
THE REASONER

VOLUME 8, NUMBER 7
JULY 2014

www.thereasoner.org

ISSN 1757-0522

CONTENTS

Editorial

Features

News

What's Hot in . . .

Events

Courses and Programmes


Jobs and Studentships

EDITORIAL

I first met Jordi Fernández at Brown University in 1996. Both of us were graduate students at that time—I was visiting Brown for some months thanks to my scholarship, and Jordi doing his graduate courses and working with Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa at the Philosophy Department. I remember we used to talk about the dark situation of

philosophy in Spain, our need to go to study abroad, the long years that we foretold were ahead of us before having a chance, if any, to get a job in our fields. It is now a pleasure to recall those times, and others when we met, and think, perhaps for the first time, that somehow we achieved something. I got my job at beautiful Granada, and Jordi is a brilliant international philosopher happily living with his young family at Australia.

[Jordi Fernández](#) is Associate Professor of philosophy at the University of Adelaide, which he joined in 2007. A main part of his work focuses on self-knowledge; in particular, his recent book *Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge* published last year by Oxford University Press, will be the excuse for this interview. But he is also very much interested in metaphysics of mind, mental causation, and memory—on which he is actually pursuing a project on ‘false’ vs. ‘recovered’ memory, funded by an Australian Research Council grant. And sometimes he even enjoys continental philosophy, having written about Schopenhauer or Sartre on choice. Some of his best publications are Fernández (2003: ‘Privileged Access Naturalized’, *The Philosophical Quarterly* 53, pp. 352–272), Fernández (2006: ‘The Intentionality of Memory’, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 84, pp. 39–57) and Fernández (2010: ‘Thought Insertion and Self-Knowledge’, *Mind & Language* 25, pp. 66–88).



In *Transparent Minds*, Fernández proposes an epistemological (reasons-based) model for understanding our deep mental states, and our own relations to them: the *bypass model* of self-knowledge. According to this model, we (reasoners) have self-knowledge of our mental states and, in particular, we have knowledge of our beliefs and desires, when we form beliefs about those mental states based on our grounds for them. Our grounds for our beliefs are, of course, epistemic grounds: perceptual experiences, memories, testimony, reasoning, and intuition. Thus, if my belief that identity is a necessary relation is grounded on some act of intuition, then my self-attribution of the belief that identity is necessary is based on that very same act of intuition.

The bypass model is proposed to explain some important characteristics of self-knowledge such as *transparency*, i.e., the idea that, in order to determine whether I believe that identity is necessary, I do not look into my mind in search of my belief; rather, I consider whether identity is necessary. Bypass is also meant to explain *privileged access*, i.e., the thesis that, normally, I know better than you or someone else whether I believe that identity is necessary: it is *I* who intuit that identity is necessary. Also, in self-knowledge, I am the subject of a cognitive operation that yields a *cognitive achievement*, on my part, about my own mental states. Moreover, the fact that I achieve knowledge when I consider my mental states explains the *assertiveness* of my self-attributions of those states: if I believe that I believe that identity is necessary because I have the intuition that identity is necessary, then my self-attribution of that belief will put pressure on me to endorse it, so I will be inclined to defend this idea against other accounts on identity. And, relevantly enough, the bypass model is intended to explain various *failures* of self-knowledge: I can or might deceive myself about my beliefs, I might fail to self-attribute some of my beliefs, I could even think that my beliefs

are not mine despite feeling that they are in my mind.

MARÍA JOSÉ GARCÍA ENCINAS
Philosophy, University of Granada

FEATURES

Interview with Jordi Fernández

María José García Encinas: Jordi, first of all, I need to thank you for granting me this interview. It is a real pleasure, not only because of what you represent but, especially, because I have had the opportunity to really enjoy reading your book. It has been a very thought-provoking experience; perhaps also due to my general ignorance of this very singular issue that is self-knowledge. And I say this, not only in the professional sense, but also in the sense that, contrary to what you affirm in your book, I do not take my capacity for self-knowledge to be especially reliable. To be honest, some of the questions involved in those psycho-sociological tests concerning my knowledge of my own mental states (questions such as whether I think that I am happy now, or pessimistic, or whether I believe that the Spanish economy is getting better or not) seem to me much more difficult to answer than questions like how many books are in my office or whether it is raining. In general, I do not think that we know ourselves better than we know our world.

Jordi Fernández: Well, thank you for such a kind introduction. Your question is very interesting in that it reveals that theorists of self-knowledge often take for granted the view that self-knowledge is more reliable than, say, perceptual knowledge, as a starting point. And it can be easy to forget that one needs to motivate that idea at the onset of a discussion of self-knowledge, rather than simply assuming it. (I probably did the latter in the book.)

It is certainly true that there is a lot of literature, particularly within psychology, on how we all make mistakes trying to answer the kinds of questions about our mental states that you are referring to. I do not deny that those questions are difficult to answer in many cases. If one has sexist or racist beliefs, for example, it may be difficult for one to gain knowledge of one's beliefs from the first-person perspective, which is the kind of knowledge that the bypass model is trying to explain. It may be difficult because the fact that one has such beliefs may not be something that one wants to come to terms with. In those kinds of cases, self-deception is possible and it may be better to try to gain knowledge of one's beliefs from the third-person perspective; the way in which a therapist provides us with knowledge of our beliefs by pointing out features of our behaviour. I do not deny any of that. In fact, one chapter of the book is devoted to explaining how failures of self-knowledge might take place in instances of self-deception. It seems to me that the belief about the state of the Spanish economy may fall into this



category. I can certainly see how one might believe that one believes it is getting better when, in fact, one wants it to get better but, in light of all the evidence, one cannot really believe that it is getting better. The other interesting case you mention concerns our knowledge of our own emotions. This is a particularly difficult case because, whereas, for some emotions, there seems to be such a thing as our grounds for them, we do not seem to have any grounds for other emotions. (There may be grounds for shame or resentment, for example, but are there really grounds for depression or euphoria?) I have a hunch—and it is only a hunch at this point—that the difficult emotions to gain knowledge of are precisely those emotions for which we have no grounds.

MJGE: The explanation of the possibility of *failures* of self-knowledge is, I think, the strongest line of defence for the bypass theory of self-knowledge. In other accounts, like Peacocke's epistemic view on belief or agent-based theories, this possibility seems to be a problem. Could you, please, explain why Peacocke or agent-theories make self-knowledge infallible?

JF: I take it that, by 'agent-based' theories, you mean those theories which explain our self-knowledge by appealing to our capacity for deliberation as agents; theories such as Richard Moran's.

MJGE: Yes, that is what I meant.

JF: In the book, I try to make the point that, for different reasons, both Peacocke's account and Moran's account commit us to the view that self-knowledge is infallible. If this is true, then it is a problem for those accounts since, intuitively, it is possible for one to form beliefs about one's own mental states from the first-person perspective and for those higher-order beliefs to be incorrect. For example, someone who is pursuing a profession may believe that he wants to pursue it when, in fact, he is only doing it to please his parents. Peacocke's view, as far as I understand it, is that, in the just-mentioned case, what justifies me in believing that I want to be a doctor, for example, is my desire to be a doctor. More generally, self-attributions of mental states are justified by the mental states which those self-attributions are about. This means that if I am justified in self-attributing the desire to be a doctor, then I must be right in believing that I have that desire, which seems too strong. By contrast, Moran's view is that what justifies me in believing that I want to be a doctor is the outcome of my deliberation on whether a career in medicine is to be pursued or not. This is a very different view but, as I see it, it has the same difficulty as Peacocke's: the view commits us to the claim that I am only justified in believing that I have the desire to be a doctor if I do have that desire. Why is that? Because concluding that a career in medicine is to be pursued and deciding to pursue it are (at least on the notion of deliberation that Moran seems to have in mind) one and the same thing. Thus, self-knowledge turns out to be infallible in Moran's view as well. Both accounts of self-knowledge prove, for that reason, too much. The bypass model, though, accommodates errors in self-knowledge by construing these cases as cases in which the subject has grounds for a mental state, such as the desire to be a doctor, but those grounds have not made him form the relevant mental state. The person finds grounds for wanting to be a doctor (for instance, compassionate grounds or, more cynically, financial grounds) so he believes that he has that desire. But those grounds have not actually made him want to be a doctor.

MJGE: So cases of failure of self-knowledge are especially interesting because they

reveal the absence of the particular cognitive experience, which is normally present, that constitutes our access to our beliefs, or the mode that our beliefs are felt or known as ours. Thus, the *thought-insertion* delusion occupies a privileged space in your book; and it is one of those fascinating themes that makes the book worth reading. You propose that assertiveness is the key feature here, for people who claim that some of their thoughts are not theirs (or feel that these thoughts have been inserted in their minds) do not endorse the inserted thoughts. Moreover, you propose that assertiveness is lacking because these people have problems self-attributing the ‘inserted’ beliefs *through bypass*: they seem to have difficulties in attributing those thoughts to themselves because their attention is focused on their own experiences rather than on the content of those experiences.

JF: This is indeed a fascinating delusion. What makes it fascinating is that it shows that a very natural view about what it takes for one to experience a thought that one is having as being one’s own must be wrong. The natural view is that what is required is that one experiences being the bearer of that thought. And yet, experiencing the thought as being one’s own seems to require more than the experience of being the bearer of the thought. For patients with the thought-insertion delusion have the latter experience without having the former one. The patient who thinks that he has an inserted thought that the garden looks nice, for example, does not doubt that the thought in question is in his mind. He is not, for example, under the impression that he is having a telepathic experience wherein he is aware of a thought in somebody else’s mind. He experiences that thought as being in his mind. What is puzzling for the patient is that, nonetheless, he does not experience it as being his own. So what does it take for one to experience a thought that one is having as being one’s own? The proposal I put forward in the book is that what is required is that one forms the belief that one has that thought in a certain way; a way that will put pressure on one to endorse that thought. ‘Assertiveness’ is simply the label I give to self-attributions of mental states that put pressure on one to endorse those mental states. The way in which we normally self-attribute beliefs and desires is assertive: when we think that we have certain beliefs or desires from the first-person point of view, we feel pressured to endorse the beliefs and desires that we think we have. Feeling that pressure is, I believe, the key to experiencing those beliefs and desires as being our own. So what happens to the thought-insertion patient? My contention is, on the one hand, that self-attributions of mental states put pressure on us to endorse them when they are made through bypass and, on the other hand, that the thought-insertion patient cannot easily self-attribute mental states through bypass. The reason to think that the thought-insertion patient has difficulties doing that is that, in schizophrenia, there seems to be a phenomenon called ‘hyper-reflexivity’ wherein the patient tends to focus his attention on his own experiences rather than the world. This tendency would interfere with bypass. But I should emphasize that this is just a conjecture. In the end, this diagnosis of the thought-insertion delusion hangs on the empirical work on whether hyper-reflexivity does correlate with the thought-insertion delusion or not.

MJGE: Now, you also argue that other kinds of theories, in particular, agency-based theories, have difficulties with these cases, for they need to think of beliefs as actions. Action-theories would say that, in cases of thought-insertion, patients lack the

experience of agency, or responsibility over their beliefs. But, you retort, beliefs are not actions in the first place, at least, not if they are like other kinds of mental states, such as seeing or hearing: I am the one who sees, but I do not bring about my seeing; the same for my beliefs. However, it seems to me that not all action-based theories have to accept that the sense of action and responsibility involved here is one where a subject (in some strong sense) brings her mental states about. There are other possibilities. For instance, the possibility that the agent is considered as subject of his mental states only when these mental states fit into some sort of narrative in which he is the main character. In this, rather different, sense of agency, my seeings, my hearings, . . . as well as my desires or beliefs, are mine if they fit into my story of the world as I tell it. If they do not fit with my narrative, then I do not attribute them to myself; which would in turn, explain why these mental states are detached from my other acts; this would explain my lack in assertiveness or commitment. What would you say about theories of action of this kind? Could they explain the failure of self-attribution of belief in these cases?

JF: I guess I have two concerns about that view. My main concern would be that the ability to accommodate a mental state that one finds in one's mind into a coherent narrative of one's life does not seem to be necessary for one to experience that mental state as being one's own. It does seem to be necessary for one to make sense of why one is having that mental state, but it seems to me that this is a considerably weaker claim. Suppose, for example, that I have a memory of some event that I cannot fit into my personal past, given the rest of the things that I know to have happened in my life. It does not fit into my narrative of my life. Admittedly, I cannot make sense of why I have that memory. But I do not thereby experience it as being alien. Perhaps I conclude that it is not a memory, but an episode of imagination. Perhaps I conclude that it cannot be an accurate memory. But, in any case, I do not conclude, from my inability to square the content of that memory with the contents of the rest of my mental states, that the subject of that memory must be someone other than me. Suppose, however, that, in order for one to experience a mental state as being one's own, it is indeed necessary that one can make it fit within a narrative of one's own life; one finds it to be consistent with the rest of one's own mental states. My further concern is that some reports of thought insertion do not seem to involve mental states that are particularly hard to accommodate within a narrative of the subject's life. Why would the thought that the garden looks nice and the grass looks cool, for instance, be difficult to accommodate in a narrative of one's life? One may, of course, use 'narrative' in such a narrow sense that, in virtue of the fact that the subject has this thought despite the fact that he is not looking at the garden, the thought qualifies as not fitting into a narrative. But I suspect that, once one uses such a narrow sense of 'narrative', the narrative view may collapse into the bypass view.

MJGE: There is another aspect of your proposal that I find especially compelling. It is the idea that we have epistemic duties. We are epistemically responsible for our beliefs, in different ways. For instance, we have the epistemic obligation to believe what we have grounds for believing. Equally, we should not believe something if we do not have grounds for believing. In this sense, you accuse someone who commits the Moorean paradox of being epistemologically negligent. This is a very interesting point. Could you please tell our readers a little more about it? Imagine someone who says that he thinks that he feels that his arm hurts, but at the same time he sees that he has no

arm. His affirmations look close to Moorean sentences of the kind ‘I believe that P, but not-P’. Why is he not guilty of epistemic negligence? Could your account accommodate this kind of cases too?

JF: This is an interesting analogy. I do not think that my account of Moore’s paradox can be extended to this case. But perhaps it does not need to be. Let me explain. My proposal is that the reason why we have the intuition that the subject who has Moore-paradoxical thoughts is being irrational is that we sense that he is being epistemically negligent in that his beliefs and his grounds for belief are, so to speak, out of sync. In the case of ‘P and I do not believe that P’, he is believing that P despite having no grounds for it. Why does he have no grounds for it? Because he is also believing that he does not believe that P and, if the bypass model is right, then he must have formed that higher-order belief upon finding no grounds for the belief that P. In the case of ‘P and I believe that not-P’, he is believing that P despite having grounds for the belief that not-P. Why does he have grounds for the belief that not-P? Because he is also believing that he believes that not-P and, if the bypass model is right, then he must have formed that higher-order belief on the basis of his grounds for believing that not-P. So the key ingredient in the explanation of our intuition that the Moore-paradoxical subject is being irrational is that the subject must form his higher-order belief on the basis of his grounds for the corresponding belief (or lack of them, as the case may be). One and the same mental state must be both the grounds for the subject’s belief that P and the basis for her higher-order belief. Otherwise, my account does not work. And I think that, in the case that you are suggesting, this requirement is not met. Someone who asserts ‘I feel that my arm hurts but I have no arm’ seems to be expressing, on the one hand, the belief that he thinks that his arm hurts and, on the other hand, the belief that he has no arm. Presumably, there is some painful sensation that constitutes his grounds for the first belief, and some perceptual (perhaps visual, perhaps proprioceptive) experience that constitutes his grounds for the second belief. In this case, there is no conflict between the subject having those grounds for his first belief, and those grounds for his second belief. Those grounds are not in tension. This is why I think that I would not be able to run the line of reasoning sketched above for Moore’s paradox in order to explain our intuitions about this case. But what are those intuitions anyway? Do we really think that this subject is being irrational in the sense in which the Moore-paradoxical subject is being irrational? I do not think so. The utterance ‘I feel that my arm hurts but I have no arm’ is puzzling, but it does not seem irrational. A subject who realizes that the verb ‘feeling’ is not factive and, thus, one can feel that certain states of affairs are the case even though they are not actually the case, could make that utterance coherently. Realizing that he is under some sort of illusion, he could insist that he believes he is having a feeling that does not correspond to reality. This does not seem irrational whereas, in the case of Moore’s paradox, once one realizes that one’s belief is wrong, it seems irrational to continue to think that one is still having that belief.

MJGE: There is much more in the book than this. There are, for instance, and importantly, accounts of desire and self-deception which follow a parallel, and equally ingenious path to that of Fernández’s account of self-knowledge for belief. I strongly recommend your book to the readers of *The Reasoner*. They won’t be disappointed, nor will they believe that they are. Thank you, Jordi, for your book, and your patience!

Should we entitle strong appeals to intuition?

Appeals to intuition (hereafter, AAI *pl.*; AI *sing.*) are inferences from what seems to be the case—i.e., intuitive judgments or intellectual seemings—to what is the case; from ‘it seems that p’ to ‘p’.

According to Mizrahi, strong AAI necessarily meet the following principle:

Principle of Agreement on Intuition (PAI):

“When philosophers appeal to [intuitive judgments], there must be an agreement among the relevant philosophers concerning the [intuitive judgment] in question; otherwise, the [AI] is weak”

Mizrahi 2012 (Intuition Mongering, *The Reasoner* 6(11), p. 170)

Mizrahi arrived at **PAI** by introducing an analogy between AAI and appeals to authority (AAA *pl.*; AA *sing.*) (2012, 170). As far as I see, Mizrahi assumes the following backing claim:

Backing Claim (BC):

If AAA and AAI are analogous, they meet analogous necessary principles.

Mizrahi’s argument could be spelled out as follows:

(1) Strong AAA must meet a principle of agreement among experts.

(2) AAA and AAI are analogous.

Therefore, by modus ponens on **BC**,

(C1) Strong AAI must meet an analogous principle of agreement among experts, namely, **PAI**.

(3) As a matter of fact, AAI don’t meet **PAI**.

Therefore,

(C2) There aren’t strong AAI. (C1, 3)

My counterargument goes as follows:

(1) Strong AAA must meet a principle of agreement among experts.

(2*) As a matter of principle, strong AAI must not meet an analogous principle, namely, **PAI**.

Therefore, by modus tollens on **BC**,

(C) AAI and AAA are not analogous.

I’ll reject (C1) without assuming the falsehood of (2); otherwise, my argument would be ad hoc and I’d commit the fallacy of denying the antecedent in **BC**. I’ll argue directly against (C1) by motivating (2*).

To begin with, consider:

(a) It seems that p, therefore p.

(a) takes as evidence the fact that *p* is intuitive—i.e., that *p* cognitively appears some way—such that (a) is an appeal to the intuitiveness that *p* has by being cognitively entertained in a certain way. There are several ways of understanding ‘intuitiveness’ and, *a fortiori*, several principles by which (a) could be characterized as a strong AI.

According to the *democratic* account:

(b) ‘*p* is intuitive’ only if most people admit ‘*p*’.

By contrast, according to the *aristocratic* account:

(c) ‘*p* is intuitive’ only if most experts admit ‘*p*’.

We shouldn’t stipulate a notion of intuitiveness in virtue of our favoured theoretical requirements. We shouldn’t assume (b) or (c) on the basis of an admitted theoretical framework since such a move would involve an instrumental usage of ‘intuitiveness’, with the consequence that the debate could become a verbal dispute. I think that we should rather try to grasp an ordinary concept of ‘intuitiveness’, at least as a departure point.

To start with, in general, intuitiveness is a feature of a proposition when cognitively entertained in certain way. Thus, a concept of intuitiveness captures the conditions of that relational feature.

Here are two dictionary candidates:

Intuitiveness₁: ‘*p*’ is intuitive in case it be entertained without the mediation of a particular theoretical background.

Intuitiveness₂: ‘*p*’ is intuitive in case it be entertained without the mediation of reasoning processes.

Intuitiveness₁ is close to pre-theoreticity and **Intuitiveness₂** is close to insightfulness or *prima facie* opinion.

In everyday life we don’t count on a strongly consistent concept of the conditions of intuitiveness: our ordinary concept of ‘intuitiveness’ is ambiguous and difficult to grasp. There’s no agreement whether **Intuitiveness₁** and **Intuitiveness₂** are necessary and/or sufficient conditions for intuitiveness; that fact is orthogonal to the present purposes.

Intuitiveness₁ pushes away the presence of a particular theoretical background, while **Intuitiveness₂** pushes away the presence of reasoning: they both push away two conditions that genuine experts’ judgments should meet. So, they push away (c) too. As a consequence, the aristocratic account is far from capturing our ordinary concept of intuitiveness, at least if it is to be captured by **Intuitiveness₁**, **Intuitiveness₂**, or both.

By contrast, the democratic as well as the aristocratic accounts are somehow gratuitous, since—if, in fact, **Intuitiveness₁** and **Intuitiveness₂** are good candidates mirroring our ordinary concept of ‘intuitiveness’—our ordinary concept of ‘intuitiveness’ doesn’t indicate that some social facts regarding epistemic agreement must be the case as the mark of the intuitiveness. Thus, those accounts seem to be stipulative conceptions on the concept of ‘intuitiveness’.

I suspect that the strength of an AI relies on the intuitiveness of the proposition involved in its antecedent—i.e., ‘p’ in ‘it seems that p’—rather than on some social fact like agreement either among experts or among laymen. By endorsing **Intuitiveness₁** and **Intuitiveness₂**, a strong AI (meeting **PAI**) could derive from a proposition’s appearing very insightful (independently from a particular theoretical background) and systematic reasoning. I think that this is precisely what happens with many strong philosophical AAI.

The stronger philosophical AAI have been used to jeopardize widely accepted claims or paradigms. If their strength had already depended on any agreement among experts, they couldn’t have served to disarticulate those widely accepted theoretical claims by representing a new sort of evidence: they would have presupposed the claims they were purported to jeopardize.

A rejoinder: one might argue that a proposition is very insightful because it is widely accepted by most people in a community; otherwise it wouldn’t be insightful and, *a fortiori*, it would give rise to weak AI. Therefore, the strength of AAI somehow depends on insightfulness-grounding agreement, if not among experts, then at least among laymen. Thus, if a proposition is insightful only to one subject, it would give rise to weak AAI.

I don’t think so. In fact, the stronger philosophical AAI have usually been, *in initio*, entertained solely by one philosopher. This suggests that AAI achieved agreement because they were strong (e.g. insightful independently from particular theoretical backgrounds), not the reverse. Moreover, alternatively, the degree of insightfulness that a proposition might have (independently from a particular theoretical background) could rather derive from the degree of ignorance a community has regarding the corresponding facts. That could explain why we tend to find the stronger AAI in fields that study facts of which we are very ignorant.

If widespread ignorance doesn’t entail epistemic agreement—as seems to be the case—and strong AAI somehow depend on widespread ignorance, there isn’t a principle analogous to **PAI** to be necessarily met by strong AAI.

Summing up: it seems that the strength of AAI relies on the conditions of intuitiveness (e.g., insightfulness) and, plausibly, the degree of insightfulness relies on the degree of ignorance about something. If these considerations and conjectures are compelling, there are good reasons to believe that (2*) is true: that strong AAI must not meet **PAI**. Therefore, by **BC**, we have good reasons to conclude that AAI and AAA aren’t analogous. Briefly, we should entitle strong AAI without the fulfilment of **PAI**.

CARLOS MUÑOZ-SUÁREZ

LOGOS Research Group in Analytic Philosophy
University of Barcelona

NEWS

Formal Ethics Conference, 29–30 May

Following the success of the 2012 Formal Ethics Conference at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, this year’s Formal Ethics conference took place May 29–30

and was hosted in Rotterdam by the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics (EIPE). It attracted speakers from around the world and allowed promising scholars as well as well established experts in philosophy the possibility to examine current as well as classical ethical problems by the application of formal tools.

The conference featured three keynote speakers: Prof. Dr. Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund and LSE), Prof. Dr. Ulla Wessels (Saarbruecken) and Prof. Dr. Marc Fleurbaey (Princeton and Paris). On the opening day, the conference began with the first keynote lecture by Wlodek Rabinowicz. He presented a new approach in the analysis of probability that is structurally similar to the Fitting-Attitude analysis of value and makes it possible to account both for potential vagueness in probability comparisons and for Keynesian incommensurable probabilities. The second keynote speaker, Prof. Dr. Ulla Wessels (Saarbruecken) explored supererogation. After critically examining existing accounts of actions that go beyond the call of moral obligation, she offered an alternative approach that also includes those acts that are morally better than supererogatory actions even though they do not deserve to be called supererogatory. In the last keynote talk of the conference, Prof. Dr. Marc Fleurbaey (Princeton and Paris) examined priority and equality in the case of non-existing people. In a setting characterized by known probabilities, fixed sized population and von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, he identified advantages and disadvantages of different utilitarian, prioritarian and egalitarian perspectives.

Many of the contributing speakers were engaged in similar methods and research questions as those addressed by the keynote speakers. More specifically, the themes explored during the first day of the conference were Gustafsson's principle of value-preference symmetry and Rabinowicz's Fitting-Attitude analysis of value (Mauro Rossi), proportionality comparisons and non-comparable ratio scale measurability (Bruce Chapman), is-ought-inferences in a proof theoretic setting (Norbert Gratzl), conflicting sources of normativity (Martin Peterson), contrastivism and contextualism (Justin Snedegar) and the dynamic relation between moral deontic reasoning and factual knowledge (Alessandra Marra). During the second day, interesting talks were given on the conditional requirements of structural rationality (Julian Fink), the game theoretic formulation and evaluation of universalization principles (Itai Sher), Scanlonian contractualism and the logical investigation of procedural views of norms and justification (Olivier Roy and Martin Rechenauer), the liberal principles of autonomy and non-interference (Roberto Veneziani) and the foundations of deliberative models of public choice (Eric Pacuit).

Since formal methods can be fruitfully applied to all areas of ethics, the formal ethics conferences do not have a thematic focus. However, two days of fruitful discussion provide a great opportunity for exchange among researchers interested in shedding light on ethical concepts and theories by the application of logic and rational choice theory.

VAIOS KOLIOFOTIS

EIPE, Erasmus University Rotterdam

Topics in Explanation, Dependence, and Understanding, 5–6 June

The workshop “Topics in Explanation, Dependence, and Understanding” took place at the University of Duisburg-Essen, hosted by the Volkswagen Foundation project “A Study in Explanatory Power”. It brought together philosophers from different fields who work on explanation and related topics. This cross-disciplinary exchange is crucial for gaining an understanding of explanatory power, which is not only related to epistemic achievements, but also to dependence.

Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (Cologne) dealt with the central notion of *causal* explanation. She provided a partial defense of a Humean theory of causation. She argued that—contrary to expectations—it is compatible with the concept of intrinsic causation, i.e., the claim that causal relations only depend on the intrinsic or local features of the entities figuring in them.

Nick Haverkamp (Mainz) and Gabriel Tarziu (Bucharest) focused on *mathematical* explanations. Haverkamp argued that mathematical proofs can be explanatory. However, this explanatory relation is neither that of representing a consequence of a law, nor does it reflect an objective ordering of the truths used in them. It is rather based on the epistemic states of the users or producers of proofs. Tarziu argued that *no* explanatory relation holds between mathematical and non-mathematical facts. The examples for such explanations are no real explanations according to standard accounts of explanation. Mathematical facts foster the understanding of phenomena, but do not explain them.

Carl Gillett (Northern Illinois) was concerned with *compositional* explanations, specifically with the compositions of entities. He argued that composition cannot be defined causally, especially not by using the criterion of mutual manipulability. Instead, he used the notion of “joint role-filling”: the parts jointly fill the role of the whole.

Kenneth Aizawa (Rutgers-Newark) presented his and Gillett’s work on *multiple realization* (MR) which is an instance of composition. One theory holds that MR occurs if different properties realize the same property. Another one holds that MR occurs if different *kinds* of properties realize the same property. Aizawa argued that accounts of the latter are unmotivated and subject to counterexamples.

The relation between parts and wholes was also treated by Alexander Steinberg (Mainz). He argued that if priority monism is true, no whole *depends ontologically* on any of its parts. Priority monism claims that the cosmos is the only basic entity. All other entities somehow depend on it. If this is true, and if there are worlds in which only one thing exist, one can conclude by *reductio* that no whole depends on its parts.

Dependence is related to *grounding* relations, i.e., that some things obtain in virtue of other things. This relation is also used to describe some non-causal explanations. Stefan Roski (Duisburg-Essen) considered different arguments against the claim that if some facts ground another fact, the former necessitate the latter. Roski argued that some of these arguments are compelling. Thus, grounding can be contingent.

Last but not least, explanations are tightly connected to understanding and knowledge. Intuitively, an explanation increases the amount of one’s knowledge. Nick Treanor (Edinburgh) addressed the concept of “knowing more”. He argued against the idea that knowing more can be measured by counting the number of one’s true beliefs. Even if

truthiness is uncountable, a belief can still be more truth than another.

Altogether, the talks provided stimulating thoughts for future research on explanatory power.

INSA LAWLER

Philosophy, University of Duisburg-Essen

Calls for Papers

VIRTUES & ARGUMENTS: special issue of *Topoi*, deadline 1 September 2014.

MAXIMUM ENTROPY APPLIED TO INDUCTIVE LOGIC AND REASONING: special issue of *Entropy*, deadline 1 December 2014.

WHAT'S HOT IN . . .

Uncertain Reasoning

The development of probability is heavily intertwined with gambling. According to one quite romantic view, probability was born in gambling houses and nurtured in libertine mansions. And indeed there is no shortage of colourful characters to back up the story. Most notably the 16th century astrologer, mathematician and gambler Girolamo Cardano. Among other things, he authored one of the very first treatises on games of chance, titled *Liber de Ludo Aleae*, as well as a horoscope for Jesus. His autobiographic *The Book of my Life* paved the way for some of the deepest self-reflections voiced by Alexey Ivanovitch in Dostoyevsky's *The Gambler*.



A more prosaic way to acknowledge the significance of gambling for the initial development of the *theory* of probability consists in noting that dice, card decks, roulette wheels, etc., all unambiguously provide a unique representation of the relevant state-space, i.e., the basic partition required to distribute the probability mass. In addition, the concepts of independence and uniform distribution arise quite naturally by inspecting the physical appearance of gambling devices. Finally, “putting your money where your mouth is” is a rather natural way of linking probability to the world, an observation that Borel, de Finetti and Savage, among others, put to work very proficiently. A nice synthesis of this view is provided by a quotation attributed to Loius Bachelier (one of the forerunners of mathematical finance) which opens Dubins and Savage's 1965 monograph *How to gamble if you must*.

It is almost always gambling that enables one to form a fairly clear idea of a manifestation of chance; it is gambling that gave birth to the calculus of probability; it is to gambling that this calculus owes its first faltering utterances and its most recent developments; it is gambling that enables us

to conceive of this calculus in the most general way; it is therefore gambling that one must strive to understand, but one should understand it in a philosophic sense, free from all vulgar ideas.

But gambling has yet another “philosophic” hedge—people do gamble in real life, and online gambling provides a wealth of data which can be used to get an even better grasp of how people make decisions in the face of uncertainty. Indeed, data from 565,915 sports bets made by 776 online gamblers in 2010 is analysed in J. Xu and N. Harvey 2014 (“[Carry on winning: The gamblers’ fallacy creates hot hand effects in online gambling](#)”, *Cognition* 131, 173-180).

The results are indeed quite surprising. In a nutshell, the authors claim that “by believing in the gamblers’ fallacy, they created their own hot hands.” The gamblers’ fallacy, also known as *the maturity of chances* and the *Monte Carlo Fallacy*, is the belief that after losing many times one is more likely to win. Hence when losing, the fallacy recommends that the gambler should continue gambling. It isn’t hard to realise why this deserves the label *fallacy*. The *hot hand fallacy* on the other hand leads gamblers into thinking that their lucky stream is a reason for them to keep on betting. Of course the hot hand idea may not be fallacious if gamblers have a successful betting strategy. Indeed the experiments discussed in the paper suggest that some gamblers may indeed experience “hot hands”. The explanation provided is this:

After winning, gamblers selected safer odds. After losing, they selected riskier odds. After winning or losing, they expected the trend to reverse: they believed the gamblers’ fallacy. However, by believing in the gamblers’ fallacy, people created their own luck. The result is ironic: Winners worried their good luck was not going to continue, so they selected safer odds. By doing so, they became more likely to win. The losers expected the luck to turn, so they took riskier odds. However, this made them even more likely to lose. The gamblers’ fallacy created the hot hand.

I wonder what Bachelier would make of this.

HYKEL HOSNI

Marie Curie Fellow,
CPNSS, London School of Economics


EVENTS

JULY

IACAP: Annual Meeting of the International Association for Computing and Philosophy, Thessaloniki, Greece, 2–4 July.

WCT: workshop on Computability Theory, Prague, 3–4 July.

YSM: Young Statisticians’ Meeting, Bristol, 3–4 July.



xkcd.com

OPEN MINDS: University of Manchester, 4 July.

F & P: Fundamentality and Parsimony, University of Nottingham, 4 July.

ARISTOTLE: Bad Arguments, Leeds, 4–5 July.

SotFoM: Symposium on the Foundations of Mathematics, Kurt Gödel Research Center, University of Vienna, 7–8 July.

CICM: Intelligent Computer Mathematics, University of Coimbra, Portugal, 7–11 July.

TiLXIV: Trends in Logic, Ghent University, Belgium, 8–11 July.

BELUX: Normative Epistemic Reasons, Luxembourg, 9–10 July.

FLoC: 6th Federated Logic Conference, Vienna, 9–24 July.

BSPS: British Society for the Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, 10–11 July.

SIS: Scientific Meeting of the Italian Statistical Society, Cagliari, Italy, 11–13 July.

DEON: 12th International Conference on Deontic Logic and Normative Systems, Ghent, Belgium, 12–15 July.

7		3		9		5		
			3	6			4	
2		5	1					
9				5		1		
	7		9		3		5	
		6		8				4
					9	4		3
	2			1	4			
		9		3		7		1

CLC: Classical Logic and Computation, Vienna, Austria, 13 July.

SAT: 17th International Conference on Theory and Applications of Satisfiability Testing, Vienna, Austria, 14–17 July.

IPMU: 15th International Conference on Information Processing and Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems, Montpellier, France, 15–19 July.

LATD: Logic, Algebra, and Truth Degrees, Vienna, 16–19 July.

PLP: Probabilistic Logic Programming, Vienna, Austria, 17 July.

PSC: Proof, Structure and Computation 2014, Vienna, Austria, 17–18 July.

NMR: 15th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning, Vienna, Austria, 17–19 July.

IJCAR: 7th International Joint Conference on Automated Reasoning, Vienna, Austria,

19–22 July.

KR: 14th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Vienna, Austria, 20–24 July.

CCA: Computability and Complexity in Analysis, Darmstadt, Germany, 21–24 July.

PAAR: 4th Workshop on Practical Aspects of Automated Reasoning, Vienna, Austria, 23 July.

PRUV: International Workshop on Logics for Reasoning about Preferences, Uncertainty and Vagueness, Vienna, Austria, 23–24 July.

AUAI: Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence Conference, Quebec, Canada, 23–27 July.

KRC: Reasoning Conference, Konstanz, Germany, 24–27 July.

IJCAI: 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 25 July–1 August.

CAUSAL INFERENCE: Quebec, Canada, 27 July.

STARAI: 4th Workshop on Statistical Relational AI, Quebec, Canada, 27–28 July.

LOFT: Eleventh Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory, University of Bergen, Norway, 27–30 July.

UCM: Uncertainty in Computer Models 2014, University of Sheffield, 28–30 July.

SLALM: 6th Latin American Symposium on Mathematical Logic, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 28 July–1 August.

IR: Inconsistency Robustness, Stanford University, 29–31 July.

AUGUST

REASONING MINDS: Reasoning About Other Minds: Logical and Cognitive Perspectives, Groningen, 4–5 August.

AIML: Advances in Modal Logic, University of Groningen, 5–8 August.

ICPP: 13th International Conference on Philosophical Practice, Belgrade, 15–18 August.

CLIMA: 15th International Workshop on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems, Prague, Czech Republic, 18–19 August.

STAIRS: 7th Starting AI Researcher Symposium, Prague, Czech Republic, 18–19 August.

SBQ: Science and the Big Questions, VU University Amsterdam, 18–21 August.

ECAI: 21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Prague, Czech Republic, 18–22 August.

KNEW: Cognitive Science of Science, Kazimierz Dolny, Poland, 18–22 August.

DARE: International Workshop on Defeasible and Ampliative Reasoning, Prague, Czech Republic, 19 August.

ROBO-PHILOSOPHY: Aarhus University, Denmark, 20–23 August.

CAUSAL EXPLANATION: in Psychiatry, VU University Amsterdam, 22 August.

HYP0: Hypothetical Reasoning, Tübingen, Germany, 23–24 August.

SLS: 9th Scandinavian Logic Symposium, University of Tampere, Finland, 25–27 August.

ECAP: 8th European Conference of Analytic Philosophy, University of Bucharest, Romania, 28 August–2 September.

SOCIAL MIND: Origins of Collective Reasoning, University of Oslo, 29–30 August.

SEPTEMBER

WoLLIC: 21st Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation, Valparaiso, Chile, 1–4 September.

LPOSGW: Approaches Within Philosophy of Science, London, 2–3 September.

SOPHIA: Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy, Austria, 4–6 September.

COLLECTIVITY: Bristol, 5–7 September.

DGN: Decisions, Groups, and Networks, LMU Munich, 8–9 September.

WPMSIIP: 7th Workshop on Principles and Methods of Statistical Inference with Interval Probability, Ghent, Belgium, 8–12 September.

COMMA: 5th International Conference on Computational Models of Argument, Scottish Highlands, 9–12 September.

BPPA: British Postgraduate Philosophy Association Conference, Leeds, 9–12 September.

ENPOSS: 3rd European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences Conference, Madrid, 10–12 September.

GANDALF: 5th International Symposium on Games, Automata, Logics and Formal Verification, Verona, Italy, 10–12 September.

CI: Collective Intentionality, Indiana, USA, 10–13 September.

X-PHI: 5th Workshop of Experimental Philosophy Group UK, Oxford, 11–12 September.

M & I: Models and Inferences in Science, Rome, 11–13 September.

LANCOG: workshop on Modal Syllogistic, Lisbon, 11–13 September.

PAM: Predicate Approaches to Modality, MCMP, LMU Munich, 12 September.

SCLC: 10th Symposium for Cognition, Logic and Communication, University of Latvia, Riga, 12–13 September.

AICS: Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science, Bandung, Indonesia, 15–16 September.

SUM: 8th International Conference on Scalable Uncertainty Management, Oxford, UK, 15–17 September.

CCC: Continuity, Computability, Constructivity: From Logic to Algorithms, University of Ljubljana, 15–19 September.

NoR&N: Nature of Rules and Normativity, Prague, Czech Republic, 17–19 September.

IWSBP: 11th International Workshop on Boolean Problems, Freiberg, Germany, 17–19 September.

ICTCS: 15th Italian Conference on Theoretical Computer Science, Perugia, Italy, 17–19 September.

PGM: 7th European Workshop on Probabilistic Graphical Models, Utrecht, The Netherlands, 17–19 September.

ARD: Argumentation, Rationality and Decision, Imperial College London, 18–19 September.

EERG: Buffalo Annual Experimental Philosophy Conference, Buffalo, 19–20 September.

ICSS: International Conference on Social Sciences, Bucharest, Romania, 19–20 September.

FOIS: 8th International Conference on Formal Ontology in Information Systems, Rio de Janeiro, 22–25 September.

KI: 37th German Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Stuttgart, 22–26 September.

LAP: Logic and Applications, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 22–26 September.

JELIA: 14th European Conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence, Madeira Island, Portugal, 24–26 September.

EoM: Epistemology of Modality, Aarhus University, Denmark, 24–26 September.

IEEE: Intelligent Systems, Warsaw, Poland, 24–26 September.

LANCOG: Workshop on Analyticity, Lisbon, 25–26 September.

EoP: Epistemology of Perception, KU Leuven, 25–26 September.

EFAK: Disagreements, University of Tartu, 25–27 September.

JOHAN VAN BENTHEM: ILLC, Amsterdam, 26–27 September.

BELIEF: 3rd International Conference on Belief Functions, Oxford, 26–28 September.

PMR: Proof Theory, Modal Logic and Reflection Principles, Mexico City, 29 September–2 October.

OCTOBER

WCPA: Western Canadian Philosophical Association, Vancouver, BC, 3–5 October.

FPMW: 6th French Philosophy of Mathematics Workshop, Toulouse, 9–11 October.

DESCARTES LECTURE: Leitgeb on Rational Belief, Tilburg University, Netherlands, 20–22 October.

EBC: Explanantion Beyond Causation, LMU Munich, 23–24 October.

ILCS: Inductive Logic and Confirmation in Science, University of Utah, 24–25 October.

ICSR: Knowledge Representation and Reasoning in Robotics, Sydney, Australia, 27–29 October.

MDAI: Modeling Decisions for Artificial Intelligence, Tokyo, Japan, 29–31 October.

IDA: 13th International Symposium on Intelligent Data Analysis, Leuven, Belgium, 30 October–1 November.

COURSES AND PROGRAMMES

Courses

EASLLC: 3rd East-Asian School on Logic, Language and Computation, Tsinghua University, China, 2–8 July.

CARNEGIE MELLON: Summer School in Logic and Formal Epistemology, 2–20 July.

INEM / CHESS: Summer School in Philosophy and Economics, University of the Basque Country, Donostia-San Sebastian, Spain, 21–23 July.

SIPTA: 6th SIPTA School on Imprecise Probabilities, Montpellier, France, 21–25 July.

MCMP: MCMP Summer School on Mathematical Philosophy for Female Students, Munich, Germany, 27 July–2 August.

ESSLLI: 26th European Summer School in Logic, Language and Information, University of Tübingen, Germany, 18–22 August.

EPISTEMOLOGY & COGNITION: Groningen, 25–29 August.

IJCAI: 2nd IJCAI School on Artificial Intelligence, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1–5 September.

CLPA: Summer School on Argumentation: Computational and Linguistic Perspectives on Argumentation, University of Dundee, Scotland, 4–8 September.

CSSIP: 9th Cologne Summer School in Philosophy on Practical Reasons, Cologne, 15–19 September.

AAAI: Texas, USA, 25–29 January.

Programmes

APHIL: MA/PhD in Analytic Philosophy, University of Barcelona.

MASTER PROGRAMME: MA in Pure and Applied Logic, University of Barcelona.

DOCTORAL PROGRAMME IN PHILOSOPHY: Language, Mind and Practice, Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich, Switzerland.

HPSM: MA in the History and Philosophy of Science and Medicine, Durham University.

MASTER PROGRAMME: in Statistics, University College Dublin.

LOPHISC: Master in Logic, Philosophy of Science & Epistemology, Pantheon-Sorbonne University (Paris 1) and Paris-Sorbonne University (Paris 4).

MASTER PROGRAMME: in Artificial Intelligence, Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands.

MASTER PROGRAMME: Philosophy and Economics, Institute of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth.

MA IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE: School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy, Queen's University Belfast.

MA IN LOGIC AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS: Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol.

MA PROGRAMMES: in Philosophy of Science, University of Leeds.

MA IN LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Study of Religion, LMU Munich.

MA IN LOGIC AND THEORY OF SCIENCE: Department of Logic of the Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest, Hungary.

MA IN METAPHYSICS, LANGUAGE, AND MIND: Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool.

MA IN MIND, BRAIN AND LEARNING: Westminster Institute of Education, Oxford Brookes University.

MA IN PHILOSOPHY: by research, Tilburg University.

MA IN PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND SOCIETY: TiLPS, Tilburg University.

MA IN PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE SCIENCES: Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol.

MA IN RHETORIC: School of Journalism, Media and Communication, University of Central Lancashire.

MA PROGRAMMES: in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, and Philosophy of Mind and Psychology, University of Birmingham.

MRES IN METHODS AND PRACTICES OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH: Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen.

MSC IN APPLIED STATISTICS: Department of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics, Birkbeck, University of London.

MSC IN APPLIED STATISTICS AND DATAMINING: School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of St Andrews.

MSC IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: Faculty of Engineering, University of Leeds.

MA IN REASONING

A programme at the University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. Gain the philosophical background required for a PhD in this area. Optional modules available from Psychology, Computing, Statistics, Social Policy, Law, Biosciences and History.

MSC IN COGNITIVE & DECISION SCIENCES: Psychology, University College London.

MSC IN COGNITIVE SYSTEMS: Language, Learning, and Reasoning, University of Potsdam.

MSC IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE: University of Osnabrück, Germany.

MSC IN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY/NEUROPSYCHOLOGY: School of Psychology, University of Kent.

MSC IN LOGIC: Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam.

MSC IN MIND, LANGUAGE & EMBODIED COGNITION: School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh.

MSC IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: University of Twente, The Netherlands.

MRES IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND HUMANITIES: LANGUAGE, COMMUNICATION AND ORGANIZATION: Institute for Logic, Cognition, Language, and Information, University of the Basque Country (Donostia San Sebastián).

OPEN MIND: International School of Advanced Studies in Cognitive Sciences, University of Bucharest.

JOBS AND STUDENTSHIPS

Jobs

POST-DOC POSITION: in Set Theory, Torino University, until filled.

PROFESSOR: of Uncertainty Quantification, School of Mathematical Science, University of Nottingham, until filled.

PERMANENT POSITIONS: Federal University of Bahia, Brazil, until filled.

POST-DOC POSITION: on the project “Roots of Deduction”, Philosophy, University of Groningen, deadline 1 July.

Studentships

PHD POSITION: on the project “Contemporary Scientific Realism and the Challenge from the History of Science”, Philosophy, Durham University, deadline 1 July.

PHD POSITION: on the project “Collective Actions & Reasons”, Oxford Brookes University, deadline 7 July.

