Transnationality in Translation[1]

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At the outset, let me note the increasing significance of the problematic of "bordering" in knowledge production today.[2] This problematic must be marked specifically as one not of "border" but of "bordering" because what is at issue is a great deal more than the old problem of boundary, discrimination, and classification. At the same time that it recognizes the presence of borders, discriminatory regimes, and the paradigms of classification, this problematic sheds light on the processes of drawing a border, of instituting the terms of distinction in discrimination, and of inscribing a continuous space of the social against which a divide is introduced. The analytic of bordering requires us to examine simultaneously both the presence of border and its drawing or inscription.

Indeed, it is in order to elucidate the differentiation of transnationality from nationality that I want to draw attention to the problematic of bordering. Most important, I want to reverse the order of apprehension in which transnationality is comprehended on the basis of nationality, on the presumption that nationality is primary and transnationality is somewhat secondary or derivative. The transnational is apprehended as something that one creates by adding the prefix trans- to nationality. Unfortunately the word *transnational* retains a morphology that the trans+national obtains only after *national* is modified, which implies that *transnational* is subsumptive to the *national*, thereby giving the misleading postulation that the national is more fundamental or foundational than the transnational. Consequently, the transnational is assumed to some degree to be derivative of the national. This widely

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1. This article is built upon my previous articles and repeats some of their discussions; see Sakai 2009, 2010, 2012.

2. I learned the term "bordering" from Mezzadra and Neilson 2008.

accepted pattern of reasoning derives from our mental habit according to which the adjectival *transnational* is attributed to an incident or situation uncontainable within one nationality. For example, when some individual or people moves across the outer limits of one national territory into another, such a movement is called transnational. Likewise, a company incorporated in multiple national territories and managing projects mobilizing its employees of different nationalities living in different countries at the same time is called a transnational corporation. What I want to highlight, first of all, is the implicit presumption underlying the concept of nationality: that nationality cannot make sense unless it is postulated against the horizon of internationality.

MODERNITY AND INTERNATIONALITY

We must keep in mind that *nationality* does not make sense unless it is viewed in conjunction with *internationality*, and transnationality must not be confused with internationality. In order to assert the priority of transnationality to nationality, therefore, our first move is to delineate the semantics of transnationality as distinct from that of internationality.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of the modern world can be found in its *internationality*; the modernity of the modern world has manifested itself in the formation of the international world. Today transnationality is generally understood within the schema of the international world. By "schema," I mean a certain image or figure against the background of which our sense of nationality is apprehended. However, it is important to note that, in some regions, such as East Asia, the international world did not prevail until the late nineteenth century. In this part of the globe the international world was entirely new, and it took more than a century before East Asian states gave up the old tribute system and yielded to the new inter-state diplomacy dictated by international law. In this regard, there the international world was a mark of colonial modernity. And it is in the very process of introducing the international world that the binary of the West and the Rest began to serve as the framework within which the colonial hierarchy of the globe was represented.[3]

Of course, the international world is not exclusively a phenomenon of the twentieth century. Dividing the world into two contrasting areas,

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3. The idiom "the West and the Rest" has been used by a number of historians of modern colonialism. Arguably the most important is Hall 1996.

the West and the Rest, has been an institutionalized practice widely accepted in academia for a few centuries.[4] This dichotomy may be traced as far back as the seventeenth century, when the system of international laws was inaugurated with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This peace treaty, subsequent to the Thirty Years' War, established the division of the two geopolitical areas. The first of these two areas would subsequently be called "the international world," in which four principles were to be observed: (1) the sovereignty of the national state and its self-determination; (2) the legal equality among national states; (3) the reign of international laws among the states; and (4) the nonintervention of one state in the domestic affairs of another. The second of these areas was a geopolitical area excluded from the first, in which these four principles, including the reign of international laws, had no binding force. The first area would later be called the West, while the second area would be excluded from the international world and became literally "the rest of the world," with its states and inhabitants subject to colonial violence.

The beginning of modernization in Japan is usually depicted as her "opening to the West" when Commodore Matthew Perry commanding the United States naval fleet forced the Tokugawa shogun to sign the Convention of Kanagwa in 1854. It marks Japan's entry into the international world. It goes without saying that Japan's colonization of Korea half a century later, for instance, was accomplished following the protocols of the international world. Many parts of the globe were also colonized according to the schema of the international world. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the majority of the second area was transformed into colonies belonging to a few superpowers. However, this pseudo-geographic designation of the West—it is pseudo-geographic because, in the final analysis, the West is not a geographical determinant—gained currency toward the end of the nineteenth century when the international world had to expand to cover the entire surface of the earth as a result of three developments: (1) colonial competition among the imperialist states; (2) the emergence of Japan and the United States as modern imperial powers; and, most important, (3), the increasingly widespread anticolonial struggles for national self-determination. In this historical determination of the West, its distinction from the rest of the world derived from the legacy of colonialisms.

In order for a colony to gain independence, the colonized had to establish their own national sovereignty and gain recognition from

other sovereignties. In other words, the process of decolonization for a colonized nation meant entering the rank of the nation-states in the international world. As the number of nations being recongized in the international world increased, the presumptions of nationality and internationality were accepted as if these had been naturally given. As the schematic nature of the international world was somewhat forgotten, both nationality and internationality were naturalized, as though the institutions marking the border of the national community—national territory, national language, national culture, and so forth—had been genetically inherited.

It is at this juncture that the concept of transnationality must be invigorated. It must be rejuvenated in order to undermine the apparent naturalness of nationality and internationality and to disclose the very historicity of our presumptions about nationality, national community, national language, national culture, and ethnicity that are more often than not associated with "the feeling of nationality." Here the classical notion of *nationality* in British Liberalism is of decisive importance in order to historicize the schema of the international world. According to John Stuart Mill, *nationality* means:

> a portion of mankind are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively. This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, and community of religion greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past. (Mill 1972, 391)

In East Asia, it was arguably Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901) who first introduced the British discussion on the nation and nationalism systematically and wholeheartedly. Today he is remembered as one of the leading enlightenment intellectuals who advocated for the creation of the modern nation in Japan and translated the English term *nationality* into *kokutai* (national body) in the 1870s, the early Meiji period. Later *kokutai* was used as a fetish to express the sovereignty of the Japanese emperor. The word *nationality* or *national body* had acquired almost a

sacrosanctity and proscriptiveness in the Japanese Empire in the early twentieth century. In his *Outline of a Theory of Civilization* (1973), however, Fukuzawa included Mill's explications of nationality and the *feeling of nationality (kokutai no jô)* almost verbatim in his exposition of *kokutai*. For Fukuzawa, the project of creating the feeling of nationality among the inhabitants of the Japanese archipelago was an absolutely indispensable part of the construction of a nation-state. First of all, what had to be acknowledged in what used to be under the reign of the feudal government was the absence of the feeling of nationality among the masses inhabiting the islands of Japan; there was no nation of Japan, no Japanese as a nation. Therefore, the task of creating an unprecedented type of community called "nation" had to be found in the manufacture of the feeling of nationality.

Without being recognized as a sovereign state in the international world, however, people living in the Japanese archipelago would never constitute themselves as a nation or enter the modern international world. For Fukuzawa, the modernization of Japan, therefore, meant the creation of the institutional conditions for the feeling of nationality, without which people would never form a national community; neither as individuals nor as a collectivity would the Japanese be able to become independent without the feeling of nationality.

As soon as the term *nationality* was introduced in East Asia, it served to distinguish those who were capable of independence from those others who were doomed to colonization. Fukuzawa firmly believed that, unless the legacies of Confucianism were removed, society could not be reorganized to transform itself into such a modern community—namely, a *national* community—so that the feeling of nationality would prevail. As we know this was not particular to Japan, this conviction toward modernization was repeated by other nationalist intellectuals such as Lu Xun in China and Yi Kwansu in Korea. The urge to modernize and turn their countries into nation-states propelled many nationalist intellectuals in East Asia to engage in struggles against Confucianism and other feudalistic remnants in their own societies. In East Asia as elsewhere, the problem of nationality was closely affiliated with concerns about colonial modernity.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nationalist intellectuals believed, almost without exception in East Asia and elsewhere in the Rest, that the introduction of nationality was an absolutely necessary condition without which peoples in the rest of the modern international world could not deal with colonial modernity. They understood that only by turning local masses into a *people* with

nationality could they incite them to refuse to accept their predicament of colonial subjugation and humiliation. It was, of course, imperative to institute the systems of industrial capitalism in their own countries and to educate the population so as to make it capable of scientific rationality. The fate of the nation could not be divorced from the project of modernization. Modernization necessitated the introduction of industrial production facilities, national education, a system of national transportation, a national currency regulated by the national bank, a modern military built up with national conscription, and a spirit of scientific rationality guiding modern technology and production into a society. Still, any of these institutions necessary for nation-building would be empty and useless if not accompanied by the feeling of nationality that bound people together as a nation as a community of shared destiny. Nationalist intellectuals firmly believed that people under colonial domination would never be able to deal with the actuality of colonial modernity unless they formed a political community called "nation," a new political camaraderie shaped after the pattern of "fraternity" independent of the previous familial, kin, or tribal affiliations. They were convinced that, unless the indigenous population first formed a nation, they would never be able to liberate themselves from the shackles of colonial subjugation.

Of course, the problematic that guides my inquiry here is quite different from this nationalist concern. Rather, it is committed to the problem of how to emancipate our imagination from the international regime of the nation-state, not through negation of the nation-state itself but by problematizing the methodological nationalisms permeating knowledge production in the humanities, particularly in area studies, so as to project an alternative image of the transnational community. Suspending nationalist conviction, I refuse to view nationality as something given; instead, I reverse the order of priority while never rejecting our struggle with colonial modernity. Simply put, my starting point is that nationality is a restricted derivative of transnationality, and my guiding question is how the transnational, the foundational modality of sociality, is delimited, regulated, and restricted by the rules of the international world. It is in this context that I have to confront the issue of *bordering*.

BORDERING AND TRANSLATION

In order to problematize the priority of nationality and the international world, we must first problematize the figure—image, trope, or

schema—of the border. It goes without saying that the border cannot exist naturally; physical markers such as a river, a mountain range, a wall, or even a line on the ground become a border only when made to represent a certain pattern of social action. In this respect, a border is always constructed by humans and assumes human sociality. Only when people react to one another does a border come into being. Even if a border separates, discriminates, or distances one group from another, people must be in some social relation for a border to serve as a marker or representation of separation, discrimination, or distance. A border is a trope that serves to represent primordial sociality. Therefore, a border is posterior to social relations, which may well include the act of exclusion, discrimination, or rejection. At the beginning, there is an act of "bordering." Only where people agree to "border" can we talk about a border as an institution. Thus, "bordering" always precedes the border.

Prior to bordering, it is impossible to conceptualize the national border. Thus, the national territory is indeterminate prior to bordering. Similarly, it is impossible to determine a national language prior to bordering.

So what corresponds to this "bordering" as far as language is concerned? Of course, it is translation. What I want to put forth here is that, at the level of schematism, translation comes prior to the determination of language unities that translation is usually understood to bridge. Before the postulation of a national or ethnic language, there is translation, just as there is transnationality before nationality.

At this stage I do not know whether a focus on bordering has gathered momentum across different disciplines, but a bordering turn must be accompanied theoretically by a translational turn: bordering and translation are both problematics projected by the same theoretical perspective. Just as bordering is not solely about the demarcation of land, translation is not merely about language.

In this article I pursue a preliminary investigation about the discussion of translation beyond the conventional domain of the linguistic. Yet the first issue that must be tackled is how to comprehend language from the viewpoint of translation, or how to reverse the conventional comprehension of translation that depends on the trope of translation as bridging or transferring between two separate languages. However, please allow me to remind you that mine is a discursive analysis beyond the domain of the linguistic. Accordingly, it involves the questions of figuration, schematism, mapping, cartographic representation, and the institution of strategic positions. In the conventional understanding

of translation—elsewhere I characterized it as the schematism of co-figuration (Sakai 1997, 1–17, 41–71)—the separation of two languages or the border between them is already presupposed. This view of translation always presumes the unity of one language and that of another because their separation is taken for granted or already as given; it is never understood to be something drawn or inscribed. In other words, the conventional view of translation does not know bordering.

In this order of reasoning regulated by the tropic of translation I find one of the delimitations imposed by the presumptions of nationality and the international world. Nationality must be postulated prior to the process of the transnational transaction precisely because it cannot be conceptualized otherwise, just as national language must be assumed to exist prior to the process of translation because translation is preordained to be represented as bridging the gap between two separate languages. For this reason, the international world cannot but be predetermined as the juxtaposition of distinct nationalities that are external to one another. The economy of the international world thus excludes the potentiality of "heterolingual address" from the outset (Sakai 1997, 1–17).

Translation almost always involves a different language or at least a difference *in* or *of* language, but what difference or differentiation is at issue? How does it demand that we broaden our comprehension of translation? From the outset, we must guard against the static view of translation in which difference is substantialized; we should not yield to the reification of translation that denies it its potentiality to deterritorialize. Therefore, it is important to introduce the difference in and of language so that we can comprehend translation not in terms of the communication model of equivalence and exchange but as a form of political labor to create continuity at the elusive point of discontinuity in the social.

One may presume that it is possible to distinguish the type of translation according to the type of difference in or of the language to which translation is a response. To follow Roman Jakobson's (1971, 261) famous typology of translation, one may refer both to a project of overcoming incommensurability as a type of translation (interlingual translation) from one natural language to another and to an act of retelling or interpreting from one style or genre to another in the same language (intralingual translation) as instances of translation. Furthermore, one may cite an act of mapping from one semiotic system to another as a distinctive type of translation (intersemiotic translation). In this typology, however, the unity of a language must be unproblematically pre-

supposed. Were it not for this supposition, it would be hard to discuss a *different* language, different from the original language, in *inter*lingual translation that takes place between languages external to one another. Neither would it be possible to designate the inside of a language or to refer to a language as the same in *intra*lingual translation. Thus, we are forced to return to the question, What difference?

At this point my inquiry moves from the question of what is different *in* or *of* language to another question: What is different *from* the language? This is to say, we must entertain the question of what language is, how the linguistic differs from the extralinguistic, and how the domain of the linguistic is constituted. In the scope of difference in and of language, however, we are still caught in the mode of questioning where the unity of a language is assumed. By difference, then, do we still understand that one term in particularity is distinguished from another against the background of the same generality, just as a white horse is different from a black horse among horses in general? Do we have to understand difference necessarily as a *specific* difference? Can the sort of difference at stake in translation be appropriately discussed in terms of the *species* and *genus* of classical logic?

The world accommodates one humanity but a plurality of languages. It is generally upheld that, precisely because of this plurality, we are never able to evade translation. Our conception of translation is almost always premised on a specific way to conceive of the plurality of languages. Not surprisingly, we are often obliged to resort to the story of Babel when we try to think through the issues of the unity of humanity but the necessity of translation. But we must not forget that the ancient story of the tower of Babel is most often appropriated into the schema of the international world. Can we assume that this unity in plurality must be figured out only within the schema of the international world transhistorically? Can we conceive of discourses in which the thought of language is not captured in the formula of "many in one international world"? Are we able to conceive of language in an alternative way?

How do we recognize the identity of each language? That is, how do we justify presuming that languages can be categorized in terms of one and many? Is language a countable, like an apple or an orange and unlike water? Is it not possible to think of language, for example, in terms of those grammars in which the distinction of the singular and the plural is irrelevant? What I am calling into question is the unity of language, a certain *positivity of discourse* or historical a priori in terms of which we understand what is at issue whenever a different language or difference

in language is at stake. How do we allow ourselves to tell one language from another, to represent language as a unity?

My answer to this question posed some twenty years ago is that the unity of language is like Kant's *regulative idea* (Sakai 1992, 326). It organizes knowledge but is not empirically verifiable. The regulative idea does not concern itself with the possibility of experience; it is no more than a rule by which a search in the series of empirical data is prescribed. It guarantees not empirically verifiable truth but, on the contrary, "forbidding [the search for truth] to bring it to a close by treating anything at which it may arrive as absolutely unconditioned" (Kant 1929, 450). Therefore, the regulative idea gives only an *object in idea*; it only means "a *schema* for which no object, not even a hypothetical one, is directly given" (1929, 550, emphasis added). The unity of language cannot be given in experience because it is nothing but a regulative idea, enabling us to comprehend related data about languages "in an indirect manner, namely in their systematic unity, by means of their relation to this idea" (1929, 550). It is not possible to know whether a particular language as a unity exists or not, but by subscribing to the idea of the unity of language, we can organize knowledge about languages in a modern, systematic, and scientific manner.

To the extent that the unity of national language ultimately serves as a schema for nationality and offers a sense of national integration, the idea of the unity of language opens up a discourse to discuss not only the naturalized origin of an ethnic community but also the entire imaginary associated with national language and culture. A language may be pure, authentic, hybridized, polluted, or corrupt, yet regardless of a particular assessment of it, the very possibility of praising, authenticating, complaining about, or deploring it is offered by the unity of that language as a regulative idea. However, the institution of the nation-state is, we all know, a relatively recent invention facilitated by the formation of modern international law. Thus we are led to suspect that the idea of the unity of language as the *schema* for ethnic and national communality must also be a recent invention.

How should we understand the formula of many in one, the plurality of languages in one humanity, when the unity of language has to be understood as a regulative idea or *schema* for an object in idea? For Kant, a regulative idea is explicated with regard to the production of scientific knowledge; it ensures that the empirical inquiry of some scientific discipline will never reach any absolute truth and therefore is endless. Every scientific truth changes as more empirical data accumulate. Kant also qualifies the regulative idea as a *schema*, that is, an image,

design, outline, or figure not exclusively in the order of idea but also in the order of the sensory.

From the postulate that the unity of national language is a regulative idea, it follows that this unity of national language enables us to organize various empirical data in a systematic manner so that we can continue to seek knowledge about the language. At the same time, it offers not an object in experience but rather an *objective* in praxis toward which we aspire to regulate our uses of language. The principle is not only epistemic but also strategic. Hence it works in double registers: on the one hand, it determines epistemologically what is included or excluded in the database of a language, what is linguistic or extralinguistic, and what is proper to a particular language or not; on the other hand, it indicates and projects what we must seek as our proper language, what we must avoid as heterogeneous to our language and reject as improper for it. The unity of a national language as a schema guides us in what is just or wrong for our language, what is in accord or discord with the propriety of the language.

Of course, *translation* is a term with much broader connotations than the operation of transferring meaning from one national or ethnic language into another, but in this context I am specifically concerned with the delimitation of translation according to the *regime of translation* by which the idea of the national language is put into practice. I suggest that the representation of translation in terms of this regime of translation serves as a *schema of co-figuration*: only when translation is represented by the schematism of co-figuration does the putative unity of a national language as a regulative idea ensue. This schema allows us to *imagine* or *represent* what goes on in translation, to give to ourselves an *image* or *representation* of translation. Once imagined, translation is no longer a movement in potentiality. Its image or representation always contains two figures, which are necessarily accompanied by a spatial division in terms of border. Insofar as not the act of representation but the representation or image of translation is concerned, we are already implicated in the *tropes* and images of translation. As long as we represent translation to ourselves, it is not possible to evade the *tropics of translation*. Primarily border is a matter of tropics as far as translation is concerned because the unity of a national or ethnic language as a schema is already accompanied by another schema for the unity of a different language; the unity of a language is possible only in the element of many in one, and in order for there to be many, one unity must be distinguishable from another. In the representation of translation, therefore, one language must be clearly and visibly distinguished from

another. The unity of a language requires the postulation of border in the tropics of translation.

DISCONTINUITY IN THE SOCIAL

Translation takes various processes and forms, insofar as it is a political labor to overcome points of incommensurability in the social. It need not be confined to the specific regime of translation; it may well lie outside the modern regime of translation.

The modern is marked by the introduction of the schema of co-figuration, without which it is difficult to *imagine* a nation or ethnicity as a homogeneous sphere. As Antoine Berman (1984) taught us about the intellectual history of translation and Romanticism in Germany, the economy of the foreign, that is, how the foreign must be allocated in the production of the domestic language, has played the decisive role in the *poietic*—and poetic—identification of the national language. Without exception, the formation of a modern national language involves institutionalizations of translation according to the *regime of translation*.

Most conspicuously manifest in eighteenth-century movements such as Romanticism in western Europe and *Kokugaku* (National Studies) in Japan, intellectual and literary maneuvers to invent a national language mythically and poetically were closely associated with a spiritual construction of new identity, in terms of which national sovereignty was later naturalized. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue, the nation makes "the *relation* of sovereignty into a *thing* (often by naturalizing it) and thus weed[s] out every residue of social antagonism. The nation is a kind of ideological shortcut that attempts to free the concepts of sovereignty and modernity from the antagonism and crisis which define them" (Hardt and Negri 2000, 95). This foundation for the legitimation of national and popular sovereignty was proffered as a "natural" language specific to the *people*, which ordinary people supposedly spoke in everyday life. This historical development is generally referred to by literary historians as the emergence of the vernacular. The emphasis on ordinary and colloquial languages went with the reconception of translation and the schematism of co-figuration.

Returning to the question of the relation between translation and discontinuity, I will explore how our commonsensical notion of translation is delimited by the schematism of the world (i.e., our representation of the world according to the schema of co-figuration) and conversely how the modern figure of the world as international (i.e., the world consisting of the basic units of the nations) is prescribed by

our representation of translation as a communicative and international transfer of a message between a pair of ethnolinguistic unities.

The measure by which we are able to assess a language as a unity— again, I am not talking about phonetic systems, morphological units, or syntactic rules of a language but rather about the whole of a language as *langue*—is given to us only at the locale where the limit of a language is marked, at the border where we come across a nonsense that forces us to do something in order to make sense of it. This occasion of making sense from nonsense, of doing something socially—acting toward foreigners, soliciting their response, seeking their confirmation, and so forth—is generally called translation, provided that we suspend the conventional distinction between translation and interpretation. The unity of a language is represented always in relation to another unity; it is never given in and of itself but in relation to an other. One can hardly evade dialogic duality when determining the unity of a language; language as a unity almost always conjures up the co-presence of another language, precisely because translation is not only a border crossing but also and preliminarily an act of drawing a border, of *bordering*. Hence I have to introduce the *schematism of co-figuration* in analyzing how translation is represented.

If the foreign is unambiguously incomprehensible, unknowable, and unfamiliar, it is impossible to talk about translation, because translation simply cannot be done. If, on the other hand, the foreign is comprehensible, knowable, and familiar, it is unnecessary to call for translation. Thus, the status of the foreign in translation must always be ambiguous. It is alien, but it is already *in transition* to something familiar. The foreign is simultaneously incomprehensible and comprehensible, unknowable and knowable, and unfamiliar and familiar. This foundational ambiguity of translation derives from the ambiguity of the positionality generally indexed by the peculiar presence of the translator; she is summoned only when two kinds of audiences are postulated with regard to the source text: one for whom the text is comprehensible, at least to some degree, and the other for whom it is incomprehensible. The translator's work lies in dealing with the difference between the two. It is only insofar as comprehensibility is clearly and unambiguously distinct from incomprehensibility that the translator can be discerned from the nontranslator without ambiguity in the conceptual economy of this determination of the foreign and the proper.

It is important to note that the language in this instance is figurative: it need not refer to any natural language of an ethnic or national community such as German or Tagalog, since it is equally possible to

have two kinds of audiences when the source text is a heavily technical document or an avant-garde literary piece. Language may refer to a set of vocabulary and expressions associated with a professional field or discipline, such as legal language; it may imply the style of graphic inscription or an unusual perceptual setting in which an artwork is installed. One may argue that these are examples of intralingual and intersemiotic translation, respectively, but they can be postulated only when they are in contradistinction to translation proper. The propriety of translation presupposes the unity of a language; it is impossible unless one unity of language is posited as external to another, as if, already, languages were considered as countable, like apples. These figurative uses of translation illustrate how difficult it is to construe the locale of translation as a linking or bridging of two languages, two spatially marked domains. Here I want to stress again that translation is not only a border crossing but also and preliminarily an act of drawing a border, of bordering.

Considering the positionality of the translator, we can now approach the problematic of subjectivity. The internal split in the translator, which reflects the split between the translator and the addresser or between the translator and the addressee, and furthermore the actualizing split in the addresser and the addressee,[5] demonstrates the way in which the subject constitutes itself. This internal split in the translator is homologous to the fractured I, the temporality of "I speak," which necessarily introduces an irreparable distance between the speaking I and the I that is signified, between the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the enunciated. Yet in translation the ambiguity in the personality of the translator marks the instability of the we as the subject rather than the I; this suggests a different attitude of address, which I have called "heterolingual address" (Sakai 1997, 1–17) and in which one addresses oneself as a foreigner to another foreigner. Heterolingual address is an

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5. The split cannot be limited to the cases of translation, for, as Briankle Chang suggests, the putative unities of the addresser and the addressee can hardly be sustained because the addresser himself is split and multiplies, as figuratively illustrated by the Plato-Socrates doublet in Derrida's "Envois" (Derrida 1987, 1–256). As to communication in general, Chang argues, "Because both delivery and signing are haunted by the same structural threat of the message's nonarrival or *a*destination, the paradox of the signature also invades communication. Communication occurs only insofar as the delivery of the message *may* fail; that is, communication takes place only to the extent that there is a separation between the sender and receiver, and this separation, this distance, this *spacing,* creates the possibility for the message *not* to arrive" (Chang 1996, 216).

event, because translation never takes place in a smooth space; it is an address in discontinuity.

Rejected in monolingual address is the social character of translation, of an act performed at the locale of social transformation where new power relations are produced. Thus the study of translation will provide us with insights into how cartography and the schematism of co-figuration contribute to our critical analysis of social relations, premised not only on nationality and ethnicity but also on the differentialist identification of race, or the colonial difference and discriminatory constitution of the West.

Of course I cannot present an exhaustive account of how transnationality is prior to nationality, but I hope I have suggested one directive among many of analysis in which to emancipate our imagination from the regime of the nation-state by problematizing the methodological nationalism that permeates knowledge production in the humanities, particularly in area studies, and thereby projecting an alternative image of the transnational community. By focusing on the tropics of translation, I refuse to view nationality as something given and to seek in nationality the sole exit from colonial subjugation. Instead, I choose to reverse the order of priority between the transnational and the national. Simply put, my starting point is that nationality is a restricted derivative of transnationality, and my guiding question is how the transnational, the foundational modality of sociality, is delimited, regulated, and restricted by the rules of the international world. It is in this context that I want to situate the issue of *bordering* as one of translation.

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