BDI introduce il concetto di intenzione e complica la propria ontologia: le intenzioni pongono dei vincoli di consistenza sulla componente motivazionale dell’individuo e fungono da ﬁltro di ammissibilità sulla selezione di altre intenzioni (Bratman 1987). Presento ed analizzo di seguito due formalizzazioni, sviluppatesi in due diverse aree di ricerca (logica e intelligenza artiﬁciale), dei principi ﬁlosoﬁci della teoria: il sistema BDICTL*-W3 (Georgeﬀ e Rao 1998) ed un esempio di Agent Control Loop (Wooldridge 2000). La discussione vuole rilevare le peculiarità dei vari approcci alla teoria in oggetto, individuare i nodi concettuali comuni ma anche le speciﬁcità di ciascun apporto. Concludo quindi con alcune osservazioni di carattere epistemologico sui vantaggi di un approccio plurale.

Some proposals for the set-theoretic foundations of category theory

2019-01-01T06:41:53+00:00

The problem of finding proper set-theoretic foundations for category theory has challenged mathematician since the very beginning. In this paper we give an analysis of some of the standard approaches that have been proposed in the past 70 years. By means of the central notions of class and universe we suggest a possible conceptual recasting of these proposals. We focus on the intended semantics for the (problematic) notion of large category in each proposed foundation. Following Feferman (2006) we give a comparison and evaluation of their expressive power.

Epistemic Logic and the Problem of Epistemic Closure

2019-01-01T06:41:55+00:00

This paper argues that propositional modal logics based on Kripke-structures cannot be accepted by epistemologists as a minimal framework to describe propositional knowledge. In fact, many authors have raised doubts over the validity of the so-called principle of epistemic closure, which is always valid in normal modal logics. This paper examines how this principle might be criticized and discusses one possible way to obtain a modal logic where it does not hold, namely through the introduction of impossible worlds.

Hilbert, Completeness and Geometry

2019-01-01T06:41:57+00:00

This paper aims to show how the mathematical content of Hilbert’s Axiom of Completeness consists in an attempt to solve the more general problem of the relationship between intuition and formalization. Hilbert found the accordance between these two sides of mathematical knowledge at a logical level, clarifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for a good formalization of geometry. We will tackle the problem of what is, for Hilbert, the definition of geometry. The solution of this problem will bring out how Hilbert’s conception of mathematics is not as innovative as his conception of the axiomatic method. The role that the demonstrative tools play in
Hilbert’s foundational reflections will also drive us to deal with the problem of the purity of methods, explicitly addressed by Hilbert. In this respect Hilbert’s position is very innovative and deeply linked to his modern conception of the axiomatic method. In the end we will show that the role played by the Axiom of Completeness for geometry is the same as the Axiom of Induction for arithmetic and of Church-Turing thesis for computability theory. We end this paper arguing that set theory is the right context in which applying the axiomatic method to mathematics and we postpone to a sequel of this work the attempt to offer a solution similar to Hilbert’s for the completeness of set theory.

Interview with Francesco Berto

2019-01-01T06:41:54+00:00

Interview with Kevin Scharp

2019-01-01T06:41:55+00:00

Report: Scuola estiva di Logica

2019-01-01T06:41:55+00:00

Recensione: "Logica" di Graham Priest

2019-01-01T06:41:56+00:00

Recensione: "Possibile/necessario" di Massimo Mugnai

2019-01-01T06:41:57+00:00

Recensione: "Che cos’è una Contraddizione" di Francesco Berto e Lorenzo Bottai

2019-01-01T06:41:57+00:00

Recensione: "La computabilità: algoritmi, logica, calcolatori" di Marcello Frixione e Dario Palladino

2019-01-01T06:41:58+00:00

The Link between Misinterpretation, Intentionality, and Mental Agency in the Natural Language Interpretation of “Fake”

2019-01-01T06:41:58+00:00

In formal semantics of natural language, an intersective interpretation works for many adjectives: x is a French lawyer iff x ∈ {x:x is French} {x: x is a lawyer}. For those adjectives for which this does not work, like “excellent”, we still have, at worst, a subsective modification ({x: x is an excellent violinist} ⊂ {x:x is a violinist}). Neither of these applies to “fake”, whose formal interpretation is a traditional challenge. In this paper, I propose an analysis of the semantics of “fake” in which the speaker’s attribution of intentionality (derived or original) to the object or person of which she predicates fakeness is central. In fact, the boundaries between the properties that ‘fake’
modifies and those it leaves unchanged are moved in function of this attribution of intentionality. In a famous 1994 paper, Dretske argues that for something to be specifically mental it does not merely need to exhibit original intentionality. It also has to be capable of misrepresentation, i.e. be a structure having a content independent of its causes. I argue that this intuition is implicitly contained in the natural language use of “fake”.

Temporal Subitizing and Temporal Counting: a Proposal between Vision and Action

2019-01-01T06:41:59+00:00

How is our temporal experience possible? When we hear a song, we are aware that every note is before and after another note (and that’s how we remember it), but we also ’experience-as-present’ more than one note at a time. To answer this question, I suggest an analogy with the diﬀerence drawn, in the spatial case, between the two diﬀerent mechanisms of counting and ’subitizing’ (the immediate visual capture of a certain number of items as a single object). My proposal is to identify two diﬀerent mechanisms even in the temporal case: a temporal counting, a coconscious experiential ’single look’ of a temporal interval; and a temporal subitizing, an atomic storing operation which organizes every event in a mathematical, point-like sequence. These two mechanisms are taken to be operative always and together; we never cease to store the events encountered in a temporal line, but we also experience a subgroup of them as present.

Determinismo causale e responsabilità morale: un approccio semicompatibilista

2019-01-01T06:41:59+00:00

Questo articolo si propone di analizzare il recente sforzo teorico di J.M. Fischer in merito alla compatibilità del determinismo causale con la responsabilità morale. Dopo l’analisi concettuale dei termini fondamentali della discussione contemporanea sul determinismo e la libertà del volere, metterò in luce l’originalità della teoria di Fischer basata sulla difesa del semicompatibilismo. Secondo tale prospettiva teorica è possibile essere responsabili del proprio agire anche nel caso in cui la verità del determinismo causale dovesse eliminare la presenza di possibilità alternative. Per sostenere questa tesi farò riferimento alla nozione di controllo (Fischer e Ravizza 1998) unitamente alla presentazione del controesempio elaborato da Frankfurt (1969) sulla non necessità di poter fare altrimenti per essere ritenuti responsabili del proprio agire.

Inﬁne, dopo aver aﬀrontato alcune critiche agli esperimenti mentali elaborati a partire da quelli di Frankfurt, mi concentrerò sugli attacchi diretti alla compatibilità fra responsabilità e determinismo, vale a dire sulle critiche che pur non rifacendosi alla necessità della possibilità di fare altrimenti cercano di mettere in discussione la compatibilità fra responsabilità morale e determinismo causale.