Staging an encounter between scholars who work on the politics of translation and those involved in the politicization of the concept of translation, this special issue of *translation* attempts to take stock of the theoretical developments and achievements in the field. And at the same time it aims to lay the basis for future conversations and new directions of research. It needs to be repeated that the politicization of the concept of translation in recent years has run parallel to the discovery of its deep *ambivalence*.

Sandro Mezzadra and Naoki Sakai

The *politics* of translation remain fundamentally linked to the dialectic precisely because the dialectic is the essential form through which the critical force of antagonism and contestation is preserved. But what is it, in the form of dialectical thought, that remains linked to this split of translation and its representation?

Gavin Walker

Politics of translation may be invented. Since they will necessarily be forever amendable, such politics of translation may rather not respond to the high name of theory. They will be checked by translation practices in view of their resistance to new enclosures within an "unsurpassable" capitalist horizon.

Rada Ivecović

Translation is no more just a linguistic matter than can linguistic differences be reduced to cultural differences. I believe we have reached the point where the eventfulness of translation itself must be interrogated.

Lydia Liu

ISSN 2240-0451

€ 35,00

ISBN 978-88-6792-050-1

translation Issue 4 Spring 2014

POLITICS

POLITICS

translation

a transdisciplinary journal

Issue 4

Spring 2014

Raffaelli Editore

translation is a new international peer-reviewed journal published in collaboration with the Nida School of Translation Studies.

Recent developments in our contemporary world (globalization, interculturalism, global and transcultural communication through the web) pose a challenge to every traditional concept of translation. Today, translation has to be considered as a transformative representation of, in, and among cultures and is poised to become a powerful epistemological instrument for reading and assessing cultural exchange.
We imagine a new era that could be termed **Posttranslation Studies**, an era of fundamental transdisciplinarity.

translation invites new thinking about what translation is today, about where translation occurs, and about how we can find new words to speak about translation.

Cover photo: "Shadows" by Anne-Karin Furunes. Detail of one of her works from the *Shadows* exhibition at Palazzo Fortuny, Venice, Italy, summer 2014, in which she uses archival photos of anonymous faces taken by Mariano Fortuny of the women who populated the everyday life of Palazzo Pesaro degli Orfei in Venice.

Art direction and layout: Walter Raffaelli

Biannual Journal

Vicolo Gioia, 10
47921 Rimini—Italy
www.raffaellieditore.com

ISBN 978-88-6792-050-1
ISSN 2240-0451

translation
Fondazione Universitaria San Pellegrino
Via Massimo D'Azeglio, 8
47843 Misano Adriatico—Rimini (Italy)
info@translation.fusp.it
http://translation.fusp.it

Issue 4—Politics

translation

Spring 2014

a transdisciplinary journal

FUSP
Raffaelli Editore

Contents

translation / spring / 2014

Presentation

I am very pleased to announce that **politics** is the theme of ***translation***'s first special issue. The guest editors **Sandro Mezzadra** and **Naoki Sakai**, to whom I express my deep gratefulness for producing such excellent work, have thoughtfully assembled it. They have succeeded in responding to all the goals I have set for such a special issue: to create a space of reflection and debate with and among scholars representing different disciplines; to inaugurate transdisciplinary discourse and take a step toward what we have called posttranslation studies; to unite different voices and approaches under one unitary theme; and to create an issue that constitutes a point of reference for future thinking and research on one specific theme.

As Mezzadra and Sakai write in their introduction to this issue, "the 'politics of translation' has emerged as a fundamental topic, even for the more technical debates within translation studies, while the concept of translation itself has been politicized and used as a theoretical tool in discussions of nationality, citizenship, multiculturalism, and globalization." Translation, they continue, is "a process, political *par excellence*, which creates social relations and establishes new modes of discrimination." This issue serves as an excellent example of the various ways in which translation and politics are necessarily intertwined, or rather, of how translation is always political.

I am fascinated to see how Sakai's concept of *heterolingual address* emerges as a thread connecting all the essays present in this issue, a thread that takes us beyond a traditional communication model of translation to an approach that assumes heterogeneity to be inherent in every medium, thereby illustrating the endlessness of translation.

The articles collected by Mezzadra and Sakai are followed by my interview with Vicente Rafael, a conversation which focuses on yet other aspects of the politicality of translation. The interview is already available on the journal's website http://translation.

fusp.it/interviews, and I am grateful to Rafael for his kind permission to print an edited version of our talk.

I am sure you will all join me in my appreciation of the stimulating thought behind the concerns developed by the authors of this issue.

Before I give the word to Mezzadra and Sakai, let me thank Bob Hodgson, a member of ***translation***'s board as well as one of its founders and active promoters, who is retiring. On behalf of the journal's board, its contributors, and readers, I thank Bob for his precious work and support during these formative years.

S. N.

Introduction

Sandro Mezzadra and Naoki Sakai

University of Bologna, Italy
sandro.mezzadra@unibo.it

Cornell University, U.S.A.
naoki.sakai@cornell.edu

Over the last decades the encounter with cultural and postcolonial studies has deeply influenced the development of translation studies.[1] The study of the conditions of translation, and more radically of what Antonio Gramsci would call "translatability," has led to an emphasis on the issue of power and deep asymmetries between languages, and social and "cultural" groups. The "politics of translation" has emerged as a fundamental topic, even for the more technical debates within translation studies, while the concept of translation itself has been politicized and used as a theoretical tool in discussions of nationality, citizenship, multiculturalism, and globalization.

The relations between translation, violence, and war, to give just one example, have been productively at play in these theoretical developments (cf. Apter 2006; Rafael 2012). Translation can be productive or destructive, by inscribing, erasing or redrawing borders; it is a process, political *par excellence*, which creates social relations and establishes new modes of discrimination. Far from being conceived of as the "other" of violence, translation has emerged as a deeply ambivalent concept and practice. Put simply, translation always cuts both ways: at once a mechanism of domination and liberation, clarification and obfuscation, commerce and exploitation, opening up to the "other" and appropriation. Translation, to further explicate its constitutive relation with the concept and institute of the border, produces both bridges and walls (see Mezzadra & Neilson 2013). To insist on this requires, however, some critical remarks on the ways in which translation has been traditionally conceived of. This will clear the way for a better understanding of the stakes

[1] On "Translation and the Postcolonial," see the recent special issue of *Intrverntions. International Journal of Postcolonial Studies*, 15 (2013): 3, edited by Francesca Orsini and Neelam Srivastava. Among the founding postcolonial texts on translation, we limit ourselves to mentioning Spivak 1993, considered its importance for the topic of this issue of *Translation*.

of current discussions surrounding the politics of translation and the politicization of the concept of translation.

1. Translation beyond communication

Often, translation has been apprehended within an implicit framework of the communication model. Just as a verbal interaction between individuals is typically and schematically construed according to the model of communication in which a message supposedly travels from a speaker's consciousness to a listener's consciousness, the action of translation is represented in a similar schema of communication in which a message is transferred from one language to another. Whereas the verbal communication occurs between two individual minds through the common medium of the same language, presumably translation is distinct from verbal communication in general precisely because the common medium is absent in the case of translation. Instead, two languages are involved in translation so that a message cannot be deciphered in terms of a common code. It is expected that translation takes place where, due to language difference, there is no immediate comprehension. In this view of translation as a communication, the trope of border works powerfully to make and determine a particular incident of social and political transaction as translation. From the outset, whenever translation takes place, a border between one language and another is given as a gap or distance that separates one group of people from another and differentiates one language from another. Let us call this particular image or representation of translation according to the model of communication "the modern regime of translation." But, the status of discontinuity or incommensurability that prompts translation is far from self-evident in this representation of translation between the preestablished unities of languages. Accordingly, we are led to further investigate the workings of the communication model in our understanding of translation.

We are thus skeptical of the model of communication that underlies the view of translation readily accepted in some translation studies today. First of all, as the tropes of war, battle, or violence capture some aspects of translation very well, translation cannot be simply regarded as an act of overcoming a gap or of bridging a distance between languages. Neither can it be merely an operation of diplomacy and conciliation between national polities, distinct ethnic groups, religious communities, or political orders. The relation between translation and borders is again crucial here. There is a need to repeat that translation can inscribe, erase, and distort borders; it may well give rise to a border where there has been none before; it may well multiply a border into many registers; it may erase some borders and institute new ones. Similar to the maneuver of occupation at war, translation deterritorializes and reterritorializes languages and probable sites of discommunication. It shows most persuasively the unstable, transformative, and political nature of border, of the differentiation of the inside from the outside, and of the multiplicity of belonging and nonbelonging.

In short, a border is not something already accomplished, something engraved in stone, so to say, but in constant motion and metamorphosis. It is rather in the register of action than of substance, rather a verb than a noun. It is a *poietic* act of inscribing continuity at the singular point of discontinuity. Viewed from the peculiar angle of this constitutive relation with processes of bordering, new and in a way unexpected political implications of translation come to light.

2. Modernity in translation

The role of translation in the epistemic structure of modern colonialism and the formation of the modern state and national sovereignty, as well as in the operations of global capitalism, has therefore been underscored by several scholars, while often the same scholars have emphasized the need to rework the concept and practice of translation as a cornerstone of a new politics of liberation. The very unity of the concept and practice of translation has consequently been challenged and productively exploded. This is the very site where, as Gavin Walker insists, the politicality of translation ought to be explored. What we called above "the modern regime of translation" has been contested, and it has been acknowledged that different, even antagonistic, regimes of translation were prevalent in previous eras and in many regions in the world. What must be investigated is a specific structure of *homolingual address* that characterizes "the modern regime of translation"(see Sakai 1997).[2] The different regimes may also be "homolingual," but the

[2] The modern regime of translation does not immediately imply that it is "homolingual," as the opposition between "homolingual" and "heterolingual" is primarily concerned with the two contrasting attitudes of

modern regime of translation institutes a particular and strict economy of homogeneity and heterogeneity through translational transactions. It is important to note that the "identities" we take for granted in the world today—ethnic, national, cultural, and civilizational identities—are premised upon "homolingual" addresses in the modern regime of translation.

Some genealogical remarks are needed here. What must be emphasized with respect to the formation of the modern state and nationality is the particular role played by the modern regime of translation by means of which the unities of national languages were projected and manufactured. The so-called modern era, which witnessed the emergence of national languages—German, French, English, and so forth in Western Europe, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean in Northeastern Asia, and many others in other parts of the world—is fundamentally different from previous eras in the identification of language.[3]

the interlocutors: the homolingual attitude assumes that, within the same language—the sameness of which is in dispute—transparent communication is somewhat guaranteed, whereas the heterolingual attitude sees the failure of communication in every utterance, so that every interlocutor is essentially and potentially a foreigner. See Sakai, 1997.

The "modern regime of translation" indicates a different classification of translational institutions. Historically there have been many modes of translation, some of which do not clearly distinguish one language to translate from and another to translate into. In the present-day world, "Spanglish" is a good example of such a mode, which is widely used in North America to link many different groups and individuals. "Spanglish" cannot be accommodated within the "modern regime of translation" precisely because it is neither English nor Spanish. Seen from a slightly different perspective, it is *both* English and Spanish. What is remarkable about this mode of translation is that, instead of clearly demarcating one language unity from another, it confuses the two, preventing one unity of language from becoming distinct from another. Precisely because it cannot be accommodated in the modern regime of translation it is not regarded as a "legitimate" form of language.

There used to be many modes of translation like "Spanglish" in Northeast Asia, and as a result it was extremely difficult to develop the sense of a distinct national language. Our suspicion is that, prior to the development of national languages, medieval Europe was not so different from Northeast Asia in this respect. In the eighteenth century, the Japanese established a new mode of translation, as a result of which they discovered the Japanese language for the first time. When it was discovered, however, the scholars of the Japanese classics did not say the Japanese language existed in the present. Instead, they said that there used to be a Japanese language in antiquity, but it became so contaminated by the Chinese that it was dead by the eighteenth century in their present world. Thus the Japanese language was discovered as stillborn. It is astonishing yet true that people in the Japanese archipelago did not know that the language they spoke in their everyday life had unique phonetics and syntax totally distinct from classical Chinese, the then universal language of Northeast Asia (Sakai, 1991).

[3] The terms "modernity" and "premodernity" are deployed in this article so as to demonstrate that social formations in many parts of the world have transformed in a remarkably uniform manner in the last several centuries. Even though the eras of premodernity and modernity are used to guide our explication concerning the particular values, methods, and procedures of translation—the modern regime of translation—it is not assumed that these eras can be determined with a strict chronology. Our presumption is that the contrast of premodernity and modernity clearly indicates the historical tendency from a wide variety of social formations in premodernity to a comparative uniformity of the modern international world. The chronological pattern of development in one area is so vastly different from that of another area that the historical development in Western Europe, for instance, cannot be said to replicate itself in East Asia and the rest of the world. In this respect, we believe that the developmentalist history of modernization, in which the modernity of Western Europe is expected to be reproduced in other, less developed areas in later eras, is incapable of apprehending the historical situation of the present, in which the stability of the West can no longer be taken for granted. Nevertheless, we also believe that there are a number of tendencies along which each area is transformed. What is suggested by the contrast between premodernity and modernity is this tendency or direction from one polarity (premodernity) to another polarity (modernity).

In the eras prior to the one we understand as modernity, there was no political entity—empire, kingdom, city–state—whose subject population was monolingually unified. In the premodern eras, there were only multilingual societies, where belonging to a polity was never equated to the possession of an ability to speak a single language. Of course, the multiplicity of languages did not mean an egalitarian recognition of different languages. Language use was always associated with social rank, so that different languages were hierarchically ordered and regarded as markers of the social station an individual speaker or interlocutor occupied, but in the eras of premodernity it was impossible to find the legitimacy of government based on an official monolingualism or of a nativist heritage by which the identity of the individual was determined in the last instance by whether or not he or she was a *native* speaker of the official language. The very idea of the native speaker, which plays the decisive role in the identity politics of national recognition in modern cultural politics, was invented in the transitional phases from the premodern eras to the modern era.

It is evident that what is crucial in this diagnosis of modernity and its politics of language is a presumption that language is *countable*—that is, that language is some being in the world which can be subsumed under the grammatical category of the countable.[4] Here the countability consists in separating one language from another (externality) on the one hand, and juxtaposing these separated units within a common genre (commensurability) on the other. The transition from the premodern eras to the modern era seems to have given rise to two essential conditions to render the monolingualism

[4] To elucidate whether or not language is a being-in-the-world requires a lengthy discussion, which cannot be undertaken here. Tentatively, we must be satisfied to say that, as far as it is a representation, language is a being-in-the-world. It is well known that the grammatical category of the countable is limited to some linguistic formations. Many languages in Northeast Asia, for instance, do not have this category as an essential rule of syntax. Nevertheless, the concept of the countable is equally important to these Northeast Asian languages, roughly classified as Chinese, Korean, Japanese, and so forth.

of national language available. To separate one language from another is to locate a language outside another and thereby establish an externality of one language to another.[5]

Of course, this process of separation is generally called "translation," which is again a process of inscribing a border. As one can see, the externality of one language and another is necessarily accompanied by a certain practice of "bordering" (Mezzadra & Neilson 2013).

The language unit thus separated, however, is not unique beyond comparison in each case—language A is separated from language B, and language B is separated from language C. Despite different operations of separation, the languages thus isolated—A, B, C, D, and so on—form one common genre; they are commensurate among themselves so that, from the outset, they are posited as *comparable* units in the common genre. In this respect, translation is also a procedure of comparison. To use the terminology of Aristotelian logic, each language is a species in the general class of languages, with the separation of one language from another, marking the instance of "species difference or specific difference (*diaphora*)"; this thus accommodates languages within the classical conceptual economy of *species* and *genus*. It goes without saying that the operation that measures this "species difference" is nothing but a historically specific form of translation, and this particular regime of translation conforms to the design of the modern international world. Translation may be carried out in many different forms, but modernity does not allow for forms of translation that do not accord with the modern international world. Let us call this particular assemblage of the methods, criteria, and protocols regulating the conduct of translation, as distinct from other forms, "the modern regime of translation."

It is important to note that the explication of modernity offered here is not descriptive of the empirically valid reality of the modern international world. It is essentially prescriptive. The regime of translation is said to project and produce the supposed

[5] It is precisely because of its rejection of externality that "Spanglish," for instance, is not recognized as a proper and legitimate language (see note 3, above).
Here one must not confuse externality with the idiom of "exteriority" or "outside" referred to by Maurice Blanchot and Michel Foucault, since externality is nothing but an erasure and displacement of "exteriority."

unity of a national language, the externality of one language to another, and the idea of the international space in which ethnic and national languages supposedly coexist and are compared. The operation of national translation, of translation conducted in terms of the modern regime of translation, asserts and institutes these components—the unity of a national language, the external relationship of one language to another, and the presupposition of the international space—not on a descriptive but a prescriptive basis.

What this theoretical elucidation reveals is the prescriptive design of the international world. The unity of a national language, for example, is not an empirically ascertainable objectivity; rather it is what Immanuel Kant called "the regulative idea," which does not concern itself with the possibility of experience. It is no more than a rule according to which a search in the series of empirical data is prescribed. What it guarantees is not the empirically verifiable truth. Therefore, the regulative idea gives only an *object in idea*; it only means "a *schema* for which no object, not even a hypothetical one, is directly given" (Immanuel Kant 550 [A 670; B 698]). Therefore, what takes place performatively in accordance with the modern regime of translation might also be called "the schematism of cofiguration." Schematism means a working of schema, so, in this case, it represents a working of two schemata projecting two different language unities between which a message is transferred.

The unity of language cannot be given in experience because it is nothing but a regulative idea; it enables us to comprehend other related data about languages "in an indirect manner, in their systematic unity, by means of their relation to this idea" (Kant 550 [A 670; B 698]). It is not possible to know whether a particular language as a unity exists or not. The reverse is true: by subscribing to the idea of the unity of language, it becomes possible for us to systematically organize knowledge about languages in a modern, scientific manner. And the occasion on which the schemata of national languages are projected is the process of translation, prescribed by the protocols of the modern regime of translation.

3. Bordering the international world

In this respect, the regime of translation, which helped to institute national languages and sustain the view of the international

world as a forum for a juxtaposition of distinct ethnic or national languages, is distinctly modern. In the premodern eras, as we contended above, the population was not unified through the common language imposed by the state; rather it was fragmented into many different kinship lineages, classes, ranks, and regions. Until the eighteenth century in Western Europe and until the nineteenth century in East and South Asia, Eastern and Northern Europe, and Russia, there hardly existed the idea of integrating the entire population under the norm of one ethnic or national language. Consequently some universal languages—Latin, Classical Chinese, Arabic, Sanskrit, Classical Greek, and so forth—prevailed across regions, kingdoms, fiefdoms, and various graduated zones of power and suzerainty. The elite minority was skilled at one of these universal languages while the vast majority of commoners lived in a multiplicity of local dialects and pidgins.

Two points must be noted with regard to the modernity of the *international* world. The first is the historical particularity of the concept of nationality. The word "nationality" signifies the relationship between an individual and a territorial national sovereign state. However, it is important to note that this relationship is mediated by the "nation." The institution of a territorial state sovereignty came into existence in the system of the *Jus Publicum Europaeum* in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the process of its "nationalization" took off quite later even in Western Europe.[6] As the relationship between an individual and a territorial national sovereign state, the concept of "nationality" means a formula of identification according to which a particular individual subjects him or herself to the sovereignty of the state. It is a specifically modern form of communal belonging for an individual and, to our knowledge, was not to be found anywhere in the world before the eighteenth century. Nationality connotes an individual's exclusive belonging to the state, but this feeling of belonging is primarily expressed in one's sympathy with other individuals belonging to the same state. And this community of shared sympathy is called a "nation." Even when the word is used in the sense of ethnicity or race, it necessarily implies an exclusivity of belonging. The concept of nationality is erected upon the assumption of a one-to-one correspondence between an individual and a nation, and indirectly between an individual and a state sovereignty.

The second point that must be stressed is how the unity of language is appropriated into the assumption of one-to-one correspondence between an individual and a particular state sovereignty. It is through the concept of the *native* speaker that one-to-one correspondence between an individual and a particular nation is most unambiguously expressed. With the native speaker, the possession of a language is equated to the innate identity of the individual's destiny. It is a truism that a language is something one acquires after birth, but against all counterevidence, the concept of the native speaker reconstitutes an individual's belonging to the nation in terms of his or her innate and almost biological heritage. This is how the concept of nationality is most often asserted in ethnic terms, and the ethnic identity of an individual is recognized in reference to his or her *native* language.

In the new international configuration of modernity, there is no room for universal languages that transcend nationalities and ethnicities. It is no accident that all the universal languages—except perhaps for Arabic—gradually declined as national languages were established to symbolize the cultural homogeneity of the national community (while at the same time, due to colonialism, some languages were spread across continents, gaining a status that was nevertheless completely different from previous universal languages).[7] Regardless of whether or not a language is actually spoken by the vast majority of the nation in the territory of the national state, the national language is held as a norm with its use as a prescriptive marker of nationality. The institution of national language thereby acquired an incredible force of command with which to nationalize the population.

For a long time, however, as if to reiterate ultranationalist mythology, it has been assumed that national language is a transhis-

[6] For a brilliant analysis and description of modern state sovereignty and the *Jus Publicum Europaeum*, see Schmitt, 2006.

[7] It goes beyond the scope of this introduction to discuss the problems connected with this colonial spread of such languages as Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French, Russian, and Japanese. Postcolonial scholars have long focused on such problems and on the related challenges for translators of literary works characterized by the presence of a multiplicity of languages. In the present global conjuncture further problems are posited by the status of English as the universal language of exchange and communication as well as by the emergence of competing universal languages (e.g., Spanish and Mandarin Chinese).

torical entity and can be traced back to the ancient origin of the nation. But as soon as the historical vicissitudes of national or ethnic languages are in question, one can no longer evade a series of problems—how the modern national language came into being in the first place, how a language could be conceived of as an internally coherent entity distinguished from other languages in an analogy to the territorial integrity of the modern territorial state, and ultimately in what modality the national language can be understood to be a unity unambiguously distinguished from other national languages. Once again we must go back to translation, a process of border—or *bordering*, to use the terminology of Mezzadra and Neilson once again—in which a distinction is inscribed and reinscribed between a language and another, a quite violent process of negotiation in which two figures of a language to translate from and another language to translate into (schemata of cofiguration) are projected to regulate the conduct of translation. Let us note that the distinction of one language from another is primordially figured out in this process of translation, without reference to which the very externality of one language to another could not be established.

4. Citizenship and translation

By staging an encounter between scholars who work on the politics of translation and those involved in the politicization of the concept of translation, this special issue of *Translation* attempts to take stock of the theoretical developments and achievements in the field. At the same time, it aims to lay the basis for future conversations and new directions of research. It needs to be repeated that the politicization of the concept of translation in recent years has run parallel to the discovery of its deep *ambivalence*. As Rada Iveković writes in her contribution to this issue, "translation does not guarantee freedom of any kind, and […] it can be as much a politics of conquest, capture, exploration–and–exploitation and colonialism, whether inner or outer." "But politics of translation," she adds, "may be invented." It is in working through this deep ambivalence that some of the main concepts and topics at stake in contemporary political debates can be productively reframed. No doubt, what is unambiguously declared—and this is a guiding motto of this special issue of *Translation*—is that translation is not a matter confined solely to the domain of linguistics.

Take citizenship, for instance. There have been several attempts to rethink the concept of citizenship through translation in order to open it up and delink it from the national norm. Étienne Balibar comes to mind here, among others. In his contribution to this issue, Balibar dwells very effectively on the opposition as well as the tricky entanglement of the "paradigm of war" and the "paradigm of translation" in the construction of the "other" of the citizen, which means of the "foreigner" and the "stranger." At stake in his essay is the emergence of the very opposition (of the *borders*) between "us" and "them" upon which modern citizenship is predicated. While it is rather obvious to think of "war" as the most catastrophic modality of the relation between "us" and "them," the role of translation as a "transcendental" condition of possibility for the existence of reified political identities can easily pass unnoticed.

The essay by Boris Buden is particularly relevant here. It draws a convincing parallel between the scene of translation and the seminal scene of the "state of nature" in European modern political philosophy. Thinking of an original "state of language," within which the "first translation" produces the emergence of distinct languages and linguistic communities, works on both sides. On the one hand it sheds light once again on the deep political implications of the very concept and practice of translation—"All Contract," Thomas Hobbes symptomatically writes in *Leviathan* (1981, 194), "is mutuall translation, or change of Right." On the other hand, it opens up a peculiar angle on the development, and even on the technical apparatus, of the modern regime of translation we discussed above (starting with the important instance of the German Romantic tradition, emphasized by Buden). Simply put, this regime of translation does not merely reinforce the distinctiveness of national languages upon which the bordering of citizenship is predicated. Rather, it contributes to their production—as well as to the production of the "other" of citizenship.

A whole set of questions arises here—ranging from debates on multiculturalism (as well as on its multiple current crises) to the contemporary transformations of border and migration "management" regimes. When considering such issues, it is clear that the role of translation cannot be confined to the one we have just highlighted. It is clear, in other words, that here and now, not in some

remote future utopia, "vernacular" practices of translation are working the boundary between "distinct" and reified linguistic communities, building platforms that enable the daily crossing of fortified borders and are fostering new experiences of identity and "otherness."[8] It is definitely possible and productive to envisage a kind of clash between the ordered regime of translation staged by borders and the translational practices connected to the production of subjectivity, which meshes with migration as a social movement. What Naoki Sakai has called "heterolingual" address nicely captures these subversive aspects of practices of translation, which point to the emergence of a "multitude of foreigners" (Sakai–Solomon 2006). "There is no absolute translation," Rada Iveković writes in her contribution. This impossibility (notwithstanding the many attempts to deny it) opens up a wide and heterogeneous field of social conflict and political experimentation.

While what we can call "homolingual citizenship" oscillates between the extreme of war and a benevolent "integration" within an already constituted and bordered assemblage in dealing with the "other," the heterolingual practices of translation outside the modern regime of translation disrupt this very polarity and keep open both the space of citizenship and the production of subjectivity that inhabit it. This is the reason why a particularly important task today is an exploration of spaces of citizenship below and beyond the nation–state—from cities to regions.[9] As far as the production of subjectivity is concerned, the relevance of translation in the forging of the modern Western subject has often been highlighted in recent years. Both Rada Iveković and Jon Solomon refer to it in their contributions to this issue. It is therefore crucial to insist on the fact that to point to an opposition and a conflict between radically different regimes of translation is to open up a field of investigation

[8] For a rich discussion of these topics, and more generally of cultural translation, see the essays collected by Ghislaine Glasson-Deschaumes for the special issue of *Révue Transeuropéenne*, 22 (2002), entitled "Traduire entre les cultures."

[9] On "cities in translation" see, for instance, the fascinating book by Sherry Simon (2011). As far as "regions" are concerned, translation has, for instance, been key to the attempt to rethink the European space by Étienne Balibar (2009). But we may also recall Gayatri Spivak's reflections on a "critical regionalism," which led her to speak of a "practice of othering ourselves into many Asia-s," making Asia "a position without identity" (Spivak 2008, 235 and 240). Interestingly, she draws inspiration from José Martí's essay "Our America" and from W. E. B. Du Bois's *Pan-Africanism* (217–223), engaging in what could be termed an exercise in transregional translation.

where the very constitution of the subject, itself crisscrossed by lines of antagonism, is always at stake.

While it is rooted, as we stressed above, within concrete practices of translation, our use of the "heterolingual" address here also works more broadly, shedding light on practices and dynamics well beyond the translational and even linguistic field. The concept of the institution itself deserves to be reassessed from this angle; it must open up towards the imagination of a continuous labor of translation between its stabilizing function and the multifarious social practices that the institution targets and that at the same time make its existence possible.

5. Translating capital

As Brett Neilson's contribution to this issue demonstrates in particular, one of the multifarious ways in which the concept of translation has been politicized in recent years lies in its use as a tool for the critique of political economy, or, in other words, for critical understanding of the operations of contemporary (global) capital. In highlighting the growing relevance of "machine translation" in our time, Neilson focuses on two crucial aspects of these operations: so-called "knowledge management," and logistics. More generally, Neilson is keen to register "the link between translation and the production of value," referring to the parallel drawn by Marx in the *Grundrisse* "between translation and the role of money in facilitating circulation and making possible the universal exchange of commodities." This is a crucially important point discussed by several scholars in recent years. By placing the problem of translation within the "political economy of the sign," several years ago Lydia Liu, for instance, mapped some intriguing connections "between the exchange of commodity and that of the sign in Marx" (Liu 2000, 23; see also Spivak 1985, 83).

The crucial point here, as both Neilson and Liu recognize, is the commensurability and *equivalence*—between languages, systems of signs, and values of commodities. From this point of view, it becomes possible to use what was previously discussed as the "homolingual" address to critically grasp the modalities with which capital translates the heterogeneous contexts, ways of human activity and life, modalities of labor it encounters in its "development" into the homogeneous language of value (Mezzadra 2010). How does

capitalism repeatedly sanction this specific regime of translation, according to which it is an act whereby to establish an equivalence between different languages on the one hand, and a linguistic difference represented as a gap to be bridged by translation on the other? The international space of commensurability on the one hand and the externality of one language to another on the other? How is the formula of *equivalence* prepared in the modern international world as a space of commensurability? We think these questions are becoming increasingly urgent today.

One of the ways in which they emerge, as Neilson shows, is the challenge of achieving "interoperability" between systems in the governance of supply chains through logistical protocols. Another way in which it surfaces is, as Gavin Walker succinctly observes in his contribution to this volume, the refusal of the political in translation, of the potentiality in translation of contestation, by the "flattening of the uneven and hazardous *practice* of translation" into simplistic forms of commensurability. Thus, the question of equivalence brings us back to the topic of the politics in and of translation. "To insist on the historical," Walker argues, "is also an insistence on the instability of this *two* [of the contrasting figures in the regime of translation], an emphasis on the point that this *two* is in no way a coherent or natural arrangement but rather itself a historical product of the encounter of translation." What Gavin Walker uncovers in this politics of translation is exactly what Marx called the historically practical character of relation "in which the very terms of its relation itself is subject to a fluid motion, a flux of radical singularity."

6. Framing the world

There is a need to emphasize this link between capital and translation within the more general discussion that surrounds the multiple roles played by translation in the historical and conceptual constitution of modernity. In particular, it is looking at the global scope that has characterized it since its inception, which means looking at colonialism and imperialism as constitutive aspects of modernity, that it "cannot be considered unless in reference to translation" (Sakai 2000, 797). In his contribution to this issue, Jon Solomon proposes to critically consider "the various forms of social domination and exploitation that have accompanied modernity" from the triple perspective of *capitalist* accumulation (which produces "the subjects of political economy"), *translational* accumulation (which produces "the subjects of civilizational and anthropological difference"), and *erudite* accumulation (which produces "normalized bodies of knowledge"). Needless to say, what counts more is the interweaving between these three regimes of accumulation. Translation, in particular, is deeply implicated in capitalist accumulation, as just mentioned, and apparently it has prominent roles to play in the production of "normalized bodies of knowledge" through what Solomon calls "erudite accumulation."

The combination of these three angles allows light to be shed on the constitution of "the West" through the encounter with its multiple "others"; this necessarily required multiple exercises in translation, linguistic as well as conceptual. Both the spatial partitions that organized the global geography of modernity (from the "global lines" described by Carl Schmitt in *The Nomos of the Earth* to the "areas" of area studies) and the cognitive partitions, upon which modern knowledge and rationality are predicated, bear the traces of these translational exercises. While it is still necessary to investigate these traces and the reproduction of "Eurocentrism" in the present, there is also a need to carefully analyze current global developments and trends in order to grasp elements of continuity and discontinuity.

7. Translation, universalism, and the common

Among other things, the financial crisis of 2007–2008 has exposed the shattering of old spatial hierarchies, the reshuffling of geographies of development, and the emergence of new regionalisms and patterns of multilateralism that are among the most important tendencies of contemporary capitalist globalization. For the first time since the beginning of "modernity," the hegemony of "the West" within the world system appears unstable and challenged. Constructed as "particular" and "ubiquitous" at the same time through the "homolingual address" (Sakai 1997, 154–155), "the West" can definitely reproduce itself, even in a situation in which Western hegemony destabilizes. But again, it is urgent to map the practices of translation emerging in the current geographical turmoil that point to different frames of encounter, transnational and transcontinental entanglement. In her contribution to this issue,

Lydia Liu's reconstruction of the development of "Afro-Asian" writers' solidarity after the 1955 Bandung conference is especially important from the point of view of the construction of the historical archives of such practices in the past. A new theory and practice of translation can help us to imagine new spatial and political constellations that emerge out of the current spatial turmoil, and also test and challenge the stability of the "international world," and the Eurocentricity upon which the internationality of the modern world was initially erected.

Considering the prominent role played by translation both in the production of national languages and in the "regulation" of the intercourses between them, it is not surprising that the modern regime of translation, as we insisted above, was also pivotal to the shaping of the modern world as an international world, i.e. as a world organized around the (legal and political) norm of the "nationality." The Chinese translation of Henry Wheaton's *Elements of International Law* (1836) by the American missionary W. A. P. Martin and his Mandarin collaborators, published in 1864, is a good case in point, and Lydia Liu discusses it in her essay (see also Liu 2006, chapter 4). Wang Hui also shows very effectively in his recent *The Politics of Imagining Asia* (2011, 233–242) the ways in which this particular translation traveled very quickly to Japan and became an important tool for the disruption of the "tribute system" that prevailed in the region of today's East Asia, particularly along China's borders.

The Japanese elite was already aware before the Meiji Restoration that the tribute system was incompatible with the international world. The Japanese takeover of the Ryukyu archipelago, with the establishment of the Okinawa prefecture in 1879, and the occupations of Taiwan and Korea are part and parcel of the process through which the national norm and the aesthetics of nationality—with its imperial implications—were imposed on the population of the regions. The "translation" of Western international law prompted this process, legitimizing it "on the basis of a new kind of knowledge and new rules of legitimacy" (Wang 2011, 241). It is important not to overlook that in the process of modernization, while the Japanese state effectively undermined the tribute system in East Asia and subsequently appropriated Okinawa, Taiwan, and Korea externally on the international stage, the Japanese national language was formed internally or domestically. It goes without saying that the Japanese national language was invented through the regime of translation (Sakai 1991).

New borders were drawn in this process, both on maps and in minds. The role of translation in law deserves careful study both in past history (think for instance of the Japanese adoption of the French and, later, German model of civil law, and the British model of commercial law in the late nineteenth century through translation[10]) and in the present (think for instance of the global transfer of the American standard of "rule of law"[11]). In her contribution to this issue, Lydia Liu points to a rather different instance with her analysis of the drafting of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948). In reconstructing the multilingual making of that historical document, Liu shows how the contribution of a multiplicity of languages, as well as the translations, clashes, and even misunderstandings between them, potentially opened the *Declaration* to "the radical multiplicity and translingual plurality of the philosophies and cultures of the world, first in its moment of genesis and

[10] A massive importation of European institutions to Japan was already underway in the 1870s and ran parallel to the development of the study of foreign languages. In the first two decades after the Meiji Restoration, the most studied European languages were English, French, and some Russian. Initially, no one studied German. But in the late 1880s and 1890s Germany became an important country for the Japanese. The Japanese State began adopting German examples in such a variety of fields as constitutional, civil, and criminal law and jurisprudence, industrial engineering and natural sciences, medicine, and the army. It is important to note that the modern Japanese language itself was created in these processes of introducing and translating European institutions into Japan.

[11] There is a growing literature on the role of translation in law, both with reference to specific historical instances and more generally within the framework of theoretical debates. From this latter point of view see, for instance, Hasegawa 2009 and Ost 2009. For a critical analysis of the global transfer of the American standard of "rule of law," see Mattei and Nader 2009. To follow up on the Japanese example, in the first few years of the Meiji period (1868–1910) many Euro-American legal and political texts were translated into Japanese because a knowledge of European institutions was absolutely necessary for the new Japanese State administrators to ensure the Japanese State be recognized as a legitimate sovereignty in the international world. For them international recognition was absolutely necessary, for this was the only way to escape colonization. It was during this period that the Napoleonic civil code was first introduced to Japan, and a radically different institution of family—the modern family—was introduced to replace the previous institution of family. "Translate the Napoleonic Civil Code as soon as possible!" was the order Etô Shimpei, the first Minister of Justice, issued to his staff at the new Meiji Government in 1871. But there was no systematic civil code in the first few decades of Meiji. Many ordinances were sporadically issued by the state so as to establish new civil rules and procedures, but there was no systematic civil law until 1898, when the systematic civil code, modeled after German civil law (which is to say after the circulating drafts of what would become the German Civil Law Code of 1900), was first legislated. German civil law theory was particularly influential in Japan until the First World War and shaped the interpretation of the civil code in its first two decades. After the war the main trend was toward a "re-Japanization" of civil law, balanced by the need to accommodate international—i.e., Western—standards. US influences became particularly important at that time (see Schröder and Morinaga 2005).

then in subsequent translations." It is necessary to keep in mind, as Liu herself does, that this moment of "openness" was foreclosed by the hegemony of the United States of America, which largely monopolized the interpretations and uses of the document. Nevertheless the multiple temporalities and the dense fabric of cultural and political encounters hidden behind the text of the *Declaration* point to a conflict between different regimes of translation which deserves further investigation.

It is important to remember in this regard that African American leaders like W. E. B. Du Bois played an important role in the process that led to the constitution of the UN and to the drafting of the *Declaration* (see Anderson 2003). More generally, Du Bois (as well as the late Malcolm X) interpreted "human rights" in a particularly radical way. One of the earliest African American political texts, David Walker's *Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World* (1830), may be quoted here in order to highlight the background of this peculiar interpretation. "There is a great work for you to do," Walker wrote to his "coloured" fellows, "as trifling as some of you may think of it. You have to prove to the Americans and the world, that we are MEN, and not *brutes,* as we have been represented, and by millions treated" (Walker 2003, 32). Put simply, it was this experience of a "failed recognition," this violent negation of humanity, common to colonized and enslaved peoples (men *and women*, of course), that allowed Du Bois to see in the claim for *human* rights something more than a merely juridical or political device. The "human" itself could not be taken for granted; rather, it was something to be (re)constructed as a fundamental "ontological" stake in politics.

Once we consider it from this standpoint, Lydia Liu's discussion of the roles played by translation in the multilingual making of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* acquires new, and more general, meanings. It effectively points to the potentialities of the very concept of translation in the contemporary discussions surrounding the topics of universalism, universality, and the common. In brief, we think there is a need to even go beyond the notion of alternative and competing universalisms, which risks ending up reproducing the familiar picture of "equivalent" (universal) languages, with translation playing the role of arbitrator and mediator among them, thereby restoring the modern regime of translation for national translation rather than undermining it. The point is, instead, to insist that the universal itself (as the example of the "human" in the African American experience shows) has to be produced, and to focus on the necessary roles of translation in this aleatory process of production. These roles cannot but be profoundly ambivalent, and this ambivalence (discussed in this introduction from the point of view provided by the distinction between "homolingual" and "heterolingual" addresses) shapes universalism as such. Keeping universalism open (open in translation to multiplicity and heterogeneity) means keeping it accessible to the common process of its production, as a basis for the invention of new processes of liberation. It is here that the "hazardous and contingent possibility of the common," to quote once more from Gavin Walker's contribution to this issue of *translation*, emerges as a fragile but necessary key to the collective invention of "a new mode of life desperately needed in the global present."

References

Anderson, Carol. 2003. *Eyes off the Prize. The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944–1955*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Apter, Emily. 2006. *The Translation Zone. A New Comparative Literature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Balibar, Étienne. 2009. "Europe as Borderland." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 27 (2): 190–215.

Hasegawa, Kō. 2009. "Incorporating Foreign Legal Ideas through Translation." In *Theorizing the Global Legal Order*, edited by A. Halpin et al., 85–106. Oxford: Hart Publishing.

Hobbes, Thomas. 1981. *Leviathan*. Edited by C. B. Macpherson. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Kant, Immanuel. 1929. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St Martin's Press.

Liu, Lydia H. 2000. "The Question of Meaning Value in the Political Economy of the Sign." In *Tokens of Exchange. The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations*, edited by Lydia H. Liu, 13–41. Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press.

———. 2006. *The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Mattei, Ugo, and Laura Nader. 2009. *Plunder: When the Rule of Law is Illegal*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Mezzadra, Sandro. 2010. "Living in Transition. Toward a Heterolingual Theory of the Multitude." In *The Politics of Culture. Around the Work of Naoki Sakai*, edited by R. F. Calichman and J. N. Kim, 121–137. New York: Routledge.

Mezzadra, Sandro, and Brett Neilson. 2013. *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor*. Durham, NC–London: Duke University Press.

Ost, François. 2009. *Le droit comme traduction*, *Le droit comme traduction*. Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval.

Rafael, Vicente L. 2012. "Targeting Translation. Counterinsurgency and the Weaponization of Language." *Social Text*, 30 (4): 55–80.

Sakai, Naoki. 1991. *Voices of the Past: the Status of Language in Eighteenth Century Japanese Discourse*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

———. 1997. *Translation and Subjectivity. On "Japan" and Cultural Nationalism*. Minneapolis–London: University of Minnesota Press.

———. 2000. "'You Asians': On the Historical Role of the West and Asia Binary." *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 99 (4): 789–817.

Sakai, Naoki, and Jon Solomon. 2006. "Introduction: Addressing the Multitude of Foreigners, Echoing Foucault." In *Biopolitics, Colonial Difference*, edited by Sakai and Solomon, 1–35. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Schmitt, Carl. 2006. *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*. Translated by G. L. Ulman. Candor, NY: Telos Press Publishing.

Schöder, Jan, and Yoshiko Morinaga. 2005. "Zum Einfluss des BGB auf das Japanische Zivilrecht." *Rechtstransfer durch Zivilgesetzbücher*, issue edited by Elisabeth Berger, 2005 (29): 38–44.

Simon, Sherry. 2011. *Cities in Translation. Intersections of Language and Memory*. New York: Routledge.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1985. "Scattered Reflections on the Question of Value." *Diacritics*, 15 (4): 73–93.

———. 1993. "The Politics of Translation." In *Outside in the Teaching Machine*, 200–225. New York: Routledge.

———. 2008. *Other Asias*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Walker, David. 2003. *Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World*. Edited by Peter P. Hinks. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Wang Hui. 2011. *The Politics of Imagining Asia*. Edited by Thomas Huters. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Sandro Mezzadra teaches political theory at the University of Bologna and is adjunct fellow at the Institute for Culture and Society of the University of Western Sydney. In the last decade his work has particularly centered on the relations between globalization, migration, and citizenship as well as on postcolonial theory and criticism. He is an active participant in the "post-workerist" debate. Among his works: *Diritto di fuga. Migrazioni, cittadinanza, globalizzazione* (2006) and *La condizione postcoloniale* (2008). With Brett Neilson he is the author of *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor* (2013).

Naoki Sakai teaches in the departments of Comparative Literature and Asian Studies and is a member of the graduate field of History at Cornell University. He has published in a number of languages in the fields of comparative literature, intellectual history, translation studies, the studies of racism and nationalism, and the histories of semiotic and literary multitude—speech, writing, corporeal expressions, calligraphic regimes, and phonographic traditions. His publications include: *Translation and Subjectivity*; *Voices of the Past*. He has edited a number of volumes including: *The Translation, Biopolitics, Colonial Difference* (with Jon Solomon) Vol. 4, *Traces: A Multilingual Series of Cultural Theory and Translation* (2006).

The Regime of Translation and the Figure of Politics

Gavin Walker
McGill University in Montréal, Canada
gavin.walker@mcgill.ca

Abstract: What is a "politics" of translation? How does translation—a general theoretical term that indicates a social process of articulation or disarticulation through which some phenomena in a given social field appear as a "two"—relate to politics *as such*, that is the *practice* of politics? Frequently, a phrase such as "the politics of translation" presupposes that "translation" is a complex and multivalent term to be unpacked, but "politics" is, in this style of composition, often treated as if it were self-evident, as if it were possible to simply affix the term "politics" to various concepts in order to *politicize* them. But I want to disrupt this easy notion of politics and politicization by suggesting that we must seek another means of entry into the relationship of politics and translation than simply a facile imbrication of two presuppositions. What I will be primarily concerned with here is the clarification of the question of *the two*—duality, two "sides," complementarity, comparison, division, scission, antagonism, perhaps even the figure of the "dialectic." The question of translation, and particularly the status of the two in translation, has important consequences for the thinking of politics, even the politics of politics, a metapolitics or archipolitics. I will attempt to elaborate these consequences at length in order to disrupt two complementary misunderstandings: the notion of politics as ubiquitous or constant, and the notion of translation as a simple transposition or transference between two already established positions or fields.

In recent years, the question of translation has been deepened and extended by numerous important interventions in theory. This concept—and I want to insist on the full plenitude of translation as a concept—is not, however, merely a theoretical question. Translation is also a means of naming or marking a real arrangement of forces that organizes real social relations. In this sense, Naoki Sakai has alerted us to an important conceptual distinction within the work of this concept: the distinction between translation itself and what he calls "the regime of translation." I want to try to develop this distinction, so crucial to Sakai's work, in a specific direction: the direction of politics proper. What is a "politics" of translation? How does translation—a general theoretical term that indicates a social process of articulation or disarticulation through which some phenomena in a given social field appear as a "two"—relate to politics *as such*, that is the *practice* of politics? Frequently, a phrase such as "the politics of translation" presupposes that "translation" is a complex and multivalent term to be unpacked, but "politics" is, in this style of composition, often treated as if it were self-evident, as if it were possible to simply affix the term "politics" to various concepts in order to *politicize* them. But I want to disrupt this easy notion of politics and politicization by suggesting that we must seek another means of entry into the relationship of politics and translation than simply a facile imbrication of two presuppositions. We should be equally careful here to avoid a disciplinary separation of registers that would simply equate "politics" with presumed political acts—practical/concrete acts—and "translation" with "culture" in a metonymic style of substitution. Instead, I want to enter into this relation by treating these two terms, these two concepts, in a divergent manner: what is at stake in the concept of politics? What is at stake in the concept of translation? And above all, what is at stake for an act of theoretical articulation between them? What I will be primarily concerned with here is the clarification of the question of *the two*—duality, two "sides," complementarity, comparison, division, scission, antagonism, perhaps even the figure of the "dialectic." The question of translation, and particularly the status of the two in translation, has important consequences for the thinking of politics, even the politics of politics, a metapolitics or archipolitics. We will attempt here to elaborate these consequences at length in order to disrupt two complementary misunderstandings: the notion of politics as ubiquitous or constant, and the notion of translation as a simple transposition or transference between two already established positions or fields.

There are essentially two dominant registers of inherited knowledge in which the figure of the two has been extensively developed: politics and psychoanalysis. We can think of figures of politics such as the distinction between friend and enemy (Schmitt), the primacy of partisanship (Gramsci), the choice of one line or another (Lenin), the geopolitics of the right wing (one putative "civilization" or another), the geopolitics of the left (the revolutionary

camp or the capitalist camp), questions of historiography (the transition from one mode of production to another and the articulation between them), and, of course, questions of psychoanalysis. In the case of psychoanalysis, the figure of the two is perhaps most widely developed: we can immediately recall such instances as the two of analyst and analysand in the clinical scenario, the field of love ("the scene of the Two" in Badiou's terms), but also the two of the split—the splitting of the drive between its self-negating effects and its compulsive repetition, the splitting of the subject between the enunciation and the enunciated, the splitting of the law between its pretension to eternality and its unstable institution in every scenario of domination. But what is the two on the most abstract or conceptual level? (Perhaps this is in fact the most truly "practical" level, in the sense that the concept is precisely what allows for the fullest development of what is constrained in the "real" social field). Here, we must return to the broad question of how to explain three terms or fields: translation, politics, and the politics or politicality *of* translation. Let us then begin with translation.

Translation: The Regime of the Two

The typical presentation of the concept of translation is not, in fact, referential to "translation" at all but rather to the *representation* of translation, what Naoki Sakai has called the "regime of translation." In order to set the scene for an articulation between the concept of politics and the concept of translation, we must first expand and delineate what is actually referred to by this term "translation" and the ways in which a clear understanding of this term is covered over, hidden, or obscured by its confusion with its own representation. In the commonsensical usage of this word, we often assume a simple and formal transposition of content from one signifying system to another. The individual terms, linguistic structure, and field of meanings are meant to pass through and detach from one system of signification and reattach themselves, transferred into another system, to a new *home*. More broadly, we are no longer simply accustomed to translation as a concept linked solely to national language, yet national language nevertheless remains the general historical concept *implied* in the term translation: one putatively unitary language system's set of codings are disarticulated and reassembled in the terms of another putatively unitary system. English is "translated" into Japanese, French is "translated" into Russian, and so forth. Beyond this basic sense, however, we are now used to another use of this term—the whole field of discussions of "cultural translation," for example.

These discussions, however, often reproduce the worst tropes related to the representation of translation—the image of translation as communication, translation as simple transfer, translation as a "bridge" between two self-identical elements, translation as a "filter" or screen (see Sakai 2009). All of these concepts of translation essentially imagine that translation is nothing more than an act of articulation between two *already existing* entities. Hence, "Western" products are "culturally translated" in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and so forth, or vice versa, essentially leaving the concept of "cultural translation" as a mere substitution for something like the local inflection of ostensibly "foreign" elements. Here, therefore, there is no reflection on the *process* of the formation of the local and the foreign as modes of classification; instead, they are simply treated as the presupposed boundaries or edges of terms that are posited as "two sides" of a relation, a relation that could be connected in multiple ways, to be sure, but always a relation of one thing and another.

It is exactly this representation of translation that suppresses or conceals the more basic question of translation as such:

> Strictly speaking, it is not because two different language unities are given that we have to translate (or interpret) one text into another; it is because translation articulates languages so that we may postulate the two unities of the translating and the translated languages as if they were autonomous and closed entities through a certain representation of translation. (Sakai 1997, 2)

In other words, translation is an open and inconclusive *act* of articulation in the space of radical incommensurability, in the space of indeterminacy prior to coalescence into the form of relation. Translation is *represented* as if this zone of indecidability was not the primary scene of engagement, but rather the *outcome* of its own processual motion. But the basic problem is that translation describes what Gramsci called a "historical act," an act with political and historical *contents*. However, the representation of translation represses this aspect of history, and therefore, the aspect of politics, which is always involved in the necessity of reducing cir-

cumstances to *one line and another*. We will return to this aspect when we take up the question of politics proper. If we reduce translation to its representation, we undertake an act of *dehistoricization*, by which the originary differential, the *acting* and *poietic* dimension of translation, is repressed and reduced to an ahistorical constant, a relation already established between two elements that are themselves not called into question.

The paradox presented by this gap or rupture between the work of translation and its representation is that it is only *through* translation that we can enter into this gap itself, exposing us to a theoretical dynamics in which translation appears as a *structure that works on itself*. But how does this operate? And what kind of problem does this disclose, not only for *translation* but also for *translatability*?

> What makes it possible to represent the initial difference as an already determined difference between one language unity and another is the work of translation itself. This is why we always have to remind ourselves that the untranslatable, or what can never be appropriated by the economy of translational communication, cannot exist prior to the enunciation of translation. It is translation that gives birth to the untranslatable. Thus the untranslatable is as much a testimony to the sociality of the translator, whose figure exposes the presence of a nonaggregate community between the addresser and the addressee, as to the translatable itself. However, the essential sociality of the untranslatable is ignored in the homolingual address, and with the repression of this insight, the homolingual address ends up equating translation to communication. (Sakai 1997, 14)

Here Sakai introduces the concept of "homolingual address," a term that plays a crucial role in explicating the specifically theoretical physics of this question. The homolingual address presupposes that not only the language community (or let us say more broadly *social* community) of the addresser but also that of the addressee is *unitary*, or perhaps, more specifically, *univocal*, and that it can be expressed in a relation of integrity or totality. In this schema, the unity of the community of the addresser and that of the addressee do not have to be the same. In fact, they can be radically divergent from each other. But they must each be *presupposed* as *two unities*. That is, the surrounding economies of address and receipt must be understood or imagined as two islands, two self-contained and self-identical spaces without excess or escape. These two spaces would each constitute an interior and an exterior, a hard kernel of solidity inside and a fluid, indeterminate space outside. But this structure of presupposition is itself based on another intervening set of determinations, a *schema*—and here we should emphasize the centrality of the Kantian thinking of the concept of schema for Sakai's work, in which important and original theoretical results are generated around this figure of thought—through which social circumstances are represented *as if* they corresponded to this prior image of isolated, unitary, and identical communities.

But what happens in such a schematic? What is elevated and what is repressed from view? In turn, what is accidentally or fortuitously disclosed to us by means of another dynamics that would inhere in such relations? First and foremost, a complex temporality is installed here. Translation, as we have been arguing, is above all *a historical act*, in the Gramscian sense. What Gramsci suggests by this formulation is that the concept of the act—the practice—that is crucial to us never occurs merely at the level of a conceptual dynamics or an empty, contentless purity. The act for Gramsci is *always* historical, always immersed in a context, a genre, a category of statements, movements, alliances, spontaneous and emergent political allegiances, forms of intelligibility, and so forth. In this sense, translation—the act of articulation in a social space of incommensurability—is always historical insofar as it never merely occurs as an interval, but rather *creates the conditions for an interval or gap to assert itself*. But where this gap should be located, how it should be formed, and what conditions inform its emergence, are all questions linked to the specific historical and political dynamics of the particular circumstantial conjuncture within which the act of translation is undertaken. In this sense, translation is an instance of the *historical present*, a historicity suffused with an openness and sense of intervention, while translation's representation is saturated by a conception of the past as closure, the past as fixity, in which two sides are structurally presumed.

What plays the essential role here is the *prefix*, in the strict sense: the always-already determined nature of supposition:

> By erasing the temporality of translation with which the *oscillation* or *indeterminacy of personality in translation* is closely associated and which can be thought in an analogy to the aporetic temporality of "I think", we displace translation with the representation of translation. […] The representation of translation transforms *difference in repetition* into *species difference* (diaphora) between two specific identities. (Sakai 1997, 15)

Here, a new and crucial point is presented: we see how translation as a historical act is conflated with or covered over by the representation of translation, or the regime of translation, but we also see how this conflation creates a specific modality of the presentation of difference as such. As Sakai points out, here difference in repetition—translation as a historical act, an act of articulation that is incessantly repeated but always in divergent conjunctures with divergent compositional elements and outcomes—is instead transformed into a sort of *specific difference*, in the schematic sense of genus, species, and individual. It is in this sense that the representation of translation, in which the open historicity of articulation is foreclosed as a mere encounter between two presupposed "sides," comes to be not an expression of a difference that must be bridged, but rather a difference that takes place always-already *within* the economy of commensurability. Two sides are presupposed, two unities are preposited. These two unities come to be capable of an encounter, of being represented as two fields between which translation *passes*, because they already are presumed as unities within a field of commensurability, in which an encounter is possible at all. But this, as Sakai demonstrates throughout his body of work, is precisely the theoretical mode by which translation as an act of articulation in the space of *incommensurability*, is repressed or hidden. In this sense, the regime of translation is the repression of the historical, despite its appeal to history – the supposed "natural" basis of national linguistic community and so forth – an appeal that might be linked here also to the psychoanalytic concept of "drive," a force of *pulsion* towards an object of desire that nevertheless must undermine its own satisfaction or fulfillment.

This entire theoretical structure is what Sakai calls "the schema of cofiguration," "the discursive apparatus that makes it possible to represent translation" (Sakai 1997, 15). This apparatus or mechanism is immersed in discourse, that is to say, in *history*. The schema of cofiguration is a mechanism that is itself profoundly historical, a product of the historical process, but one that allows through a certain evasion of the implications of this historicity. This schema in essence names or marks the gap between the historicity of translation and the historicity of its own representation, a representation that acts *as if* translation could from the outset be a presupposition rather than a rupture or contingent act in the incommensurable and irreconcilable field of historical flux. This is again why the historicity of translation that is repressed by the regime of translation finds its resolution in *practice*, in the historical act: "the *practice* of translation remains radically heterogeneous to the representation of translation" (Sakai 1997, 15). As an act of social articulation, in which a previously existing set of terms and relations emerges and develops, translation is always first and foremost practical. It involves an intervention, or what we might call a *forcing* (following Alain Badiou), the production of an economy of elements and relations between them that the prior conjuncture could not theoretically anticipate in its own logical structure. This openness of practice and historical contingency must always be "radically heterogeneous" to the regime of translation, the schema of cofiguration in which two sides are posited from the outset as if their own conditions of production were mere teleological outcomes of necessity, and not themselves subject to the same historical flux that enabled even the discursive apparatus through which they could be apprehended at all.

This is why, in the question of translation, we must pay extremely close attention to the position of the translator, the site in which the entire process remains open to a certain flux, even within the representation of translation, which desperately attempts to repress the historicity of the image of "two sides":

> At best she can be *a subject in transit*, first because the translator cannot be an "individual" in the sense of *individuum* in order to perform translation, and second because she is a *singular* that marks an elusive point of discontinuity in the social, whereas translation is the practice of creating continuity at that singular point of discontinuity. Translation is an instance of *continuity in discontinuity* and a poietic social practice that institutes a relation at the site of incommensurability. (Sakai 1997, 13)

Here the concept of the singular needs to be unpacked at length, and in reference to a series of theoretical problems linked to the question of the subject. Sakai locates the concept of singularity in the figure of the translator, what he calls the *subject in transit*, that is, the "point of discontinuity" in the representation of translation as a smooth transposition of meaning between one signifying system and another. The singular here is thus a marker of interruption, an emblem of a split, a break, or a rupture. Equally, however, the

singular is also that mechanism through which continuity attempts to renew or renovate itself, needing to always be articulated through concrete instances and thereby attain a social solidity. As a consequence, singularity is that form in which both continuity and discontinuity find a foothold or grounding, a paradox or dynamic tension that furnishes the point of rupture in the regime of translation. It is in this sense that singularity is the site of connection between the historical practice of translation and the representation of translation that hides or shields it from view. Equally, however, singularity is also the point around which our investigation of *politics* must circulate.

Politics: The Torsion of the Two

Just as the concept of translation is in fact a divided concept, suspended between the regime of translation (the work of its representation) and translation *as such*, so too is the concept of politics divided between at least two dominant instances. Translation itself is a marker of instability, a point or site within the social motion at which there is an active process of *institution*, the formation of a relation out of the field of radical incommensurability. But the regime of translation is a repression of this radical singularity, one that instead relies on an ahistorical insistence on the *ubiquity* of the two. Here is where a theoretical relation can be drawn between translation and politics. But let us first investigate the concept of politics as such, before we enter into the relational concept of a politics *of* translation.

The two dominant instances through which the concept of politics is broadly understood can be conceived in terms of *ubiquity* and *rarity*. What do these two relations signify? Our global moment is one in which politics appears to be everywhere: in our personal lives, in our increasing capacities to participate in supposedly political processes (polls, questionnaires, the interactive space of online news, the massification of opinion via social media, and so forth). Our tendency today, therefore, is to imagine that politics is something ubiquitous: always available, easily accessible, a question of simply "choosing" or "thinking" within a field of immediacy, a direct plane of outcomes that lies within our proximate horizon. But is this thesis not in fact the death of politics as such? What specificity could we even accord to politics if every social–historical instance were considered "political"? The concept of ubiquity presupposes that everything is political, that politics suffuses our situation. In a sense, this concept of politics is one that conceives of it as a continuity, as a constantly present field of instances that emerge in and through everything. But what if instead we were to say that politics is *rare*? In other words, what if we were to state that politics is not what is included throughout the social–historical world, but rather what is excluded? The argument for the rarity of politics is one that suggests something quite different from the thesis of ubiquity. Here, instead, politics would be conceived as a specific, concrete, historical, and practical *figure*, something with specific moments of institution, something that emerges in and through a specific conjuncture, rather than a presupposed immanent and universally accessible field.

Such a concept of politics could be said to have a certain genealogy of recent and contemporary thinkers associated to it: Foucault, who rejected the ubiquity of politics, and instead spoke of the possibility of *politicization*, the "making-political" of social instances through practical interventions; Badiou, who insists on the event, which punctures the seemingly smooth and closed situation by introducing new and inventive contradictions, grounding a political sequence and thus retroactively convoking a political subject through a fidelity; Rancière, in whose work we find an emphasis on the strong intervention of an egalitarian proposal that suspends the representations possible in the dominant order, an opposition that he names the antagonism between "politics" and "police." In essence, all these thinkers oppose the basic thesis that "everything is political," insisting instead that, strictly speaking, if everything is political, then in truth nothing is political, because politics here would be indistinguishable from the situation of its emergence, eliminating entirely any element of contestation or novelty. If everything were political, the very act of politicization would be meaningless. There would be no need for political analyses or political interventions that above all introduce an element of *exteriority* into the situation, exposing it to new limits, boundaries, and combinations rather than simply accepting the status quo as a set of rigid givens. In this sense, contestation itself would merely be enclosed within an economy of inclusion, such that any force of the outside would itself already be presupposed as internal to the all-

encompassing, entirely immanent situation. Here, of course, there would be no need to speak of politics as such, because if politics is anything, it is precisely the rare moment when the existing social and historical arrangement is called into question by means of novel and inventive acts of contestation, the creation of new antagonisms that previously could not be represented in the conjuncture.

In thinking this concept of politics, let us take an example from Rancière, who offers an apt formulation: "Politics exists when the figure of a specific subject is constituted, a supernumerary subject in relation to the calculated number of groups, places, and functions in a society" (Rancière 2004, 51). Here a series of terms emerge that are crucial for our analysis. First, as Rancière points out, the question of politics is always linked to the question of the subject. But there is an important proviso, in that the subject – that is, the subject of a political process – is not considered here to be a *given*, something that would be presupposed. Rather, the typical or commonsensical order of the process is inverted: the subject is understood as an effect of politics rather than its guarantor, justification, or legitimating force. It must also be said that here the subject is *specific*, that is, the product of specific circumstances, trends, and forces. But what Rancière also emphasizes here that is most crucial for our analysis is his emphasis that this subject is always *supernumerary*. What does he indicate with this concept? There is here a thought of *countability* or *calculability*: as we know, a given social formation is composed of groups, interests, communities, forms of relation, and types of social linkages. For this given society, the social body itself apprehends these elements; certain groups are recognized, acknowledged, and counted, or accounted for in the body of society as a whole, by means of statistical interventions, censuses, and surveys. In other words, these groups and communities constitute a specific number rather than an infinite series. This must be the case because for a group to *count as one* it must be acknowledged as such.

But what Rancière points us toward here is a concept of politics that exceeds or that cannot be encompassed by this calculability, this preestablished count through which society constitutes itself in a given situation. Instead, he claims, politics proceeds when a supernumerary—some element, statement, concept, action, invention, creation—that is not calculable within the given hierarchies, taxonomies, and arrangements presents itself within a social formation. This figure of politics would be precisely an excess element escaping calculation that, by presenting itself within an order of the count, suspends that order by its very existence, calling into question the very foundations of the forms of ordering making up the social status quo. Elsewhere, Rancière provides us with a suggestive historical episode that might clarify the process by which this rare conception of politics erupts, inserting into the conjuncture an entirely new mode of contestation that, strictly speaking, was *absent* prior to its enunciation, prior to the historical act of politics:

> The difference that political disorder inscribes in the police order can thus, at first glance, be expressed as the difference between subjectification and identification. It inscribes a subject name as being different from any identified part of the community. This point may be illustrated by a historic episode, a speech scene that is one of the first political occurrences of the modern proletarian subject. It concerns an exemplary dialogue occasioned by the trial of the revolutionary Auguste Blanqui in 1832. Asked by the magistrate to give his profession, Blanqui simply replies: "Proletarian." The magistrate immediately objects to this: "That is not a profession," thereby setting himself up for the accused's immediate response: "It is the profession of thirty million Frenchmen who live off their labour and who are deprived of political rights." (Rancière 1999, 37)

In essence, the crucial point of this historical moment is expressed in terms of a "subject name" that is "different from any identified part of the community." What is already included or counted within the existing situation is a compositional part of that situation, something "identified" (sighted or cited) within the set of available relations produced by the status quo, the arrangement of forces at work. Thus, when Blanqui refers to himself before the magistrate as a "proletarian," he presents the subject-name of something paradoxically foundational to the existing order, but in a negative or absent sense. The figure of the proletariat appears as the negative ground of the status quo, the element that must be included insofar as it is a core element of the situation ("the profession of thirty million Frenchmen who live off their labour and who are deprived of political rights"), but that must be excluded as calculable within the existing social and political arrangements, because to do so would expose the instability, the contingency and accidental nature of the dominant discursive apparatuses for the ordering of society (the figure of the citizen, legal personhood, state recognition).

All of these elements are themselves historical products, but products whose contingent and historical origins must be erased or covered over in order to function as putatively "natural" givens in the maintenance of the social order. It is here that Rancière points out that politics is exactly what emerges at the point when this erasure of historicity is exercised, when the element that is *excluded in representation presents itself*.

Here, we might profitably take up another complimentary discussion, this time in the work of Alain Badiou, who has extensively developed the generic conceptual schema behind such an understanding of politics by drawing a clear distinction between representation and presentation, and the position of an evental rupture in the supposedly "normal" course of the situation, a circumstance linked in his thought to the figure of the State.

> The ultimate effect of an evental caesura, and of an intervention from which the introduction into circulation of a supernumerary name proceeds, would thus be that the truth of a situation, with this caesura as its principle, *forces the situation to accommodate it:* to extend itself to the point at which this truth – primitively no more than a part, a representation – attains belonging, thereby becoming a presentation. The trajectory of the faithful generic procedure and its passage to infinity transform the ontological status of a truth: they do so by changing the situation "by force"; anonymous excrescence in the beginning, the truth will end up being normalized. However, it would remain subtracted from knowledge if the language of the situation was not radically transformed. (Badiou 2005, 342)

Here Badiou, in a dense and concentrated formulation, points out something crucial for this discussion of the supernumerary "subject-name" in the question of politics: the role of *force*. In essence, when Rancière relates the story of Blanqui's trial, what he points out is that something derived from the situation but not coextensive with it erupts into being and "forces the situation to accommodate it." More specifically than merely its supernumerary character, it is this *forcing* that expresses the nature of politics. A political process does not merely *present* something absent from the situation that nevertheless must play a role within it; rather, it forcibly *punctures* the situation by means of an insistence. What is "counted" in the situation is given a place within it. But what is supernumerary, what exceeds calculability in the optic of a putatively constant and stable scenario, never attains a clear "place" within the logic of the situation into which it intervenes. This is because, as a forcing, such a supernumerary intervention always compels the situation to modify its equilibrium in order to persist.

What we might then say is that, if politics is the rare and evental forcing of a modification of the situation by means of the intervention of a supernumerary element, then the *representation* of politics as a calculable, easily accessible, and immediate field obscures and represses politics as such. This we could call "the regime of the political," the mode of inquiry that reduces the instance of politics proper—a forceful and hazardous intervention that institutes a novel modality of the situation—to a mere set of choices *already presented* within the field of commensurability. Let us expand more on this point.

What is commensurable is capable of a relation, capable of being included in a preestablished or presupposed set of potential relations. What is incommensurable is a radical difference, a difference that cannot be "explained" or resolved, even into a relational concept of "difference" itself. Concepts of difference that we frequently encounter in theoretical analysis—cultural difference, linguistic difference, sexual difference, national difference, etc.—are not, strictly speaking, incommensurable. One putative cultural space is contrasted with another, instituting a relation of "difference"; one presupposed linguistic community is placed into relation with another, establishing a system of ordering "differences" between the two zones; physical elements, social behaviors, cultural practices, and so forth are formed into categories of belonging, thereafter establishing modalities of detecting supposed "abnormalities" and forming a regime of differences with types of relations, modes of contrast, means of comparison, and so on. But all these "differences" are forms of *specific difference*, differences that are gradations of contrast *within a conceptual species*. In other words, rather than being markers of difference as such, these are all relations *included* within a regime of homogeneity, one in which the heterogeneous is ordered on the interior of a bordered space of univocality.

When politics is thought as the simple oscillation between already-established positions within the field of commensurability, what is desperately repressed is the historicity of politics as such, politics as an historical act. Paradoxically, however, it is always history that is appealed to in the service of this erasure: the situation

is treated as a necessary outcome of a circumscribed history, a language is retrospectively made a unity through appeals to national history, a social circumstance is made "natural" by means of retrojecting a historical development onto a contingent process. But in this way, the historical possibility of politics, the fact that politics has no guarantee or legitimating force, is covered over and re-presented as a set of necessities. The radical historicity of politics is contained precisely in its *excess* over the historical narrative, the inability of appeals to history to exhaustively account for the historical materiality of the institution of a new mode of social existence, or to account (or "count") for the historicity of *singularity* (see Haver 1986). If politics then, is a fidelity to a concept of historicity as incompletion, it is never an incompletion that would lead to abstention or withdrawal. Such a concept of politics, by emphasizing the incompletion of the historical process and the radical incommensurability of interventions supernumerary to the conjuncture, is instead a theory of *partisanship*. And this concept of the partisan is always a thought of the two. From the outset, politics has its own concept of "two"—the situation and the intervention, the field of the countable and the supernumerary, for instance. It might be argued that such a conception of politics can never be reducible to the two precisely because it is supernumerary and therefore exceeds all forms of the count. But this would be to misunderstand the status of the two, a decisive concept that we now must clarify in knitting together the questions of politics and translation.

The Politics *of* Translation: The Distribution of Force

Having considered two separate concepts—the relation between translation and its representation (the "regime" of translation) and the relation between two conceptions of politics (ubiquity and rarity)—I want to consider the possibilities for thinking the politics of translation through an articulation of these two fields of inquiry. First and foremost, let us revisit the basic problem: the representation of translation is a regime in which two sides are made to appear. It is not the case that these two sides are "already there"—translation is an act in which this division or separation is enacted. This division or separation occurs for at least two reasons. On the one hand, it expresses the forms of political subjectivation that are given by means of social relations and that express social forms of power and subordination. On the other hand, the intervention into this regime—which cannot be simply or easily overcome, as it essentially expresses the social-historical forms through which significations such as language itself are inherited—cannot consist in refusing the act of division or separation either. To do so would simply mean valorizing a flattened concept of immanence, in which the copresence of all phenomena was treated as one indistinguishable plane. The political consequences of this are stark: the status quo is thus treated as the immanent expression of the existing field of elements, which only have to be differentially arranged to enact a political intervention. Everything is *interior* to this schema, it ends in proposing a certain univocality of politics and of thought, in which an actual *break* remains impossible.

In other words, if our reaction to the concept of translation as a schema, as a modality of analysis, remains at the level of simply refuting the parceling out of phenomena into "two," we will be unable to sustain a genuine *politics* of translation. A politics of translation must not take the immanentist route, which presumes that the response to the simplistic binaries of modernity is to propose instead one unitary field in which everything is arrayed for experience. This would be to deny the politicality of politics proper, which consists precisely in following through the consequences of what *cannot be included* within a unitary field of experience. In other words, if we are to create a politics of translation that is not merely an acting correlate to the *regime* of translation, in which we are consistently given "two sides" of a false choice, we must attempt to inhabit this relation of the Two in a divergent manner, to see how this separation might function differently. If we were to say that politics is rare, while the regime of politics is ubiquitous, we might also say that, although the discursive apparatus of the regime of translation makes us think otherwise, in fact *translation is rare*.

Let us now take up this question of the two, the question of how to think this problem without simply valorizing the false binary structure of the schema of cofiguration. In the case of translation, the representation of this concept always relies on the image of the structure of communication—one successful and unitary sequence is "translated" (here transposed, recoded, reframed) into an-

other. In this representation, therefore, a figure of the two is always being generated: two sides, two languages, two systems of enunciation. This sense of equivalence—the insistence that translation is a smooth transfer of meaning from one "side" to the other—is given by means of the regime of translation itself, in which the structure of presupposition is always relied on as a primary driving force. Language itself is presupposed as coextensive with national community or with an instituted and given community of belonging, thus rendering all instances of translation into modes of communication or transfer between these already-presupposed entities. In this sense, to insist on the historical act or practice of translation is also an insistence on the instability of this two, an emphasis on the point that this two is in no way a coherent or natural arrangement but rather itself a historical product of the encounter of translation, which is then retrospectively attributed to its origins, and then once again conjured up in order to derive itself from its own presuppositions. This peculiar and circular logic of origin is a general phenomenon of capitalist society, one that we must insist is in no way limited to the questions here under consideration (see Walker 2011, and 2012). But for our purposes, what is distinctive and crucial here is to try to think of how we can understand this figure of the two—of division, scission, torsion, and so forth—without reproducing the other two, the binary structure of cofiguration presented to us in the regime of translation.

If the two of the regime of translation is a two that is located, as we have discussed, within the presupposed terrain of commensurability, we might profitably ask: is this cofigurative pairing really a Two at all? Is it not the case that the secret of the regime of translation is in fact its flattening of the uneven and hazardous *practice* of translation, in which neither "side" preexists the process, itself never a simple teleological instance? If this is all true, should we not refer to the regime of translation not as a Two but as a One? In fact, what the regime of translation and the regime of the political share, in flattening their respective practices into simplistic forms of commensurability, is a refusal of contestation, of the truth of the two, the truth of division and rupture, that another direction is possible, and *one must choose*. One must choose because politics, while contained in the supernumerary eruption that suspends the dominant order by introducing or presenting a structuring principle that is nevertheless absent, consists also in upholding the *consequences* of this eruption (see Walker 2013). In the guise of the two, what is really presented to us in the regime of translation and in the regime of the political is a concept of the one, of a field without real scission, a space of preordained "difference" within which everything has already been decided, placed into a regime of relation that excludes critical contestation.

In considering this duality of the two, suspended between the historical practice of translation and its representation, we might proceed here by entering into the thinking of the concept of the dialectic, this embattled and even "scandalous" term, a term over which fierce contestations in the theoretical field have been fought. The question of the relation between the analysis of translation and the thought-form of the dialectic is fraught and complex. How can we think these two instances of relation or non-relation together? What is at stake in doing so? First and foremost, before we enter fully into the elaboration of this question, I want to state from the outset my basic thesis: the *politics* of translation remain fundamentally linked to the dialectic precisely because the dialectic is the essential form through which the critical force of antagonism and contestation is preserved. But what is it, in the form of dialectical thought, that remains linked to this split of translation and its representation? Marx reminds us:

> The dialectic in its rational form is a scandal and an abomination to the bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire spokesmen, because it includes in its positive understanding of what exists a simultaneous recognition of its negation, of its inevitable destruction; because it regards every historically developed form as being in a fluid state, in motion, and therefore grasps its transient aspect as well; and because it does not let itself be impressed by anything, being in its very essence critical and revolutionary. (Marx 1996, 20)

The dialectical torsion between elements is an expression, not of simple commensurability, but of the historically *practical* character of relations, in which the very terms of the relation itself are subject to a fluid motion, a flux of radical singularity, in which the terms—and the putative division between them—torsionally invert into each other, each in turn containing the seeds of the prior results and cyclically passing between forms of solidity. The dialectic is in essence a refusal of the simplistic commensurable stratum of specific difference, a refusal that posits a new and restless

Two, ceaselessly changing in history and practice, against a mere binary treated as two sides of a given field. This "rational form" here is of course the Hegelian "rational," the figure of *intelligibility*, not the concept of rationality linked to the questions of "rational choice," *homo economicus*, and so forth. What is this "rational" figure in the field of translation? It is precisely *politics*. Politics is the form through which the potentiality of translation—the historical act of making, creation, relation in the space of incommensurability—realizes itself in the social life world. In this sense, the politics of translation is an entirely literal phrase: translation, rather than its representation, realizes itself in and through politics, understood here as the field of contestation, raised to a principle: the principle of the supernumerary historical intervention that cannot be merely reduced to an outcome of the existing situation.

The politicality of the split between the historical practice of translation, the pure articulation in the space of the incommensurable, and the representation of translation as communication or exchange between two given sides is a conflict between two images of duality: the regime of translation or schema of cofiguration essentially produces a false image of the two in order to neutralize the real of the Two, the radicality of intervention that the Two expresses. This latter duality is not the simple exchange between one "side" and another, but a two that expresses the split between the state of the situation, in which difference is flattened into commensurability, and the eruptive intervention of *singularity* that presents the void core of the situation, that exposes its regime of cofiguration.

To apprehend the singular is frequently nothing but a reduction to a genealogical or taxonomical structure, a process through which the singular is itself erased *as singular*, precisely in an act of attempting to "locate" it, to "site" (or *cite*) it. The structure of the citation, the historicization, whereby the singular comes to be a stabilized meaning, a stable signification, places the singular into an economy of signification, one that then saturates the original instance with a full density of meaning. When we cite a quotation we do more than simply "locate" a text: we refer a series of words, concepts, and statements to a group of significations—places, names, publishing houses, networks of knowledge, linkages of power, patronage, intellectual heritage and genealogy, modes of analysis, partisan groupings within the production of knowledge, etc.—thereby overwriting the cited text with a deeply sedimented, ingrained history. This interjection of the historical into the text constitutes one of the key elements through which the singular tends to always *vanish*, emergent but interrupted, in the process of its own elaboration. In turn, just as a statement once cited transforms from an irruptive interjection into a genealogical referent, so too a politics that presents itself as a natural outgrowth of a set of givens or field of historical necessities erases the element of politics proper—antagonism, contestation, the singular exposure of the void of the situation.[1]

One of the peculiar aspects of the question of translation, one crucially pointed out by Sakai, is that translation names both the negative system of capture in which social phenomena are bracketed into simple dualisms (the schema of cofiguration or regime of translation), but also names the affirmative politics through which this gap itself is negotiated or intervened into, in practice, in strategy. Translation always implies strategy. We know that there is a politicality of translation—but the real question is, if this politicality is merely the expression in the political field of the double bind of the regime of translation, how can we develop a specifically *affirmative politics* of translation? Here part of the essential question is the distance, separation or split between the one shore of translation and the other. Can we learn something essential here from the question of politics more broadly? In the political sphere the problem is exactly that you must take a distance from a relationship of antagonism in order to develop your forces on your own terrain. What does this tactical consideration mean for the politics of translation?

The representation of translation makes the social space of incommensurable and radical heterogeneity into a simple relation of two already-determined sides. But this two, as we have noted, in fact functions in a univocal manner, suspending the radical difference of the two under the homogenizing force of the one, the field in which specific difference is already included in its count of the situation. In contrast to this false pairing, politics consists in the *active* and *forceful* production of a two where previously there was

[1] On the thought of singularity, see Lazarus, especially 1996 and 2013. I intend to extensively discuss the unique and original work of Lazarus on another occasion.

only one: the act of division here is of a decisively different character than that of the regime of translation, in which division is only a simulacrum of difference. Politics, in this sense, precisely consists in the radical act of making two sides appear—two antagonistic classes, two lines, two positions—and in refusing the two (the schema of cofiguration) produced by the situation itself and in which we find nothing but a field of mutually reinforcing complicities. Let us take the example of class—the quintessential social category of capitalist society—in thinking the possibility of a politics of translation:

> The simple class contradiction is a permanent structural fact, economically locatable (weak correlation), while the class struggle is a process of particular conditions, entirely political in essence, which is not deducible from the simple weak correlation. To confuse the class contradiction with the class struggle, to practice the correlative indistinction of the contradiction, is the philosophical tendency of economism, workerism, the Marxism of drowsiness and the classroom. (Badiou 2009, 24)

In the same way that the "simple class contradiction" is a structural fact of the situation under which it exists (world capitalism), so too the "regime of translation" which establishes the civilizational-colonial division of labor is a structural fact of the "international world," the world constructed from the unit of the nation–state. What this means in practice is that a *politics* of translation cannot begin from the mere "structural fact" of translation—the fact that significations and social relations are parceled out and distributed according to the schema of separation and classification as discrete and holistic entities—but must begin instead from the *active negation* of this fact. Such a politics would not refuse the concept "translation," but would attempt to enter into it from another direction, another mode of possibility, a way to "apprehend singularity without making it disappear" (Badiou 2005, 30), without making it disappear under the weight of its own name.

Just as politics can never confuse the class contradiction—the mere fact of the situation—with the class struggle, the active and inventive intervention that cannot be accounted for in the terms of the situation, so too a politics of translation must never conflate the representation of translation with the rare and singular encounter of translation. A politics of translation would consist in the *apprehension* of singularity, an apprehension that would hold it in tension, refuse to subsume it under the weight of its own surrounding economy, but that would sustain its visibility in the midst of a regime of representation dedicated to rendering it invisible. In a time when the mutually reinforcing civilizational narcissisms of area studies and the representations of the international world are being constantly presented in the schema of cofiguration, the political and historical work of translation remains a decisive task. Elaborating new political modes of relation, actively creating new linkages and solidarities beyond the simplistic communicative model that we are given by the regime of translation in which we are immersed is a task that reminds us of the center of a politics of translation: a new and open search for the possibilities of the common, but an uncanny common, a common that disturbs our sense of inherited belonging and that suspends our fantasies of natural affiliations. Only through a careful consideration of the politics of translation can we hope to produce this hazardous and contingent possibility of the common, a new mode of life desperately needed in the global present.

References

Badiou, Alain. 2005. *Being and Event*. Translated by Oliver Feltham. London: Continuum.

Badiou, Alain. 2005. *Metapolitics*. Translated by Jason Barker. London: Verso.

Badiou, Alain. 2009. *Theory of the Subject*. Translated by Bruno Bosteels. London: Continuum.

Haver, William. 1996. *The Body of This Death: Historicity and Sociality in the Time of AIDS*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Lazarus, Sylvain. 1996. *Anthropologie du nom*. Paris: Seuil.

———. 2013. *L'Intelligence de la politique*. Paris: Al Dante.

Marx, Karl. 1996. "Afterword to the Second German Edition." Volume 1 of *Capital*, volume 35 of *Marx–Engels Collected Works*. New York: International Publishers.

Rancière, Jacques. 1999. *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*. Translated by Julie Rose. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

———. 2004. *The Politics of Aesthetics*. Translated by Gabriel Rockhill. London: Continuum.

Sakai, Naoki. 1997. *Translation and Subjectivity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

———. 2009. "Translation and the Schematism of Bordering." Translated by Gavin Walker and Naoki Sakai. Presentation at *Gesellschaft übersetzen: Eine Kommentatorenkonferenz*, October 29–31, 2009, Universität Konstanz, Germany.

Walker, Gavin. 2011. "Primitive Accumulation and the Formation of Difference: On Marx and Schmitt." *Rethinking Marxism* 23 (3): 384-404.

———. 2012. "Citizen-Subject and the National Question: On the Logic of Capital in Balibar." *Postmodern Culture* 22 (3). *Project MUSE*. Web. <http://muse.jhu.edu/>.

———. 2013. "The Body of Politics: On the Concept of the Party." *Theory & Event* 16 (4). *Project MUSE*. Web. <http://muse.jhu.edu/>.

Gavin Walker is Assistant Professor of History and East Asian Studies at McGill University in Montréal, Québec. He has been a Mellon Graduate Fellow in the Society for the Humanities at Cornell University and a visiting researcher at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo, Japan. He works on modern Japanese intellectual history, Marxist theory and historiography, and contemporary critical theory. Recent publications include "The Absent Body of Labour Power: Uno K z 's Logic of Capital" in *Historical Materialism* 21 (4) and "The Body of Politics: On the Concept of the Party" in *Theory & Event* 16 (4). He is currently completing his book, entitled *The Sublime Perversion of Capital: Marxist Theory and the Politics of History in Modern Japan*.

Translation and national sovereignty. The fragility and bias of theory [1]

Rada Iveković

rivekovic@hotmail.com

Abstract: The author starts by describing her own relationship to language and translation, which is the result of her growing up between languages and among several. She proceeds to explain why she uses elements of "Indian" philosophies to highlight her point about language and translation, just as she uses elements of "continental" philosophy, with the advantage that exposing "our" problems to that "elsewhere" sheds unexpected light on them. She then explains difficulties in language, translation, and understanding as a result of the division between "theory" and "practice," and gives examples (such as those from ancient Indian languages and writings) of cultures where that division was avoided. The divide takes sharper contours in the relation between the "west" and the "rest." Assumptions of superiority are based on the tacit *cognitive precondition of separating theory from practic*e by an insurmountable wall. Historically located polities have each *a general corresponding cognitive order and translation regime*. Which means that whole genealogies of knowledge have remained invisible to European languages, untranslated, apparently *untranslatable* to the hegemonic gaze. The conclusion points to the disaster of national subjectivation in Yugoslavia, in the post-Yugoslav states, and elsewhere.

Translation always raises the question of its politics. I will try to argue for the inevitability of an inter-con-textual and political approach to translation, quite beyond the textual one.

I start from the observation that any "origin" is located, therefore oriented, therefore interested, and therefore concealing a politics; that knowledge is historically informed and that so is therefore translation. Language and translation are not neutral: translata-

[1] This paper was partly written while i was Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, from February to June 2013. I thank ARI and in particular professor Prasenjit Duara, ARI's director, for their input and for giving me the opportunity to carry out this work in excellent conditions.

bility, not only as a possibility, but also as a fundamental mechanism, is already there in any language capacity, even before we can name the language. Both have associated themselves since modernity with the constitution of the nation.

Translation is both on the side of a metaphor as well as, literally, of language(s) and of the material production of worlds, in both cases as political. They involve a declared or hidden politics of translation. Languages traverse each other, bear one another, and rub against each other, even beyond our awareness. They are not mutually excluding. No child is born monolingual. Monolingualism is inculcated in and through a national horizon and the definition of a national language. In this sense a world of translation—translational—is still a transnational world. Because languages are communicating vessels decanting into each other, content is never transferred from a source language into a target language without rest or excess. Translation cannot be reduced to a binary, and it actually precedes the definition or establishment of national and linguistic difference. It happens not between but within languages. It is a complex relationship fleeing in various directions, including all the way through languages, and it transforms the translator as well. The writings of protagonists translate to themselves and to others, but above all, to later generations, their lives, imaginaries and historical conditions. Understanding them from outside their context, from a later generation, or from another translation regime requires some ability of brokering between parallel, circulating, and intersecting histories, where everything is moving and changing meaning: translation takes place on uncertain ground, according to uncertain principles, without guarantee, and gives vacillating, uncertain results. Translation is inevitable, although its politics is unpredictable. The question of learning from others' experience, or from experience tout court arises. How do we translate from one regime of sentences (Wittgenstein, Lyotard), or from one world, into another? But how do we translate from one translation regime to another?

An example: the impossibility and difficulty to translate "caste" (as well as many other terms): the concept of caste is a normative concept of Western sociology for India. How does it translate into India, and back to and from India? It is a "travelling" concept, lost between theories and undermining the construction of hegemonic knowledge, which is oblivious of translation regimes or of the politics of translation. The question concerns a minimum rhetorical rule: since we can only speak of language from within language itself, don't the rules about language also apply to the would-be metalanguage?

Lost in languages

I was born into Serbo–Croatian which, rather than a clearly and once-and-for-all standardized language, was a constellation consisting of a number of different language feelings, stylistic values, competing standardizations, carrying of course various accents, some syntactical variations, and multiple vocabulary choices. By the accidents of life, i was exposed early on to a series of variants of that language (once going under that common name, though no more). These corresponded to different places in Yugoslavia. The language feeling was regional and local rather than national, because the national/state framework itself was fragmented by accents, syntax, scripts, writing, and various rival standardizations. The language could be "more Croat" or "more Serb," with a gradation and no absolute distinguishing principles. I could read the two scripts before going to school. Across that *nébuleuse* of multiple possible ways of speaking and writing that were however heavily disputed by politicians and by some language-policing linguists, and that were used to express other political disagreements, i, like everyone else, could find my way at large throughout the country, understand and be understood. Speaking was no issue at all. Publishing *was*, however, depending on the linguistic politics of your editors, of the journal, the publisher, or the local academy. I was constantly negotiating with editing rereaders—bearers of a great variety of language views and believers in different standardization conventions—about my articles and books. We called them "lectors." Some of them were my great enemies, in general those who were staunch advocates of a strong official codification of separate national languages (whether Serb or Croat). You could tell from their editing (submitted to us before publication for proofreading) not only their linguistic and translation politics most of the time, but their politics *tout court* (Iveković 2007a).

The result is that i have published, depending on how i managed to negotiate my personal language and how my own relation

to it evolved, in a great variety of forms of Serbo–Croatian, completely "inconsistently" over time. It was never like French, which you can write in only one way. Not everyone was as fickle as i was, and most probably adopted the language of his or her social context at the time of writing. But i moved a lot between Belgrade and Zagreb and lived in both. You could write according to various codes and in several ways of which each meant a political statement if you stuck to it. That language contained a contested, competing, and disputed inner multiplicity. Yet i couldn't help but be utterly inconsistent, not out of carelessness, but on the contrary out of a constant concern for language, meaning, and translation. Such inconsistency was paradoxically dictated by my continuous constancy regarding language. The very spirit and most important feature of that language was that it had plural and inconclusive standardizations as well as plentiful options, and the official rules for writing (*pravopis*, which included spelling and some additional sets of usages) also changed constantly, sometimes due to political disputes disguised as linguistic disputes. Being consistent either meant being dogmatic about form and sticking to only one way of writing, or being inconsistent with the form but consistent with the spirit of this language that was always in transformation. Great writers such as Miroslav Krleža and Ivo Andrić had written in different modes of the language—*ekavski* and *ijekavski*—which have only recently become (and only superficially and, in the final analysis, wrongly, irrespective of language history) identified respectively with Serbian and Croatian. People who had not been exposed, like myself, to various vernaculars and manners of speaking and writing, could stick to one form, although even there official rules changed all the time.[2]

Since i started publishing predominantly in foreign languages, the fate of my writing is exactly the same: it is corrected,

[2] A number of spellings and writing rules were made official for all during the lifetime of Yugoslavia, and alternative proposals were occasionally issued by nationalist institutions. One spelling (*pravopis*) was the *Novosadski pravopis*, or "The Novi Sad writing agreement," of 1954 (and the revised 1962 version), which focused on similarities, which i had decided to stick to when i started publishing, not so much because it was midway between Serbian and Croatian, but rather because i thought it would be good to stick to one as the rules kept changing all the time. It was contested by linguistic nationalists. Another attempt in 1967, the *Deklaracija o nazivu i položaju hrvatskog književnog jezika*, or "Declaration on the name and condition of the Croatian literary language," insisted on dissimilarities and announced a first nationalist turn a few years later (1971).

depending on the sensibility of the reader or reviewer, because it is perceived to be inadequate in terms of an ideal form of the language.

Many were those who refuted that multiplicity, who held monolithic, sovereignist, national politics of language and translation. *That language was many languages at once, or in one,* always itself in the process of translation. It was both one and many. The comparisons were to me linguistically delectable, ruminating on language was exciting and sometimes frustrating. The one-and-multiple language was fluctuating in its definitions, grammars, spelling, writing codes, and even names, which were occasionally changed and decreed by academies, uncertain to some, loved and disputed by many. All styles were cultivated, from the extreme purism of each "national" language to rather syncretic approaches where "languages" and their accents or vocabularies were mixed.[3]

Croatian was much more language sensitive at first sight in its national language politics and also more concerned about written form, but it turned out later that Serbian as a national language (somewhat more at ease with oral expression) was no less dogmatic, including in its apparent carelessness about form. What was later (after the war in the 1990s) called Bosnian was more flexible, less standardized, and fluctuating between the two other forms.

Yugoslavia was this peculiar country composed of six republics, two "autonomous regions," two scripts, and half a dozen main languages, of which several were Slavic, and where Serbo–Croatian was the most widespread, spoken in four of the federal states (Bosnia–Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Serbia) and taught at school in all. Serbo–Croatian was thus imposed on everyone and was also the lingua franca. All instructions on Yugoslav goods were in all Yugoslav languages, including minority languages. These are now all considered and named as four different national languages, linked to the idea of each national state, and more could appear at any time, with theoretically possible, though

[3] Naoki Sakai (2013): "I do not think that difference at stake in this instance can be subsumed under the concept of *species difference*." It is worth emphasizing the fact that the determination of the species difference is offered as a solution to the initial problem of us being at a loss, in response to the perplexity we come across in such a locale." "[I]t is imperative to keep in mind that it is not because some person or people are *different*—in the sense of *species difference*—from me or us that we are at a loss. On the contrary, it is because we are at a loss or unable to make sense in the first place that we attempt to determine this encounter with *difference* within the logical economy of *species* and *genus*."

now less likely, further partitions. The other two Slavic languages were Slovenian and Macedonian, to a great extent understandable with a little good will at least to neighbors, speakers of Serbo–Croatian, who, however, did not learn them at school. Important minority languages were Albanian, Hungarian, Italian, and Romani, and many other languages also circulated. The distinction between Macedonian and neighboring Bulgarian responds to the same pattern, and is a matter of convention, a convention governed by the political stand on the nation. In Yugoslavia and successor states, the language of Macedonia was and is Macedonian. But that may change for those Macedonians who now opt for Bulgarian citizenship (and get it) because it gives them an easy entrance into Europe. There is no doubt about the hegemony of Serbo–Croatian, which, by the end of Yugoslavia, caused a lot of bitterness in particular with the Slovenes (the small difference) and the Albanians (the bigger language difference). In Yugoslavia, the languages flanked Yugoslavia's constitutive "nations" and "nationalities."[4]

Only where languages are distinguished can the unity of one language be established, says Naoki Sakai (2013). Languages and nations tend to construct each other reciprocally in an endless process (Iveković 2008).

I have always doubted the existence of the language i was born into. "Lectors" often made you believe that your own language was violating some "pure" form. Competing and coexisting standardizations did so too.

When i started university in Zagreb, i enrolled at a "general linguistics and oriental studies" department where i read "Indian studies," to a great extent from a linguistic and philological perspective, quite old-fashioned. I came to philosophy through "Indian" philosophy, "in the reverse" as it were if compared to a usual European trajectory. The nonaligned political orientation of the country that came to introduce such and similar studies after the 1961 Belgrade first summit of leaders of the Non-Aligned countries, in view of its nonaligned and third-world friendships and priorities, still relied to a great extent on an Orientalist reading, notwithstanding the decolonization wind blowing in the 1960s that had reached our shores with, especially, much empathy for the Algerian war of liberation. We studied Sanskrit, Pāli, and Hindi, among Indian languages, and read secondary literature not only in our language[5] but also in German, French, and English, while i soon read Max Weber on Asia in Italian, because that seemed to be the only available edition, or translation.

I started translating ancient texts from Sanskrit and Pāli into Serbo–Croatian,[6] besides translating contemporary philosophy from European languages. The technical problem of transcription and transliteration presented itself immediately with Indian sources, and came to feed our engagement with scripts, language, writing of foreign names and words (disputes among several options supported diversely by the script). Sanskrit has a declension of eight cases, while Serbo–Croatian has seven. How do you decline a Sanskrit noun in Serbo–Croatian? How—and where—do you add suffixes from the Serbo–Croatian declension to Sanskrit nouns? There were many different usages and clashes over them. Sanskrit has the sonant "r," which operates like a syllable-forming vowel, that we also have in our language. But English and French language transcription conventions require "ri": should we do the same, or should we write simply "r" as we do in our language in words like "prst"? In that case we should write (and we did) "sanskrt." Consider ***ṛ*** ("r" with a dot underneath) as is done in some transcriptions? Should we write, as the English transliteration does, ***ś*** and ***sh***, or, as the French one does, ***ç*** and ***ṣ***? Or should we write, in analogy with our ***ć*** and ***č*** (two distinct sounds that foreigners usually do not differentiate in our names), ***ś*** and ***š***, something that speakers of Serbo–Croatian understand immediately by analogy? We used to do the

[4] "Nations" and "nationalities" (*narodi i narodnosti*) were supposed to be constitutive and equal, and most had a federal republic that went by their name, while more-mixed-than-the-others Bosnia-Herzegovina was a conundrum of its own. "Nationalities" (national minorities) had a more complex status: they were supposed to be constitutive in their main national body as nations, in another Yugoslav republic or abroad, as was the case for Albanians in Kosovo or Hungarians in Vojvodina.

[5] "Our [language]," *našk*i, has become a most widespread and neutral appellation of the common language without naming it, since the partition of Yugoslavia, with nonnationalists. It indistinctly denotes Bosnian, Montenegrin, Serbian, Croatian, or any future split-off language that may come. The Indian–Pakistani analogy would be *de* and *de i.* NB: i deliberately have no use for the word "dialect," which has no meaning outside a national vertical hierarchy of languages. Languages and dialects are of course the same, as much as nations and ethnicities, fixed constructs within a regime of rigid "identities."

[6] At that time, the correct and official appellation of that language in Croatia, where i studied and started writing (though my first book came out in Sarajevo), was "Croato–Serbian," simply called "Croatian" in popular parlance, just as "Serbian" was shorthand for "Serbo–Croatian" in the Serbian context. In order to avoid further complication, i do not use the form "Croato–Serbian" when writing in English or French, where it is in fact unknown.

latter, and immediately created problems for ourselves with any quotation or reference we introduced from Western Indology, and with local nonacademic usages.

The language problems from Sanskrit transposed into Serbo–Croatian were a direct continuation of the language dynamics and complications we had with our own language. Sanskrit and Pāli became for me inner problems of Serbo–Croatian, and of the same kind. And again, i had to deal with more or less understanding rereading and editing. The problems raised by the alternative script, Cyrillic, can be added to these. Cyrillic makes foreign words and, above all, names, unrecognizable, and by the same token it also erases some of the historic depth and traces from the written word. Other subterfuges are needed when writing or publishing in Cyrillic, and they, too, are diversely (non)standardized. So my experience with mediating Indian culture in Yugoslavia and dealing with Indian languages only continued my experience with the now nameless language, one-and-multiple.

Since very early infancy, too, and again without any merit, i was deeply exposed to other languages—French and Italian at first as my parents were living in Belgium and Italy. I spoke Serbo–Croatian, French, and Italian with different people surrounding me. Those languages never left me, although they went and returned with absences or vacations, and Italian was somewhat neglected. I then went to a French school in Germany, where i spoke French and listened to German. Later at school in Belgrade, from grade 5, i took English as a foreign language. From there on, other European languages came through reading or listening. They also came through the other languages and thanks to them, sometimes weighing against each other. They came particularly thanks to Serbo–Croatian into which i tended to translate the new words and to compare them. The welcome diversity of those languages somehow mirrored my own multiplicity, rather than their "national" limitations. It was only natural for me to continue *between* languages, understood both as medium and mediator. I believe that the diversity, profusion, extension, complexity, burgeoning, and abundance those languages gave me through their simultaneity and intertwining were suitable patterns structuring my thinking and work, somehow never in straight lines. I could not be disciplined. When writing in French or English, i continued the same passionate relationship to language that i had with Serbo–Croatian, brokering styles and writing conventions with more or less success.

The world has changed vertiginously since i was born into Serbo–Croatian. Not only have i been brought to learn other languages, but i have also come to construct with others intersecting spaces of many languages with which i dealt at various levels. It is not my merit. Estranged at a mature age from my first language, especially for publishing and work, since the dismantlement of Yugoslavia, i am in the—regular—situation of constantly hesitating between languages and always being beside a language, or at a crossroads of several languages. Stumbling, faltering, forgetting, double and even treble consciousness help us overcome the double-talk rhetoric, the frozen language (*langue de bois*), the officialese of the *pensée unique*. It is a condition of epistemological diversity and of ontological uncertainty, but it is also some kind of normalcy and way of life. I now write in the language i was asked for a paper, which is mainly French or English, and only rarely Serbo–Croat. The dilemma is devastating not regarding articles, but when it comes to fictional writing: here, no language suits me any more.

But why the hesitation, since displacement is the rule? Uncertainty is critical and part of the technology of becoming in displacement. It is part of a translated world. It may not be the easiest thing to live and it doesn't guarantee any progressive politics, but we are lucky it is there and lucky to be able to mold a world without absolute translation (Iveković 2007a, 21–26; 2007b). Stumbling ushers us into the wasteland, the *terrain vague*, that will give the *hors champ*, the off camera, the *tiers instruit* (Serres 1991), the distance necessary for writing, translating and working. Uncertainty comes as the necessary third "language" or other, the third element, an operator and broker.

Brahmā's Net

Brahmā's net is the name Buddhists give to ideology.[7]

Avijjā, ignorance about both the origin and the functioning of the world, keeps us within that net. In a very early linguistic turn

[7] **Brahmā-jāla: Brahmā**'s net is also "the all-embracing net of views," a hegemonic point of view that, in the eyes of the Buddhist, would be Brahmanistic. There is a speech attributed to the Buddha, ***Brahmajāla Suttam*** (***Dīgha-nikāya*** 1, 1), which deconstructs under that name different doctrines, including unorthodox ones, existing at that time. **Višṇu, Śiva, Brahm** are the **Trimūrti**, the "troika." Like all three, Brahm is a

in Indian philosophy (6th–7th century BCE), Buddhists discovered that language couldn't say it all, being itself part of that whole. There is no metalanguage different from language. The "beginning" being unknown, Buddhists cultivated cognitive uncertainty and self-decentering.

Let me, however, clarify that i do not take Buddhism as a model to follow, nor do i preach it. I only take it as arguably the clearest example, possibly with Daoism, of a series of ancient "Asian" epistemes having certain characteristics highlighted here through the example of Buddhism. Some of these features are: not cultivating the putative split between subject and object (which is really a capturing apparatus of hegemony), between theory and practice, or between sovereignty and exception—amongst others. This does not mean that Buddhism, much as any other philosophy, cannot be used and misused to enhance nationalistic politics—as it has been in many examples, particularly Japan, or recently more locally in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, if these things can be measured. So Buddhism doesn't give any guarantee for an equitable translation regime, nor should it be idealized. No philosophy carries within itself the guarantee of its infallibility.[8]

I use elements of "Indian" philosophies to highlight my point just as i use elements of "continental" philosophy, with the advantage that exposing our problems to that "elsewhere" sheds unexpected light on them.

Untranslatability is a paradox: there are untranslatables (Barbara Cassin 2004; Lyotard 1983; Balibar 2009); there are also *conditions of (un)translatability*. What is untranslatable according to one *translation regime*, may be translatable in another. There is no absolute translation. There are degrees between untranslatables and translatables (Iveković 2002a, 121–145; also at Iveković 2002b), indicative of a multitude of options. There are levels and registers of translation, which all point to the circulation of (non)intended meaning and implications, with possible incalculable gaps between the two. *Because* we have the option between an infinite number of translations (including impossibility and unwillingness), and an equally infinite number of methods, we either translate in sheer ignorance of our subject-position as translators/mediators, or we must have a politics of translation and know or ignore that we do.

Lyotard's *Le Différend* (1983) was a turning point in continental philosophies as these opened to the possibility (not the guarantee) of other epistemes in principle. Since any utterance releases myriad possible worlds,[9] as Lyotard would have it after Wittgenstein; and since a concatenation of sentences is inevitable although there is no guarantee or predictable indication—theoretically—concerning their contents and "sentence regime,"[10] we must count with the coexistence (and confusion) not only of sentence regimes, but of "translation regimes" as well. We might be under a sentence regime unwittingly, or apolitically, but we can also form a *politics of translation* by choosing this or that translation code. There are translation regimes even when there is no "translation" as such, since there is no zero degree of language, of translation, or of the human condition, including in extralinguistic matters. But then, for humans, as Buddhist philosophy knows, there is no extralinguistic condition, except outside Brahmā's net, a very unlikely although possibly desirable ambition, as in *nirvāṇa*. Some translation from one condition to another is always at work.

The difficulty of theory

There is some problem with the concept of theory. One could indeed invoke Kant here, but here is a simpler approach. The problem comes from the paradox of the concept of theory's origination in the West, yet its propagation everywhere as a normative idea in science especially with modernity, and from its vertical hierarchy. Theory is a must. It is a contentious notion dividing the West from the rest (see Sakai 2010a; 2010b; 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; Mignolo 2011; 2012), assigning ideological advantages to the West in keeping the monopoly of theory.

masculine figure and, although without rites, he is also the anthropomorphic personification of the Brahmanist universalist ideal *brahman* (n.), the absolute. I distinguish between *Brahmanic* and *Brahmanist*, the latter involving ideology and a universalist project.

[8] I would like to thank Naoki Sakai for pointing out to me the danger that talking about Buddhism may lead to some kind of its idealization: this is not the intention here, nor am i pleading for any kind of indigenism. We should also meditate on the fact that this is very difficult to get through under the ordinary hegemonic translation regime. I am not dealing with the existing political instrumentalizations of Buddhism, but with the Buddhist conceptual apparatus.

[9] One and the same utterance may open up many diverse universes, as "open the window," which may be a command or a prayer, may imply that it is cold, that it is hot, that there is an earthquake, that there is a bat in the room, that Romeo is waiting outside etc.

[10] Sentence régimes, *régimes de phrases*: performative, imperative, interrogative etc.

How to translate from one episteme to the other without essentializing them?[11] We may temporarily forego the philosophical self-critical breakthrough achieved *in principle* regarding the lingering, but eventually receding, superciliousness of Western thought, ridden with immunity. *In principle*, for "Western" philosophers, self-critique is self-understood. They have even theorized this self-critique as *the* achievement of Western modernity, and claimed that theirs is the only self-critical *episteme*. Non-Western scholars have repeated this, though it may be questionable whether anyone is non-Western at all by now (Chakrabarty 2012). The problem remains. Assumptions of superiority are based on the tacit *cognitive precondition of separating theory from practic*e by an insurmountable wall, an abyssal line. This division has a normative function. It grounds the ideology of western superiority *but presents this as* neutrality.

Assumptions of preeminence sharply separate subject from object, theory from practice, "civilized" from "uncivilized," "us" from "others." Such divisions are characteristic of modern Western knowledge inasmuch as it is colonial, its coloniality being concomitant and coextensive with the historical construction of capitalism. Such bipolar structuring of knowledge serves a predatory purpose, the purpose of *appropriative* sciences at the service of nations and states.

Academic disciplines and status–knowledge, which differ from language to language, are constructed in collusion with hegemonic colonial knowledge, which is still to a great extent operative in spite of the post-Cold War devolution into a network of biopolitical control through various outsourcings of state prerogatives. Disciplines are circularly based on the nation, and reproduce it. Historically located polities each have *a general corresponding cognitive order and translation regime*, with variations, interconnections, interferences and overlaps.

On the other hand, there is in general no separating subject and object, body and soul, theory and practice in most of ancient Asian philosophical systems or other extra-European knowledge configurations. *Something of this cognitive condition is still available culturally* although refuted by modern sciences, coming through in various new assemblages—(post)modernity, and "Western" hegemony not withstanding. What has been the condition of Western understanding of the relationship sovereignty–subjectivity, namely the separation between subject and object or theory and practice, has been neither the condition of the making of politics in the "rest" nor that of sovereignty, and has not been understood as being at the root of the becoming of political subjects in the "rest." Which means that whole genealogies of knowledge have been kept invisible to European languages, untranslated, indeed apparently *untranslatable* to the hegemonic gaze. But untranslatability (like absolute translatability) is also a politics.

In another conceptual and translation regime, experience and "practice" can outweigh ontological consideration, theory, the latter being in any case only an attribution, a random predication onto some reified object. The implications of *śūnya-vāda* (the teaching of naught in Buddhism) are even more radical: This "theory" (*śūnya-vāda*) is really here an *antitheory invalidating in advance*, by an implacable logic, any economic reason, material interests, selfish vital interests, any speculation trusting language and reason or daring ontological qualifications and metaphysical judgments.

But both the Brahmanists, who resorted to the absolute, who believed in unconditional given knowledge (*Veda*), as well as the philosophically nuanced Buddhists, refused building separately such concepts as "subject" or "object." This is the *advaita*, nondualism, in both, which however doesn't amount to monotheism. It is a disposition that is decisive even today, and present in art, literature, aesthetics, much of philosophy, in some political dispensations, in forms of life, and in general culture. The historical distinction subject–object known to the West and disseminated all over the world for modernity-useful purposes, is part of an *appropriating* conceptual and language apparatus that always has the tendency to reappear. It is part of a pursuit limited and burdened by the *vital interest*, situated within the horizon of "lower" knowledge.[12]

[11] In the next three paragraphs, i draw on my as yet (2013) unpublished paper "The immunity paradigm's contradictory / complementary facets" from the conference *Except Asia: Agamben's Work in Transcultural Perspective,* Department of English, National Taiwan Normal University, Taipei, June 25–27, 2013.

[12] Buddhist philosophers introduced the somewhat problematic but philosophically rich distinction between ordinary and higher knowledge. The two are intertwined and the former leads to the latter, which allows

The preoccupation with subject and subjectivation, specific to "Europe" and the "West," stems from *monotheism*. It emerges as a Mediterranean particularity, and becomes all-pervasive, through colonial history. But there were originally no comparable monotheisms in Asia (except for a late Islam). Something of the mahāyānian Buddhist philosophy can be extrapolated to most philosophies of Asia: The subject–object relationship together with the realm of politics is part of the experiential, conventional truth, *limited by language* and within "Brahmā's net." We perceive the world as plurality through the appropriational mode.

Reluctant theory and unreflected theory. *Théorie malgré elle*

If we agree that "theory" is a normative, somewhat paradoxical concept, difficult to sustain and to prove since subsequent ones will correct any theory, and if we agree that it is a normative concept originating, again, in the conceptual "West," we then must admit that "theory" is a fragile concept.

If there is no neutral theory, the normativity in a theory will be its political bias depending on its ideological, geographical, cultural, class, gender etc. interests. It will have an origin in a specific concern that can be defined as political and vital, with a tendency to be universalized if possible and neutralized in order to pass unnoticed.

Sundar Sarukkai (2013)[13] mentions examples that identify ideological biases of theories, particularly in the area of history and of philosophy of science, and also their critique. We couldn't agree more with him, principally as he argues "that non-Western philosophies might actually contribute more usefully to the understanding of the complex scientific description of reality compared to the tools available in dominant western traditions" (Sarukkai 2013, 6). Indeed, there is a blatant incapacity of philosophy and of history of science to *translate from one cultural register to another*. I would call this failure political, a politics with a deep historic condition. I must quote Sarukkai extensively, before suggesting some comments and complements to his excellent work.

for an unphilosophical jump to esoteric knowledge in popular Buddhism and elsewhere, later. But it also allows important philosophical speculation.

[13] I would like to thank Sundar Sarukkai for letting me engage with his important paper here.

> What is striking about these [Western or after the Western pattern] discussions is that there is no mention of the non-European traditions in all these debates about H[istory of] S[cience] and P[hilosophy of] S[cience]. Even in the invocations of "tradition" and the "ever-changing fabric of human culture" there is no mention of the possible histories of the non-West which might be of interest to this debate. (Sarukkai 2013, 3)

Sarukkai displaces his argument on the political terrain without announcing it. He switches from the HS and PS level to the political. Indeed, silencing a discourse is a political act, besides being a cognitive one. The two registers (scientific and political) come in the same wording, but have different implications. Yet as Sarukkai expects an answer from history of science and philosophy of science, he withdraws from the political register again (although a broader reading would have both history of science and philosophy of science as political, but this is not Sarukkai's option.)

> Elsharky[14] makes the important observation that it was the creation of the new discipline of history of science that begins to propagate a global ideology of science based on universal values. This effort, beginning before WW I, began to use a new ideology of internationalism in order to reshape the idea of science. Using notions such as Scientific Revolution, this discipline departed from the earlier syncretic model in order to frame the new global science which became synonymous with western science. (Sarukkai 2013, 5)

Here, Sarukkai acknowledges a political and ideological dimension to history of science and philosophy of science, and he would be right in expecting an answer in political terms. But he stops short. He fails to acknowledge the national character and framework of the discipline of history of science—part and parcel of the international and colonial configuration of "Western science." History, be it of science, was born as the foremost national discipline.

> If, as enough work in H[istory of] S[cience] clearly shows, colonialism and imperialism influence the very creation of the larger historical and philosophical themes associated with modern science then why is there still appreciable resistance to a critical engagement with other scientific traditions in the world? Ignoring them only continues this

[14] Referenced by Sarukkai as M. Elshakry, "When Science Became Western: Historiographical Reflections," *Isis* 101, 2010. See also Jack Goody (2007).

process of colonialism and imperialism and this is more dangerous since it is now done implicitly. (Sarukkai 2013, 5)

But the "other scientific traditions in the world" are also national, since the nation has prevailed as an organizational principle even retrospectively, when we say "*Indian* philosophy" or "*Greek* philosophy," meaning antiquity. We are now clearly on political terrain. But where does the identified "resistance to critical engagement with other scientific traditions" occur? Presumably, again in history and philosophy of science only, which are also pointed to by the author as coming from the Western cognitive hegemony. Why not seek alliances where doors are open, in (some) political philosophy? Why not break out of a limiting discipline, discourse, and translation regime?

Sarukkai further remarks that philosophy of science ignores Indian logic because the latter doesn't distinguish between the empirical and the formal (Sarukkai 2013, 7), or indeed between theory and practice. This observation is fine, but the problem is now defining "Indian logic" as if it were a fact given once and for all, as some kind of retroactively operating national logic. If we wish to overcome historical unfairness due to the national construction of knowledge and its transmission, the solution cannot be to claim fairness for one nation or "national" science, "ours," but only to critique that general national blueprint of knowledge construction.

In the Indian case, the extensive work on Indian metallurgy, chemistry and mathematics—to give a few examples—have conclusively proved the presence of an active *theoretical and practical* engagement with activities that seem to be similar to other such activities in early Greek and later Europe. However, this does not mean that there was a universal way of doing and creating science. (Sarukkai 2013, 7, italics mine)

Again—the comparison is national for all examples, and the nations fixed and defined as preexisting the translation operation. More importantly, Sarukkai doesn't link whatever he notes in the just quoted paragraphs with the *absence* of divide between theory and practice in "Indian" philosophy (reproached by "Western" views to "Indian" thought). Surprisingly, he invokes it without clarifying the relation between "theory" and "practice," without defining them or tracing their genealogy. But the divide between theory and practice (a marked hierarchy too) is originally a typically modern Western one. Why would it oblige Sarukkai to conform in any way, if he contests the latter's logic? There is a

skewed mainstream history of science which does not take into account non-Western contributions in the creation of science (ironical considering the work in H[istory of] S[cience] which questions this view!). We need to take this ideology of the mainstream history of science seriously for the harm it has created to non-Western societies—the harm extends from their students to government policies and indeed has had a great impact on these cultures. An exclusivist history of science that keeps the possibility of the scientific imagination within a constructed Greek and European history does great violence not only to other non-Western cultures but also to the very spirit of the scientific quest. (Sarukkai 2013, 8)

It is the national configuration of knowledge that needs to be overcome. One step further is needed. Why not combat Western history and philosophy of science with the help of "Western" and "non-Western" political philosophy and other disciplines of the kind that take into account those other epistemologies? Why not draw a broader picture involving *a critique of the logic of the episteme*? If we do that, we will also find that an episteme is coextensive, coexistent, and enmeshed with a mode of production, forms of life, a political regime, a construct of culture and language, and that we need to look for a broader context. As Solomon writes, "One of the qualities that distinguishes the West as a paradigm of the modern apparatus of area is the institutionalization of translation-as-cultural transference through the disciplinary control of bodies of knowledge" (Solomon 2013).

[T]he social formation that we have come to know as 'the West' is precisely that form of community that reserves for itself, among all other forms of human community, the key position in the speciation of the human, the place where the epistemological project is articulated to the politico-ontological one. Seen in this light, the West aspires to be the sole community that is self-aware, through scientific knowledge, of humanity's active participation in its own speciation. Yet it is not simply by virtue of a proprietary claim over knowledge that the West has been able to form itself as the pole or center or model of human population management in general. In order to occupy this position, it has been necessary to construct out of the contingency of historical encounter (colonialism) a political system for effective population management (effective from the point of view of capitalist accumulation). (Solomon 2013, n. p.)

I argue that the separation reproduced by Sarukkai between hard sciences on the one hand as well as the social sciences and po-

litical philosophy on the other coincides with the problematic distinction between theory and practice mechanically taken over from positivism and from some unsophisticated forms of Marxism. It is itself "Western" in origin and manner, but, what is more important, *it belongs to appropriative knowledge*. It has also become quite universal by now. History of science

still draw[s] on philosophical concepts that are also available in alternate philosophical traditions. There is no reason to believe that these philosophical ideas are irrelevant to these contemporary concerns of philosophy of science. (Sarukkai 2013, 8)

I agree.

Connective history of science will by necessity have to deal with and incorporate alternate worldviews and philosophical concepts. (Sarukkai 2013, 8)

I agree, but additional efforts are needed to achieve this and get out of the system.

Connective history of science is a move towards a "global history of local science." (Sarukkai 2013, 9)

Agreed, but it is also a move towards a "global history of science" *tout court*, since the local–global distinction reproduces the other divides that are at the basis of *objectal*, and eventually *predatory* knowledge—particularly congenial to globalized capitalism. Such knowledge was alien to and discarded by ancient "Asian" philosophical systems. Although this has been revised as modernity made its way, *refusing* objectal, appropriative knowledge instrumental to production has nevertheless persisted as an alternative scientific temper in "India" and generally in Asia as well as elsewhere. But Sarukkai only insists that *Indians* did have all the rationality needed for modern industry, and that their knowledge was merely stolen by the British through distinguishing between "theory" and "practice." That is surely only part of the story.

When the British encountered many Indian inventions in science and technology, they made use of them in order to establish their own industries but refused to acknowledge that these processes were part of scientific rationality. Claims that these Indian inventions were more a product of "doing" rather than "knowing," specifically a theoretical mode of knowing, made it easy for them to reject the claim of science to almost all intellectual contributions from India." (Sarukkai 2013, 9)

How can we project India back, a later and national formation, onto ancient science? The fact that Western philosophy has always done exactly that with ancient Greek thought does not justify the mimetic gesture. That would keep us within the system instead of showing ways out. We need some other "scientific" and, eventually, political imagination. A useful investigation here, in line with Sarukkai's attempt, would be to probe into the parallel, intertwined, interrelated structures of knowledge, power and production.

About the normativity of science and theory: "One of the primary ways by which the title of science is denied to non-Western intellectual traditions is through the invocation of terms such as logic, scientific method, evidence, prediction and so on" (Sarukkai 2013, 9).

While discovering the normativity of hegemonic forms of knowledge, Sundar Sarukkai fails to investigate the relationship between knowledge, production and political system, and thus deprives himself of the help that political thought could bring, including a consideration of the terms of translation. He remains riveted to a world with fixed identities, which reduces translation to a sterile bipolar exercise that ignores the fluidity of relations.

Sarukkai further significantly argues that western mathematics are irreparably linked to Platonism, unlike Indian mathematics. This makes it impossible for the former to recognize the latter. From seeing the trees, Sarukkai doesn't see the forest! His claim about Platonism is extremely important: It implies the body-and-soul, theory-and-practice divisions. It will become systemic and institutionalized through monotheism (Christianity) among others, and hence, in modernity, through the grounding of state sovereignty and all this implies. Platonism will pervade all spheres of life, labor, and culture, not only mathematics, so that understanding and deconstructing it will require social sciences, one step further from the history and philosophy of science because these too need to be questioned (not that social sciences are in any way a guarantee). It is the whole framework, the regime of translation that requires interrogation.

> What is really so mysterious (a word used by Einstein in this context) about the use of mathematics? The major reason for this mystery is Platonism. If mathematical entities exist in a nonspatiotemporal world then how do we spatiotemporal beings have knowledge of them? For these scientists, who viewed mathematics along such a nonempirical axis, the use of mathematics was surprising. Its "natural match" with physical concepts was a source of mystery only if we first begin with a clear disjunction between mathematics and the world.[15] (Sarukkai 2005, 11)

Very well: a clear disjunction between subject and object, theory and practice, body and soul, man and woman could also be stated in the same line. The disjunction between mathematics and the world corresponds to that between body and soul of the Christian episteme. It has been the main apparatus of capturing the material world by the vested interests of dominant classes, and thus of hegemony. Sarukkai proceeds:

> It is precisely this point which Indian mathematics would challenge. Mathematics is essential to this world; it arises from this world and through human action. The puzzle of applicability will take on a completely different form if we begin with the assumption that mathematics is enworlded and embodied. Interestingly, this is a position that has now gained some ground through the framework of cognitive studies but in a predictable replay these approaches also make no mention of such approaches in non-Western traditions. (Sarukkai 2005, 11)

The disjunction of mathematics with the world also implies that of theory with practice, of soul with body, of man with woman, as it entails hierarchical normative relations. One could be more ambitious than Sarukkai, while supporting his critique, and claim that it is not only mathematics but the *whole episteme* which is affected by such disjunctions; and that these do not appear, or not to the same extent, in extra-European epistemes—that is, in non hegemonic epistemes (except for the universal divide, diversely implemented, between men and women). There is a historic reason for this: these extra-European epistemes, far from being more righteous, have not been able to impose themselves as hegemonic, considering the colonial leaning and attraction for power involved in any knowledge. No answer can come solely from traditional philosophy of science or history of science here, but rather through a more comprehensive approach and critique of translation regimes, by way of political philosophy, or through an all-encompassing approach that will question the whole hegemonic episteme and concrete national epistemes too, their genealogy and apparatus.

Sarukkai convincingly argues that contributions of "Indian philosophies and sciences" to science in general have been occulted and obscured, impoverishing the history of science of important parts of its heritage. He also gives examples of how varied and rich "Indian physics" or metaphysics (considerations of matter, substance, nature, elements, quality, inherence, motion, etc.) have been ignored, how different schools of "Indian logic" have been uncared for, while similar views from "Greek" philosophy have become the only reference and terminus even though "Indian" examples could have been offered. This additionally left out of sight original "Indian" contributions. Sarukkai therefore proposes the method of a *connective history of science* which would take into account the philosophical context of the different historic configurations where all contributions to "global science" would be acknowledged, helping the advancement of both science and its history. But without an extra step, he will remain within the system he pledges to critique. Sarukkai has the enormous merit of identifying the non-Platonism in "Indian" sciences, which has earned it nonrecognition on the side of "Western" universalized knowledge.

Another important characteristic may be mentioned concomitantly here that added to "Indian" philosophies being rejected by the "Western" ones, and that has been mediated especially through Buddhism: the purposeful nonrecognition of any kind of subject (or any kind of subject/object divide) on the "Indian" side, and thus the not grounding of any kind of (state) sovereignty at the other end of the scale (Iveković, 2014). While i share Sarukkai's observations about the configuration of "Indian" philosophies and while i think that they can be enlarged and applied to other areas of knowledge, i would also suggest that it would be more than necessary to define or discard terms such as "Indian," "Indian science" etc. in the way of deconstructing the national scaffolding, if we wish to overcome the given national and transnational framework and inner logic we critique.

[15] The author's reference here is Sarukkai, 2005.

For a critical (Anti)Theory of Translation: competing translation politics

Theories are built by subjects and sovereigns, and when successfully hegemonic, also in support of sovereignties. Sovereigns need to have a monolithic national language that is also the language of command and of maintaining the system. Theories are linked to conjuncture, to places, to specific and interested readings of history, to fending for the dominant regime of thinking, of languages, of translation, and, once they prevail, for mainstream. Today it is global capitalism. The reluctant "theories" we are nevertheless *practicing* as processes, for better or for worse, can at best attempt to deconstruct the national framework of knowledge as well as of its transmission (theory), through inventing new politics of liberation and new *imaginaires* of translation. It must be understood that translation does not guarantee freedom of any kind, and that it can be as much a politics of conquest, capture, exploration-and-exploitation,[16] and colonialism, whether inner[17] or outer. But politics of translation may be invented. Since they will necessarily be forever amendable, such politics of translation may rather not respond to the high name of theory. They will be checked by translation practices in view of their resistance to new enclosures within an "unsurpassable" capitalist horizon.

Theory tends to correspond within knowledge, in a figure of co-figuration,[18] to the sovereignty of the political sphere. It tends to be absolutized, to produce transcendence and an absolute other. It has also been historically self-attributed, self-complacent, and reserved by the West to itself. This construction originally comes from the monotheistic Mediterranean context where god as the supreme subject (sovereign) is the necessary condition to the projection of the human (epi)subject: no god, no subject. The theory has its modern developments and versions. One of the subject's declensions will be the nation. Theory is a kind of (barely) secularized cognitive variant of divine transcendence.[19]

"Scientific knowledge" has been intertwined with and inseparable from theology. Theory will sustain the sovereign (whether godly or human) and its emanation, the subject, as well as their separation from life experience. The subject (and, in its/his stead, derivatively, the epi-subject), custodian of Revelation (Sanskrit: *śruti*), kicks a "beginning" *as if* it were absolute. The multiple genealogies, origins, and inheritances of theory, however carefully hidden and silenced, resurface again and again, disputing its high and unique status. In fact, what is hidden is the whole apparatus of theory-established hierarchies and exclusion—that is, the mechanism of its sovereignist claim (see Solomon 2013). Theory's tools are language and narration, just as in less theoretical matters. In South Asian ancient philosophies in Sanskrit, this corresponds to the hammered—but really constructed and ideological—difference between *śruti* and *smṛti*.

Theory will also distribute names and set grades, in which its function—as well as that of language through master-narratives—is not very different from that of foundational myths *(smṛti)*. The Greek *divide* and constructed abyssal gap between *logos* and *muthos* (taken over into the Christian religion in corresponding form, and parallel to the developing split between theory and practice) reinforces and maintains the coloniality of knowledge and power: all "others," whether inner or outer, have systematically been reduced to *muthos* and *nontheory* (mere "practice"), as irrational and incapable of science. This separation, downgrading, exception, is also an exemption from sovereignty. "Others" were deemed bereft of autonomy out of their own limitation: other continents, women, and any other group, form of life, or translation regime under that label. Theory, as much as god, designates the other.

There are certainly ways, and historic experiences, of not complying with such a diktat, that amount to "other possibilities of the spirit." François Jullien says that such "other possibilities" are

[16] One and the same word, *exploração* appropriately denoting "exploitation" and not "exploring" in Portuguese.

[17] By inner colonialism i mean the treatment of such groups as women, Roma, migrants, minorities, or whoever the excluded beyond the *abyssal lines* (Boaventura de Sousa Santos) or subordinated of one time are. See de Sousa Santos (2000) and de Sousa Santos (2007).

[18] Sakai's important term in a slightly different application. See N. Sakai (1997).

[19] See François Jullien (2012, 107): "[L]es 'Grecs' ont-ils jamais existé? N'ont-ils pas été forgés par nos Humanités?" A similar point is made in Prasenjit Duara (forthcoming). I would like to thank Duara for allowing me to read chapters of his work in progress.

not always played out, and he goes on unveiling them by "comparing" Greek, Christian, and Chinese thinking histories: they become particularly visible when various civilizational options are rubbed against each other. We mentioned some, stemming from what would ultimately be known as (ancient) "Indian" philosophies, while Jullien has been showing it for the Chinese worldviews. Chinese or "Indian" philosophies did not delve the insuperable gap between *logos* and *muthos,* or theory and practice. No grand narratives were therefore constructed in China, according to Jullien: China had no need to posit god, and the word is not foundational there (see Jullien 2012, 68, 69, 70, and 98).[20]

Jullien pleads in favor of *reading a system of thought* "*from outside*," through "contrasting parallels" (which is not a dichotomic hierarchical comparison of the classical Western type, and does not presuppose prior categorization), through letting go, letting play parallels, through yielding, through detachment from one's own/unique culture. The contrastivity, letting the effects of a gap work, will shed light on avenues of thought that have not been fulfilled (Jullien 2012, 65 and following). He calls the contrasting of Chinese and Western thought "entering a way of thinking" (*entrer dans une pensée*). Such an entry is not afforded through a narrative or a subject behind it. It is operated from a *declension* or inclination of the reader, of the translator, of the one who approaches a "way of thinking," who is changed in the process: the translator is translated as she discovers the unthought (*l'impensé*) lying at the base of thought. It would be difficult to translate this into Sakai's translation theory, but, like the latter, the former doesn't believe in neutral translation or a neutral ground between contrasted elements. In both, this entails concrete political responsibility from case to case. Discarding one's armature of thinking, deconstructing and dislocating the national construction and fixed framework of knowledge (see Iveković 2007b; 2009–2010) is a necessary precondition and way of doing this.

Contrasting without establishing categories and hierarchies, without heeding disciplines (molded by national cultures and institutions), may be particularly helpful in highlighting unexpected possibilities, unfulfilled options, or eschewed results. Given that disciplines denote borders of theoretical territories, ignoring them sometimes allows passing beside, below, above, or through dividing lines. This might be a possible way indeed in systems where there is no dominant narrative or vertical epistemological hierarchy, no historic construction of sovereignty and of the concept of a subject (Iveković 2013), such as is sometimes the case in Asia or elsewhere in once colonized continents, or where there has been some constitutive (even merely) structural resistance to monolithic national narratives. Times of crises put an accent on the subject's wavering (Europe today), but can prompt these other thinking options where the concept of a subject was purposely avoided.

The great writer and philosopher Radomir Konstantinović wrote about the tension resulting from the inner cleavage of the citizen and of the communist, important figures of the subject in twentieth-century Yugoslavia (but metaphorically, also elsewhere), ending in the failure of both (Konstantinović 1981).[21]

Konstantinović's pessimistic message concerning Western modernity in general was that the political subjectivation of the citizen may end in nationalism/Nazism.[22]

He exemplifies it with the Serbian case. His optimistic message comes with, in principle, open possibilities (the blank of the borderline spirit of the crisis, *palanka*) and through the split subject. Paradoxically, this is best shown in art, writing, and translation, as in the self-fulfilled prophecy of the novel or drama that can only signal the impossibility of a novel (as the form *par excellence* of national citizenship) or of drama: in the same way in which the only possible subjectivation from perhaps the end of the 1960s is—the impossibility of constituting a subject.

Did Yugoslavia not implode because of that impossibility, having no middle class and no nation, supposed to be only a secularized administrative, common post-national frame? No drama was to oppress its nonsubject citizens, who were to be spared the

[20] Although an "Asian" disposition, this does not fully correspond to Brahmanic (consider the Veda, Mahabharata, and Ramayana) or Hindu thought (see Rada Iveković 1992).

[21] See also French excerpts in Konstantinović (2001a), Konstantinović (2001b), and Konstantinović (2001c). Other French excerpts can also be found in Becket and Konstantinović (2000), and Iveković (1998).

[22] Konstantinović talked about modernity as such, irrespective of whether capitalist or socialist: the pattern, for him, was the same, and socialism was a form of modernity.

need to engage in politics (my generation), because everything had been taken care of by our revolutionary fathers in the Second World War through resistance to the Nazis? Revolution was "museified," drama excluded. Radomir Konstantinović tried to think the non-subjectified subject of our times,[23] the one incapable of, or refusing translation as exchange and fluidity; the one allowing only for absolute translation (see Iveković 2011), entrenching borders, social relations and inequalities.[24]

Naoki Sakai however deems that nation is not a fatality or a necessity, and that it could have been avoided. What forms in Asia could have helped such an alternative? It is difficult to imagine other options, he insists, from within the prevailing one. We could have had another world, with no nationalities and no nation states. In particular, it was not the destiny of Asia, which took a very long time to adapt to the international world. According to Sakai, nationality was not given, being "a restricted and distorted derivative of transnationality." Like language being the result of translation (and not vice-versa), so is nationality the outcome of transnationality that precedes it. "A bordering turn must be accompanied theoretically by a translational turn: bordering and translation are both problematics projected by the same theoretical perspective" (Sakai 2013).

Writing of the scandals with the cartoons of prophet Mohammad, Judith Butler analyses the ways in which, according to different frameworks (Christian or Muslim), we may diversely understand the term "blasphemy": "the translation has to take place within divergent frames of moral evaluation. […] in some ways the conflict that emerged in the wake of the publication of the Danish cartoons is one between competing moral frameworks, understanding 'blasphemy' as a tense and overdetermined site for the convergence of differing schemes of moral value" (Butler 2009, 103–104).

[23] See not only Konstantinović (1981), but also downloadable texts by and on him in Serbo-Croatian, including Konstantinović (n.d.). The site from which these texts can be downloaded () is an archive of important Yugoslav intellectual and political works and is run by Branimir Stojanović Trša. On Konstantinović, see also *Sarajevske Sveske*, an on-line Serbo–Croat journal. See also Klaus Theweleit (1977 and 1988), and Iveković (2009).

[24] On bordering as a process, see Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson (2003) and (2013). See also Sakai in general, but (2013) in particular.

There are thus competing translation codes or regimes, much as Balibar identifies competing universalisms.[25]

They may go hand in hand. Wendy Brown has it that critique (and theory?) have been identified with secularism. As we know from Balibar (see especially 2012), secularism or cosmopolitanism and religion compete on the same terrain. It is all a matter of translation.

It is on that contested terrain that various political options for translation can unfold. Alas, there is "normally" no imaginative power or political imagination enabling us to think a world without nations, nationalities and borders, or translating them: in order to do so, we must step without that frame through our mind's eye. This is a contribution towards an attempt to start thinking one. The question of political translation becomes a concrete one at times of crisis and reshuffling. We are currently in one such age, and translation may well be one of the tools.

[25] Étienne Balibar, from "Les universels" (1997) through "Sub specie universitatis" (2006), develops the observation of competing universalisms, then, logically, with his paper "Cosmopolitanism and Secularism: Controversial Legacies and Prospective Interrogations" (2011), that of competing national sovereignties and competing religions or secularisms. This matter is taken up once again in Balibar (2012).

References

Balibar, Étienne. 1997. "Les Universels," in *La Crainte des masses*. Paris: Galilée. 421–454.

———. 2006. "Sub specie universitatis." *Topoi* 25: 3–16. doi:10.1007/s11245-006-0001-6.

———. 2009. "Several issues in the work of Jan Assman." *Transeuropéennes* 22. 199-202.

———. 2011. "Cosmopolitanism and Secularism: Controversial Legacies and Prospective Interrogations." *Grey Room* 44: 6–25.

———. 2012. *Saeculum. Culture, religion, idéologie*. Paris: Galilée.

Beckett, Samuel and Radomir Konstantinović. 2000. «–Ne rien céder à la traduction/Yield nothing to translation–», *Transeuropéennes*, n° 22. 187–199, letters by Beckett tr. by Cathy Lenihan from French, essay by Konstantinović tr. by Nataša Ilić from Serbian. (From Konstantinović, Radomir. 2000. *Beket prijatelj*. Belgrade: Otkorvenje, 38-40; 78-93.

http://www.uciteljneznalica.org/upload/ebook/Konstantinović%20Radomir;%20Beket%20prijatelj;%20;%20Otkrovenje;%202000.pdf.

Buden, Boris. 2013. "Translating Beyond Europe." *eine kommunalität, die nicht sprechen kann: europa in übersetzung* 6. http://eipcp.net/transversal/0613/Buden/en.

Butler, Judith. 2009. "The Sensibility of Critique: Response to Asad and Mahmood," in Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood, *Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech*. Berkley: The Townsend Center for the Humanities. 101-136.

Cassin, Barbara, ed. 2004. *Le Vocabulaire européen des philosophies. Dictionnaire des intraduisibles*. Paris: Seuil–Le Robert.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2012. "From Civilization to Globalization: The 'West' as a Shifting Signifier in Indian Modernity." Shanghai Museum. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14649373.2012.636877.

de Sousa Santos, B. 2000. *Para um novo senso comum (vol. 1): A crítica da razão indolente. Contra o desperdício da experiência*. São Paulo: Cortez.

———. 2007. "Beyond abyssal thinking. From global lines to ecologies of knowledges." *Eurozine*. http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-06-29-santos-en.html

Duara, Prasenjit. Forthcoming. *Transcendence in a secular world: Asian Traditions and Sustainable Modernity.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goody, Jack. 2007. *The Theft of History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Iveković, Rada. 1992. *Orients: critique de la raison postmoderne*. Paris: Blandin.

———. 1998. "Radomir Konstantinović, La philosophie du bourg, La mort de Descartes." *La République des lettres*. Available at http://www.republique-des-lettres.fr/855-radomir-konstantinovic.php.

———. 2002a. "De la traduction permanente (nous sommes en traduction)/On Permanent Translation (We are in Translation)." *Transeuropéennes* 22. 121–145.

———. 2002b. "De la traduction permanente (nous sommes en traduction)/On Permanent Translation (We are in Translation)." *eipcp-translate*, *Under translation*. http://eipcp.net/transversal/0606/ivekovic/en.

———. 2007a. "Born in Babel." *eipcp-transversal*, *gespräche zur übersetzung*. http://eipcp.net/transversal/0908/ivekovic-buden/en.

———. 2008. "Translating Borders. Limits of nationalism, transnationalism, translationalism." *eipcp-translate*, *borders, nations, translations*. http://eipcp.net/transversal/0608/ivekovic/en.

———. 2009. *Autopsie of the Balkans. A Psychopolitical Essay*. Available in French at http://radaivekovicunblogfr.unblog.fr/2009/10/30/autopsie-des-balkans-essai-de-psychopolitique-livre/.

———. 2011. "Resisting Absolute Translation. For a politics of culture." *Incroci di sguardi. Interculturalità, relativismo e globalizzazione*, special issue of *Incroci* edited by Antonella Pocecco and Nicoletta Vasta. 36–47.

———. 2013. "Sovereignties, Buddhisms, post-1989: an epistemological conundrum in rising Asia." ARI Working Papers Series. Singapore: National University of Singapore. http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/docs/wps/wps13_206.pdf.

———. 2014. *L'éloquence tempérée du Bouddha. Souverainetés et dépossession de soi*. Paris: Klincksieck, Paris.

Iveković, Rada, ed. 2007b. *Translating violence*. Special issue of *eipcp-transversal*. http://eipcp.net/transversal/1107.

———. 2009–2010. *Que veut dire traduire?* Special issue of *Asylon(s)* 7. http://www.reseau-terra.eu/rubrique171.html.

Julien, François. 2012. *Entrer dans une pensée, ou Des possibles de l'esprit*. Gallimard: Paris.

Konstantinović, Radomir. 1981 [1969]. *Filozofija palanke*. Belgrade: Nolit.

———. 2001a. "Le Style du bourg." *Transeuropéennes* 21. 129–139.

———. 2001b. "Sur le nazisme serbe." *Lignes* 6. 53-74.

———. 2001c. "La Mort de Descartes et la désolation du bourg." *Transeuropéennes* 21: 174–178.

———. n.d. *Dekartova smrt*. http://www.uciteljneznalica.org/list-arhive-autora-2.htm.

Lyotard, Jean-François, 1983. *Le Différend*. Paris: Minuit.

Mezzadra, Sandro, and Brett Neilson. 2008. "Border as Method, or, The Multiplication of Labor." *eipcp-translate*, *Borders, nation, translation*. http://eipcp.net/transversal/0608/mezzadraneilson/en.

———. 2013. *Border as Method, or, The Multiplication of Labor*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Mignolo, Walter. 2011. "Géopolitique de la connaissance, colonialité du pouvoir et différence coloniale." *Multitudes* 6. http://multitudes.samizdat.net/Geopolitique-de-la-connaissance.html.

———. 2012. "Geopolitics of Sensing and Knowing. On (De)Coloniality, Border Thinking, and Epistemic Disobedience." *eipcp-transversal*, *unsettling knowledges*. http://eipcp.net/transversal/0112/mignolo/en.

Sakai, Naoki. 1997. *Translation and Subjectivity: On "Japan" and Cultural Nationalism*. Minneapolis–London: University of Minnesota Press.

———. 2010a. "Theory and Asian Humanity: on the question of humanitas and anthropos." *Postcolonial Studi*es 13 (4): 441–464.

———. 2010b. "Translation as a filter." *Transeuropéennes*. http://www.transeuropeennes.eu/en/articles/200/Translation_as_a_filter/Sakai.
———. 2011a. "Theory and the West: On the Question of Humanitas and Anthropos." *Transeuropéennes*. http://www.transeuropeennes.eu/en/articles/316/Theory_and_the_West/Sakai.
———. 2011b."Le genre, enjeu politique et langage du nationalisme post-colonial japonais." *Cahiers du genre* 50 (1): 41–64.
———. 2011c. "The Body of the Nation : the Pastorate, the Emperor System and the Society of Sympathy of Japan's Intellectual Modernization." In *Biopolitics, Ethics and Subjectivation*, edited by A. Brossat, J. C. H. Liu, Y-H. Chu, and R. Iveković. Paris: L'Harmattan. 91–120.
———. 2013. "The Microphysics of Comparison. Towards the Dislocation of the West." In *eipcp-translate*, *eine kommunalität, die nicht sprechen kann: europa in übersetzung*, http://eipcp.net/transversal/0613/sakai1/en/#_ednref1.
Sarajevske Sveske. http://sveske.ba/.
Sarukkai, Sundar. 2005. "Revisiting the 'Unreasonable Effectiveness' of mathematics." *Current Science* 88 (3). 415–423.
———. 2013. "Philosophical Implications of Connective History of Science," paper at the workshop "The Bright Dark Ages: Comparative and Connective Perspectives," organized by the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, February. 27–28.
Solomon, Jon. 2013. "Another European Crisis?! Myth, translation, and the apparatus of area." *eipcp-transversal, a communality that cannot speak: europe in translation*, June. http://eipcp.net/transversal/0613/solomon/en.
Theweleit, Klaus. 1977. *Männerphantasien*. Volume 1. Basel: Verlag Roter Stern/Stroemfeld.
———. 1978. *Männerphantasien*. Volume 2. Basel: Verlag Roter Stern/Stroemfeld.

Rada Iveković lives and works in Paris. She is a philosopher.
Articles: "The Watershed of Modernity," http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/JSKSdg2AgTaxgvg9V67F/full; "Politiques de la philosophie à partir de la modernité" (in English and French), www.transeuropeennes.eu/fr/articles/113; "For whom the whistle blows: Welcome to the immunity frontier,"; www.africanrhetoric.org/pdf/O%20AYOR%203_1%20Ivekovic.pdf; "Gender and nation" (audio recording in French), http://www.mondialisations.org/php/public/art.php?id=36101&lan=FR; *L'éloquence tempérée du Bouddha. Souverainetés et dépossession de soi* (2014); http://eipcp.net /bio/ivekovic.

At the Borders of Europe
From Cosmopolitanism to Cosmopolitics

Étienne Balibar
Kingston University, London, UK
e.balibar@wanadoo.fr

Abstract: The essay addresses uses of "cosmopolitanism" and "cosmopolitics" in the current global political conjuncture, from a European point of view. Against the assumption (by Jürgen Habermas in particular) that Europe could become the typical cosmopolitan continent through a natural continuation of its universalist traditions, it argues that the universal exists only in the form of conflicting universalities. Eurocentrism therefore deserves not only a refutation, but a genuine deconstruction. Expanding on previous contributions, I focus on the *historical transformation* or the "border" as a quasi-transcendental condition for the constitution of the political, which is paradoxically reflected in its center. The "central" character of the "periphery" acquires a new visibility in the contemporary period. A "phenomenology of the border" becomes a prerequisite for an analysis of the citizen. I examine tentatively three moments: first, the antithesis of war and translation as contradictory overlapping models of the Political, which I call "polemological" and "philological" respectively; second, the equivocality of the category of the stranger, who tends to become reduced to the enemy in the crisis of the nation-state; third, the *cosmopolitical difficulty* of Europe to deal with its *double otherness,* regarding other Europeans and non-Europeans who are targeted by complementary forms of xenophobia.

In this essay, I want to address questions of common interest about the use and relevance of such notions as "cosmopolitanism" and "cosmopolitics" in the current global political conjuncture, and I will do so mainly from a European point of view. This might seem a contradiction in terms, since the overcoming of a certain Eurocentrism forms one of the preconditions for the development of a cosmopolitical discourse. I have two reasons for doing so, both linked to a certain practice of critical theorizing.

The first is that—in spite of some very interesting references to the idea of cosmopolitanism, or its transformation, in so-called postcolonial discourse—the continuous reference to cosmopolitanism today seems largely a product of the self-con-

sciousness of Europeans seeking to understand, if not to promote, Europe's autonomous contribution to the regulation of conflicts in the new Global order. Habermas's "return to Kant" (and others as well, from which I do not except myself) is typical in this respect. It is as if, after becoming the first imperial "center" of modern history, Europe could become the typical cosmopolitan continent through a natural continuation, or perhaps a dialectical reversal, building its new political figure in this perspective. This implicit claim, shared by many of us, has to be compared with realities, and examined as a discursive formation.

The second reason refers to an even more general perspectives of "politics of the universal," which would take into account the conflictual character of universality as such, or the fact that the universal historically exists only in the form of conflicting universalities, both inseparable and incompatible. Universalities become conflictual because they are built on the absolutization of antithetic values, but also because they are enunciated in different places by different actors in the concrete process of world history. From this point of view, "Eurocentrism" has a paradoxical, if not unique, position: it is the discourse whose pretense at incarnating universalism in the name of reason, or culture, or legal principles, is most likely to become increasingly challenged and refuted, as the history of the European and "new European" conquest of the world becomes reexamined from a critical point of view. But it is also a symbolic or conceptual pattern which is likely to remain untouched while rejected or reversed or to become transferred to other imagined communities. As a consequence, Eurocentrism deserves not only a rejection or a refutation, but a genuine deconstruction—that is, a critique which dissolves and transforms it from the inside, in order to produce a self-understanding of its premises and functions. In this sense, a deconstruction of Eurocentrism performed by the Europeans themselves—with the help of many others—is not only a precondition for the undertaking of any postimperial "cosmopolitics," it is part of its construction itself.

A distinction of *cosmopolitan discourse* (or theory) and *practical cosmopolitics* seems now to have gained a very wide acceptance, and, while I make use of it, I certainly claim no particular originality. It apparently results from three interrelated considerations. First, from the idea of reversing utopia into practice, or returning from the elaboration of a cosmopolitan *idea* (which could serve as a regulatory model for the development of institutions) to the programs, instruments, objectives, of a politics whose actors, be they states or other social individualities, immediately operate and become interrelated at the world level. Note that such an idea can be associated with the consideration of globalized processes in the field of economy, strategy, communications, in opposite ways. It can be argued that the overcoming of the utopian moment of cosmopolitanism arises as a consequence of the globalizing phenomena themselves. The material conditions would now exist for cosmopolitanism to pass from utopia into reality, if not "science." There would even exist already something like an "actually existing cosmopolitanism," to recall the title of one of the sections in Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins's influential anthology (1998), which could become politicized or provide a cosmopolitics or *Weltinnenpolitik* with its practical and affective support. But it can be argued also that globalization *destroys the possibility* of a cosmopolitan utopia, or deprives it of any nonideological function, because cosmopolitanism was only possible as an idealized counterpart for the fact that, however global or transnational its objectives might be, which is particularly the case of socialist *internationalism* in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, actual politics remained rooted in local, and particularly national, communities (see Balibar 2006a). This ideal projects a solution or final settlement for the actual conflicts, and for that reason would grant a foundational value to the prospect or project of *peace*, in particular the establishment of peace through the implementation of law.

This leads us to another powerful reason for the substitution of a practical notion of cosmopolitics for the classical ideal of cosmopolitanism, which has to do with the broadly shared idea that the proper realm of politics is *conflict*. What Globalization has mainly achieved is a generalization of conflicts of multiple forms, reviving old ones (for example, between religious and secular forces) and perpetuating recent ones, displaying them all at the level of the whole world: and so the ultimate horizon of politics in the global age, with no predictable end, would be the fighting of conflicts or the attempt at regulating them, but never putting an end to them. Such an idea is common to many authors today, albeit with important nuances: it is there in Ulrich Beck's thesis that the "cos-

mopolitical gaze" presupposes that "war is peace" or their respective realms are no longer fully discernible (Beck 2006). It is there also in Chantal Mouffe's representation of an "agonistic pluralism" that informs the macropolarities of the progressively emerging postnational political sphere (see Moufffe 2000). And it is there in Etienne Tassin, who along Arendtian lines, but also drawing the consequences from a postmodernist critique of the notions of political consensus and collective identities, seeks to articulate different concepts of resistance to the destruction of the "common world" which results from the uncontrolled processes of capitalist globalization (see Tassin 2003). But again there is a wide range of discursive positions here, including a certain equivocity of the use of the category "conflict." At one end we have conflict understood as a *specific form* of political practice, in a tradition that could be Marxist but also Weberian and, indeed, Schmittian; at the other, we have the idea of conflict as *matter or object* of political intervention, which takes the form of regulation or, to use the now fashionable terminology, "governance." The core of contemporary politics, which pushes it to the level of "cosmopolitics," would be to find how to keep regulating or governing conflict, that is ultimately establish consensus and hegemonies, beyond the declining monopoly of the nation–state in its violent or legal capacity to create peace and order within certain territorial boundaries. Such is clearly the prospect evoked in the work of David Held, with its opposition between a growing state of injustices, disorders, and inequalities created by Globalization as a counterpart for the universalization of exchanges and communications, and a global "social-democratic governance," whose quasi-legal instrument would be a "planetary contract" among states and social actors (see Held 2013). But it is also the horizon of Mary Kaldor's (2013) idea of the "Global Civil Society" and its politicization as "an answer to war," although in a more nuanced and empirical style.

And finally this leads us to the third interrelated motive that I believe underlies the current insistence on "cosmopolitics" as the concrete form of cosmopolitanism or an alternative to its utopian character, which lies in the primacy of the issue of *insecurity* or—to put it again in Ulrich Beck's terms—"risk society" at the global level. This is an additional element because the issue here is not simply to confront *alternative replies* to the same insecurity, or to the same *dominant form of insecurity* (be it terrorism, war, economic instability, mass poverty, the destruction of the environment, and so forth), but more fundamentally, in a sort of *generalized Hobbesian problematic,* to define and hierarchize the *different forms* of "insecurity" which are perceived and expressed by actors and power structures in today's world. It is this second degree in the political contest on insecurity that, far from remaining purely theoretical, directly impacts the antithetic positions on the function of international institutions, inherited from the ancient cosmopolitan ideal, as was plainly illustrated by the controversy between George Bush and Kofi Annan in 2003 at the opening of the United Nations' General Assembly, just before the invasion of Iraq.

Again, I claim no originality in my discussion of these themes. My specific contribution, which I have been trying to elaborate in a more or less explicit manner in the last two decades, has progressively focused on the *historical transformation* or the "border" (or the "frontier") as a concrete institution which, far from forming simply an external condition for the constitution of the political, empirically associated with the hegemony of the territorial nation–state, represents an *internal, quasi-transcendental* condition of possibility for the definition of the citizen and the community of citizens, or the combination of inclusion and exclusion which determines what Arendt called the "intermediary space," or *Zwischenraum*, of political action and contestation, where the right to have rights becomes formulated. In this sense, the border is only seemingly an external limit: in reality it is always already *interiorized* or displaced towards the center of the political space. This could be considered since the origins—even before the emergence of the modern Nation–State—a "cosmopolitical" element, which profoundly transformed the meaning and *institution* of borders but did not invent them. The question then becomes how to understand why this paradoxically "central" character of the "periphery" acquires a new visibility and a more controversial status in the contemporary period, in any case in Europe. The same kind of issue is currently being discussed and investigated in depth, especially in Italy, by Sandro Mezzadra and Enrica Rigo from a more juridical and constitutional point of view (see Rigo 2006). But I also try to develop what I call a "phenomenology of the border" as prerequisite of an analysis of the globalized citizen, which combines sub-

jective experiences with objective structural transformations in a highly unstable, overdetermined manner. It is this kind of phenomenology that I would like to evoke now, by sketching three developments: first, on the antithesis of war and translation, or polemological and philological models of the border; second, on the equivocity of the category of the stranger and the tendency to reduce it to a figure of the enemy through the development of border wars against migrants; and third, on what I call the "double otherness" affecting the status and representation of foreigners in today's Europe, to reach a final interrogation on the paradoxical identity of what we might call the "subject of cosmopolitics," as a figure determined locally as well as globally. But before that, I must return, as briefly as possible, to some considerations concerning Europe, "Eurocentrism," and the cosmopolitical issue.

It will be easier and also politically revealing, I believe, to refer here to some well-known propositions by Jürgen Habermas and the way they have progressively evolved under the impact of the recent "war on terror." This is not only a way to pay a well deserved tribute to a great living philosopher, whose questions and interventions continuously inform our reflection even when we disagree with his premises or depart from his conclusions, but also a way to illustrate this self-critical, internal relationship to the "European" definition of cosmopolitanism that I mentioned at the beginning. It did not remain unnoticed that Habermas's positions concerning cosmopolitanism had significantly changed in the last period, before and after 9/11 and the subsequent new wave of US military interventions in the world, especially the unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003 without a warrant from the Security Council. Many of his declarations and contributions have been internationally widespread, including the declaration from May 2003 reacting to the statement by European States supporting the US invasion, which was also endorsed by Jacques Derrida, with the title "After the War: Europe's Renaissance," in which he hailed the simultaneous anti-war demonstrations in various European countries as a moment of emergence of the long-awaited European public sphere (see Habermas and Derrida 2003). This was later developed in the acknowledgement of a "split" within the Western liberal–democratic alliance, arising from the antitotalitarian commitment in the post-World War II period, which separated the unilateralist power politics of the US from the orientation of the European "core states" (*Kerneuropa*) which was supposed to act in the direction of the constitution of a "global domestic politics without a global government" (*Weltinnenpolitik ohne Welregierung*) in the Kantian spirit (see Habermas 2006). This involved not only a limitation of national claims to absolute sovereignty, but the equivalent of a "constitutionalization of international law," subjecting and transforming the national politics of states through the self-imposed recognition of the primacy of universal legal and moral rules forming a politics of human rights.

More recently, Habermas has expressed disappointment and skepticism with respect to this cosmopolitan function attributed to Europe, or its historical avant-garde, but he has maintained the commitment to the same general objective (see Habermas 2009). This amounted to granting a practical reality and effectivity, in a critical situation which would appear as a turning point in Modern history, to the more speculative idea already explained at length in Habermas's "post national constellation" essays from the previous decade: the constitution of a supranational European ensemble, limiting the sovereignty of its member–states without giving rise to a new imperial superstate, was presented there as a form of "transition" between the old power politics of states based on their identification as substantial historical communities, in other terms the hegemony of nationalism, and the coming of the new cosmopolitan order where the relationship of individuals to their communities and allegiances is subjected to the formal and ethical recognition of universal legal norms. The argument bears analogies with the manner in which, in Kant's practical philosophy, the respect for the moral law or categorical imperative is supposed to impose a constraint on the "pathological" affective element of individual personality, or in Kant's own terms, to permanently "humiliate" its power. Accordingly, we would have the unmistakable sign of a shift from nationalism to the dominance of a pure "patriotism of the constitution" (*Verfassungspatriotismus*), intrinsically governing the development of the European Union, and conferring upon it a meaning and an influence widely superseding its local function.

Now, it would be too easy to dismiss Habermas's views as utopian and grossly overestimating the cosmopolitan content and

capacities of the European construction, and to call for a sobering return to the facts, showing that the *Weltpolitik* of the European Union, or perhaps we should say, rather, its *lack of a Global project of its own* in the last period, has patently refuted any illusion of a progressive function, especially with respect to the creation of a Global order and a system of international law genuinely independent from power interests. I believe that a more interesting series of remarks can be proposed. With a nasty spirit, I was always tempted to draw a formal analogy between the way Habermas presented the European construction as an intermediary step between nationalism and the coming cosmopolitical juridical order and the way, after the adoption of the idea of "socialism in one country" around which the world revolutionary movement should gather and redefine its strategy, the construction of the Soviet Union and the Socialist camp was presented as a "transitional phase" in the long process of political transition from capitalism to communism. This is only a formal analogy indeed, but that testifies to the extent to which teleological models of historical progress arising ultimately from the Enlightenment permeate both the cosmopolitan and the internationalist discourses, or dominate their concepts of history in a manner that is relatively independent from the divisions between rival political ideologies. It testifies also to the extent to which such discourses are inseparable from a deep Eurocentric representation of history, even when they claim to be critical of something like a "European nationalism," or "pan-European ideology."

But there is more to be said, and namely that such a paradox also affects discourses which, in the same circumstances, tried to be more critical with respect to the achievements of the European construction. I am thinking of the way in which, in their book on "cosmopolitical Europe," Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande (2004) described the European construction as a "reflective moment" or the emergence of a "politics of politics" in which the feedback effect of globalization and its specific problems associated with "global risks" would progressively transform the very idea of a national interest and allow Europe to correct its own Eurocentrism and lack of cosmopolitanism. Accordingly, the intermediary position in which Europe finds itself would dialectically foster its own internal transformation and allow it to play a crucial role in the transformation of the global distribution and definition of power.

And, if I may invoke my own elaborations here, I am even thinking of the manner in which, borrowing the dialectical image of the "vanishing mediator," I tried to explain in 2003 that Europe as a society, a new moment in the history of political forms, could only exist on the condition of becoming the instrument of a resistance to the polarizations of the War on Terror as well as a multilateral competition between *Grossräume* or geopolitical rival entities, which is centered on a combination of state power and cultural exceptionalism. It should "decenter" its self-consciousness and acknowledge the extent to which it had become itself transformed and reshaped by the aftereffects of its violent interaction with the world, particularly through the postcolonial transformation of its population and culture (see Balibar 2003a). However "dialectical" this presentation of Europe may appear (as a potential vanishing mediator in contemporary politics, which could transform others on the condition of becoming transformed itself by the others), it clearly contained an element of European messianism which I shared with many others.

It is perhaps owing to my self-critical reflection on the extent to which the messianic idea of Europe as the "vanishing mediator" in fact reproduces or pushes to the extreme the Eurocentric scheme inherent in other contemporary uses of the cosmopolitan ideal that I can put into question what I believe is one of the deep philosophical structures underlying the combination of universalism and Eurocentrism in the cosmopolitan tradition: namely, the idea that the transformation of the local, particular, national citizen into a "citizen of the world" through a relativization of memberships and borders requires a singular *mediation* (or even a mediator), which *turns the empirical interest against itself*, performing the negation of particularity *from the inside*. There is no doubt to my mind that the cosmopolitical discourse in its classical form, as it was elaborated philosophically in Kant and others—including Marx, in his own way—formed a conceptual system organized around the transcendental dualism of the empirical individual and the universal person, or the "generic individual" (as Hegel, Feuerbach, and the young Marx would reformulate it), namely the individual who carries within themselves a representation of the species, therefore also a commitment to the superior interest of the human community as such. The universal subject can be a "univer-

sal class," or a "universal political project" called *post national constellation*. In any case the mediation has to be performed by a membership or a community endowed with the character of a self-negating subject, which means a community (of citizens) without a "communitarian" collective identity, or not reducible to it, therefore without exclusionary effects, and with a revolutionary potential of universalization. Such is the case of "cosmopolitan Europe" in the discourses that I was quoting.

What I am suggesting is, in fact, a reversal of this pattern (which perhaps in the end will prove to be again one of its metonymic reformulations). At the same time I am admitting that the incapacity of Europe to emerge as a cosmopolitical mediation is not to be separated from its only too obvious current stalemate as a political project. There is something intrinsically contradictory in the idea of framing a postnational Europe which is a public space of conflicts, regulations, and civic participation, although it does not take the form of constructing a superstate—perhaps *especially* if it does not take that form. In a moment I will try to indicate that this intrinsic contradiction can be linked to the fact that the European construction as such emphasizes all the elements of *otherness* inherent in the representation of Europe as a whole, or simply as an ensemble. But this requires a detour through the consideration of the role of borders, from which I hope to gain a metamorphosis in the self-perception of Europe, in which its definition never simply comes from its own history, but *returns to it from outside*, from the consequences of its externalization. This is a point of view that seems more likely to become adopted in what constitutes *the peripheries of Europe* in the broad sense: cultural and political zones of interpenetration with the rest of the world—Britain or Turkey or Spain, say, rather than France or Germany, where Habermas implicitly localized the European "core states." But in reality, owing to the consequences of colonialism, and later postcolonial migrations and hybridization of cultures, it is also a possibility open for the whole of Europe that should be discussed in common, passing from one country to the other and one language to the other.

Let me now concentrate on what I called a "phenomenological approach" of the border as institution—and in a sense an *institution of institutions*, whose fundamental characteristics appear historically when it determines specific political practices, setting their quasi-transcendental conditions, as it were. In the the past, analyzing the repressive functions performed by the border especially with respect to some strangers, but also some nationals, I coined the formula "a nondemocratic condition of democracy" (Balibar 2003b). I now want to emphasize the ambivalent characteristics of this condition, which represents both *closeness and aperture*, or their permanent dialectical interplay. Thus, a phenomenology of the border is a very complex undertaking. It is now becoming one of the major objects of reflection and points of interdisciplinary cooperation for anthropologists, historians, geographers, political theorists, and so on. Even philosophers may have something to say from within their intellectual tradition and disciplinary logic (see Balibar, Mezzadra, and Samaddar 2012, and Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). To take the institution of the border as privileged vantage point in the discussion on cosmopolitics and its tensions does not produce the same effect as adopting, say, the point of view of culture, or territory, or urban society—although there clearly are reciprocities between these different paradigms. In previous essays I suggested, following a suggestion from Kant's early Latin dissertation on the "regions of space," that borders are never purely local or bilateral institutions, reducible to a simple history of conflicts and agreements between neighboring powers and groups, which would concern only them, but are always already "global"—that is, a way of dividing the world itself into *places*, a way of configuring the world or making it "representable" (as the history of maps and mapping techniques testifies). Hence the development of a "mapping imaginary" which has as much anthropological importance as the imagination of historical time and is not to be separated from it. I should add that borders are, therefore, constitutive of the transindividual *relationship to the world*, or "being in the world" when it is predicated on a plurality of subjects. This might already explain why the imagination of borders has a privileged relationship with utopias, albeit in a very contradictory manner. Either it works through the assumption of their closure, when utopian societies are imagined as isolated from the world, or it works through the anticipation of their suppression, their withering away giving rise to a "borderless world" for the whole of mankind. But the borders are not only structures of the imagination; they are a very real

institution, albeit not with a fixed function and status. And as conditions for the construction of a collective experience, they are characterized by their intrinsic *ambivalence*.

Here I generalize a reflection on the category of the foreigner and "foreignness" that I find in particular in Bonnie Honig's excellent book (2001), to which I will return. This ambivalence begins with the fact that borders are both *internal* and *external*, or subjective and objective. They are imposed by state policies, juridical constraints, and controls over human mobility and communication, but they are also deeply rooted in collective identifications and a common sense of belonging. We may continue with the fact that borders are at work within opposite paradigms of the political, particularly what I call *the paradigm of war* and *the paradigm of translation*, with antithetic models for the construction of the "stranger," or the institution of difference between the "us" and the "them," which are both exclusive and nonexclusive. As a consequence, while recognizing the importance of the border in the development of utopian discourses, I prefer to consider that the border as such is a *heteroropia* or a "heterotopic" place in Foucault's sense—that is, both a place of exception where the conditions of normality and everyday life are "normally suspended," so to speak; and a place where the antinomies of the political are manifested and become an object of politics itself. It is borders, the drawing and the enforcing of borders, their interpretations and negotiations that "make" or "create" peoples, languages, races, and genealogies… Let me try to indicate three moments of this heterotopic phenomenon of borders from the point of view of their current transformations, especially across and beyond Europe. The emergence of "European borders" which need to be constantly displaced or redrawn is indeed one of the main concerns underlying this very sketchy theorization.

The first element I want to emphasize is the fact that borders and frontiers are simultaneously defined as functions of *warfare* (or the interruption of warfare in the form of territorial settlements and an equilibrium of power codified by international law), and as functions of *translation*, or linguistic exchange: I call this second aspect a philological model of the construction of the political space—particularly the nation in modern history—where the appropriation of a collective identity and its equivalence with others mainly rests on establishing a correspondence as tight and effective as possible between linguistic communities and political communities. They must have the same boundaries, which are enforced and developed through education, literature, journalism, and communication (as Benedict Anderson famously demonstrated in his study of "imagined communities" and the becoming hegemonic of the national form of the state—see Anderson 1983). The construction of borders through war and the suspension of war, and their interiorization through the community of language and the possibility of translation (namely the activity that takes place when one stands *on the border itself*, either very briefly or for a long period, sometimes coinciding with the whole life), are clearly antithetic, but it does not mean that the two models are completely external to one another. On the contrary they are bound to continuously interfere and merge. In a sense, or in specific circumstances, war arises about translation and translation remains a war—because it involves a confrontation with the conflictual difference, or the irreducible "differend" with the other (in Lyotard's terminology) that can be displaced but not abolished, returning under the very appearance of consensus and communication. This reciprocity of war and translation within the establishment of lasting cultural power structures or hegemonies has been particularly emphasized by postcolonial studies which concern both the old peripheries and the old "centers," where so called "universal" or "international" languages have been created and institutionalized, and more recently by critics of the idea of a "world literature" (see, for example, Apter 2005). This is one of the major themes in Chakrabarty's work, *Provincializing Europe* (2000), where he insists on the conflict between antagonistic ways of "translating" life worlds, or the experience of the world, into labor (that is, abstraction in the merchant and capitalistic sense), and history (that is, majoritarian and minoritarian traditions and belonging). Perhaps we could suggest that what characterizes our experience of the globalized world, both virtually common and divided among incompatible representations of the sense of history, is a new intensity of this overlapping or undecidability of the relationship between war and translation. This would come also, on the side of war, from the fact that war has become immersed in a much more general economy of global violence, which is not less but *more* murderous, and in fact includes perma-

nent aspects of extermination. Ethnocide or culture wars are part of this economy.

The pattern of a "global civil war" that is looming in such diverse interpretations as those proposed by Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Negri and Hardt, or Agamben, is useful here but it is also misleading because it tends to quickly reduce to unity the enormous heterogeneity of the violent processes overlapping in this global economy, ranging from so-called "new wars" which involve state and nonstate actors, and subvert international law, to the seemingly natural catastrophes which foremost affect the populations targeted by mass impoverishment and made "superfluous" from the point of view of the capitalist rationality. On the other side the labor of translation which permanently confronts the antinomy of equivalence and difference, is a way of acknowledging the irreducible nature of the untranslatable elements: through its confrontation with this "impossible" task it produces a *universal community of languages*, or a "pure language," as Benjamin explained in somewhat messianic terms in his famous essay on "The task of the translator" (on this point, see Balibar 2006b). With the process of globalization, especially as it is seen "from below"—that is, not from the global Republic of Letters, but from the working populations themselves, this labor has also become much more complex and conflictual. In a postcolonial world the *hierarchy* of idioms, therefore of possibilities of translation towards the same "languages of reference," which serve as general equivalent for all the others, is becoming less and less indisputable and unilateral; it is therefore continuously enforced in a brutally simplified manner through the monolinguistic discipline of internet communication. The association of linguistic hierarchies with borders and collective identities appears much more clearly as a structure of national and transnational *power*: there is as much violence and latent political conflict, as much questioning of established sovereignties, in the possibility for Algerian citizens to simultaneously use their three historical languages (including Arabic, French, and Amazigh), as there is for Urdu, Turkish, Arab, and African languages to become recognized as equal parts of the "conversation" among the populations of multinational and multicultural Europe, therefore granted the same educational and administrative status as the "genuinely European" national or regional languages (some of which have for centuries been ex-propriated—that is, they no longer "belong" to the populations of European descent). I suspect that similar problems could be raised with respect to Spanish and Asian languages in the North American realm.

This brings me to the second aspect of a phenomenology of borders as preliminary to the cosmopolitical issue. Zygmunt Bauman, who is certainly one of the great anthropologists of the cultural side of "globalization" today, emphasized that "all societies produce strangers, but each kind of society produces its own kind of strangers, and produces them in its own inimitable way" (Bauman 1997). I take this phrase to mark an important step in a story of sociological and philosophical reflections on the figure of the stranger and the foreigner (the duality of categories already marking the difficulty in assessing the priority of the interior or the exterior, the juridical or the cultural aspect), which derive from the famous essays by Simmel and Alfred Schutz, and continues today with Gilroy, Babha, Honig, Spivak. Whether it was the existence of borders that created the stranger, imposing an institutional mark of otherness on the complexity of cultural and local differences, or the preexisting difference among nations and genealogies that led to the institution of borders and the closure of territories, is a question that was never completely solved. It would seem that the establishment of the new borders of Europe, and the way they are enforced against the self-determination and the right of circulation of migrant and refugee populations, with the continuous relocation of these police demarcations, sheds a brutal light on this issue because of its discretionary character, as embodied in the Schengen rules.

In previous essays, I intentionally gave a provocative dimension to this discussion by suggesting that the introduction of a notion of European citizenship based on national memberships within the European Union produces something like a European *apartheid*, a reverse side of the emerging of a European community of citizens, by incorporating anybody who is already a national citizen in any of the member states, and excluding anybody, however permanently settled and economically or culturally integrated, who comes from extra-Communitarian spaces. The exclusionary aspect arises from the simple fact that differences of nationality, distinguishing the national and the foreigner, which formerly applied in the same manner to all aliens within each nation state, now institute

a discrimination: some foreigners ("fellow Europeans") have become *less than foreigners*, in terms of rights and social status (they are no longer exactly strangers), while other foreigners, the "extra-Communitarians," and especially immigrant workers and refugees from the South, are now *more than foreigners*, as it were—they are *the absolute aliens* subjected to institutional and cultural racism. To this general idea, Alessandro Dal Lago and Sandro Mezzadra (2002), Didier Bigo (2005), and other sociologists or politologists who work on the "normalized state of exception" to which migrants are increasingly subjected in order to uphold the distinction between legal and illegal categories of immigrants, have added another element: the violent police operations (including the establishment of camps) performed by some European states on behalf of the whole community (with the help of neighboring client States, such as Libya or Morocco), amount to a kind of *permanent border war against migrants* (see, also, Balibar 2003c). The extent to which this policy is an intentional one can be disputed, but what I draw from their analysis is especially the growing indiscernibility of the concepts of *police* and *war* (also present in other forms of sovereign violence in today's world): hence the tendency towards a reduction of the *foreigner*, or the "real stranger," to a notion of virtual *enemy*, which pertains to a power permanently running behind a lost sovereignty, or the possibility of controlling populations and territories in a completely independent manner (see Brown 2010).

Reducing the figure of the stranger to that of the enemy is one of the clearest signs of the crisis of the nation–state, or the historical *national form of the state*, as was already signaled by Hannah Arendt (1951). It shows that the crisis of the nation–state, focusing on its borders but also continuously dislocating these borders, does not coincide with a linear process of withering away. On the contrary, it makes the nation–state, or any combination of nation–states, return to a relatively lawless mode of exercising power, which strongly suggests a comparison with the early modern moments in the construction of the monopoly of violence that Marx interpreted as "primitive accumulation." They probably have to do with a new phase of primitive accumulation of capitalism on a global scale. But, as Bonnie Honig (2001) rightly suggests, they also testify for an extremely ambivalent character of the political process itself: in fact, whole populations of strangers are now oscillating between a condition of *outsiders* and *insiders* in the construction of a postnational and postcolonial order, for which Europe appears as a violent, conflictual "laboratory." Strangers could become (and very often actually become), either *internal enemies*, who are looked upon with suspicion and fear by the state and the "majoritarian" population, or *additional citizens*, whose very difference enlarges the fabric of rights and the democratic legitimacy of the institutions. Their inclusion in the domain of the "right to have rights" would illustrate what French political philosopher Jacques Rancière called *granting the shareless their share* (Rancière 1998). Indeed, this symmetry is heavily unbalanced yet never completely destroyed, or it is at stake in the daily resistances and vindications of basic rights on the part of the foreigners, making them members of an active community of citizens even before they are granted formal citizenship, thus concretely anticipating a cosmopolitical transformation of the political.

This consideration may sound very optimistic indeed, and I will qualify it through adding a third and last point. I became aware of this when I started reflecting on the consequences of the failed attempt at establishing a European Constitution in 2005, and its relationship to the development of so-called "populist" attitudes in Europe, in fact a revival of nationalist feelings, of which the strangers are the inevitable victims—not only when they come from outside Europe, but between its own "peoples." *What is cause and what is effect* in this matter can be disputed, but perhaps it does not matter so much, and we must develop a symptomatic interpretation. The French and the Dutch played the role of the bad Europeans in the story, but shortly after the even former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt—not a bad connoisseur—expressed his conviction that, if popular referendums had been called everywhere in Europe, the result would probably have been a "no" in a majority of countries, including Germany. I don't believe this to illustrate the perpetual conflict between reactionary nationalism and enlightened cosmopolitanism. I also don't think that the reason for the failure of the "federal" project entirely lies in the social and economic causes that were emphasized by the French Left, when it insisted that the draft constitution had been rejected because it completely endorsed a legitimization of the neoliberal conception of the public sphere, and a dismantling of collective social rights. Even if this is

largely true, which I tend to believe it is, it would not produce a nationalist revival on its own. It could also—at least ideally—foster the development of pan-European social movements, for which democratic advances written into the Constitution (notably in the Charter of fundamental rights) could serve as an instrument. Something else must be acting as well. I believe this might lie in a vicious circle created by the addition of different kinds of xenophobia: on the one hand, negative feelings toward *other European peoples*, or "fellow Europeans," in each European country; and on the other hand the xenophobia directed against *non-European populations of migrants (or of migrant descent)*—with such highly ambivalent cases as Romanians, Turks, Balkan peoples, or populations of North African descent who have been part of "European history" for centuries in a colonial or semicolonial framework.

This is what I call the *cosmopolitical difficulty* of Europe to deal with its *double otherness*, an internal and an external otherness which are no longer confronted in absolutely separated spaces. This is also the difficulty of Europe to completely distinguish between *internal borders* (between member states) and *external borders* (with the rest of the world, and especially the South), *or* abolish this distinction and return to a classical status of the national border and the definition of the stranger. To put it in one phrase, European racism directed against immigrant "extra-European" populations, which hampers the development of social movements against neoliberal policies, also results from a projection of the nationalist feeling opposing European nations to one another, which the European construction in its current form has only superficially cloaked. It forms a derivative for a repressed mutual xenophobia. But the reverse is also true: it is the incapacity of European nations, and the unwillingness of European states, to grant migrants and populations of migrant descent equal rights and recognition, as well as the permanent temptation from populist parties and leaders to exploit antimigrant fears and hatreds for domestic purposes, which prevents Europeans from imagining that they could address their most urgent common social and political problems as a single constituency, thus giving rise to a new more "cosmopolitical" moment in the history of democratic citizenship. There is something like a "missing nation" in the middle of Europe, a nation made of several long-established migrant communities with different histories but a similar final destiny, and also some common cultural characters easily seen as threats to European culture. Once it might have been called the "sixteenth nation" when there were fifteen official member states, now it could be called the "twenty-sixth nation" (an idea already proposed by Catherine di Wenden—see Wenden 1997; with more recent admissions to the EU, including Croatia, one should perhaps more accurately say "the twenty-ninth state"). And it is *this missing nation in the middle* returning in a fantastic manner as a virtual internal enemy that makes it so difficult for all the other nations to perceive themselves as building a single constituency, automatically depriving them of the capacity of collectively influencing the global trends of politics, culture, and the economy.

References

Anderson, Benedict. 1983. *Imagined Communities*. New York–London: Verso.

Apter, Emily. 2005. *The Translation Zone: A New Comparative Literature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Arendt, Hannah. 1951. "The decline of the Nation State and the End of the Rights of Man," chapter 9 of *The origins of Totalitarianism* (Part II: *Imperialism*), New Edition, Harvest Books: New York, 1994, 267–303.

Balibar, Étienne. 2003a. *L'Europe, l'Amérique, la guerre*. Paris: Éditions la Découverte.

———. 2003b. "World Borders, Political Borders." *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 2003c. "Europe, An 'Unimagined' Frontier of Democracy." Translated by Frank Collins. *diacritics* 33 (3/4): 36–44.

———. 2006a. "Cosmopolitisme et internationalisme: deux modèles, deux héritages." *Philosophie politique et horizon cosmopolitique. La Mondialisation et les apories d'une cosmopolitique de la paix, de la citoyenneté et des actions*, under the direction de Francisco Naishtat. Paris: UNESCO.

———. 2006b. "Sub specie universitatis." *Topoi* 25 (1–2): 3–16. Special issue *Philosophy: What is to be done?* Berlin–Heidelberg: Springer Verlag.

———. 2010. "Europe: final crisis?" *Theory and Event*, 13 (2). http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/summary/v013/13.2.balibar.html.

———. 2011. "Our European Incapacity." *opendemocracy*, May 16. http://www.opendemocracy.net/etienne-balibar/our-european-incapacity.

———. 2013a. "Out of the Interregnum." *opendemocracy*, May 16. http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/etienne-balibar/out-of-interregnum.

———. 2013b. "How can the aporia of the 'European people' be resolved?" *Radical Philosophy* 181: 13–17.

Balibar, Étienne, Sandro Mezzadra, and Ranabir Samaddar (eds.). 2012. *Borders of Justice*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 1997. *Postmodernity and Its Discontents*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Beck, Ulrich. 2006. *Cosmopolitan Vision*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Beck, Ulrich, and Edgar Grande. 2004. *Das kosmopolitische Europa. Gesellschaft und Politik in der zweiten Moderne*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Bigo, Didier, Elspeth Guild (Ed.) (2005). *Controlling Frontiers. Free Movement into and within Europe*. Hants and Burlington: Ashgate.

Brown, Wendy. 2010. *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*. Cambridge, Mass.: Zone Books.

Butler, Judith, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek. 2000. *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality*. New York–London: Verso.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2000. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cheah, Pheng, and Bruce Robbins. 1998. *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Dal Lago, Alessandro, and Mezzadra, Sandro. 2002. "I confini impensati dell'Europa", published in the collective volume *Europa politica. Ragioni di una necessità*, edited by H. Friese, A. Negri and P. Wagner. Roma: Manifestolibri.

de Wenden, Catherine. 1997. *La Citoyenneté*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

Habermas, Jürgen. 2006. *The Divided West*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

———. 2009. *Europe: The Faltering Project*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Habermas, Jürgen, and Jacques Derrida. 2003. "Nach dem Krieg: Die Wiedergeburt Europas." *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 31. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/habermas-und-derrida-nach-dem-krieg-die-wiedergeburt-europas-1103893.html.

Held, David. 2013. *Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.

Honig, Bonnie. 2001. *Democracy and the Foreigner*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kaldor, Mary. 2013. *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.

Mezzadra, Sandro, and Brett Neilson. 2013. *Border as Method, Or, the Multiplication of Labor*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Mouffe, Chantal. 2000. *The Democratic Paradox*. New York–London: Verso.

Rancière, Jacques. 1998. *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Rigo, Enrica. 2006. *Europa di confine. Trasformazioni della cittadinanza nell'Unione allargata*. Roma: Meltemi.

Tassin, Étienne. 2003. *Un monde commun. Pour une cosmopolitique des conflits*. Paris: Seuil.

Étienne Balibar was born in 1942. He graduated from the École Normale Supérieure and the Sorbonne in Paris, and then obtained his PhD from the University of Nijmegen. After having taught in Algeria and France, he is currently Anniversary Chair of Contemporary European Philosophy at Kingston University, London, and Visiting Professor at Columbia University, New York.

His books include *Reading Capital* (with Louis Althusser) (1965), *Race, Nation, Class. Ambiguous Identities* (with Immanuel Wallerstein) (1991), *Masses, Classes, Ideas* (1994), *The Philosophy of Marx* (1995), *Spinoza and Politics* (1998), *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship* (2004), and *Identity and Difference* (2013).



Beyond the Regime of Fidelity

Boris Buden

Bauhaus University, Germany.
boris.buden@gmx.net

Abstract: The case of NSA leaker Edward Snowden, accused of treason by the United States, reveals its true political meaning in the context of a problem with which the traditional theory of translation is so obsessively concerned—the quasi dialectics between fidelity and betrayal. To put it more simply: to betray in translation always means to break a contract in which modern society and its political container, the nation–state, is ideologically grounded, namely the so-called social contract. It is because the commonsense concept of translation, whose meaning Naoki Sakai epitomized in the notion of homolingual address, not only conceptually parallels the social contract theory, but is, even in its most recent versions (Rawls, Habermas), directly involved in the construction of the bourgeois political sphere and the modern liberal democratic state. For the same reason, an abandoning of the regime of homolinguality—that is, traditional understanding of translation with its crude binarism and its obsession with the question of fidelity—cannot be reduced to a simple shift in the paradigm within translation theory. It implies an agonistic—and therefore genuinely political—act of challenging the very mode of sociality that is reproduced by the modern liberal democratic state. In short, it implies the traumatic betrayal of the very regime of fidelity on which it is based.

Treason

It didn't take long for the infamous T-word to appear. Not only were notorious American conservatives like Dick Cheney quick to accuse the NSA leaker Edward Snowden of treason, but they were promptly joined by Democrats like California Senator Dianne Feinstein and the most prominent John Kerry, Barack Obama's Secretary of State. Those rightly shocked by the use of such a scary word in a public discourse supposed to be governed by rational argument, a word that not only moralistically sabotages a possible debate on the problem but is itself heavily charged with almost mystical dimensions of guilt, crime, and punishment, just as quickly responded with a no less irrational rejection of the accusation of treason. An article in *The New Yorker* (Herzberg 2013) provides a good example of how desperate such justification strategy is: first, Snowden has committed no crime. According to the Constitution (Article III, Section 3), the treason against United States consists only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, which, as it can be easily proved, he hasn't done. Secondly, even if he has violated a law ("he is manifestly a lawbreaker"), Snowden is not a traitor. The proof: his intentions were innocent. Not only did he never intend to damage national security, but he acted, rather, on the basis of a belief that he was serving the true interests and highest values of his country. Thus, regardless of whether he has broken the law or betrayed his country, Snowden is a true patriot. And finally, guilty or not—a lawbreaker, a traitor, a patriot or not—he has already been severely punished by sentencing himself to perpetual exile.

However helpless in its attempt to rationally reject the accusation, this argumentation succeeds perfectly in foreclosing the problem it has touched upon. It deals with the symptoms of the intoxication caused by the public use of the world "treason"—"the word is pure poison," writes Herzberg in the same article—not with the toxic substance itself. What is actually so poisonous about the word "treason" is precisely the fact that its meaning transcends far beyond the moral–juridical discourse that reigns over the public of today's liberal democratic regime. The motif of treason and fidelity—which is intrinsically tied to it—evokes fundamental questions on the formation of the social.

More than a hundred years ago, the sociologist Georg Simmel stated that society would not be able to exist for any time at all without the phenomenon of fidelity, or *Treue* (Simmel 1908). He understood fidelity as a "sociological affect" that aims to foster the persistence of social relations. His favorite example is the well-known expression "faithful love." Why is there a need for fidelity, Simmel asks, if love that once brought two people together still persists in their long-lasting relationship? Fidelity is obviously needed when the cause that initiated the relationship at the very beginning has in the meantime disappeared. It is, for instance, what makes an erotic relationship survive even if the physical beauty that brought it about diminishes and turns into ugliness. This is why Simmel suggests that the notion of "faithful love" simply be replaced by a more appropriate one: "enduring love." It is precisely because of the mat-

ter of time, or, rather, of endurance that "fidelity and its opposite become important [...] as the bearer of the existing and self-preserving kinds of relationship among members." It is "one of the most universal patterns of action significant for the most diverse interactions among the people" (Simmel 2009, 517).

"Fidelity and its opposite," writes Simmel, where by "its opposite" he obviously means "betrayal," which in this context acquires an unexpected meaning. To stay within Simmels's example: the expression "betrayal of love" makes no more sense than the already mentioned "faithful love." Behavior that appears to us, and is often described, as "betrayal of love" is nothing other than an effect of the simple absence of love. How can we say that a person who leaves his or her partner, or begins a love relationship with another, has betrayed the love of this person, if the fact that this love vanished before is precisely what brought about the demise of the relationship? Paradoxically, one can betray only a former love, or, more precisely, one can betray what has been brought into existence by this love—be it marriage, family, children, friendship, or similar. It is in this context that Simmel questions the well-known truism "that it is easier to destroy than to build." It doesn't actually hold for certain human relationships. While it is true for a relationship that it requires certain conditions to come into existence, this doesn't mean that the subsequent loss of these conditions will necessarily cause its collapse. Once it has begun, it doesn't permanently rely on the feeling or practical occasion without which it would not have arisen in the first place—as long as it relies on the fidelity that compensates for the absence of these conditions and keeps the relation unchanged in its social structure. This is why it is sometimes harder to destroy than to build.

But what does this tell us about the case of Snowden's "treason," which has shocked public opinion the world over? First of all, it tells us that the whole juridical dimension of the accusation of treason, including its rejection, completely misses the point—its temporal meaning. Although juridical discourse correctly addresses the agonistic character of the problem by situating it in the relation between friends and enemies—"Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort," states Article Three of the United States Constitution—it understands treason and implicitly addresses fidelity primarily in terms of belonging to a friendly *inside* that automatically presupposes loyalty and is opposed to a hostile *outside* that deserves no such feelings. This quasi dialectic between fidelity and treason is based on a spatial perception of political and cultural entities. Precisely as such, it reminds us directly of the commonsense view of translation and its obsession with the same subject.

According to this view, translation takes place between two already existing languages that automatically imply two different cultures, respectively two separate social and political entities—mostly a nation and a nation–state—each enclosed in a homogeneous, often also clearly demarcated space. The task of translation in this situation is then to bridge linguistic and other differences so as to facilitate communication between the two entities. Once we have accepted this view, the proper position of translational practice becomes problematic. It can, in fact, never occupy a location equidistant from the two sides, one of which is always defined as original while the other is a sort of secondary production—that is, its translation.[1] This circumstance is the source of an endless discussion about which side to adhere to—either the linguistic and cultural realm of the original, or the respective one of its translation. Since in either case there is always at stake more than a simple correspondence of linguistic meaning—namely cultural but above all social and political effects of translational practice—such discussion assumes dimensions of much greater importance that go back to the very formation of the social. The already-mentioned quasi dialectic between fidelity and treason is nothing but a moralistic—and in this sense ideological—expression of a simple truth according to which translation has always been more than a purely linguistic issue, and namely a social and political act.

As in the case of the accusation of treason leveled against Snowden, this endless moralistic discussion about whom a transla-

[1] One of today's widely preferred solutions to this problem is to declare "inbetweenness" as a cultural space in its own right, endowed with authentic emancipatory potential. Precisely in promising an easy escape from the crude binarism of the traditional concept of (cultural) translation, it fosters the illusion of an emancipation without a radical conflict with the powers that have themselves generated this same binarism. To challenge an imposed "either/or" implies an even more decisive "either/or," of which the case of Edward Snowden is the most cogent proof.

tor should be faithful to has an ideological function, which is to suppress the problem it tackles, and in this way support the social relations that inform the existing reality.

Security or Freedom

As is well known, the public debate surrounding recent cases of leaking classified information—not only in Snowdon's case, and not only in the USA—is generally framed by the alternative "security or freedom" that is typical for the whole debate on "terrorism." Rastko Močnik[2] compared it with Lacan's concept of *vel*, or a "forced choice" (Močnik 2003, ix). Confronted with someone who says "your money or your life," we actually have no alternative. If we choose money we lose both. So there is no other option than to choose life (without money). Something similar happens in the "security or freedom" alternative. If we choose security, we will have security without freedom; if we choose freedom, we will lose both.

In the case of Edward Snowden, it seems at first sight that he has crossed a fine line that demarcates a proper relation between freedom and limitations to this freedom imposed in the name of security. In a democratic society, such a line is supposed to be drawn as a result of a rational public debate, which cannot be decided *a priori* and is in itself endless. Yet we have seen that such a debate was quickly interrupted by the accusation of treason and deteriorated into an *a posteriori* sophistry on individual guilt and innocence.

So it seems that Snowden mistook "security or freedom" for a true alternative, while it was, in fact, a *vel*—a non alternative.

[2] At this point, an editor at a typical publisher's or journal would ask me to further specify who this name actually refers to, expecting me to provide additional information usually comprising profession and geopolitical location. In this particular case, this information would probably read "Slovenian philosopher." This would most certainly help readers quickly orientate themselves on the map of today's global production of knowledge, yet the question is, what sort of orientation is this in point of actual fact? It opportunistically follows the model of representation and classification of epistemological subjects that is fully in accordance with today's still dominant picture of the world as a colorful cluster of nations and ethnicities located in their own, clearly demarcated linguistic, cultural, and political spaces. But this is precisely the model that supports—and is supported by—the traditional concept of translation and the corresponding regime of fidelity, which are the object of criticism here. This is why I refuse—at least in the main text—to provide any such "stylistic" specification.

By choosing freedom, it had to end in treason. But why was his the wrong choice? The answer seems obvious: Snowden seems to be a naive essentialist. In his decision to reveal to the general public classified details of the mass surveillance programs put in place by the US and UK governments, he actually addressed and claimed a value—freedom manifested as civil liberty—for which he believed to be the very essence of the society and the state he served, or as we would rather put it today, an essential part of the US American identity. The fact that the addressee responded with the accusation of treason proves that this value has already evacuated its political embodiment, the institution of the state as well as the decisive part of civil society both still claiming to have originated in this value. This is the reason why there is a need for fidelity. It alone is capable of preserving the duration of a social relation beyond the presence of the values and forces that once initiated it. Fidelity assures that this social relation, including the whole institutional edifice built on it, will outlive these values and forces with the same synthesizing effect. What Snowden did not know is that by choosing freedom instead of security he has claimed a former freedom whose place within the American imaginary has in the meantime been occupied by security.

By the same token, we might say more generally that the accusation of betraying the so-called American values—or, for example, "Western values"—does not make much sense. One can only betray what has been created by and built upon those values and now persists after they have passed. The same applies to the accusations of betraying love of country as well as the attempts to justify such a betrayal—a claim, for instance, that Snowden in his "wrongdoings" was actually motivated by a genuine love for his country. The moment a patriotic feeling becomes a matter of fidelity, then the so-called love of country has already vanished.

This, however, does not mean that an endless public debate over the proper dose of love of country or a harmonic coexistence of freedom and security makes no sense whatsoever. Such discussions, as Močnik argues, have a clear ideological function—to reproduce the relation between the state and individual in the immediacy of this relation. At stake is a situation that has been conceptualized in the grounding myth of the modern bourgeois state, in the so-called social contract theory. As is well known, it explains

the establishment of political order, above all of its most important institutional form, the state, as a result of a contract among individuals. It also presupposes that these individuals, before they enter into the contract, were not bound by any social relation. They enter into the contract directly, as it were, from the state of nature, as purely natural beings, so that the social character of their mutual relations is nothing but a retroactive effect of the contract itself. There is also an element of gain and loss in the social contract, at least in its Hobbesian form, where individuals have to surrender some of their freedoms to their ruler in exchange for protection of their remaining rights, a meaning that brings us back to the topic of freedom and security, or, respectively, of treason and fidelity. Seen from this perspective, treason is simply a violation of that original contract by which an individual egoistically usurps too much freedom, thus jeopardizing the security of others. As a response, society cancels the contract with this particular individual and excludes him.[3]

Translation and Social Contract: a Parallel

At this point, we should draw a parallel between the theory of social contract and the already mentioned commonsense concept of translation, whose meaning Naoki Sakai has epitomized in the notion of homolingual address (Sakai 1997, 1–17). Sakai shifted attention from the paradigm of communication in which translation appears as the transferring of a message from one language to another to the problem of address, which reveals the linguistic encounter that takes place in translation as essentially a social relation. What he calls the regime of homolingual address is a particular representation of translation in which one side of the translational encounter addresses the other as though both are representatives of different linguistic communities. It reduces the initial situation of not understanding, which prompts translation, to one single difference between two language societies. Thus, the already mentioned commonsense notion of translation according to which translation always takes place between two separate languages perceived as enclosed, homogeneous, internally transparent linguistico-cultural spaces—and necessarily implies the whole drama of fidelity and

[3] It either prosecutes a traitor like Bradley Manning, or leaves him in a quasi-stateless limbo by canceling his travel documents, as in the case of Snowden.

treason—is in fact a retroactive effect of the homolingual mode of address.

At stake is a constellation that, as mentioned above, is reminiscent of the social contract, that fairytale regarding the formation of state and society. First of all, the relation between languages and language communities, as structured under the regime of homolingual address, resembles the relation between individuals in the social contract. As is well known, individuals enter into the original contract directly, as it were, from the state of nature—that is, as though they have never before been involved in any sort of social relation. In other words, they become social beings only and for the first time at the moment of entering into the contract. Is this not similar to the perception of languages and language communities that enter into translational encounter? It makes an impression that they have never encountered each other before and have no traces of former relations, no shared experiences, no history of mutual hybridizations, no memories of being in the past mere moments of same linguistic continuities. Like individuals at the moment of entering into the social contract, languages and language communities appear at the moment of translation in their absolute isolation and solitude, a condition that is constantly reproduced under the regime of homolingual address.

It is therefore probably even wrong to say that this regime suppresses the fact that translation is a social relation. Rather, it completely usurps and monopolizes the very sociality of linguistic practice. Translation appears as the only social relation a language is able to articulate, but as a relation between languages not between humans. Now there are languages that, as isolated monads, socialize freely among themselves thanks to translation. Humans who speak these languages, who understand, misunderstand, or do not understand them, who therefore cannot but constantly translate and hence reproduce their linguistic praxis (a praxis of which translation is an unavoidable element) and themselves through it, are supposed to socialize too—but only within the enclosed space of one single "own" language. Do they have any social life beyond that? No. Outside of this space there is nothing but a (linguistic) wilderness, a presocial state of language *qua* nature. Once again, we are describing a reality that is retroactively structured as such through a certain, historically particular, and ideologically framed perception of trans-

lation based on the paradigm of homolingual address. It would be wrong to say that it simply desocializes translational praxis. Rather, it seizes the social truth of translation and redistributes it according to its ideological function. Its *modus operandi* is dehistoricization. In order to achieve its ideological goals, the homolingual address imposes a sort of structural oblivion on the translational praxis.

It is only after having got rid of its history, which is the history of its social relations, that translation in the homolingual mode of address can feature its three main characteristics, typical of a commonsense understanding of translation. The first is its posteriority, the impression that translation enters the scene only after the two languages have already completed their development and reached their final form—that is, as though they meet for the first time without having had anything to do with each other before. This automatically has another effect: the externality of translation. It appears that it confronts an already existing, enclosed, and internally homogenous linguistic space from its outside. So the perception of such a language–space excludes translational praxis in both way temporally and spatially. Finally, these two features merge into one for the traditional understanding of translation's essential feature, its secondary character. At stake is the notorious binary relation between the so-called *source* and *target* language, which implies a qualitative difference between the original in one language and its secondary production in another.

It is also on the grounds of this same dehistoricization that the regime of homolingual address in principle doesn't recognize any qualitative difference between and among languages. Rather, it presupposes an abstract equality of all of them and grants each the freedom to enter into relation with any other language according to its own need or will. In this sense, too, it repeats the logic of the modern bourgeois political sphere that is imagined as emerging out of the social contract and consisting of abstract, mutually separated individuals that are all "free and equal." In fact, we can think of the regime of homolingual address as a linguistic pendent to the bourgeois political sphere. It also creates a homogeneous space, clearly differentiated from other spheres of life, in which, instead of individuals, languages and respective language societies appear in translational encounter as free and equal—only after and because they have been radically separated from each other, which actually means separated from their social relations and the history of their social interactions.

But beyond the abstract postulate of equality among languages, the reality of translational praxis looks quite different. The statistical data on international flows of translated books show how the world system of translation is hierarchically organized (see, on this point, Heilbron 2010). The so-called hypercentral position is occupied by one single language. Almost sixty percent of all translated books in the world are translations from English. Only two languages, German and French, have a central position each with a share of about ten percent of the global translation market. It is followed by seven to eight languages in a semicentral position, each with one to three percent of all translated books (Spanish, Russian, Italian, etc). The remainder of almost two hundred languages, among which quite large ones such as Chinese or Arabic (from which less than one percent of all translations worldwide are undertaken), are peripheral (Heilbron 2010, 2).

As in the case of the social contract, the regime of homolingual address does not simply hide the reality of hierarchies, hegemonies, and relations of domination and submission. It is, in fact, like the bourgeois political sphere that is retroactively constructed by the social contract, an institution of domination itself. The relation of domination is intrinsic to the very formation of such a separate homogeneous sphere of abstract linguistic equality, which is why there is no space for an alternative within its horizon.

Good, Bad, Faithful

The conceptual and ideological alliance between the regime of homolingual address and the social contract theory can also be historically traced down to German Romantic translation theory. As is well know, it is still praised for its so-called welcoming of the foreign (see Berman 1992). In the perspective of German Romantics, the foreign (*das Fremde*), which should be clearly perceptible in translation, is a sort of added value that is supposed to refine the language of the translator and the spirit of his or her nation, or as we would say today, its culture. Concretely, in their case it was a classical quality that German originally lacks and can acquire only through translations from the classical languages—Greek and Latin. This, however, implies a certain original form of the German lan-

guage that could be imagined as a kind of linguistic state of nature, a condition of language before its first encounter with other languages. We can think of it as a state of language prior to its first translation. Precisely as such it again clearly resembles the concept of an individual existing before its first encounter with other individuals in the abstractness from any social relations, that is, before the emergence of society—a constellation akin to the concept of the social contract.

In relation to the principle of fidelity that implies a foreignizing of the language and culture of translation, both emphatically preferred by German translation theorists—in contrast to the so-called French school, which proclaimed the principle of license and domestication—the German Romantic concept of translation operates according to the following scenario: a language, respectively a language community, represented through the figure of the translator, gives up a part of its natural originality and accepts contamination by the foreign in order to achieve the state of culture. But the translator, in accomplishing this cultural mission, must therefore also sacrifice part of his or her freedom and stay faithful to a certain cultural task, which is always already a social and political one—the task of nation-building. Accordingly, the fidelity of translation is not a matter of its quality in terms of a degree of faithfulness to the original, but, rather, a matter of loyalty to the linguistic community, and, concretely, to the nation. It refers directly to a social relation that must be preserved and developed beyond any given essence, or to recur to Simmel's notion of fidelity, it refers to a social relation that must be constantly cultivated after the pregiven originality—as it is retroactively projected into the state of nature—has been replaced by culturally generated sociality. Thus, not being faithful in translation does not mean betraying the original text, or any sort of original essence, but betraying the social relation that has been cultivated upon and beyond this originality. In the final analysis, this means betraying a very specific and a very specifically binding political commitment.

The consequences of such a betrayal, of course, run far deeper than the consequences of an inaccurate or bad translation. In fact, the differentiation between a good and a bad translation is itself ultimately a political issue. So, Antoine Berman (1992, 5) defines bad translation as an ethnocentric translation that systematically negates the strangeness of the foreign work. It is clearly the fidelity to a particular political cause—here, obviously, a commitment to what we may call liberal inclusivism—that makes such an assessment possible. However, Berman cannot admit a political and ideological bias. Rather, he insists on a purely ethical position, arguing that translation gets its true sense only from the ethical aim by which it is governed. Moreover, he is convinced that defining this ethical aim will liberate translation from "its ideological ghetto," which is for him one of the tasks of a theory of translation. For Berman, ethics is what translation is all about, not politics or ideology. What he calls the "ethics of translation" consists of determining the pure aim of translation as such. It consists, finally, "of defining what 'fidelity' is" (Berman 1992, 5).

That such an expansion of the ethical dimension of translation has itself an ideological function, namely to avoid confrontation with the political meaning of translational praxis and the role fidelity plays in it, is already revealed by opening the historical dimension of translation. Referring to Leonard Forster's research on multilingualism in literature, Antoine Berman reminds us himself that the lettered public of the sixteenth century used to read a literary work in its different linguistic variants, which is why it ignored the issue of fidelity and treason (Berman 1992, 4). How, then, has this issue become, since the eighteen century, of such crucial importance for different translation theories and is even believed to determine the very essence of translational praxis? People started to hold their mother tongue sacred, says Berman. Not only that, we can add. People began to think of the origins of their social order, the state, and their very sociality in terms of contractual relationships, which significantly raised the importance of the ethical dimension of social and political life including the issue of fidelity and treason. Moreover, people started to imagine their common being in cultural terms. They began to create nations, unique national cultures, and languages enclosed in homogeneous, clearly differentiated spaces. It was in the age of Enlightenment in the seventeenth and eighteenth century that the ground was laid for the most important political institution of our time, the nation–state, and for the political structure of the modern world, the so-called Westphalian order. Needless to say, both translation and fidelity have important roles in this process, which they have played up to the present. The best example

is one of the most prominent political philosophies of the liberal age—John Rawls's theory of justice, a modern revival of the classical social contract theory.

No Justice Without Translation: a Proviso

John Rawls introduces the notion of translation at the most traumatic point of his concept of a liberal democratic society, at the dividing line between the private and the public, which in our age of radical desecularization has become a true frontline along which today's societies threaten to break apart and fall back into the constant war of all against all, as is the case today with the sinister aftermaths of the so-called Arab spring.

This historical event is in a way a double failure of translation. First, the translation of an allegedly universal concept of Western democracy into a local, "predemocratic" idiom of a non-Western world, supposed to be deeply contaminated by tribalism, ethnocentrism, religious fundamentalism, and authoritarianism—a translation that undoubtedly follows the track of the old imperialist expansionism—resulted in chaos and violence. It only rearticulated this particular non-Western location as historically belated, concretely, not yet mature for democracy. But at the same time the political concept of translation that was built into the very project of Western liberal democracy as the instrument of its universal translatability, designed to deal with particular claims of all sorts, especially with those of different religious communities, has also failed, revealing a corrupt element within the original itself that renders its translation impossible.

As is well known, in his conceptual reenactment of the old social contract theory, Rawls constructed the so-called original position, an imaginary standpoint projected behind what he calls "the veil of ignorance," an imagined boundary that makes all particular facts like ethnicity, gender, class, religion, and so forth external to our reasoning that now, protected from and cleansed of all the particularities, can arbitrate between rival parties out of the only knowledge available within this sphere—the knowledge of the general principle of justice.

Rawls later revised this argument—making concessions to the ever stronger ideology of liberal multiculturalism—and included the so-called *proviso*, which allows for the expression of religious arguments in public debates so long as they can be translated into the language of public reason (see Rawls 1997).

Thus, the bourgeois political sphere falls apart into two linguistic spaces that are at the same time separated and connected through translation, which articulates and controls the divide within this sphere and at the same time provides for its homogeneity.

In his own dealing with the problem of desecularization, Jürgen Habermas (1989) basically adopted Rawls's "translational *proviso*." He, too, believes that religious citizens—whom he calls "monolingual citizens" (!) since their religious language is the only one they understand—should be allowed to use their religious arguments in the public sphere as long as these are translated into a language that is accessible to all citizens. But he also explicitly states who is supposed to undertake this translation, namely the secular citizens, and precisely where it should occur—at what he calls the "institutional threshold," a boundary that separates the so-called informal public sphere, which allows for articulation of religious arguments and which is therefore contaminated with private reasons, from another that informs a sort of pure, or primal, public sphere, the sphere of parliaments, courts of justice, ministries, public administrations, et cetera.

Within the informal public, which we can imagine after the multicultural model as a sphere of linguistic diversity, prevails a cacophony (Habermas calls it the "babble of voices" of public communication) of mutually incomprehensible languages of different religions, or, as Rawls would put it, comprehensive doctrines. Placed on the threshold to the institutional part of the public sphere, where no religious arguments are allowed, translation, which Habermas explicitly compares with a filter, lets pass only secular inputs, cleansing the language of religious particularities and turning it into a homogenous, totally transparent language of the secular state.

The political sphere of a bourgeois democratic society is thus multilingual. It speaks many languages, of which only one is considered to be its original language—the mother tongue of a liberal secular state. From the point of view of this proper language of the state and society, all its other languages appear foreign, which is why they must be translated. And yet this translation is a one-way translation. Is the proper language of the public sphere supposed to be accessible to all, thus requiring no translation?

The source of this ambiguity actually lies in the fact that Habermas understands translation according to an *a priori*, given homolinguality—that is, in terms of a preexisting linguistic unity. He thus reduces its meaning to the function of linguistic purification and homogenization. This is only possible on the assumption of a homogenous target language, the language of a public reduced to an exclusively institutional realm. However, this language doesn't seem to preexist translation. Rather, it appears to be its product, a performative result of the homolingual address, in which Habermas's idea of translation is grounded. This is why this ultimate language of the political public—purified from any sort of religious or doctrinaire particularity, a language into which all the languages of the "informal public" can be and should be translated—itself eludes any further translation. It is a language in which all foreignness is finally sublated, which makes it the mother tongue of a society enclosed in a democratic, secular state. It alone is able to generate a total transparency of the political public in which, in the sense of an act of self-reflection, society as society is grounded. We should not forget that Habermas, in his *Structural Transformation* (1989, 24–29), already starts from the assumption that public debates are fully comprehensible and linguistically transparent.

On the other hand, the linguistic heterogeneity that is ascribed to the informal public turns out to be a mere plurality of the already existing, homogenous languages of a particular religion, a political doctrine, or a *Weltanschauung*. From the point of view of the mother tongue of the society—that is, on the part of a presumed total transparency of the proper, institutional political public—the linguistic diversity of the informal public appears as a domain of a specific clandestinity, the clandestinity of the so-called alien word.

Translation: a Return of the Repressed

We should, at this point, recall the "grandiose organizing role of the alien word" of which Vološinov writes in *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (1973).[4] He defines the "alien word," or the "foreign-language word," primarily as a word that eludes general use; it hides within itself a secret that can be deciphered and is administrated by "rulers" or "priests" who alone have at their command its "true meaning." It is not difficult to recognize here a homogenous religious language of Habermas's informal public. This also explains his translational *proviso*. What religion has alienated from general use must now be made "generally accessible" again through translation at the institutional threshold.

This becomes clear if we remember that Habermas, in fact, conceives of translation according to the psychoanalytic model (see Habermas 1987, and, for a more detailed consideration, Buden 2005, 85–89). Its primal task is not simply to enable understanding between two partners who speak different languages, but rather to sublate the suppression (*Verdrängung*), which he understands as the splitting-off of one part of the language from public communication—in other words, the privatization of one part of its meaning.[5] The goal of psychoanalytic cure, which Freud already explicitly compares with translation, (see Freud 280) is to enable the self-reflection, that is the reappropriation, of a previously privatized part of public language—made foreign and clandestine due to mental illness—so that the self can restore itself in its totality and transparency.

This generally explains Habermas's model of secularization: religious language is allowed to take part in the articulation of the public sphere because it is in principle understood as a split-off part of this same public sphere, a language that is alienated from society, which, precisely as such, obscures one part of the social self-formation process (*Bidlungsprozess*) that is closely connected with the public sphere. Just as the patient reappropriates alienated parts of the history of her development in performing translation/self-reflection together with the analyst, so too does society reconstruct its own self-formation process in performing translation/self-reflection cooperatively via secular and nonsecular citizens, thus establishing itself in its totality and transparency.

This clearly confirms that translation for Habermas has a primarily socially formative function, concretely playing a crucial

[4] In this section, I rely on Nowotny's "Kontinua der Verwandlung. Sprachphilosophische und linguistische Aspekte der Übersetzung." See Nowotny 2008, 95–131.

[5] Here, we should not forget that psychoanalysis is not an auxiliary means of communication for Habermas, but rather the paradigm of communicative self-reflexion.

role in the *Bildungsprozess*—not only a process of both collective and individual self-creation, but also a process in which society and culture inextricably merge.

However, precisely in fulfilling its social function, translation opens up a paradox similar to the one of the theories of the so-called social contract, in which liberal political concepts still try to ground society. Louis Althusser has pointed to this problem in dealing with Rousseau's *contrat social* concept: at the moment of the conclusion of the contract, as a contract between individuals and the community, the second contractual partner, the community, doesn't exist since it is only its product (Althusser 1987, 146 and following pages). Thus, the result of the contract—the community that does not preexist the contract—is preinscribed in the very condition of the contract.

This completely applies to Habermas's translational *proviso*, which presupposes that translation occurs between two languages—a religious language articulated in the so-called informal public and the language of the proper political public that is spoken behind the institutional threshold. Namely, at the moment of translation one of these languages, the "mother tongue" of the liberal, democratic state, does not exist yet since it should first emerge as the product of this translation. In terms of the filter metaphor—as has been said before, Habermas explicitly compares the institutional translation with a filter that extracts only secular reasons—this language has the form of a "language filtrate." The perception that it was already there before the translation is, in fact, an effect of a particular representation of translation that necessarily compels us to the assumption of preexisting, distinct, and closed linguistic entities—in short, the performative effect of what Sakai calls the homolingual address.[6] So both the existence of homogenous religious communities and the existence of a secular, liberal democratic society are grounded in the ideological perception of a homogenous linguistic unity. This is the reason why we say that translation has

[6] See Nakai (1997, 2): "[I]t is not because two different language unities are given that we have to translate (or interpret) one text into another; it is because translation *articulates* languages so that we may postulate the two unities of the translating and the translated languages as if they were autonomous and closed entities through *a certain representation of translation.*"

a socially formative function. It is translation that finally makes out of a diversity of different, religious, ethnic, doctrinaire, and so forth, linguistic communities a homogenous secular society.

This society, too, is a linguistic community, yet it does not originate in "natural"—or, from the perspective of the secular state, alienated, privatized—languages, but in a linguistic extract filtered out of these natural languages, which is considered the mother tongue of a liberal democratic society enclosed in the secular state. The nature–culture difference, which is clearly heard here, again evokes the theory of the social contract. One can easily imagine what Habermas and liberal theory would expect to happen to a society that ignores the translational *proviso* and does not properly guard the boundary between private and public—a regression into the state of nature, into a Babylonian confusion of tongues and linguistic communities that can no longer agree on any common interest, since they only speak languages that are foreign to one other. In short, a society without the internal border between private and public, without a borderline drawn by the translation–filter would collapse and end in some sort of Hobbesian *bellum omnium contra omnes*.

Come Home and Face the Consequences

Referring to the impossibility of literally translating the famous Italian aphorism on translation *traduttore traditore* into English as "the translator is a betrayer," Roman Jakobson suggests that this rhyming epigram be translated in the form of "a more explicit statement and to answer the questions: translator of what messages? betrayer of what values?" (Jakobson 2000, 143).

Let us avoid being seduced by the allegedly high stakes of "messages and values." There is more at stake here: fidelity and betrayal in translation refer directly to the socially formative role of this linguistic practice. As we have tried to show here, under the regime of homolingual address—which is precisely the name for a historically contingent, ideologically functional, and politically pragmatic form of translational practice—the meaning of linguistic translation, as well as the meaning of fidelity and betrayal in translation, cannot be separated from the concept of social contract. To betray in a translation does not mean to send a wrong message or to violate a precious value but to break a social contract and in this

way jeopardize the existing form of social being—that is, concretely, a particular society enclosed in a nation–state and defined primarily through its identity that implies a unique culture, history, ethnicity, and language.

The regime of homolingual address, which almost uncontestedly dominates present-day understanding of translation, structurally and historically corresponds to the formation of the bourgeois political sphere, which still provides the backbone for the system of actually existing democracy. Moreover, the concept of translation, forged under the same regime, plays a crucial role—as we have seen in Rawls's and Habermas's theories of the secular state—in the way this system creates and maintains the values in which it sees itself grounded: the rule of law, civil liberties, legal equality, secularity, human rights, et cetera. In other words, what is at stake is not only how the concept of translation based on homolingual address performatively reproduces the social and political conditions of its possibility, the "objective reality" of separate languages, linguistic communities, and nation states, but rather how the system of actually existing democracy—which implies this "objective reality" of separate languages, linguistic communities, and nation–states as the condition of its possibility—ideologically reproduces itself through this same concept of translation. It plays a crucial role in the strategy of its self-legitimation. We would probably not be exaggerating if we were to say that removing this concept of translation from the ideological construction of the liberal democratic state—abandoning, for instance, the homolingual mode of address implied in it—would bring the whole edifice down. Can we imagine a secular democratic state without translation at the threshold between its separate spheres that is a necessary precondition for its values claims? Can we imagine a democracy without the claim to transparency and rationality of its political sphere that is provided through translational filtering on its boundaries? Can we imagine a society and its nation–state without its mother tongue that is created through homolingual translation, both in linguistic and political terms? And, finally, can we imagine a democracy, or whatever might replace it for the better, beyond the homosociality of the nation–state and its claims to a unique cultural, linguistic, or ethnic identity? No we cannot—as long as we obey the regime of homolingual address. It has captured our (political!) imagination, disguised as a natural, self-explanatory concept of a relative humble form of linguistic practice called translation. It has also morally blackmailed our political will, pressing it into the irrational and terrifying limbo between fidelity and treason. There is therefore no other escape but to betray it. And face the consequences.

This is precisely what American television journalist Bob Schieffer said in his commentary on CBS News to Edward Snowden: "Come home and face the consequences." In his view, Snowden is not a hero like Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King Jr. who led the civil rights movement, broke the law, and suffered the consequences. They didn't put the nation's security at risk, run away and hide in a foreign country, like Snowden did.

For Schieffer, there is no value—such as civil rights for instance—without "home." One cannot claim one without claiming the other. His heroes of the civil rights movement sacrificed themselves for their home, or more precisely for a value they believed would make this home better. For them, therefore, the whole drama of fidelity and treason was not an issue. But it has now become an issue in the case of Snowden, where the value he claimed has detached itself from "its" home. Now fidelity is needed—to preserve a home without value, or, as Georg Simmel once put it, to preserve a social relation after the reasons that initiated it have disappeared. This is why Schieffer calls on Snowden to come home. He wants him to reconcile value and home and to revive the old harmonic unity of both from the time of the American civil rights movement. And this is also why Schieffer maliciously accuses Snowden of being motivated by his private pathology: he is "just a narcissistic young man who has decided he is smarter than the rest of us." Not only does he deny any social relevance to Snowden's act, he sees nothing socially relevant outside of home. So he could easily stage the drama of fidelity and treason and cast the NSA leaker in the role of repentant traitor. "Come home and face the consequences" is merely an empty, moralistic blackmailing ploy that relies on no values whatsoever, except on an equally empty appeal to honor. Yet, brought together, honor and fidelity make for a poisonous mixture: *Meine Ehre heißt Treue* ("My honor is fidelity") was the motto of the Nazi *Waffen Schutzstaffel* (SS) organization, and was engraved on its members' belt buckles.

Dare to Betray!

Before bringing this story to an end, we should not forget to ask ourselves what actually made Snowden a traitor. Was he truly a freak who naively mistook public transparency for an essential American value? In fact, as a person working for state institutions (the NSA and the CIA) he occupied—in terms of the languages spoken in the public sphere—a contradictory position. On the one hand, he was clearly situated in the midst of what we have called the mother tongue of the liberal democratic state, the language of the state institutions that is, according to Habermas, supposed to be understandable by all citizens. At the same time, it was a place of total clandestinity, of a language that is completely excluded from public use since it originates in a secret that can be administrated only by the rulers themselves, regardless of whether they are democratically elected or not.

Kant was already familiar with the contradictory character of such a position. In his famous essay on the nature of the Enlightenment (Kant 1996), he states that those who occupy a civil post or office entrusted to them are actually destined to use their reason privately, meaning not freely, since they are bound by the interest of the community whose affairs they have to deal with. So it is precisely the position within a state institution that automatically prevents a person from using their reason publicly. What Kant calls the public use of one's reason takes place only when a person as a scholar (*Gelehrter*) makes use of it before the entire public of the world of readers (*Leserwelt*). Only this public use of reason is free, precisely in terms of a freedom that is required for the Enlightenment.

But the difference between private and public use of reason can also be understood in terms of a difference in the mode of address. One makes private use of reason insofar as one addresses one's own political community and its particular interests. In political terms, we might call it a homosocial mode of address, and it consequently implies its linguistic correlate, homolingual address. The use of reason in this case is limited within the scope of one particular society that is almost automatically perceived as a particular language society. So it is limited within one—mostly national—language and within the idea of its exclusive transparency as well as its exclusive political impact. In other words, one addresses the public privately when, in doing so, one assumes a position that is representative of a particular political and linguistic community. It is this limit that not only renders our addressing the public private, but also deprives it of freedom.

A public use of reason, on the contrary, knows no such limits. We use our reason publicly when we address *the world of readers* beyond any particular society or language. And we do so, as scholars, not as representatives of this or that political or linguistic community, and not even as representatives of this or that academic community. It is the mode of address here that defines scholar, not a particular professional competence. A scholar is someone who addresses an entire world whose boundaries are drawn only by literacy. Since the literacy in this case is supposed to transcend all linguistic and cultural differences as well as political demarcations, it obviously presupposes the praxis of translation. This then also means that we have to deal, here, with some sort of translational literacy that is performatively evoked in the scholar's mode of address.

This throws new light on Snowden's treason. It certainly consists in his breaking the social contract in which today's normatively dominant political form of sociality—the liberal democratic nation–state—is still ideologically rooted. The question is, however, how has he done it? Obviously, by performing another mode of addressing the public that transcends the limits of his own political community and its interests as well as the limits of one single language. Concretely, Snowden has addressed a value, which has abandoned that particular universe called home—a transparency that has spilt over from the enclosed space of a single society, from a clearly demarcated area of an alleged cultural originality, from the conceptual frame of a democracy locked up within the container of the nation state, from the vocabulary and the grammar of a single national language and its respective community. But he has addressed a transparency, too, that has liberated itself from the quasi-dialectical clinch with its "mirror-value," the secrecy that is constitutive of any institutional articulation of the so-called national interests; a transparency that at the same time liberates both him as the addresser and his addressee, the Kantian "world of readers" or what Naoki Sakai nowadays calls the "nonaggregate community of foreigners," from the confines of a privately enclosed public.

In radically going public, Snowden's treason also clearly consists in his using reason publicly in the original Kantian sense. Does this then mean that precisely in committing his treason he also acted as a Kantian scholar? Why not? His treason is a political act *par excellence*, yet such that it simultaneously produces and disseminates knowledge. It implies and fosters an emancipatory hybridization of a radical democratic politics and knowledge production whose effects recall the forgotten ideals of the Enlightenment. It is a treason that performatively evokes what it normatively addresses—a translational literacy: an ability to act politically and comprehend cognitively beyond the homosociality of the nation–state, beyond the homolinguality of a language society but also beyond the gated communities of cognitive competence.

As is well known, for the Enlightenment project to work, it had to rely on what Kant called maturity (*Mündigkeit*). He defined it as the emergence from self-imposed immaturity and dependence whose cause lies not in a lack of intelligence but in a lack of determination and courage to use one's own intellect freely and independently, without the direction of another. Kant summed up this idea in the famous slogan of the Enlightenment: *Sapere aude*!, or "Dare to know! Dare to think independently!"

It is precisely in terms of Kant's maturity that we should think of Edward Snowden's treason. It presupposes his liberation from a self-imposed regime of fidelity. However, to accomplish it, determination and courage are needed. The slogan of the emancipatory transformation the leakers like Manning and Snowden have announced would therefore read: *Prodere Aude*!—"Dare to betray!" (see Buden 2008).

References

Althusser, Louis. 1987. "Über Jean-Jacques Rousseaus 'Gesellschaftsvertrag'. Die Verschiebungen." In *Machiavelli - Montesquieu - Rousseau. Zur politischen Philosophie der Neuzeit*, *Schriften* volume II, translated by Henning Ritter and Frieder Otto Wolf, 131–172. Berlin: Argument.

Berman, Antoine. 1992. *The Experience of the Foreign: Culture and Translation in Romantic Germany*. Translated by S. Heyvaert. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"Bob Schieffer To Snowden: Come Home And Face The Consequences." 2013. http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2013/06/16/bob_schieffer_to_snowden_come_home_and_face_the_consequences.html. Accessed August 2013.

Buden, Boris. 2005. *Der Schacht von Babel. Ist Kultur übersetzbar?* Berlin: Kadmos.

———. 2009. "A Tangent that Betrayed the Circle: On the Limits of Fidelity in Translation." http://translate.eipcp.net/transversal/0608/buden/en. Accessed August 2013.

Freud, Sigmund. 1982. *Traumdeutung*. Studienausgabe Band II, edited by Thure von Uexküll and Ilse Grubrich-Simitis. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1987. *Knowledge and Human Interest*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

———. 1989. *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. Translated by Thomas Burger. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Heilbron, Johan. 2010. "Structure and Dynamics of the World System of Translation." http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/40619/12684038723Heilbron.pdf/Heilbron.pdf. Accessed May 10, 2013.

Herzberg, Hendrik. 2013. "Some Dare Call It Treason." *The New Yorker*, June 28.

Jakobson, Roman. 2000 [1959]. "On Linguistic Aspects of Translation." In *The Translation Studies Reader*, edited by Lawrence Venuti, 138–143. Oxon–New York: Routledge.

Kant, Immanuel. 1996. "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" In *Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy*, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press. http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/ethics/kant/enlightenment.htm.

Močnik, Rastko. 2003. *Tri teorije: Ideologija, nacija, institucija*. Translated by Branka Dimitrijević. Beograd: Vesela nauka.

Nowotny, Stefan. 2008. "Kontinua der Verwandlung. Sprachphilosophische und linguistische Aspekte der Übersetzung." In Boris Buden and Stefan Nowotny, *Übersetzung: das Versprechen eines Begriffs*, 95–131. Vienna: Turia und Kant.

Rawls, John. 1997. "The idea of public reason revisited." *The University of Chicago Law Review* 64 (3): 765–807.

Sakai, Naoki. 1997. "Introduction: Writing for Multiple Audiences and the Heterolingual Address." In *Translation and Subjectivity. On "Japan" and Cultural Nationalism*, 1–17. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Simmel, Georg. 1908. "Treue: Ein sozialpsychologischer Versuch." *Der Tag* n. 225, Erster Teil: Illustrierte Zeitung (Berlin), June 10.

———. 2009. *Sociology: Inquiries Into the Construction of Social Forms*. Translated and edited by Anthony J. Blasi, Anton K. Jacobs, and Mathew Kanjirathinkal. Leiden: Brill NV.

Vološinov, V. N. 1973. *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. Translated by Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Boris Buden is a writer, cultural critic, and translator based in Berlin. He studied philosophy in Zagreb (Croatia) and received his Ph.D. in cultural theory from Humboldt University, Berlin. His essays and articles cover topics relating to philosophy and politics as well as art and cultural criticism. He has translated some of Freud's most significant works into Croatian, and has authored several books, including *Der Schacht von Babel* [The Pit of Babel] (2005) and *Zone des Übergangs* [The Zone of Transition] (2009). Buden is currently visiting professor at the Faculty of Art and Design, Bauhaus University, Weimar.

Knowledge on the Move: Between Logistics and Translation

Brett Neilson
University of Western Sydney, Australia.
B.Neilson@uws.edu.au

Abstract: Translation and logistics are often considered distinct and opposed activities. The former is a social practice that produces boundaries and connections between languages, cultures and forms of life. The latter is a technical operation that contributes to the production of value by creating efficiencies of communication and transport. This paper takes translation and logistics as twin analytical pincers in which to examine the changing politics and economy of knowledge in the contemporary capitalist world. Particular attention is given to the sociotechnical systems that enable practices of translation and the role of social and cultural negotiation in facilitating movement along the logistical chains that support global production. By examining the terms and the limits of the overlap between translation and logistics, the paper investigates its implications for the global arrangement of space and time as well as the subjective stakes of labor in the production of knowledge.

How does knowledge travel? The question is profound to the point of being banal. Movement is intrinsic to knowing. Whether the passage is between subject and object, through space and time, or across the boundaries of disciplines or other gardens of knowledge, knowledge seems unable to submit to stillness. The present essay investigates two dimensions of knowledge movement that have come to the fore under conditions of capitalism and globalization: the first associated with logistical operations and the second deriving from translation. The aim is to show the intertwining and interdependence of these different aspects of knowledge movement, despite the seeming tension between them in terms of openness to political and cultural life, subordination to technological processes and coordination with economic activity.

Logistics organizes and produces the heterogeneity of global space and time. Tuned to the turnover of capital, it mobilizes material and infrastructural implementations to produce communication, transport, and economic efficiencies. With its origins in mil-

itary supply, it has, since the 1960s, become a software-driven process that coordinates production and assembly processes across planetary expanses. No longer an exercise in cost reduction, it has become integral to the maximization of profit. Essential to its operations is the governance of supply or commodity chains. Logistical networks rely on internal standards and protocols to establish interoperability between systems and facilitate the movement of people, goods, and things. Attention to the logistics of knowledge movement thus requires awareness of techniques and technologies that enable sorting, classification, distribution, and storage. Increasingly these processes are inseparable from the production of knowledge itself, making it unfeasible to consider them *post hoc* arrangements that pertain merely to the movement of already formed or commodified knowledge. The metaphor of knowledge transfer, which circulates widely in academic and commercial contexts, registers some of the limits and dilemmas associated with such an approach to knowledge. It signals at once the dream that knowledge might travel efficiently and unaltered between a source and a target and the reality that such movement is always interrupted by social and cultural factors. In other words, it shows how the logistics of knowledge movement is always entangled with the politics of translation.

Translation is a privileged cultural operation and social practice that produces bridges and barriers between languages, civilizations, and forms of life. It is an iterative operation that facilitates movement through an active process of mutation in which difference and incommensurability tend to win over standardization and protocols. This is to say it is a vernacular or idiomatic practice that creates social relations within a force field marked by differentials of power, culture, and economy. At once sparking connections and active in processes of domination, not least those associated with modern colonialism and global capitalist expansion, translation is an inherently double-sided political concept and practice. It can open channels of communication and understanding between communities and cultures but only at the risk of establishing boundaries in ways that further a politics of rigidified identity. Historically this has been one of its major functions. When the practice of translation establishes equivalence between languages or groups of people, it enforces the idea of distinct communities, nations, or civilizations traveling coevally through time. It thus contributes to the creation of dominant geopolitical constructs: the West and the rest, center and periphery, and so on. In the contemporary world, where such an approach to translation remains prevalent, it plays a part in dividing the planet into blocs or regions and producing normative figures of continentalization: the European, the Asian, the African, et cetera. Yet, as several critical scholars (Sakai 1997, Iveković 2010, Mezzadra 2010) have emphasized, translation continues to hold a potential for radical subversion or the unsettling of established identities, boundaries, and the social relation of capital.

Here is the dilemma. Translation is seen as the cultural operation *par excellence*, a creative act with the power to rearrange social relations whether in politically liberating or constraining ways. By contrast, logistics is widely understood as a set of technical operations driven by algorithmic processes and subordinated to the imperatives of capital or war. Attempting to shift these established views is perhaps a futile exercise. The current paper holds these shibboleths in place, even as it questions them by probing the borders between the cultural and the economic, and querying the separability of the creative and the technical. The argument is deceptively simple: without logistics no translation, and without translation no logistics. This is an analytical and political claim rather than a logical proposition or dialectical formulation. The intertwining of translation and logistics comes into view with the historicization of these practices. Particularly in current conditions of capitalism (where cooperative networks are crucial to systems of production, and value creation depends ever more on distribution and access to knowledge), translation and logistics have developed in ways that make them increasingly indistinguishable. This article explores the terms and limits of this overlap, investigating its implications for the global arrangement of space and time as well as the subjective stakes of labor in the production of knowledge.

Traveling Theory

In an article entitled "Traveling Theory" (1983, 226), Edward Said identifies "a discernible and recurrent pattern to the movement" of ideas and theories. Although widely read within critical and postcolonial circles, the paper's delineation of four distinct stages of "travel" reads like a familiar narrative of immigration and

acculturation:

> First, there is a point of origin, or what seems like one, a set of initial circumstances in which the idea came to birth or entered discourse. Second, there is the distance transferred, a passage through the pressure of various contexts as the idea moves from an earlier point to another time and place where it will come into a new prominence. Third, there is a set of conditions—call them conditions of acceptance or, as an inevitable part of acceptance, resistances—which then confronts the transplanted theory or idea, making possible its introduction or toleration, however alien it may appear to be. Fourth, the now full (or partly) accommodated (or incorporated) idea is to some extent transformed by its new uses, its new position in a new time and place. (Said 1983, 226–227)

Said's essay focuses on the geographical movement of ideas and theories, which, although part of knowledge, are not the whole of it. Yet the typology he offers provides a schema by which to assess the evolution of knowledge movements across the past three decades. A distinct absence from his analysis is an account of the material forces and technical factors that compel knowledge to move. Said recognizes a "commerce of theories and ideas" but does not interrogate the economic and material processes that underlie this trade or exchange (226). The movement of knowledge, in this account, seems almost disconnected from economic forces or technical parameters. It is the result of patterns of influence between prominent thinkers.

Said's primary example is the transfer of Lukács's concept of reification into the works of Lucien Goldmann and from there into the writings of Raymond Williams. Although he examines the conditions of acceptance, pressures, and resistances that surround this transplantation of ideas, he does not explore the material conduits that make it possible. The movement of knowledge between the works of these figures is attributed to patterns of "indebtedness" and "use" (235, 242). There is little attention to histories of publication, translation, or dissemination—say, in the manner of Franco Moretti's (1999) rewriting of the history of the European novel. Said mentions that Goldmann was Lukács's student and that Williams heard Goldmann deliver two lectures in 1970. But in his account, the transfer of knowledge is almost entirely restricted to philological and hermeneutic concerns. As a result "Traveling Theory" has little to say about how the movement of knowledge is linked to infrastructural conditions of transport, communication, memory, or economy. Implicit in Said's argument is the claim that Lukács's concept loses its revolutionary potential as it travels, a position he revises in a later essay entitled "Traveling Theory Reconsidered" (1994) by considering Frantz Fanon's reception of Lukács. In both of these pieces, however, the focus is on matters of concept production, reading, and reception. Transplanted knowledge is subjected to pressures of context and interpretation but the exact manner in which it moves through space and time remains obscure.

This is surprising given Said's (1978) writings on how orientalist knowledge practices have shaped and in turn been shaped by colonial adventures in Asia and the Islamic world. Following from this work, there has been an ongoing concern across a number of disciplines with the material and discursive practices that have led to the emergence (and maintenance) of a distinction between the West and the rest. One result of this is a/the growing attention to how the practice of translation facilitates the circulation of knowledge across geopolitical and social boundaries. As Irrera (2013, 2) explains, the "notion of translation, although rarely mentioned by Said, is actually at the very heart of the cultural practices of Saidian humanism." At stake is partly an emphasis on translation's capacity to create mutual understanding and reciprocity between human groups. In a late article published in the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Ahram*, for instance, Said (2001) argues against a campaign to stop the translation of Arabic books into Hebrew on the grounds that greater availability of Arabic writings in Israel will better enable Israelis to understand Arabs "as a people." But as a practitioner of comparative literature, a discipline that maps linguistic differences over bodies of expression and thought, Said would have been aware of the ambivalent position of translation as both a border-breaking and border-making practice. Although committed to humanist precepts and the opening of world-historical horizons, he remained acutely aware of the politics of cultural imperialism and the capacity for translation to serve the ends of domination and separate populations into distinct identity groups.

The limit of Said's work for understanding current knowledge movements lies less in its muted engagement with translation than its neglect of what today is called knowledge management—that is, the codification and collection of processes and devices for governing the production, circulation, and utilization of knowledge.

"Traveling Theory" was written at a time when the rise of a knowledge economy oriented toward services, intellectual property rights, innovation and information technology was just getting underway. Thirty years later, the implication of translation in practices of logistical calculation that pertain to the production and transfer of knowledge has become a crucial part of globalizing capitalism. There is a need to move beyond the paradigm of traveling theory with its cultural and exegetical bias and to probe translation's role in the production of subjectivity and the making and unmaking of worlds. This means investigating translation's entanglement with operations of capitalism. The capacity of capital to translate heterogeneous forms of life into the homogenous language of value is only one aspect of this entanglement. Efforts to make capital's turnover productive also invest practices of translation, whether they take a linguistic, cultural, or more generally social form. Only by disentangling translation from these efforts can we begin to discern a knowledge politics adequate to the invention of new modes of social cooperation.

The Logistics Revolution

If Said's "Traveling Theory" supplies an icon of thinking about knowledge movements and translation without a developed account of relevant logistical arrangements, there is a plethora of approaches that do the opposite. Logistics is a technological and pragmatic field, increasingly driven by computational modes of control and forever pushing deadlines. It is hard to imagine logisticians entertaining an interest in the subtleties of translation theory or its implications for issues of economy and politics. Nonetheless the transfer and sharing of knowledge is crucial to logistical processes, particularly when they connect up supply chains in which efficiencies can be established through the implementation of standards or other mechanisms of internal governance. According to Ballou (1992, 5), the "mission of logistics is to get the right goods or services to the right place at the right time, and in the desired (right) condition, while making the greatest contribution to the firm." This definition, with its identification of the firm as the exemplary logistical subject, registers the commercial imperatives that drive contemporary logistical practices. Yet this was not always the case. Until the mid twentieth century, logistics was primarily a military practice associated with the supply of food and arms to fighting forces.

This is not the occasion to explore the history of military logistics and its implications for the relation of war to politics (Neilson 2012). Suffice it to say that logistics was considered one of the three arts of war alongside strategy and tactics. Prominent nineteenth-century military thinkers such as Carl von Clausewitz (2007) attributed a lesser role to logistics insofar as it was understood as a preparatory exercise that established the conditions for these more warlike arts. As technological innovations such as the introduction of railways and the use of fossil fuels changed military campaigns, logistics became a central part of modern warfare. Meanwhile, with the spread of the industrial revolution, practices of transport and spatial economics drew mounting interest in the civilian sphere. In seminal publications such *The Theory of the Trace* (1900), the German civil engineer Wilhelm Launhardt built on the mathematical formulations of Pierre de Fermat to derive efficiency criteria for commercial transport networks with regard to topography. This work was replicated and extended by Alfred Weber, the younger brother of Max, in his *Theory of the Location of Industries* (1929). Weber's book closed with a mathematical appendix, written with Georg Pick, which offered a formula purporting to derive the optimal location for an industrial plant based on variables such as the cost of transport, the agglomeration of industrial facilities and the cost of labor across different sites. These are among the earliest precedents for a mathematical approach to logistics. It is not until the 1960s, however, that the introduction of a systems analysis approach to transport and distribution management began to remake geographies of production and circulation at the global scale, giving rise to the distinct economic sector of logistics.

Scholars who study the evolution of the field call this the logistics revolution (Allen 1997). Changes in this period and its aftermath include the spatial reorganization of the firm, the performance monitoring of labor, the interlinking of logistics science with computing and software design, the introduction of the shipping container, the formation of business organizations and academic programs for the production and dissemination of logistical knowledge, the building of global supply chains, and the search for cheap labor rates in poorer areas of the world. Logistics moved from being

an effort of cost minimization to become an integrated part of global production systems and a means of maximizing profit. The myth that production stopped at the factory gates, challenged in feminist theory and politics, was shattered in the mainstream world with the evolution of more efficient transport and communication systems. The assembly of goods across different global locations, with objects and knowledge constantly moving between them, served to blur the processes of production and distribution. Logistics also made the organization of global space more complicated and differentiated. Geographical entities such as special economic zones and logistics hubs sprang up to attract investment and organize the business of global production. Increasingly, logistics also came to play a role in service economies and production processes not involving the manufacture of material goods. From financial operations to television production, translation services to the formation of global care chains, the logistical organization of work and mobility became central to the expansion of capitalist markets and logic.

The technological and representational systems that enabled this shift have seen vast changes since the 1960s. The evolution of supply chain management and just-in-time production would have been impossible without the controlled feedback of logistical data into production and distribution systems. Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) software platforms aided efforts to digitally record, communicate, and analyze every aspect of production, transport, display, and sales. This resulted in more expansive and articulated logistical systems that sought to continuously map out the position and trajectory of objects in motion. The real-time integration of these systems provided an unprecedented ability to rationalize labor at every point along the chain, intensifying the pace and squeezing workers for greater productivity. But the desire to match ideals of lean production to agile and adaptable logistical processes proved elusive. The reduction of costs, elimination of waste, and optimization of flow could only be pushed so far without jeopardizing the robustness and flexibility of production systems. Issues of supply chain resilience sparked efforts to minimize contingency by simulating the decisions of actors on both supply and demand sides of the equation. Today complex techniques of scenario planning, sometimes involving the use of software adapted from financial market applications, are deployed to smooth out discrepancies and interruptions. The challenge of achieving interoperability between systems and building "fault tolerance" into them has underscored the difficulties that underlie programs of standardization. Nonetheless, the internal governance of supply chains continues to demand protocols of hierarchy, codifiability, capability, and coordination (Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005).

To some extent, the problem of interoperability can be conceived as one of translation. The attempt to coordinate discrepant systems, smooth out glitches, and exchange data via common formats means working across gaps and connections to relationally produce, arrange, and conceptualize information. Often this involves the creation of standards to which different systems must conform to enable the transfer of information between them. In such instances, translation is flattened out and directed toward a single and tightly controlled set of protocols. But such standards are hard to create, technically and in terms of the time, labor, and resources that must be invested in them. They also tend to proliferate, leading to a situation where standards conflict with other standards. Even in cases where technical interoperability has been established, social and cultural factors tend to interfere, making the task of translation tricky and unstable. This is not an observation made only by social and cultural thinkers such as the anthropologist Anna Tsing (2005), who writes about the "friction" that inhabits the global supply chains of contemporary capitalism. Engineers also recognize the cultural and social barriers to interoperability, writing of the need to establish "cultural interoperability" and of the imperative to establish "supply chain integration" by facilitating "the exchange of knowledge across dissimilar cultures and in different native languages" (Whitman and Panetto 2006, 235-36). It is in this sense that logistics must reckon with the politics of translation. The question is whether such a politics provides resources for smoothing out the operations of capital or whether it supplies methods for organizing against current practices of exploitation and dispossession.

In the Translation Machine

The proximity of the social practice of translation to the worlds of the technologist, engineer, and logistician is evident not only in discourses about "cultural interoperability" and supply chain integration. It is also present in processes of translation themselves, which are increasingly powered by algorithmic technologies and codes. Any attempt to reckon with the politics of translation must confront the rising prevalence of machine translation, which submits the social practice of translation to logistical protocols and software routines that purport to accomplish direct transfers between languages. Think of the interface of online translation platforms such as Babelfish or Google Translate. Two text boxes of the same size face each other. One can write (or more usually cut and paste) into the first, choose the language into which the text is to be translated, and click the button. The program has the capacity to detect the input language. Such a technique of translation powerfully reinforces what Sakai (1997) calls the schema of cofiguration. The copresence and equal size of the text boxes suggests a parallel between languages that are conceived as separate prior to and independently of the act of translation. Rhetoric and context fall away. The screen divides source from target, incomprehensible from comprehensible. As the user's eyes are drawn from left to right, she is sealed as member of one language community as opposed to another. As much as this is a machine for translation, it is also a machine for the production of what Jon Solomon (2013) calls the "speciation of the human"—the division of the genus human into distinct and fixed blocs of identity and culture. From philology to imperialism, comparative literature to algorithms, the movement is seamless and seemingly instantaneous.

Yet there is a glitch. As anyone who has used these platforms knows, the results are patchy. Machine translation offers an antidote to dreams of a pure or universal language, such as that offered by Walter Benjamin (1968, 80) when he describes the translator's task as releasing "in his own language that pure language that is under the spell of another." Benjamin's impulse is theological, but the dream of machine translation has equally been driven by a vision of universal language, albeit one that is much more instrumental. The cyberneticist Warren Weaver (1955), a pioneer in the field, writes: "When I look at an article in Russian, I say: 'This is written in English, but it has been coded in some strange symbols. I will now proceed to decode'" (18). He also described the need to "descend, from each language, down to the common base of all human communication—the real but as yet undiscovered universal language—and then re-emerge by whatever route is convenient" (23).

Such an approach, which treats language as code, has proved a dead end in machine translation (see Kay 2003, Neilson 2010). Today rule-based methods have all but been replaced with corpus-based approaches, which deploy statistical techniques and huge libraries of translated texts to move between languages. The results are sketchy and often only partly legible. It as if culture has taken its revenge against logistics. But what is the politics of all this?

Benjamin's vision of a universal language may have been undermined by machine translation techniques but his writing supplies us with at least one powerful image to describe the fate of contemporary translation. In the first of his "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (1968, 253), he writes of an "automaton" that can play a winning game of chess. The contraption, which makes it appear as if the game is being played by a "puppet in Turkish attire," actually conceals an "expert chess player" who guides "the puppet's hand by means of strings." Benjamin uses this image to argue for the role of theology in supporting and driving historical materialism. Today, when the theological drive toward a universal language has been displaced by machine translation, this image of the mechanical Turk has a much more cynical connection to the business of translation. In 2005, Amazon opened its platform Mechanical Turk (https://www.mturk.com/mturk/), a web-based service that offers users the possibility to bid to perform paid work by completing various tasks that cannot be fulfilled by artificial intelligence. As the FAQ for the site explains, "[t]oday, we build complex software applications based on the things computers do well, such as storing and retrieving large amounts of information or rapidly performing calculations. However, humans still significantly outperform the most powerful computers at completing such simple tasks as identifying objects in photographs—something children can do even before they learn to speak." Not surprisingly, this model of microcontracting, pioneered by Mechanical Turk, has also found its ap-

plication in the translation world, particularly via sites such as http://ProZ.com, which allow translators to submit quotes to perform translation jobs, often cleaning up the results of machine translations. The site claims to serve "the world's largest community of translators" and to be the "*number one source* of new client's for translators." In this way, the glitches in machine translation routines have become occasions for the crowd sourcing of labor in the most precarious and flexible of circumstances.

In his article "The Freelance Translation Machine," Scott Kushner (2013, 2) explores how online translation platforms such as ProZ.com negotiate "the encounter between the computational and the human in the service of capital." He is interested in how "algorithmic power" harnesses "human thought, precisely because it does not conform to machine logic." The task of the translator, in the context of sites like this, is to "complete the algorithm" in a way that obscures the act of translation or makes it appear automated, despite the fact that the translator exists in a social world (4). Kushner explains that ProZ features social networking tools that allow clients to rate the work of translators. The 300,000 freelance translators who work on the platform pay for membership, bid for jobs, accumulate a record of ratings and have the opportunity to display credentials and qualifications on the site. Vendors are granted easy access to a global workforce by filling out a submission form that specifies language pairs, number of words, and deadlines. This has allowed ProZ to emerge "as a temporary stand-in for the ultimate translation dream: friction-free machine translation" (12).

Platforms like ProZ reinforce what Sakai (1997) calls homolingual address, posing as if it is possible to translate seamlessly between languages that are conceived as always already separate entities. At stake is "the idea of the unity of language," which makes it possible "to systematically organize knowledge about languages in a modern, scientific manner" (Sakai 2009, 73). In observing that "such an idea is essential for any standardized, automated, algorithmic approach to translation," Kushner (2013) draws an interesting parallel. ProZ, he comments, is interested not in the contents of translation but rather in the protocols that allow it to occur in as frictionless a manner as possible. To this extent, translation becomes a logistical proposition: "ProZ.com is no more interested in a translation project's contents than a barge captain is in the contents of the shipping containers piled upon his deck." Furthermore, the "smooth functioning of the translation industry under globalization demands conceptual containers ('unified languages') just as transoceanic transport requires uniform containers." With this parallel between container shipping and the workings of online translation platforms, Kushner suggests a strong relation between the protocols and algorithms of the global logistics industries and the protocols and algorithms that facilitate the "do loops" of contemporary freelance translation practice. He is fully aware, however, that platforms like ProZ require humans to tease out "the finer points of language and its social wrappings" and recognizes that these "social wrappings are the stuff of Sakai's (1997) 'heterolingual address.'" He thus understands the freelance translation machine to develop "an interface connecting (and simultaneously separating) the homolingual and the heterolingual, the machine and the human" (Kushner 2013, 13). But what are the politics of this implied association of the homolingual with the machine and the heterolingual with the human? Is the politics of heterolingual address something more or less than an attempt to salvage *humanitas* from logistical operations?

On Seamlessness

Writing with Sandro Mezzadra, I have posed the question of the politics of translation as one of the rubbing up of concepts against material circumstances. Taking our cue from a comment by Gramsci on a speech delivered by Lenin in 1922, Sandro and I seek to derive a political concept of translation that reaches beyond the linguistic and cultural dynamics usually implied by the term. In particular, we are interested in how the question of translation becomes constitutive for political organization in a globalized world—an aspect of translation that is strongly evident in political struggles concerning migration and border crossing. We also seek to understand "the role of translation in the operations of capital" to provide a "framework for analysing the conditions under which translation can become a tool for the invention of a common language for contesting capital" (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013a, 276). Capital is a social relation that reduces all differences to a homogeneous measure of value, and, to this extent, it functions like a

regime of homolingual translation. The heterogeneity of labor—which means its fragmentation beyond the figure of the waged industrial worker—offers a counterpoint to this homogeneity but also poses the problem of organization across different borders and social, cultural, and economic boundaries. The challenge of translating between disparate and divergent struggles is one of the most pressing political tasks of the day.

Logistical supply chains provide a privileged point of intervention for this challenge. This is because they organize and connect labor forces in the name of capital. The aim of supply chain management is to make the operations of such chains as efficient as possible. Software optimization is a crucial part of these efforts, which must continually balance the leanness of the chain, or its ability to eliminate redundancies and function in a responsive just-in-time manner, against its agility, or capacity to route around disturbances such as resource shortages or labor strikes. As Tsing (2009) writes, supply chains focus "our attention on questions of *diversity* within structures of power" (149). They link up dissimilar firms, distant locations, and distinct labor forces, showing "that diversity forms a part of the *structure* of capitalism rather than an inessential appendage" (150). Logisticians dream of creating a seamless world, where borders and differences become not barriers to be overcome but parameters within which to establish efficiencies. In practice, however, they know that designs and programs encounter obstacles and frictions of all kinds and even contribute to their creation, from traffic bottlenecks to unruly workforces. The analytical temptation is to associate such disturbance with the human element in logistical transactions. Society and culture become interruptive forces that disrupt the efficiency of capital's logistical operations, playing havoc with relations of interoperability and value creation.

Earlier I outlined how the question of interoperability relates to that of translation, but it is important also to register the link between translation and the production of value. In the *Grundrisse*, Marx famously draws a parallel between translation and the role of money in facilitating circulation and making possible the universal exchange of commodities. He writes about "ideas which first have to be translated out of their mother tongue into a foreign language in order to circulate, in order to become exchangeable" (1973, 163). This is a familiar metaphor but it is worth considering how this logic of exchange relates to the question of capital's turnover, or the process of circulation by which it turns through commodity production to resume its original monetary form. It is this process of turnover that logistics seeks to optimize or render more profitable. The dream of seamless production is strongly linked to that of smooth and efficient circulation. Indeed, in contemporary global production networks, where objects and knowledge move constantly between distant sites, these processes become ever more indistinguishable. It thus seems to make sense to equate or draw a parallel between the homogenizing logic of capital's exchange and the creation of logistical standards and protocols that facilitate its turnover. The concept of homolingual translation provides a powerful tool for understanding both of these movements.

There is limited analytical grip, however, in equating homolingual translation with a mechanical action that is upset by the unpredictability of the human. The example of translation platforms like ProZ, already discussed above, shows how the social context of translation can contribute precisely to the appearance of a seamless movement between supposedly distinct and comparable languages. Perhaps here the Deleuzian notion of the machine, which describes a complex assemblage that crosses the human and the technical, is more applicable than that of the mechanism, which designates a technical apparatus. In any case, the social dynamics of translation and logistical operations appear inextricably linked. This link becomes evident in the historical context of contemporary capitalism, in which the production and transfer of knowledge is a privileged domain of value creation.

I do not wish to suggest that logistics provides the primary or the only ambit of contemporary capital's operations. As I have argued with Sandro Mezzadra (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013b), it is crucial to approach the logistical dimension of global capitalism in the context of its financial and extractive operations, which intersect the logistical domain in complex ways. This article points to a privileged link between the dynamics of translation and those of logistics. Doubtless it would be possible to make a similar argument about the workings of finance or extraction. But the case of logistics is interesting in this regard because it is a practice that enables and drives the material forms of global mobility that have made trans-

lation a pressing social and cultural issue. To insist on a relation between translation and subjectivity in the context of logistics is to raise the question of the labor of translation. It is to highlight the unrest, energy, and movement that are constitutive of translation as well as the bodily and cognitive relations that make it possible. It is also to emphasize the susceptibility of such labor to processes of abstraction and measure which are enmeshed in capital, state, and law. The tension between such abstraction and what Marx calls labor's "form-giving fire" (1973, 361) not only crosses bodies and minds but also shapes the heterogeneity of global space and time. Piecing apart these tensions and uncovering their political potentialities requires an analytical attention to the intersection of translation and logistics.

References

Allen, W. B. 1997. "The Logistics Revolution and Transportation." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science* 553: 106–116.

Ballou, R. H. 2007. "The Evolution and Future of Logistics and Supply Chain Management." *European Business Review* 19 (4): 332–348.

Benjamin, W. 1968. "Theses on the Philosophy of History." *Illuminations*, edited by H. Arendt, 253–264. New York: Schocken Books.

Gereffi, G., J. Humphrey, and T. Sturgeon. 2005. "The Governance of Global Value Chains." *Review of International Political Economy* 12 (1): 78–104.

Ierrera, O. 2013. "Edward Said's Humanism." *Transeuropéennes*. http://www.transeuropeennes.eu/en/articles/voir_pdf/94.

Iveković, R. 2010. "The Watershed of Modernity: Translation and the Epistemological Revolution." *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 11 (1): 45–63.

Kay, M. 2003. "The Proper Place of Men and Machines in Machine Translation." *Readings in Machine Translation*, edited by S. Nirenburg, H. Somers, and Y. Wilks, 221–232. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Kushner, S. 2013. "The Freelance Translation Machine: Algorithmic Culture and the Invisible Industry." *New Media & Society* 0 (0): 1–13. Published online before print.

Launhardt, W. 1900. *The Theory of the Trace: Being a Discussion of the Principles of Location*. Madras: Lawrence Asylum Press.

Marx, Karl. 1973. *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Mezzadra, S. 2010. "Living in Transition: Toward a Heterolingual Theory of the Multitude." *The Politics of Culture: Around the Work of Naoki Sakai*, edited by R. F. Calichman and J. N. Kim, 121–137. Abingdon: Routledge.

Mezzadra, S., and B. Neilson. 2013a. *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor*. Durham: Duke University Press.

———. 2013b. "Extraction, Logistics, Finance: Global Crisis and the Politics of Operations." *Radical Philosophy* 178: 8–18.

Moretti, F. 1999. *Atlas of the European Novel, 1800–1900*. London: Verso.

Neilson, B. 2010. "Opening Translation." *Transeuropéennes*. http://www.transeuropeennes.eu/en/articles/voir_pdf/107.

———. 2012. "Five Theses on Understanding Logistics as Power." *Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory* 13 (3): 323–340.

Said, E. 1978. *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books.

———. "Traveling Theory." In *The World, The Text, and the Critic*, 226–247. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

———. 1994. "Traveling Theory Reconsidered." In *Reflections on Exile and Other Literary and Cultural Essays*, 436–452. London: Granta Books.

———. 2001. "Defiance, Dignity and the Rule of Dogma." *Al-Ahram Weekly*. May 17–23. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/534/op1.htm.

Sakai, N. 1997. *Translation and Subjectivity: On Japan and Cultural Nationalism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

———. 2009. "How Do We Count a Language? Translation and Discontinuity." *Translation Studies* 2 (1): 71–88.
Solomon, J. 2013. "Another European Crisis?! Myth, Translation, and the Apparatus of Area." *Transversal*. http://eipcp.net/transversal/0613/solomon/en.
Tsing, A. 2005. *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
———. 2009. "Supply Chains and the Human Condition." *Rethinking Marxism* 21 (2): 148–176.
von Clausewitz, Carl. 2007. *On War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weaver, W. 1955. "Translation." *Machine Translation of Languages: Fourteen Essays*, edited by W. N. Locke and A. D. Booth, 15–23. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Weber, A. 1929. *Theory of the Location of Industries*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Whitman, L. E. and H. Panetto. 2006. "The Missing Link: Culture and Language Barriers to Interoperability." *IFAC Annual Reviews in Control* 30 (2): 233–241.

Brett Neilson is Professor and Research Director at the Institute for Culture and Society at the University of Western Sydney. With Sandro Mezzadra he is author of *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor* (Duke University Press, 2013). He is currently collaborating with Ned Rossiter in coordinating a large transnational research project entitled *Logistical Worlds: Infrastructure, Software, Labour* (http://logisticalworlds.org).

The Eventfulness of Translation: Temporality, Difference, and Competing Universals

Lydia H. Liu
Columbia University, USA
ll2410@columbia.edu

Abstract: The article seeks to develop a new angel for translation studies by rethinking its relationship to the political. It begins with the question "Can the eventfulness of translation itself be thought?" Since neither the familiar model of communication (translatable and untranslatable) nor the biblical model of the Tower of Babel (the promise or withdrawal of meaning) can help us work out a suitable answer to that question, the author proposes an alternative method that incorporates the notions of temporality, difference, and competing universals in the reframing of translation. This method requires close attention to the multiple temporalities of translation in concrete analyses of translingual practices, or what the author calls "differentially distributed discursive practices across languages." The author's textual analysis focuses on a few pivotal moments of translation in global history—chosen for their world transforming influences or actual and potential global impact—to demonstrate what is meant by the "eventfulness of translation." These include, for example, the nineteenth-century Chinese translation of Henry Wheaton's *Elements of International Law* or *Wanguo gongfa*, the post-World War II multilingual fashioning of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with a focus on P. C. Chang's unique contribution, and the Afro-Asian writers' translation project during the Cold War.

Imagine a poem fluttering down from the sky and somehow falling into your hands like snowflakes. You might think that this scenario comes from a surrealist movie, but I am referring to neither surrealist fantasy nor a writer's delirium. It is related to one of the scandals of translation in modern history. The scandal gripped my attention when I first learned that the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States had prepared a Russian translation of T. S. Eliot's poem *Four Quartets* and airdropped it onto the territory of the Soviet Union in the Cold War (see Stonor Saunders 2001, 248). This minor escapade quickly passed into oblivion, but the CIA's and IRD's (Information Research Department of the British spy

agency) worldwide promotion of post-War modernist art and literature appears singularly effective in hindsight—so effective, in fact, that Frances Stonor Saunders, who researched the CIA archives, came to the conclusion that the West won the Cold War mainly by conquering the world of arts and letters with weapons of the mind rather than with the arms race or economic sanctions that allegedly brought down the Socialist bloc.

Critics need not accept Saunders's conclusion to heed a few curious consequences of the cultural Cold War. One of them is that the majority of CIA-backed artists and writers—and there is a long list of them—have made their way into the modernist literary and artistic canon of the West and have systematically been translated as "world literature" around the globe where, for instance, George Orwell's *1984* and *Animal Farm* are read and taught in more languages than Michail Aleksandrovich Sholokhov's *And Quiet Flows the Don*, even though the latter, in the opinion of a literary critic like myself, is a superior writer. And as we turn to twentieth-century poets, T. S. Eliot is perhaps taught in more languages of the world than are Pablo Neruda, Federico García Lorca, Nâzım Hikmet, and Bei Dao combined. It seems that the bets the CIA placed on Eliot, Orwell, abstract expressionists, and other writers or artists they favored—airborne or subterranean—paid off handsomely. Critics sometimes attribute their success to the sophisticated taste and foresight of CIA and IRD covert operators and their collaborators. There may be some truth to this, but taste or aesthetic judgment can be mystifying. It cannot explain, for example, the remarkable coincidence whereby many of the writers blacklisted by Senator McCarthy and disfavored by the CIA on non-artistic grounds during the Cold War have simultaneously been marginalized in contemporary literary studies or dropped out of the canon altogether after World War II (see, for example, Goldstein 2001, and, on blacklisting in the UK, Hollingsworth and Norton-Taylor 1988). Why is it, then, that aesthetic judgment takes a backseat when it comes to excluding certain writers but would play a decisive role when it comes to including other writers in the literary canon? This begs the further question of where politics stands in regard to literature, an old or perhaps not so old a question. Is the making of the literary canon fundamentally political? Or is it merely a case of politics interfering with literature? What role, if any, does global politics play in the struggle over literary productions and their chances of survival in the modern world?[1] Can such politics throw fresh light on some of the blind spots in the field of translation studies?

These questions have prompted my study of translation as a political problem in this article as well as in my earlier work. The more I learn about the cultural politics of the Cold War, the less I feel inclined to treat global politics as outside interferences. Rather than closing off the boundaries of literature and politics and rendering them external to each other, I propose that, first, we examine the dynamic interplay of forces and circumstances that precipitate the act of translation as an act of inclusion and exclusion. Such forces and circumstances are not so much external to translation as prior to any translator's determination of texts to be chosen and translated while excluding other works. To anticipate my argument, the study of these processes can help illuminate the meaning of the political better than citing the intentions of writers and translators, or their idiosyncratic tastes.

Secondly, there is a formidable obstacle to overcome if we decide to undertake this line of investigation in translation studies. The obstacle, which often stands in the way of our understanding of the political, is the familiar mental image of translation as a process of verbal transfer or communication, linguistic reciprocity or equivalences, or an issue of commensurability or incommensurability. It is almost as if the promise of meaning or its withdrawal among languages were the only possible thing—blessing or catastrophe—that could happen to the act of translation.[2] I have critiqued these logocentric assumptions in translation studies elsewhere (Liu 1995, 1–42; Liu 1999, 13–41) and will not reiterate my position here. To do so would take us through another round of critiques of linguistics, philology, theology, the philosophy of language, and cultural anthropology which would take us too far afield. I should

[1] Most scholars of literature who are familiar with Pierre Bourdieu's work would probably concur that canon formation cannot but be political. I find Bourdieu's notion of the literary field useful in a national setting but limited for thinking across national borders, especially when it comes to international politics in cultural life. See Bourdieu 1993.

[2] Although more sophisticated than that of other theorists, Walter Benjamin's conception of translation in "The Task of the Translator" ultimately endorses this manner of reasoning. In his notion of Pure Language, translation holds out a promise of meaning in messianic time, if not in secular temporality. See my critique, in Liu 1995, 14-16.

mention briefly, though, that when I proposed the idea of translingual practices twenty years ago, I was grappling with epistemological issues about how we study translation and deal with conceptual pitfalls in philological methods (see Liu 1995). One question I came very close to asking but did not ask in the mid-1990s was "Can the eventfulness of translation itself be thought?" This question, as it now appears to me, may lead to a more promising approach to the study of translation than either the communication model or the biblical model.[3] And in the context of my essay in this special issue on translation and politics, such a question allows me to develop a new critical method for discerning and analyzing the political in regard to translation.

I have long felt that a new method and a new conceptual framework are necessary because the problem of translation troubles not only the study of language, literature, philosophy, and cultural anthropology but also cuts across other disciplines and fields. In molecular biology, for example, the idea of translation is ubiquitous and appears in the guise of a metaphor—unquestioned and under-theorized—that is used to conceptualize the biochemical processes of DNA and RNA. The mobility of this metaphor in the hands of scientists and social scientists has greatly outpaced our ability to think clearly about the idea, much less come up with a method to analyze its discursive behavior across the disciplines. In short, translation is no more just a linguistic matter than can linguistic differences be reduced to cultural differences. I believe we have reached the point where the eventfulness of translation itself must be interrogated.[4]

In the first section, below, I introduce my methodological reflections and try to develop some ideas about the multiple temporalities of translation in what I call *differentially distributed discursive practices across languages*. This analysis leads to a discussion of universalism and cultural difference in the second section, which focuses on the multilingual making of one of the best-known documents of the post-War period: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereafter, UDHR) of the United Nations. Here I examine P. C. Chang's contribution as Vice-Chair on the Drafting Committee of the UDHR document—along with Chair Eleanor Roosevelt and other members—and analyze his philosophical contestation of parochial universalism at the UN in 1947–1948. I turn next to a remarkable vision of competing universalisms with a focus on Afro-Asian Writers, Conferences and their translation projects in the 1950s. The third section shows how some of these projects were organized and pursued in response to the post-War geopolitics of that time. I conclude with some final reflections on translation, and literary diplomacy and internationalism in the Cold War.

[3] The story of the Tower of Babel has hitherto dominated our framing of translation as a theoretical problem. I am doubtful that an endless rehashing or deconstruction of this biblical story will get us any closer to a better understanding of translation. For earlier critiques of the biblical story, see George Steiner 1978; Paul de Man 1986, 73–105; and Derrida 1985, 165–208.

[4] In recent decades, new approaches have been developed here and there to open up the field beyond established translation studies. See, for example, Naoki Sakai 1997 and Liu 1995.

1. In light of my initial question—"Can the eventfulness of translation be thought?"—I would say yes, but not until we begin rethinking the relationship amongst text, interpretation, and event. If all acts of translation—and by extension, all textual work—take place within specific registers of temporality and spatiality, do all translated texts qualify as events? The answer hinges on how the idea of "event" is defined or philosophically worked out, but such is not the task of the present essay (I assume that the reader is familiar with Alain Badiou's rigorous philosophical work on the subject—see, especially, Badiou 2005 and 2009). Instead of indulging in exercises of pure thought or compulsive definitions which belong elsewhere, I choose to focus on the multiplicity of differentially distributed discursive fields as the site—spatiality and mobility—of any translated text and explore their temporalities as instances of events. For no event that is worthy of the name—as naming is always part of the process—could possibly exist outside of the discursive practices that organize it and make it emerge as such, much less the event of translation which always presupposes the multiplicity of discursive fields across different languages. The first step toward a fruitful understanding of the eventfulness of translation, therefore, is to develop a conceptual framework to analyze the interplay of temporality and discursive practices across languages.

Before we contemplate the possibility of such a framework, we must address a potential objection: What is to be achieved with the proposed study of the eventfulness of translation? Why not be

content with our good old philological methods? Is it not sufficient to analyze, say, a word for word rendering of a poem from English to Russian, or the case of a mismatched verb in translated text? I would not rule out the value of this kind of philological work so long as it does not limit our understanding of how a work of translation is brought into being in the first place and why a writer is deemed worthy of translation into foreign languages more than other writers. As a matter of fact, T. S. Eliot found himself compelled to address these issues when he accepted the Nobel Prize in Literature. In his acceptance speech at the Nobel Banquet in Stockholm in 1948, Eliot states:

> If this were simply the recognition of merit, or of the fact that an author's reputation has passed the boundaries of his own country and his own language, we could say that hardly any one of us at any time is, more than others, worthy of being so distinguished. But I find in the Nobel Award something more and something different from such recognition. It seems to me more the election of an individual, chosen from time to time from one nation or another, and selected by something like an act of grace, to fill a peculiar role and to become a peculiar symbol. A ceremony takes place, by which a man is suddenly endowed with some function which he did not fill before. So the question is not whether he was worthy to be so singled out, but whether he can perform the function which you have assigned to him: the function of serving as a representative, so far as any man can be of thing of far greater importance than the value of what he himself has written. (Eliot 1948)

Eliot's disavowal of his unique accomplishment as a poet could have been motivated by real modesty but it inadvertently touches on the truth of what it means to "fill a peculiar role and to become a peculiar symbol" or to "perform a function" and serve "as a representative." And of what is he a representative? When the poem *Four Quartets* leapt over the spatial, linguistic, and ideological divide of the Cold War to fall from the sky—let's hope not directly into rivers— the Russian translation was probably taken by covert operators to represent good poetry from the Free World as opposed to the dogma of socialist realism. In that case, the poet could do very little about the idiosyncratic decisions of those operators who instrumentalized his work under the circumstances.

It is interesting that Eliot is keenly aware of his own passivity when it comes to being selected, being endowed, being singled out, being assigned by others, and so on. To emphasize his passive role is not to extricate him from the complicity with the CIA but to point out that, in spite of himself, Eliot's name and poetry do indeed float around like a symbol, perhaps more mobile and airborne than other symbols, but nevertheless a symbol, which is often beyond his control but which he must live up to. Furthermore, the symbol called T. S. Eliot is assigned to function in a multiplicity of languages and discursive fields that inevitably mark a literary work for translation and international distribution. This preferential marking, I emphasize, holds the potential of turning a symbol into an event, or an event into a symbol, back and forth.

In this sense, the question as to which translated or translatable text qualifies as an event, or even a global event, depends very much on the ways in which we analyze the temporality and spatiality of its discursive mobility, hence its historicity. To bring the eventfulness of translation into critical view, one must stop thinking about translation as a volitional act of matching words or building equivalences of meanings between languages; rather we should start by taking it as a precarious wager that enables the discursive mobility of a text or a symbol, for better or for worse. The wager releases the multiplicity of the text and opens it up to an uncertain future, more often than not to an uncertain political future. The confluence of forces that enable the discursive mobility of a text or those forces that can mobilize the energy of translators or cause a poem to be airdropped from the sky should give us the first clue regarding the political in translation.

This is something I have learned from my previous study of the first Chinese translation of international law—Henry Wheaton's *Elements of International Law* (1836)—by the American missionary W. A. P. Martin and his Chinese collaborators in 1863-1864. In *The Clash of Empires*, I analyzed the military and political conflicts of the Second Opium War to understand who determined the selection of Wheaton's text and how its translation *Wangguo gongfa* (literally, "Public law of ten thousand countries") was brought to fruition in 1863–1864 (see Liu 2006, Chapter Four). Reflecting on the temporalities of this translation and its dissemination, I was immediately struck by its peculiar eventfulness and realized that this translated text was by no means a singular event—I saw at least a triple event at the moment of its creation.

What do I mean, though, by the triple event of the *Wangguo gongfa*? The first and immediate event was the creation of the Chi-

nese text itself, a textual event that required a great deal of negotiation and compromise among the Chinese translators and the American missionary. Words and their meanings were made up, suspended, substituted, or banished in the course of translation. Next came the diplomatic event. As a matter of fact, the textual and diplomatic events became inextricably entangled before there was even a translated text. For example, the act of preferential marking in regard to which text of international law ought to be selected and which excluded from translation mirrored the diplomatic conflicts among the imperial powers in China. The timely interventions made by the American ministers William B. Reed and Anson Burlingame and by Sir Robert Hart—the second British Inspector-General of the Imperial Maritime Custom Service of the Qing—all played into the hands of Prince Gong and his Foreign Office *Zongli yamen* in Beijing, who agreed to sponsor the translation project. Even more interesting is the third aspect of this happening, which I have called the epistemological event, because the historical unfolding of the *Wangguo gongfa* was predicated on a certain view of the global that was yet to come. That process requires a somewhat different temporality—spanning the late Qing through the Republican era up to our own time—before the geopolitical consciousness could emerge among the Chinese elite. I attribute the rise of so-called global (and belatedly national) consciousness in East Asia to this triple event. In this sense, the multiple temporalities of the *Wangguo gongfa* as one of many translations of *Elements of International Law* vastly complicate our understanding of translation and its historicity. These temporalities were thoroughly embedded in the precarious wager I suggested earlier. Through the discursive mobility of the *Wangguo gongfa*, the wager in the realm of international politics unleashed the linguistic multiplicity of Wheaton's text from English to Chinese, then from Chinese to Japanese, and so on to open it up to an uncertain political future. That future, in hindsight, converged in the Japanese annexation of Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria, and other colonial enterprises, all worked out in the legal terms of the *Wangguo gongfa* or *Bankoku kōhō* (Japanese pronunciation for the *kanji* characters).

But what about cultural differences? Are cultural differences not more central to the work of translation than the problem of temporality and spatiality? Do these differences matter? My answer is yes, they do matter, but no more and no less than the universalist aspirations that inspire any acts of translation or epistemological crossings through languages in the first place. As I argued elsewhere (Liu 1999, Introduction), universalism thrives on difference; it does not negate difference so much as absorb it into its familiar orbit of antithesis and dialectic. The situated articulation of cultural difference has been embedded in the universalizing processes of past and present all along, which determine what counts as difference and why it should matter. Such processes can indeed tell us a great deal about *how cultural differences are differentially distributed through the eventfulness of translation and how these differences undergo discursive markings*—inclusion, exclusion, comparison, dispersion, cutting, abstraction, et cetera—before they appear as such from the vantage point of the universal. Indeed, it is the struggle over the universal where the political asserts itself persistently with respect to cultural differences. And as we turn our attention to the twentieth century, what could be more universal than the claims of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? In the next section, I discuss the drafting of this important document at the United Nations in 1947–1948 to illustrate how the dialectic of universalism and cultural differences is played out in translations where the struggle over words and concepts across languages becomes the very site of international politics.

2. The UN Commission on Human Rights began its discussion informally in the spring of 1947. John P. Humphrey (1905–1995), the first Director of the UN Secretariat's Division on Human Rights, recalls that the Chairman of the Human Rights Commission, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, undertook the task of formulating a preliminary draft international bill of human rights, working with elected Vice-Chairman Peng-chun Chang (1892–1957) and the Rapporteur Charles Habib Malik (1906–1987) with the assistance of the Secretariat. On Sunday February 17, 1947, Mrs. Roosevelt invited Chang, Malik and Humphrey to meet in her Washington Square apartment for tea and discuss the preparation of the first draft of the UDHR by the Secretariat. Humphrey records a snippet of their conversation below:

> There was a good deal of talk, but we were getting nowhere. Then, after still another cup of tea, Chang suggested that I put my other duties aside for six months and study Chinese philosophy, after which I might be able to prepare a text for the Committee.

This was his way of saying that Western influences might be too great, and he was looking at Malik as he spoke. He had already, in the Commission, urged the importance of historical perspective. There was some more discussion mainly of a philosophical character, Mrs. Roosevelt saying little and continuing to pour tea. (Humphrey 1984, 29)

This seems to be the uncertain first moment of what would become decades of conversations and intellectual debates that eventually gave birth to the International Bill of Human Rights in three landmark documents in the history of mankind: the UDHR (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966).

Malik was a Lebanese Christian and Thomist philosopher. He had studied philosophy in Europe before World War II working briefly with Heidegger before arriving in the United States to complete his doctoral degree in philosophy at Harvard University. Malik was a man of strong convictions, and his Christian personalism was the main source of his universalism, even though his lifelong passion was anticommunism.[5] By contrast, Chang was a secular humanist, musician, and a man of letters. Educated in China and the United States, he was thoroughly bilingual and bicultural.[6] Chang and Malik had different upbringings and were steeped in very different intellectual traditions, but they both were scholar–diplomats and hailed from the non-Western world. At the UN, they were joined by other non-Western members of the eighteen-member Commission on Human Rights, including Filipino diplomat Carlos Romulo, Indian feminist educator Hansa Mehta, and Latin American delegates who made important contributions to the conceptualization of the International Bill of Human Rights (see Glendon 2002, and Morsink 1999, 2245-2248).

[5] Malik was Edward Said's uncle by way of his marriage to Said's mother's first cousin. Said's reminiscences show some mixed feelings about Malik's politics and personality. See Edward Said 2000.

[6] P. C. Chang (or Zhang Pengchun, in the pinyin Romanization system) was born on April 22, 1892, in Tianjin. He was the younger brother of P. L. Chang (Zhang Boling), who was the founder of Nankai University and one of the most preeminent educators in the Republic of China. Both brothers studied at Columbia University. For Chang's life, see Cui Guoliang and Cui Hong 2004, 615–710.

Upon his election as Vice-Chairman of the UN Human Rights Commission, Chang resolved to refashion the idea of "human rights" into a universal principle—more universal than ever before—and he envisioned the ground of that universalism somewhere between classical Chinese thought and the European Enlightenment. Records of the drafting processes involving the Declaration suggest that Chang was impatient with cultural relativism and engaged in a relentless negotiation of competing universals between Chinese and European philosophical traditions. His method was that of a translingual reworking of ideas across these traditions—a constant back and forth—to open up the universal ground for human rights. And he did so by crossing the conceptual threshold of linguistic differences in the face of an old conundrum of incommensurability: Does the idea of the "human" in English mean the same thing in a language that does not share its linguistic roots or philosophical traditions? On the one hand, Chang takes a pragmatic approach to the question of cultural difference and incommensurability in order to bring about consensus among member states on the Human Rights Commission and on the other hand—philosophically more interesting for us—he makes a wager of commensurability through a mode of intellectual persuasion and translation that required an unwavering commitment to his vision of universalism.

The numerous interventions Chang made in the drafting of the UDHR illustrate this commitment very well. Take Article 1, for example. The language of this article reads: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." This statement is deceptively straightforward; in actuality, the finalized words are the outcome of one of the most contentious debates on the Third Committee concerning God and religion. In what is known as the Geneva draft, which was produced by the Second Session of the Commission on Human Rights in the Geneva meetings on December 2–December 17, 1947, the draft article states: "All men are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed *by nature* with reason and conscience and should act towards one another like brothers" (italics mine; see Glendon 2002, 289). The words "by nature" in the Geneva draft were introduced by the Filipino delegate as a deistic

reference to natural law.[7] While the Lebanese philosopher Malik wanted to substitute the words "by their Creator" for "by nature," other delegates tried to introduce similar references to God in the UDHR (see Glendon 2002, 89). Johannes Morsink's study shows that when the Third Committee began its meeting in the fall of 1948, two amendments were proposed to insert overt references to God in Article 1. The Brazilian delegation proposed to start the second sentence of Article 1 thus: "*Created in the image and likeness of God*, they are endowed with reason and conscience." The Dutch delegation came up with a similar assertion of religious faith: "Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family, *based on man's divine origin and immortal destiny*, is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." These amendments led to intense debates. In the end, neither of the amendments was voted on, although the Third Committee did vote to remove "by nature" from Article 1 (the proposal was approved 26 to 4, with 9 abstentions—see Morsink 1999, 287).

Mary Ann Glendon has noted (2002, 146) that on that occasion it was Chang who carried the majority by reminding everyone that the Declaration was designed to be universally applicable. His intervention and reasoning were essential to the decision of the Third Committee to remove the phrase "by nature" from the Geneva draft. Chang's argument was that the Chinese "population had ideals and traditions different from that of the Christian West. Yet [...] the Chinese representative would refrain from proposing that mention of them should be made in the declaration. He hoped that his colleagues would show equal consideration and withdraw some of the amendments to article 1which raised metaphysical problems. For Western civilization, too, the time for religious intolerance was over." The first line of Article 1, he suggested, should refer neither to nature nor to God. But those who believed in God could still find the idea of God in the strong assertions that all human beings are born free and equal and endowed with reason and conscience, but others should be allowed to interpret the language differently. (See Third Committee, Ninety-sixth meeting on October 7, 1948, 98 and Third Committee, Ninety-eighth Meeting on October 9, 1948, 114) Obviously, Mrs. Roosevelt was persuaded by his argument, for she adopted the same language when she had to explain to her American audience why the Declaration contained no reference to the Creator (Glendon 2002, 147).

Chang urged the Third Committee not to indulge in metaphysical arguments and succeeded in sparing the Committee from having to vote on theological questions. Rather than debating on human nature again, he asked the Committee to build on the work of eighteenth-century European philosophers and ancient Chinese philosophy. From this, Morsink (1999, 287) speculates that the motivation behind Chang's support for the deletion of "by nature" was that some delegates understood the phrase as underscoring a materialistic rather than a spiritual or even humanistic conception of human nature. I am inclined to think that Chang's argument is remarkably consistent with what he had termed the "aspiration for a new humanism" (Twiss 2009, 110). His new humanism goes so far as to attempt to overcome the conceptual opposition between the religious and the secular and that between spiritualism and materialism.

That vision emerged early on in one of the most interesting interventions Chang made to the Cassin draft of the UDHR. The Cassin draft was based on the first draft of the Declaration written by Humphrey the Secretariat. Article 1 of the Cassin draft was very different from what it has since become. It states: "All men, being members of one family, are free, possess equal dignity and rights, and shall regard each other as brothers" (consult "The 'Cassin Draft,'" in Glendon 2002, 276). In June 1947, when the French delegate René Cassin presented this draft to the Drafting Committee, the group revised the language of Article 1 to read: "All men are brothers. Being endowed with reason and members of one family, they are free and equal in dignity and rights." In the course of discussion, Chang found the implied concept of human nature limited and biased, so he proposed that Article 1 should include another concept as an essential human attribute next to "reason." He came up with a literal translation of the Confucian concept he had in mind, namely *ren* 仁 which he rendered as "two-man-mindedness"

[7] The same theological reference also framed the language of the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776) and the American Declaration of Independence (1776), as well as numerous other documents on the rights of men which were promulgated before World War II and served as templates for the UDHR.

(Glendon 2002, 67).[8] Drawing implicitly on classical Chinese sources, Chang glossed this written character as a composite of the radical for "human" 人 and the written character for number "two" 二. Interpreting *ren* as "two-man-mindedness" through his epigraphic analysis of the discrete parts of the written character, Chang sought to transform the concept of "human" for human rights by regrounding that idea in the originary plurality of humanity rather than in the concept of the individual.

Yes, no equivalents of this classical Confucian concept existed in English or French to help Chang explicate the meaning of this important concept which can be traced back through the millennia-long philosophical tradition in China. That tradition, in my view, has produced an overly abundant discourse on the concept of "human," its ethical being, and so on, but had almost nothing to say about "rights" until the second half of the nineteenth century.[9] Chang, straddling both traditions, found himself in a strange, precarious situation of having to use words like "sympathy" and "consciousness of his fellow men" to convey what he had in mind (see Commission on Human Rights 20 June 1947). That effort misfired, and it certainly fell flat on Cassin, Mrs. Roosevelt, and all other members of the drafting committee who promptly accepted Chang's proposal but agreed to let the word "conscience" translate the idea of *ren*. That word was added to the word "reason" to make the second line of Article 1 read: "They are endowed with reason and conscience…" With great insight, Glendon writes that "that unhappy word choice not only obscured Chang's meaning, but gave 'conscience' a far from obvious sense, quite different from its normal usage in phrases such as 'freedom of conscience'" (Glendon 2002, 67–68). Not surprisingly, the metropolitan languages were not about to surrender themselves to the Confucian term to produce a novel concept in English or French, thus missing an extraordinary opportunity to reimagine what it means to be "human" in other terms.[10]

[8] Chang's epigraphic reading derived from the *Shuowen jiezi* (100 CE), the first dictionary of Chinese written characters compiled by the Han dynasty scholar Xu Shen.

[9] The language of "rights" and "human rights," like "sovereignty," was first introduced to China via the 1864 translation of Wheaton's *Elements of International Law* discussed above.

[10] I used the word "surrender" in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's sense. In "The Politics of Translation," she argues that the translator must "surrender to the [original] text." See Spivak 1993, 179–200.

Perhaps all is not lost in translation. Anyone who has had the opportunity to peruse the Chinese version of UDHR prepared by the United Nations will be surprised to learn that the Confucian concept has somehow worked its way back into the document through the delegation of another term, *liangxin* (see http://www.un.org/zh/documents/udhr/). The word *liangxin* is made up of two written characters 良心, the character *liang* for "innate goodness" and the character *xin* for the "mind/heart." This translation openly takes the place of "conscience" and interprets the English word back into Chang's classical term *ren*, which articulates a more fundamental sense of what makes a human being moral than the idea of "conscience."[11] The concept *liangxin* is closely associated with that of *ren* in Confucian moral philosophy, denoting the empathetic endowment of the human psyche toward another human being prior to the formation of individual conscience. In the Chinese version of the UDHR, Chang's original explication of *ren* as "two-men-mindedness"—though lost to the English and French texts—is refound through an associated concept.[12]

I have covered only one of numerous textual examples to be gleaned in the multilingual making of that historic document. In fact, a good number of languages besides Mandarin and classical Chinese contributed to the making of the UDHR, and these languages opened the document to the radical multiplicity and translingual plurality of the philosophies and cultures of the world, first in its moment of genesis and then in subsequent translations. If we but lend an ear to the plurality of voices and substitutions across numerous multilingual editions of this document, we are bound to encounter other temporalities and universals that are waiting to be rediscovered and mobilized for the benefit of future politics. The fact that Chang's pluralist vision of the universal "human" fails to register in the texts of hegemonic metropolitan languages and

[11] The notion *liangxin* was elaborated by ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius (ca. 372–ca. 289 BCE) to explicate Confucius's concept *ren* and was subsequently developed by Song dynasty philosophers for the Neo-Confucian theory of moral personhood.

[12] The official languages at the UN were initially English and French, while Russian, Chinese, and a couple of other languages were soon added to the list of official languages, rendering the linguistic landscape extremely variegated.

philosophical traditions suggests that it will take more than individual scholar–diplomats, no matter how resourceful they are, to overcome the tremendous odds of East–West or South–North disparity in the arbitration of moral discourse. Within less than a decade after the UN adopted the UDHR, however, self-determination or national independence movements swept across the globe and, suddenly, another extraordinary opportunity emerged whereupon the peoples of Asia and Africa began to stage their competing universals worldwide. Following the 1955 Bandung Conference, a number of worldwide events played a critical role in this episode of Afro-Asian solidarity to which we now turn.

3. I first developed an interest in Afro-Asian Writers, Conferences while researching the origins of the literary journal *Shijie wenxue* [World Literature] that began publication in the People's Republic of China in 1959.[13] As I was going through the past issues of Chinese translations of poets and writers from around the world, the Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe's name caught my attention immediately. His novel *Things Fall Apart* (1958) was printed in the February issue of 1963 (select chapters) and was read in Chinese translation long before this novel became known to the mainstream readership of the West, and certainly long before Achebe's works were relegated to so-called Anglophone literature. I was struck by the fact that Achebe had been recognized first as a distinguished *Afro-Asian writer* in China, Egypt, India, the Soviet Union, and other countries before he became a postcolonial Anglophone (African) writer, as he is currently known and taught in the English departments of American academia and elsewhere. And there is a world of difference between these two modes of recognition. To my mind, that difference lies mainly in the forgotten history of post-Bandung Afro-Asian writers' interactions and solidarity in 1958–1970. I should emphasize that a great deal of its politics lies in the work of translation and its organization in the name of world literature.

The first of the Afro-Asian Writers' Conferences—an offshoot of the newly formed Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization which had been inspired by the Bandung Conference and met in Cairo on December 26, 1957[14]—took place in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in Soviet Central Asia in October 1958. Asian and African delegates and Western observers flew in from all directions and landed in the new airport of Tashkent. Reporting on the arrival of these airborne poets and novelists, one journalist observed: "[W]e had come to meet the writers of Asia and Africa, gathering for the first time. A new airport; a smiling reception committee; a drive along avenues of acacia and poplar hung with coloured lamps and banners lettered in Chinese, Arabic, and Hindi" (Parker 1959, 107–111).[15] The conference was attended by leading writers of thirty-six countries, including renowned Turkish poet Nâzım Hikmet, Yashpal, Mulk Raj Anand and Tarasankar Bandyopadhyay of India, Ananta Toer Pramoedya of Indonesia, Burma's U Kyaw Lin Hyun, Cambodia's Ly Theam Teng, Vietnam's Pham Huy Thong, African American writer W. E. B. Du Bois, and Mao Dun and Zhou Yang who led a delegation of twenty-one members from China.

Interestingly, W. E. B. Du Bois and his wife Shirley were invited to Tashkent as the honored guests of the first Afro-Asian conference in October 1958. Long deemed a dangerous radical in the eyes of the US government, Du Bois drew the only standing ovation to an individual from the Asian and African authors at the conference. In an informal discussion of African unification problems with writers from Nigeria, Madagascar, Ghana, Somaliland, Senegal, and Angola, Du Bois told them that "a socialist Africa was inevitable" (Horne 1985, 321). Such was the optimism of the Tashkent conference.

Still, the Third World delegates represented a broad spectrum of literary and political persuasions. They came together not to debate about their national or political priorities but to discuss an agenda that concerned them all. First, what role would the development of literatures and cultures in different Asian and African countries play in the progress of mankind, for national independ-

[13] The journal was originally called *Yiwen* [Translations] when it was founded in 1953 and changed its name to *Shijie wenxue* in 1959 after the first Afro-Asian Writers' Conference in Tashkent in 1958.

[14] On the history of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization and China's role in it, see Neuhauser 1968.

[15] For the day-to-day events, see the diaries of Guo Xiaochuan, who served on the preparatory committee of the Tashkent conference in Guo Xiaochuan in 2000. See also Sh ichi Kat 's (1999) reminiscence of his representation of Japan on the same preparatory committee.

ence against colonialism, for peace and freedom throughout the world? Many writers commented on how colonialism has destroyed traditional cultural ties between Asia and Africa. Efua Theodora Sutherland, representing the Ghana Society of Writers, saw that occasion as "a step towards the reunification of the disrupted soul of mankind," further remarking that

> It is up to us to seek practical ways and means of strengthening our cultural links. There is a need to channel to our continent some of your best literary contributions. We need to know the works of Asian and African writers, to be in touch with the wider horizon which those works represent, and which have hitherto been unavailable in our country. (quoted in Parker 1959, 109)

Her enthusiasm was shared by all and it was decided that a Permanent Bureau of Afro-Asian Writers would be set up for the purpose of maintaining future interaction and activities and that its headquarters would be located in Sri Lanka, then still known as Ceylon (these were moved to Cairo a few years later).

Unlike the scholar–diplomat P. C. Chang, who staged a lone battle at the UN to recast the moral concept of "human" on the basis of plurality (*ren*, "two-human-mindedness") before granting universal validity to the concept of human rights, the Asian and African writers pursued a much more ambitious course of action. They mounted a full range of activities, forming international alliances, setting up transnational institutions, and creating journals to educate themselves and educate each other through translations, conversation, and so on. In the following decades, for example, the Bureau coordinated numerous meetings, translations, and publications. There were, no doubt, attempts made by the Soviet Union and China to set the political agenda, either for the purpose of pushing the world revolution or undermining each other when the relationship between the Kremlin and Beijing deteriorated. But, just as in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization over the years, these attempts often met with resistance from the United Arab Republic (Egypt), India, and other Third World countries (on this history, see Shinn and Eisenman 2012, 60–61, and Larkin 1971). Clearly, no one wanted a USSR-front organization. Egypt and India played a central role in the Permanent Bureau. After the second Afro-Asian Writers' Conference in Cairo, the Bureau started a quarterly called *Lotus* in Arabic, English and French and launched a prize for African and Asian literature—named the Lotus Prize—to honor distinguished poets and writers from Asia and Africa. Novelists and poets honored by this prize include Chinua Achebe from Nigeria, Ousmane Sembène from Senegal, Ngugu wa Thiong'o from Kenya, Malek Haddad from Algeria, and Mahmoud Darwish from Palestine. It is often forgotten that that these Afro-Asian writers—now thoroughly canonized as Anglophone or postcolonial writers in English Departments across North America and elsewhere after the Cold War—first emerged within a global socialist intellectual network where their recognition by the West as "postcolonial" writers was neither necessary nor important. Instead, the Afro-Asian writers were striving toward a new humanism—a universalism about life and liberty—that was pitted against colonial violence.

This was unequivocally expressed by Mulk Raj Anand who led the Indian delegation to the second Afro-Asian Writers' conference in 1962. In his speech, Anand elaborated the new humanism as follows:

> Our literatures and arts are thus the weapons of a new concept of man—that the suppressed, the disinherited and the insulted of Asia and Africa can rise to live, in brotherhood with other men, but in the enjoyment of freedom and equality and justice, as more truly human beings, individuals, entering from object history, into the great history when there will be no war, but when love will rule the world, enabling man to bring the whole of nature under self-conscious control for the uses of happiness, as against despair. (Arora 2007, 17–18)

Interestingly, Garcia Lorca's poem "Ode to Walt Whitman" was evoked to express the sentiment of the socially engaged writers from Asia and Africa:

> I want the strong air of the most profound night
> to remove flowers and words from the arch where you sleep,
> and a black child to announce to the gold-craving whites
> the arrival of the reign of the ear of corn.[16]

Anand states that the mission of the writer is to

[16] Here I have substituted a translation of this poem by Stephen Spender and J. L. Gili, in Lorca and Allen 1995, 135.

act as the conscience of the people aware of their pain. To have a creative vision of all that affords joy in life, to release the vital rhythms in the personality, to make man more human, to seek apperceptions of freedom from all forms of slavery and to give this freedom to other people throughout the world—in fact to awaken men to the love of liberty, which brings life and more life. (Arora 2007, 18)

This call for freedom was not empty rhetoric but was echoed by writers from the socialist bloc as well as from the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa. To those who had personally experienced slavery and racial and economic exploitation under colonialism, liberty had a specific meaning: it meant decolonization, national liberation, and world peace in the spirit of the Bandung Conference.

The Afro-Asian Writers' Conference in Tashkent made a tremendous impact on China. Almost immediately, the journal *Yiwen* (Translations), which used to predominantly feature Soviet and Western authors, began to shift focus and publish works by Iranian, Iraqi, Egyptian, and Mozambique writers. In January 1959, the journal was renamed *Shijie wenxue* [World literature] and began to devote its bimonthly issues to systematic translations of Afro-Asian writers, African American writers, and, later, Latin American writers. By 1962, more than 380 titles from over thirty Asian and African countries had been printed in its pages. Irene Eber's survey indicates that by 1964 and 1965, Afro-Asian and Latin American writers began to outnumber Western authors. The October 1964 issue was specifically dedicated to black literature, which included African writers as well as African American writers such as W. E. B. Du Bois and Margaret Walker (on this, see Eber 1994, 34–54).

Following the Tashkent conference, the Chinese Writers Union extended invitations to their Afro-Asian friends and, over the years, many of them visited China more than once. The great Indonesian writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer made his second trip to China after the Tashkent conference. His interactions with Ding Ling, Mao Dun, Guo Moruo, Zhou Yang, and other Chinese writers were frequent and helped transform his ideas about what a writer's responsibility was toward society. Hong Liu's study suggests that Pramoedya's contact with the Chinese delegation and the Chinese embassy goes back to as early as the 1955 Bandung Conference. After that, Pramoedya began to follow the works of Chinese writers and came to admire the social prestige enjoyed by socialist writers in the PRC, "where literature is considered to be one of the political and economic forces" and where writers were paid generously for their publications, in stark contrast with conditions in Indonesia (see Liu 1996, 124).

Pramoedya regarded Mao Dun and Lu Xun as the foremost writers of modern China, and he not only translated some portions of Lu Xun's short story collection *Diary of a Madman* but also published his translation of one of Ding Ling's long articles, "Life and Creative Writing."[17] Perhaps more than anyone else in Indonesia, Pramoedya took the socialist credo of "living with peasants and workers" to heart and fervently believed that writers should go into social life and live with the people. He himself "went down" to the countryside of the Banten area to investigate the lives of peasants and miners.

Conclusion

I began my discussion by trying to raise some new questions about translation and its relationship to the political. My approach has been to work through the ideas of event, temporality, difference, and competing universals as a conceptual alternative to the familiar model of linguistic communication or the theological model with which we are all familiar in translation studies. The alternative method I have developed involves analyzing the multiple temporalities of translation in differentially distributed discursive practices across languages. To bring such a method to bear on concrete analyses of the eventfulness of translation, I have taken the reader through the nineteenth-century translation of Henry Wheaton's *Elements of International Law* in Chinese, the post-World War II multilingual fashioning of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with a focus on P. C. Chang's contribution as well as the Afro-Asian writers' collective translation projects during the Cold War.

[17] See "Duer Fanwen Ji" (An interview with Toer), *Hsin Pao* (Jakarta), November 17, 1956; cited in Liu 1996, 125. It is unclear if Pramoedya's translation of Lu Xun's short story collection (Catatan Harian Orang Gila) was published, although his translation of Ding Ling's "Hidup dan Penulisan Kreatif" did appear in the journal *Indonesia* 7,3 (March 1956): 102-110.

Just as I was about to bring my reflections to a close, one of Benedict Anderson's observations about Pramoedya came back to haunt me. Anderson has been familiar with Pramoedya's work and communicated with this Indonesian writer on numerous occasions. One afternoon, as I was reading Anderson's discussion of Pramoedya in *Language and Power,* I was struck by this statement: "More broadly, Pramoedya gave me an inkling of how one might fruitfully link the shapes of literature with the political imagination" (Anderson 1990, 10). What could Anderson have meant by "the political imagination"?

This question has led me to speculate whether Anderson's personal correspondence with Pramoedya had touched upon the Afro-Asian Conference in Tashkent, where Pramoedya had been the leader of the Indonesian delegation. I wonder further if Anderson became aware of Pramoedya's extensive interactions with Mao Dun and Ding Ling and of his published translation of the Chinese writers. It is interesting that Anderson has translated Pramoedya for the English-speaking audience just as the latter had translated Ding Ling or Lu Xun for his Indonesian audience. These unexpected crossings of translations suggest that the future itself might be the ultimate preserve of multiple temporalities. I am hopeful that the legacies of the Afro-Asian Writers' Conferences— their political imagination, their encouragement to think differently about the future of universalism, their ambitious translation projects along with their reinvention of world literature—will live on through the temporalities of potential translations yet to come.

References

Anderson, Benedict R. O'g. 1990. *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Arora, Neena. 2007. *The Novels of Mulk Raj Anand: A Study of His Hero*. New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors Pty. Ltd.

Badiou, Alain. 2005. *Being and Event*. Translated by Oliver Feltham. New York: Continuum.

Badiou, Alain. 2009. *Logics of Worlds: Being and Event*. Volume 2. Translated by Alberto Toscano. New York: Continuum.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1993. *The Field of Cultural Production*. Edited by Randal Johnson. New York: Columbia University Press.

Commission on Human Rights, Drafting Committee, First Session, Summary Record Of the Eighth Meeting at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, June 17, 1947 at 2:30 p.m. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.8.

Cui Guoliang and Cui Hong, eds. 2003. *Zhang Pengchun lun jiaoyu yu xiju yishu* [P. C. Chang on education and theatrical arts]. Tianjin: Nankai daxue chubanshe.

de Man, Paul. 1986. "Conclusions: Walter Benjamin's 'Task of the Translator.'" In *Resistance to Theory*. Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press.

Derrida, Jacques. 1985. "Les Tours de Babel." In *Difference in Translation,* translated and edited by Graham F. Joseph. London: Cornwell University Press.

Eber, Irene. 1994. "Western Literature In Chinese Translation, 1949–1979." *Asian and African Studies* 3 (1): 34–54.

Eliot, T. S. 1948. Banquet Speech at the Nobel Banquet at the City Hall in Stockholm, December 10. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1948/eliot-speech.html. Accessed September 21, 2013.

Glendon, Mary Ann. 2002. *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. New York: Random House.

Goldstein, Robert Justin. 2001. *Political Repression in Modern America: FROM 1870 TO 1976*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Guo Xiaochuan. 2000. *Guo Xiaochuan quanji* [Complete works of Guo Xiaochuan]. Volume 9. Guilin: Guangqi shifan daxue chubanshe.

Hollingsworth, Mark, and Richard Norton-Taylor. 1988. *Blacklist: The Inside Story of Political Vetting*. London: The Hogarth Press Ltd.

Horne, Gerald. 1985. *Black and Red: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War, 1944–1963*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Humphrey, John P. 1984. *Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure*. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational.

Katō, Shūichi. 1999. *A Sheep's Song: A Writer's Reminiscences of Japan and the World*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Larkin, Bruce D. 1971. *China and Africa: 1949–1970: The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Liu, Hong. 1996. "Pramoedya Ananta Toer and China: The Transformation of a Cultural Intellectual." *Indonesia* 61 (April): 124.

Liu, Lydia H. 1995. *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity, China 1900–1936*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
———. 2006. *The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Liu, Lydia H., ed. 1999. *Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Lorca, Francisco Garcia, and Donald Allen, eds. 1995. *The Selected Poems of Federico Garcia Lorca*. New York: New Directions.
Morsink, Johannes. 1999. *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Neuhauser, Charles. 1968. *Third World Politics: China and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization 1957–1967*. Harvard East Asian Monographs. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Parker, Ralph. 1959. "The Afro-Asian Writers' Conference." *Meanjin Quarterly*, 18 (April): 107–111.
Said, Edward. 2000. *Out of Place: A Memoir*. New York: Vintage Books.
Sakai, Naoki. 1997. *Translation and Subjectivity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Shinn, David H., and Joshua Eisenman. 2012. *China and Africa: A Century of Engagement*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1993. *Outside the Teaching Machine*. London: Routledge.
Steiner, George. 1978. *After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stonor Saunders, Frances. 2001. *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters*. New York: New Press.
Third Social and Humanitarian Committee of the UN General Assembly. 1948. "Draft International Declaration of Human Rights (E/800) (continued)." Ninety-sixth meeting, October 7, 1948, 98; Ninety-Eighth Meeting, October 9, 1948, 114; Ninety-Eighth Meeting, October 9, 1948, 114. Summary records, *Official Records of the Fifth Session of the General Assembly*. Lake Success, N.Y.
Twiss, Sumner B. 2009. "Confucian contributions to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Historical and Philosophical perspective." In *The World's Religions After September 11: Volume 2 Religion and Human Rights*, edited by Arvind Sharma, 153–173 Westport, CT, and London: Praeger.

Lydia H. Liu is a theorist of media and translation living in New York. She is Wun Tsun Tam Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and has published on literary theory, translation, digital media, Chinese feminism, and empire in English and Chinese. Her English works include *The Freudian Robot: Digital Media and the Future of the Unconscious* (2010), *The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making* (2004) and, more recently, a coedited translation with Rebecca Karl and Dorothy Ko called *The Birth of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts in Transnational Theory* (2013).

The Postimperial Etiquette and the Affective Structure of Areas

Jon Solomon
University of Lyon, France
thejonnyroach@gmail.com

Abstract: This essay examines the role of translation in building the affective structure of postcolonial/postimperial areas, identifying *ressentiment*, erudition and disavowal, and homolingual address as the three main aspects to be studied. The postimperial etiquette is an agreement concerning the recognition of "legitimate" subjects and objects formed in the crucible of the apparatus of area inherited from the imperial–colonial modernity. This agreement functions as an ideology for contemporary cognitive capitalism. The essay ends by suggesting strategies for transforming the postimperial etiquette and proposes that energy be redirected away from both resubstantialized objects and anthropocentric subjects towards social relations that are both the point of departure for and the final determination of intellectual work.

Translation as a "Bridging Technology" with Ideological Functions

There is a series of terms beginning with translation that needs to be mapped out and connected, end-to-end. This is the series that runs through translation–culture–nation–race/species and can be rehearsed as follows: Translation is what enables people from different cultures to bridge the gaps that separate them, yet in the age of nation–states, culture has been appropriated by the practices and discourse of national identity. As for the modern nation itself, none of its claims to natural, organic status can hide its birth in colonial theories of race and species (which I shall denote by the term "anthropological difference"). Though translation therefore bears some intrinsic historical connection to anthropological difference, how are we to understand it today?

The culture–nation–race/species nexus takes us directly to the heart of historical capitalism. If we follow Elsa Dorlin as she charts the birth of the French nation in colonial theories and practices of anthropological difference, then we will agree that these

theories arose principally as a historical response to the new and accelerated practices of human migration growing out of mercantilism and colonial conquest (Dorlin 2009, 211). Dorlin's analysis, which is too interested in bringing our attention to the sadly overlooked connection between gender and race to make room for a full consideration of capitalism, draws my attention for one further reason whose importance to this essay will become greater as we proceed: the role of the body. The transition from royal to popular sovereignty was accomplished, according to Dorlin, by substituting the body of the nation, composed of supposedly natural traits (what would later be called "national character"), for the royal individual. The need for these nationalized traits to be "natural" unleashes an essential imbrication between race and gender that forms the core of Dorlin's important account, leading her to conclude that "[t]he question of the nation constantly refers back to its corporeality" (Dorlin 2009, 208). My interest in citing this passage will be to show how translation operates today as a somatic technology, tethering bodies to the apparatus of area that hides the matrix of anthropological difference by naturalizing the nation–state.

Following the new and growing visibility of the "constant crisis" that is the state at the end of the twentieth century, a broad spectrum of theorists, activists, and artists have been interested in exploring the potential of a nonrepresentational politics. My interest in nonrepresentational politics is limited exclusively to its potential ramifications for disrupting the schema of anthropological difference that forms the backbone of our common, global modernity. This article assumes that representational politics, that is, the politics of identity, is invariably tied to the state. The state is the point of reference that makes it possible to imagine complete congruence between taxonomies of anthropological difference, social organization, and divisions of knowledge without which identity politics would be meaningless. Hence, a nonrepresentational politics is by nature insurrectional, which means that it must fight against the "agents and agencies active in the invention of the ideological practices of everyday life in support of the reproduction of state power" (Kapferer 2010, 5). In relation to translation I would argue, in other words, that it must be considered in light of the reproduction of stateness (which is a way of producing and managing "anthropological difference" for the sake of capital accumulation), and that

it (translation) plays a crucial role in the management of the transition to a new type of world order based on the "corporate–state."

While an analysis of the world order imposed among and by corporate–states is beyond the purview of this essay, it will be helpful to offer a quick review of the period prior to this time, the period of a world order constructed around the nation–state. If we follow Antony Anghie's work on the colonial origins of the modern world system based upon state sovereignty, we are struck by his assertion that international law instantiates or "postulates" a "gap" within the global human population and then, having naturalized this gap, proceeds to enumerate for itself the task of developing all manner of techniques to bridge the gap (Anghie 2004, 37). Of course, you will immediately see the irony of a technique that is itself responsible for the problem that it is supposed to solve. (Perhaps Anghie has found the most economical definition of humanism around.) The reason that irony has remained largely hidden, we may conclude after reading Anghie, is to be found, with regard to the discipline or field of international law, in the ideology of cultural difference. As long as the "gap" of cultural difference was assumed, as the field of international law asserted, to preexist the practices of colonial encounter (just as the practices and institution of modern state sovereignty supposedly developed in Europe were assumed to preexist colonialism), the only viable question left for the development of that field of practice concerned the appropriate types of political and social technologies to bridge that gap. Now, this is exactly the role that translation has been called upon to play in the modern era of nation–states. Operating at a quotidian level, with a reach equal to or perhaps greater than law, translation has been a crucial technique for the establishment and consolidation of *areas*—that quintessential apparatus of modernity that correlates via a system of geo-mapping subjective formation to hierarchical taxonomies of knowledge and social organization.

I say it is a quintessentially modern apparatus precisely because of its importance to the fundamental project of modernity. According to modernity's self-definition, the "modernity-project" should be defined through the principles of liberty, equality, and reason, but I think that we are now ready to admit that there is another side to the project of modernity, the succinct definition of which would be: a belief that technological progress and aesthetics

can be joined together in a single effort to develop the perfect race/species. Modernity is thus a project in species–being the work of which is manifested or located exactly in the body. This body should ideally be understood as the physical manifestation of an *area*, which is neither climate (Hippocrates) nor temperature (Aristotle), but is rather an instrument of endogenous genotechnology (Dorlin 2009, 209). This "area" is hardly a unitary phenomenon, but rather a series of nodal points relayed in constantly shifting assemblages among bodies, tongues, and minds. These assemblages are then grouped into populations. Hence, the project of perfecting the species through a concrete population of bodies grouped into areas invariably has to posit a split within the human species. This split, which was also present in Kant's contradictory definition of "humanity" as both a universal quality shared by all members of a species and an ideal that was nevertheless unequally realized by different members or populations, has been a core component of the "modernity-project" throughout its history. I see a precursor of this Kantian strategy in Anghie's description of Vitoria's characterization of native peoples, who share universal reason but are burdened by a "personality" (which will later be called, once again, "national character") that causes them to deviate from the universal norm. I do not wish to dwell on this history, but merely call attention to the need to provide a critical counterhistory that will provide an account of the political and governmental technologies invented and mobilized, as translation has been, "to bridge the gap," when they were in fact participating in the consolidation and prolongation of the entire anthropological edifice of the colonial/imperial modernity (a racism vaster than any phenomenon known by that name today, for it includes virtually all other manner of social difference). It is my hypothesis that we do not see (or at least have not seen up to now) the ideological effects of these technologies precisely because we are (or at least have so far been) so deeply invested in the apparatus of area. These technologies, such as translation and international law, hide the essential strangeness of the areas into which the globe has been divided, as a means of population management for the benefit of capital accumulation, through the history of colonial/imperial modernity.

Ostensibly resembling the latter-day inheritors of premodern empires, kingdoms, feudalities, et cetera, these areas (typified by the nation–state) could best be understood as an enormous apparatus of capture designed to subsume the productive capacity of society into the needs of capital. Within the organizational structure of the nation–state, the work of perfecting the race/species is always an aesthetic question as much as a technological one. Hence, we might refer to the anthropological work of modernity as *perfictioning* (a neologism that combines the two words "perfection" and "fiction") inasmuch as it invariably involves a typology of fantasized images concentrated around, or projected upon, the link between bodies and nations.

As capitalism transitions to a new historical form, the role of the area–apparatus is undergoing a concomitant change. Today's areas are designed not so much to capture as to "pool" populations within. As capitalism moves from its industrial phase to a cognitive phase, the "pooling" of population takes on its greatest significance within the emerging bioeconomy of semiocapitalism and the corporate surveillance state. The call-word of this configuration is "life is code, primed for transaction."[1] Although the contemporary configuration draws its symbolic resources from the cultural imaginary of the imperial–colonial modernity, its greatest ideological use is to cover up the total subsumption of population into the bioinformatic economy. No longer a source of surplus value simply through its role as labor, population is becoming a source of value through its role as an inexhaustibly mutable source of bioinformatic code. Population is, other words, pooled not just as labor—that is, producers—nor even just as consumers, but also for its role as source-code. The reason why the corporate-state "needs" to put just about everybody under surveillance ultimately amounts to the potential of all source-code to be "pirated."

Translation today continues to play the role of ideology, preventing us from seeing how the "bridging technologies" are in fact prolonging the agony of the domination under which we live, labor, and perish. In the hope of providing elements for a critique of this ideology, I attempt in this essay to describe the affective structure of area, typified today by what I call the postimperial eti-

[1] My thanks to Julian Elam for this phrase, which he developed in our seminar "The Apparatus of Anthropological Difference and the Subjective Technologies of Speciation," held at Université Jean Moulin (spring, 2013).

quette. I propose that one part of the insurrection-to-come against the postimperial etiquette of the corporate surveillance state will emerge out of the subjectivity of the translator–subaltern.

Translation *and* Subjectivity

Naoki Sakai has been telling us for a long time that translation is a *social practice* (Sakai 1997). In it, the essential indeterminacy, hybridity, and openness of social relations is evident. Yet, Sakai also tells us, the dominant form of sociality established through the regime of translation in the modern era deliberately efaces such originary hybridity. The technical term that is used by Sakai to denote this form of sociality is the "schema of cofiguration," which is premised upon the representational practices of the "homolingual address." The identities created out of cofiguration are posterior to the translational encounter and mutually codependent, yet claim to be anterior and autonomous. This is the form of sociality that is essentially codified in the homogenizing machine of the nation–state, which would always like to present itself as an organic, historical entity when it is in fact an apparatus of posterior superimposition. The reason Sakai uses the term figuration is because the figure stands for an absent totality that cannot be grasped experientially and for which the imagination substitutes a schematic figure, like a map, that is essentially *aesthetic*. It is important to remember that in Sakai's account the totality does not correspond to anything other than the schema itself. Rather than absent, it is fictive, in an active, generative sense. The power of this fiction is that it enables originary difference to be captured and plotted onto a grid of identifiable positions. Hence the schema of cofiguration is much more about establishing a *field of representation* in which identities are constructed in such a way that they appear to precede the establishment of the representational field upon which they depend (and within which they will certainly be organized in hierarchical fashion) rather than being about the content of specific identities.

Against representation, Sakai invites us to engage in the "heterolingual address." Seen in light of Sakai's critique, the difference between the hetero- and homolingual forms of address assumes the character of a political choice, bearing clear ethical dimensions. The ethics of national language, which Sakai identifies with racism, exemplifies the stakes involved. It might be useful to point out, however, that the ethics of national language is not a characteristic unique to this or that particular language but rather a common denominator shared by all languages when they are "counted" according to a "Romantic Ideology" (Agamben 2000, 65) of cultural individuation (Sakai 2009). This understanding views both language and people as individualized, determinate entities, and assumes an organic link of equivalency between the two. The "schema of cofiguration," as described by Sakai, is precisely the means by which the "Romantic ideology" of language and people is transformed into an ethics and an aesthetics of everyday, lived experience. To engage in the practice of heterolingual address constitutes a refusal of the aesthetico-ethical constellation of cofiguration and a desire for liberation from it.

The Affective Structure of Area and the Postimperial Etiquette

If, as Balibar writes, "the emancipation of the oppressed can only be their own work, which emphasizes its immediately ethical signification" (Balibar 1994, 49), then the emancipation from the apparatus of area, which oppresses all or else oppresses none, can only be undertaken collectively. Yet by the same logic, the repression of emancipatory movements against the apparatus of area can be expected to have a definite collective face as well. This is the difference between *complicity* and *cooperation*. Bearing in mind recent discussions that underscore the displacement of this problem at an ontological level by contrasting different forms of collectivity (often positing the state/people pairing against that of the Common/singular), I would like to direct our attention to the problem of affect, where it immediately becomes evident that the practice of *ressentiment* is by far the most ubiquitous response on both sides of the colonial/imperial divide to a refusal of cofiguration and an exodus from the apparatus of area.

The phenomenologist Max Scheler, who devoted a monograph to the subject of *ressentiment*, argues that one of the reasons it arises is because one side or the other in a typical social dyad (such as Master and Slave, or Male and Female) experiences the existence of the other in terms of existential foreclosure: since I can never have/be/feel what the other has/is/feels, I am motivated by an insatiable rancor. The critique of "egalitarianism" at the heart of

Scheler's work, which mistakes social equality for exchange value[2] rather than indeterminacy (and leads Scheler to see Jews, women, and socialists as representative sources of *ressentiment*), is not the subject of my concern here. Rather, I would like to suggest that there is another form of *ressentiment* undetected by Scheler, the type that arises not between the terms of a dyadic pair, but in the *relation of complicity* that unites them. In the midst of their difference and relative struggle, they nevertheless work together. Although their mutual fear is undeniably real and strong, it is not as strong as their mutual fear and anticipation of the emergence of something new, something that neither falls within the dyadic pair nor is part of its trajectory. It is, rather, this form of *ressentiment*—a form of crisis management that aims to sustain a certain regime of biopolitical production—that is most common today. *Ressentiment* is not a personal psychological problem; it is an affective structure peculiar to the institutions of national translation in which we work, and it opens up subject positions for bodies placed within. Those who pretend that they are free from this structure are precisely the ones who contribute, through their disavowal, to the structure's reproduction—even when they are deemed to be "fighting the good fight."

The reasons why this form of *ressentiment* is now evident but was not yet visible a century ago when Scheler was writing are as much historical as methodological. Besides the revolution within phenomenology led by Martin Heidegger in the first part of the twentieth century that led to the rise of the philosophies of difference in its latter half (paving the way, in effect, for the ontological shift to which we alluded above), there is also the progression of geopolitical events that brought a formal end to colonialism and destabilized the sovereignty of the nation–state, gradually replacing it with the transnational corporate–state. As the philosophies of difference began to infiltrate humanistic disciplines outside of philosophy, the foundational oppositions of civilizational difference and national sovereignty were being thrown into disarray by the collapse of the Eurocentric system of international law that had dominated the world system throughout several centuries of colonial/imperial modernity. In other words, the "constant crisis" that is the state (Kapferer 2010) became visible. With the visibility of this crisis it suddenly became possible to imagine, *in the concrete arena of history*, subjectivities and relations that were completely unforeseen by the old oppositions between the "West" and the non-"West," or between the native and the foreign.

Yet alongside these historical openings, we also undoubtedly see today a reinforcement of those anachronistic oppositions that take the form of complicity. A particular feature of capitalism, one which was undoubtedly present throughout its history but which has become easily visible today, lies in its penchant for creating profitable crisis. Under neoliberal "biocapitalism," crisis has become a more or less permanent mode of operation for capitalist accumulation, so much so that there is a greater interest in the prolongation of crisis through regimes of permanent crisis management than there is in the resolution of crisis.

Within that context, academic exchange and the modes of address in today's world are characterized by a relation that I would like to call the *postimperial etiquette*.[3] My hypothesis is that the postimperial etiquette constitutes an affective structure, or subjective technology, that plays a crucial role in the contemporary biopolitical production.

Ressentiment, as I have proposed, is the first of its essential affective structures. The second element essential to the affective structure of postcolonial etiquette is an *investment in the homolingual address*, such as I have previously analyzed in twentieth century thinkers such as Michel Foucault (Solomon 2010, Solomon 2011), Jean-Luc Nancy (Solomon 2013), Giorgio Agamben (Solomon 2014), and Ernst Cassirer (Solomon 2009). The regime of translation constructed through the homolingual address lures even these great figures of twentieth century thought into projecting between retroactive and proactive alternatives: the images of a past-that-never-happened and those of a future-that-will-have-to-be-abandoned—that is, the West as both a tradition and a destiny.

[2] Ironic, since Scheler bemoans the effect that exchange value has wrought upon social relations. To understand how equality can be understood as a form of indeterminacy in the social, it is necessary to link it to liberty, forming an inherently contradictory and unstable pair that Étienne Balibar calls the proposition of equaliberty. See Balibar 1994.

[3] Although it is a postcolonial/postimperial phenomenon, for the sake of convenience I will use the term postimperial.

Recently, I have been trying to work out the implications of Sakai's critique of translation with respect to a phenomenon, which I call *speculative superimposition*, that is characteristic of modern postcolonial/postimperial societies in general (Solomon 2012). Here, we may refer to the affective trait of *mournfulness* expressed by deconstructive authors such as Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe when faced with a world beyond the apparatus of area. In a 1992 conference in Strasbourg, "Thinking Europe at Its Borders," Lacoue-Labarthe centers his intervention on the question of "afterwardsness" (*l'après-coup*[4]): "In its most abrupt, and hence most paradoxical, definition, afterwardsness designates the belated—but recognized—manifestation of something that did not happen or did not have even the slightest chance of happening. Of something that took place, thus, without taking place" (Collectif Géophilosophie de l'Europe 1992, 74). I am hardly persuaded that the "retroactive" quality identified by Lacoue-Labarthe as the philosophically essential movement of European modernity can be simply contained within and ascribed exclusively to an area called "Europe." On the contrary, this is, I would argue, a characteristic of the modern logic of area in general. As much as the modern nation–state would like to claim organic anteriority, it is always both an internal imposition and an expropriation from the outside. (This predicament is what eventually disqualifies the distinction between constituent and constituting powers, forcing the search for "destitute" powers instead—see Nowotny 2007.) The same "afterwardsness" is evident in the construction of the "West," which relies on translation to superimpose upon the image of spatiality a temporal process that leads to "exceptionally universal," metaphysical subjects. The deconstructive school of the postwar philosophies of difference that formed the locus in which Lacoue-Labarthe and other philosophers, such as Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy, worked was steeped in an historical awareness of the "end" of the "West." Hence it is no wonder that Lacoue-Labarthe warns us (or is it invites us to lament?): "afterwardsness can also, quite simply, take the form of regret or repentance" (Collectif Géophilosophie de l'Europe 1992, 76). Regret differs from repentance with regards to the recognition of guilt and the desire for repetition. One may regret the past not just because of some regrettable action, but simply because it is past, or has been fantasized as past, and hence desire its repetition without the slightest iota of contrition, much less repentance. Nostalgia for the bonds of a fantasized "lost community" that never really existed (or has been idealized and turned into an image) forms, according to Jean-Luc Nancy (1991, 9), one of the essential structures of modernity.

The phenomenon of "afterwardsness" through which areas are constructed finds expression in the postimperial etiquette through the affective quality of *ressentiment*. The reason why we use the French term, instead of an English translation such as "resentment," is because of the etymological structure of the French word, which emphasizes a temporal dimension (*re-*) of repetition. *Re-sentir*: to feel again and again what one has not really experienced (which is the same as turning experience into a phenomenological fetish). *Ressentiment* plays such an important role in the affective structure of the postimperial etiquette precisely because it is intrinsically related to the temporal construction of the modern area–apparatus.

The regime of translation constructed through the homolingual address lures subjects into projecting between retroactive and proactive alternatives: the images of a past-that-never-happened and those of a future-that-will-have-to-be-abandoned.

The past-that-never-happened refers to the representation of translation as an encounter between two discrete languages. Sakai shows how this idea can only be retrospectively superimposed upon the translational exchange as a schema or an image. What this superimposition effaces is the essential hybridity and indeterminacy seen in the position of the translator, as well as the peculiar interruption of linear temporality in translation. This aspect of the translator corresponds to the problem of individuation, which makes it impossible to speak of language(s) as one would speak of countable nouns (Sakai 2009).

The future-that-will-have-to-be-abandoned refers to the way that the homolingual address guides action towards the future. Sakai explains:

[4] Lacoue-Labarthe explicitly takes up the Freudian–Lacanian theme of *Nachträglichkeit*. English translations of this term are either "deferral" or "afterwardsness," neither of which is fully satisfactory.

> By the schema of cofiguration, I want to point out the essentially "imaginary" nature of the comparative framework of Japan and the West, since the figure in cofiguration is imaginary in the sense that it is a sensible image on the one hand, and practical in its ability to evoke one to act toward the future on the other. (Sakai 1997, 52)

The "future" that is thereby constituted is reduced, according to the figural logic of the schematism, to a spatialized representation. The dimension of future temporality as irruptive discontinuity is effaced. "This is why," writes Sakai, "difference in or of language that incites the act of translation comes as a representation only after the process of translation. Involved in translation is a paradox of temporality that cannot be accommodated in the worldly time of the past, the present and the future" (Sakai 2009, 86). Acting toward the future according to the schema of cofiguration constituted by the homolingual address produces a spatialized representation that effectively cuts off the temporality of the future as unrepresentable negation and creation. It eliminates, in other words, the possibility for new subjectivities that do not correspond to the oppositions installed by the schema of cofiguration. As an affective structure, the homolingual address operates exactly like that "angel of history" seen in Paul Klee's painting and famously described by Walter Benjamin as being propelled "into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward" (Benjamin 1969, 258). The "future" promised by this form of sociality, typical of the apparatus of area, is a future of ruins. One of the characteristic symptoms of this mode of capturing the future particular to the apparatus of area is the peculiar dialectic between historical preservation and environmental destruction everywhere in evidence today. One does not have to look to ancient Mayan temples in the Guatemalan rain forests, regularly "mined" for gravel by developers to see the concrete nexus of this opposition. A much more potent example could be seen, for instance, in postwar France, one of the active world-leaders in the institutionalization of historical monument preservation and which holds it to be an absolute human value essential to collective identity. Yet as a nation that derives ¾ of its energy needs from nuclear power and is one of the main exporters of nuclear technology around the globe, France can be said to be playing an active, if ironic, role in the production of the ultimate form of "preservation"—the radioactively contaminated wasteland.

The third element in the affective structure of area to which I would like to draw attention is *erudition*. In the meaning to which I would like to ascribe to this term, it refers not just to the problems of access and class mobility, but also more generally to the socially meaningful qualification of "knowledge" and the distribution of it among bodily bearers. Erudition operates through *division*—the division of labor, to begin with, but also the disciplinary divisions of knowledge, the economic divisions of affect, and finally the individuating divisions of the body. Translation and address play an important role here, too, as erudition excludes or devalorizes certain kinds of knowledge that cannot be "translated" into the quantitative forms and standardized denominations to which the definition of "knowledge" is limited. In today's neoliberal regime, such exclusion is exercised through the standards set by financially motivated evaluation bureaucracies. In today's neoliberal regime, such exclusion is exercised through the standards set by financially motivated evaluation/surveillance bureaucracies, intellectual property regimes, and disciplinary boundaries.

Erudition is *time-consuming*. It signals both an unprecedented expropriation of the intellectual worker's time, such that one is never fully off work, as well as a consumption of time by making affective experience a direct source of value ("consumers hungry for new experience"). Working-too-much, often under precarious conditions, is fast becoming the main way in which subjective disavowal, a fetishism of the object under the sign of erudition, is instituted, even among those of us who would otherwise like to be alert to the problem of disavowal. The technical term that Marx uses for "working-too-much" is absolute surplus value, typically produced by extending the worker's labor time. Several decades ago, Gayatri Spivak used Marx's technical term globally to characterize relations between the West and the non-West in the postcolonial era (Spivak 2009b, 123). Today, it would appear that the extraction of absolute surplus value through excessive labor time is fast becoming one of the principal ways to assure not just a hierarchy of relations but the unquestioned acceptance of the field of oppositional terms through which hierarchies are constructed and reversed. What is being forgotten is that the terms of specific difference, such as the West and the non-West, always contain a core

component of negativity, freedom, indeterminacy, and antagonism, and are never simply given.

Due to a Cartesian habit, we might not think of erudition in terms of affect, but under the definition that I would ascribe to it, affect "sneaks" into erudition through the particular way it individuates the body. Erudition constitutes a singular appropriation of the relation between body and knowledge by granting exclusive legitimacy to the abstract, accumulational form that we call, in English, the body of knowledge. The affective form that is closely related to this appropriation of the multiplicity of the body is the sense of knowing. Nationalism is precisely the modern political form that turns *knowing* into affect. While foreigners can know about the other nation, they cannot understand it in the same way as nationals; they cannot, in other words, partake in knowledge as an affective structure of feeling that is based in "experience" and shared among members of an imaginary community. Yet the category of experience-that-can-be-shared-sympathetically is determined in advance by the arena that capitalism, in the process of appropriating the state, establishes for the process of valorization. This is the arena of exchange value. Sympathetic knowledge, or national knowledge, is the form of exchange value that is being applied to the act of knowing understood in terms of fantasy—the fantasy of shared experience reflected in knowledge.

As an apparatus of fantasy, erudition's most important role is found in recoding the body. It is not simply that *distantiation*, based on the Cartesian stance of objectivity, becomes the principle mode of relation, with all of its known symptoms. Erudition is also a means of maintaining an attitude of *indifference* or *disavowal*. The most common form of this attitude of indifference with regard to knowledge in the postimperial configuration can be seen in the institutionally sanctioned assumption that issues related to anthropological difference fall under the purview of specific disciplines or fields within the human sciences—what are commonly termed "area studies" in North America. The matrix of anthropological difference *per se* as an organizing principle for the human sciences must never be brought into question at an organizational level. The organization must be naturalized so that participants never see their own disciplinary commitments, including language and object-choice, in terms of the history of social relations under conditions of colonial population management. It is not simply that objects reflect the desires and tastes of certain kinds of subjectivity (forming in effect a socially instituted form of prejudgment or simply prejudice), but rather that objects become means of disavowal by which people can ignore and forget the mediations and negations that constitute subjectivity as a social practice.

As an affective form, erudition is thus characterized by object-obsession and subjective disavowal. It is globally institutionalized and legitimized through the supposedly "natural" correspondence between disciplinary divisions in the order of knowledge and various social divisions in the order of political organization. And while it may look as if the university institutions in North America, in which greater anxiety about the status of objects is often seen (accompanied by all kinds of institutional innovations to accommodate interdisciplinary approaches), has an advantage in this respect, the truth is rather that an imperial nationalism, such as seen today in the United States, invariably calls forth performative gestures, such as transdisciplinary object-anxiety, in order to garner the sacrifice of minority populations for the benefit of the capital-state nexus. Disciplinary rigidity and obsession with the legitimacy of "pure" objects as seen in the other nations today outside North American high academia is not a sign of their "backwardness," but simply the function of cultural nationalism formed *in relation to* imperial nationalism.

In short, the regime of erudition oversees the silent articulation of the reproduction of cleavages (reason vs. myth, speech vs. writing) and identities inherited from the imperial/colonial modernity to the neoliberal production of value through affect. The bearer of various forms (racial, ethnic, national, gendered, sexual, linguistic, et cetera) of social domination and exploitation that have accompanied modernity, erudition is above all concerned with *bodies of accumulation*. Whereas *capitalist* accumulation produces the bodies coded by political economy and *translational* accumulation produces bodies coded by civilizational and anthropological difference, *erudite* accumulation produces normalized bodies of knowledge as well as bodies normalized by knowledge.

It is through a process of identification with the body of knowledge as a site of accumulation associated with specific "areas" that intellectuals continually abstract themselves from the

production of knowledge as translational, social practice. In the postimperial scholar, this is seen most readily in the prolongation of disciplinary divisions and linguistic competencies and homolingual modes of address that form the obverse complement of the postimperial area studies specialist. The postimperial specialist of philosophy, for instance, is not expected to acquire linguistic and affective competencies associated with postcolonial areas, and typically relies on the homolingual address to negotiate anthropological difference. Or again, the postimperialist specialist of racism studies does not have to negotiate the composition of her classes and articles in relation to the demands of an academia-publishing industry complex in a postcolonial language organized by a postcolonial state that is itself composed through various forms of institutionalized racism.

Given the recent demonstrations of admiration for public intellectuals in the "West" whose politics are characterized by their admirers with epithets such as "fuck off!" (Rancière),[5] or who gain notoriety for scandalously scatological humor (Žižek), it might be necessary to explain just what we intend to get at by a critique of "etiquette." *Etiquette* is part of the "immunitarian" apparatus described by Alain Brossat in his critique of modern liberal democracy. The English usage of the word, which is associated with "good breeding" (Merriam–Webster), underscores its relation to the theme of racial exclusion that forms the hidden backbone of liberalism (Cole 2000)—and modern sociality in general (Quijano 2000). As such, it is a biopolitical technology, for which Brossat offers a wonderfully succinct description: "the distribution of bodies in a dense space, via the mediation [*truchement*] of a system of rules named etiquette" (Brossat 2003, 36). In the dense space of knowledge, the trio of erudition, homolingual address, and *ressentiment* constitutes the affective structure according to which bodies of knowledge are constituted and areas populated. It is *immunitarian* to the extent that it protects the anthropological matrix that supports capitalist accumulation in the colonial–imperial modernity from being overturned.

[5] http://critical-theory.com/who-the-fuck-is-jacques-ranciere/ accessed on May 20, 2013.

Brossat uses the French word *truchement* to speak of a mediating role played by a "system of rules." Although the term's usage here certainly refers to a general effect of mediation, it is worth noting an older, yet still current, literary usage of the term that refers to a translator and translation. We might thus take this usage as an invitation to think about what would happen were we to substitute *traduction* for *truchement*—that is, "translation" for "mediation." Doing so, we would find that etiquette is precisely the governmental technology that uses translation as a means of distributing bodies across dense space—that is, the space delineated by the apparatus of area. This definition of etiquette approximates Naoki Sakai's understanding of translation based on homolingual address. As such, it constitutes the main operation of capture exercised by the apparatus of area.

Can the Subaltern Translate?

The importance of subjective transformation in the postimperial/postcolonial age was highlighted at the beginning of North American postcolonial studies in 1988 by Gayatri Spivak in her famous essay "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (Spivak 2009a). In that work, Spivak deftly displaces the practice of cultural knowledge production in the wake of colonialism and capitalism away from the image of objects, no matter how marginalized or "illegitimate" in the eyes of dominant representations they may be, towards the production of subjectivity. It is the role of intellectual elites—on both sides of the imperial/colonial divide—that is targeted by the critique of subjectivity in Spivak's essay.

As usual, translations of the postimperial discourse into a postcolonial context can be extremely helpful for understanding the stakes involved. In the discussions of Spivak's article in Taiwan, two of the most common translations of "subaltern" are 庶民 (*shu4min2*) and 賤民 (*jian4min2*). These are classical terms that both share the same cognate *min2* as part of there two-character compound. Skipping over the possible parallels between *min2* and the Latin-derived word "people," what the two Chinese terms share in common is a description of the people as common or low. In other words, what we have here are translations that add a biopolitical element to the original term subaltern (which describes not a people but a quality of subjugation, and is hence technically limited to the

element of politics). The biopolitical translation risks resubstantializing the term "subaltern" through the matrix of anthropological difference—which, as I will show, is precisely what Spivak fights against. Needless to say, this resubstantialization has received privileged institutionalization in the postimperial academic world, and it is precisely here that a look at translation becomes especially informative.

Let me explain this message by citing another variant translation of the term "subaltern" that I have seen circulating within Taiwan: 從屬階級 (*cong2shu3 jie1ji2*) , the "class of subordinates." Once again, this translation runs afoul of the reading of Spivak's article that I favor. The inclusion of the word "class" (*jie1ji2*) in the translated term effectively reintroduces the very point that Spivak's essay problematizes: people are something else before they are a class or a type or a figure—before they are a people, which is always what the state elites *and* their prefab minorities want them to be. "Subalterns" share aspects of the "unrepresentable"—except that they do not stand heroically "outside" the register of representation guaranteed by the state form of social organization, but are rather hidden or silenced in the biopolitical warehouse of the industrial reserve army, the "pool" of a genetic population, or the sweatshops and brothels of illegal migrant labor. Here, representation is not a formalistic problem, but a practice connected to capital's appropriation of species–being precisely at the point where the mode of production meets the mode of subjection. Hence the necessity Spivak felt to remind her readers of the difference between relations of domination and relations of exploitation, and the need to read across both registers without conflating the two in a schema of representation. Needless to say, a recuperative reading of the subaltern that reinstates the original Gramscian formula ("subaltern class") that Spivak had explicitly attempted to rework (by eliminating, first of all, the term "class," which always refers us back to the state), is hardly a problem limited to Chinese translations. Indeed, the existence of such a translation can only be explained by the realization that it is, of course, a translation not of "the text itself," but rather of the way in which the North American university-publishing complex has bestowed upon it the honor of domestication by canonization. So, it is not a mistranslation at all, but a translation that is coldly accurate. The subjective effects of this domesticating canonization become all too apparent when one considers the frequency with which the term "subaltern" becomes conflated with or simply substitutes for "the non-West," leading to the use of nonsensical terms such as "the non-subaltern" to refer to the West.

For Spivak, the precise location of this appropriation cannot be *identified*, it can only be reconstructed as it were, on the basis of a rift in subjective formation. Through a series of brilliant readings of Marx, Foucault, and Deleuze, Spivak shows that there exists a split in subjective formation that corresponds to the two meanings of the English term *to represent* (which are treated, in the vocabulary of German philosophy utilized by Marx, through the two verbs *vertreten* and *darstellen*). These two meanings correspond to the difference between the subjects formed in relations of domination and those formed in the relations of exploitation. The former requires an analysis of relations to power, the latter an analysis of relations to production. It is the modern state—which of course can now include suprastate organisms and nonstate ones as well—that offers the promise of "fixing" the relation between the two, offering a precise location, as it were, such that two projected images seem to merge, just as happens in the optical viewfinder of a coincident rangefinder camera. The image, or fiction, of this "place" in which location and identity, past and future, language and people coincide is an essential feature of the aesthetic representation crucial to the modern apparatus of area. Spivak's essay thus contributes to the classic Marxist notion of class, which is summarized, as Jacques Bidet would say, by the formula "the state is always a state of class." Spivak shows, by displacing domination and exploitation, that the notion of "class" must be expanded (without losing the specificity of "class") far beyond the limits of political economy to accommodate a vast tableau of dynamic, minoritarian relations (of which gender is only the tip of the iceberg) within the construction of anthropological difference. The "subaltern" is thus the name for the spacing that is undecidably *both* the concrete body of this or that downtrodden and marginalized individual *and* the possibility of a being that can no longer be configured through the matrix of anthropological difference. Not "humanity," not species–being, not an inheritor of the entire anthropological project of the colonial–imperial modernity devoted to perfictioning, but a true (and truly caring) stranger.

From the perspective of a concern with translation, the reasons for the necessity of this expansive analytic find themselves in the correlation between the history of linguistic transformations under the auspices of the modern nation–state and the transitions of capitalist "development." Although the creation of national language in Europe was linked to class through the rise of the bourgeoisie and their need to create a political community opposed to that of a kingdom, this narrative obfuscates that part of the European nation that was forged, as Elsa Dorlin shows, in the colonies. There, the class element was concomitantly fused to an anthropological element (beginning with race and gender). "Europe" and its nations only became "European" through this process of fusion (between gender, race, class, language, ethnicity, sexuality, et cetera) that established the anthropological matrix of modernity and naturalized it via the apparatus of area.

The crux of Spivak's essay lies, as we have said, not with the identification of objects and their historical deconstruction, but rather with the constitution of subjects, particularly the subjects of knowledge forming under the shadow of capital and the state in the apparatus of area. For this reason, I must confess that the one thing that is strangest to me in the extraordinary reception this widely circulated essay has received is that so many commentators have looked at the subaltern *as a problem to be solved or an idea to be applied*, rather than, as Spivak writes in an entirely different context (one that is actually about translation), *a locus to inhabit* (Spivak 2005, 95)—or, as *an invitation to cohabitation*. We need, in other words, to develop practices of "being there" that are different from those normally catalogued under the Apparatus of Area.[6] This is not a call for a new aesthetic piety of place, but rather a plea to definitively end the essential project of modernity: the idea that technological progress and aesthetics could be allied together in the creation of a perfect species—what I want to name by the neologism "perfictioning."

[6] I do not think that I have yet compiled a complete catalogue, but there are several series whose importance is evident: 1) typology: character–figure–image; 2) ontology: origin–individuation–hylomorphism; 3) anthropology: animal–human–milieu; 4) economy: production–exploitation–accumulation; 5) statistics and logistics: temporality–event–control

While her emphasis on unrepresentability leads Spivak to conclude that the subaltern by definition cannot speak (which means that the subaltern always disappears under the weight of representation when subjects are made to conform to identities that ignore their constitutive, originary difference), she does not consider her startling answer from the perspective of translation. Or, more precisely, the position of the translator. The translator, of course, is in the position of someone who speaks without ever meaning anything herself. She is never authorized to say "I." Strategies based on the disclosure of the "invisibility of the translator" (Venuti 1995) are important to the *politics* of translation, and for that very reason they ultimately amount to a reinvestment in the nexus between modes of production and modes of subjectification through the category of identity. In lieu of *invisibility*, Sakai (1997) calls attention to *the hybridity and indeterminacy* of the translator, and he proposes a practice of heterolingual address that accounts for discontinuity as a constitutive moment of the social. This outline of the position of the translator leads me to suggest that for *the professional university-based intellectual* the ethical response to the problem of subalternity will not be found in speaking or listening, but rather in "translating."

To suggest that an ethics of subalternity can be found in translation is quite different from suggesting either that the subaltern "herself" translate or that intellectuals translate "for the subaltern." A negative example will help to illustrate my point, and prevent the confusion that might occur by modifying an idea that was first described in a remarkable text by a North American graduate researcher in political science, Jay Maggio, titled "Can the Subaltern Be Heard?" (Maggio 2007). This article, which demonstrates formidable familiarity with Spivak's *oeuvre*, proposes translation as a viable means of displacing Spivak's original question.

The genius of Maggio's formula is, however, not well served by its elaboration. Symptomatically, the article falls into the well–populated ranks of those respectables who have assigned themselves the task of finding "a possible solution to the Spivakian puzzle" (Maggio 2007, 438). More disturbingly, the author relies upon a notion of cultural translation, whose presuppositions of homolingual address we do not share, to "advocate a benevolent translator in the West who offers a sympathetic reading of the subaltern"

(Maggio 2007, 437). Although the rhetoric of benevolence and sympathy—as well as "respect" (Maggio 2007, 435)—offers a fine opportunity to remind ourselves about the merits of Christiane Vollaire's (2007) more materialist analysis of the politics and aesthetics of humanitarian aid in its relation to war, the arms trade, and the politics of "regime change," I would like to focus our attention on this idea of being "in the West." In spite of the unmistakable spirit of charity and humility that characterizes this text, the one reform that is not contemplated is subjective—the crucial one, as far as subalternity is concerned. If "the translator must recognize the implicated relationship of the Westerner and the subaltern" (Maggio 2007, 434), the translator in Maggio's text never dislodges itself from its self-assurance about identity. In order to get a sense of the magnitude of this self-assurance, I would ask the reader to bear with a lengthy list of textual citations that refer to the "West," including: "Western discourse," "the Western translator," "the Western academy," "Western thought," "the intellectual Western scholar," "a Western critic (citizen)," "Western philosophical traditions," "the Western approach," the "Western viewer," "the Western self," "the modern Western subject," "Western metanarratives," "a uniquely Western notion of the subject," "the very Western concept of an active speaker," "the careful Western [*sic*.]," et cetera. Such self-assurance might be taken in this postimperial era as the sign of humility and respect; countless theorists of much greater sophistication than myself and Maggio have been known to engage in the same repetitive obsession. Essentially a catalogue of translational tropes, this manner of invoking the West inevitably leads the author to ask, halfway through the article, "how can the Western scholar study the subaltern?" (Maggio 2007, 431).

My response to this question is to repeat the mantra "away from the study of objects and back to the formation of subjects and social composition." The lessons that the subaltern has to teach us about representation and its objects extend equally to the translator. Even the longest list of supposed civilizational traits combined with the most well-intentioned discourse that "recognizes the conditional nature of the constitution of both the dominant group as well as the subaltern" (Maggio 2007, 436) cannot immunize the translator against her own essential hybridity—much less against what Foucault dryly terms the "form of a relation with power" (Foucault 2000, 162). Hence it is no surprise to find discussions of subalternity, among those who would like to treat it as an ethical relation to objects of study, conducted in a confessional mode whose ultimate effect is to reinstantiate identity as a subject of representation. Undoubtedly, there is a postimperial etiquette at work here. Given that the history of colonialism is seen as a massive project of expropriation, the postimperial scholar signs on to a pact (the postimperial etiquette), in which his identification with the West is to be taken as the sign of a historic eschewal of the politics of imperialist expropriation. An overwhelming proportion of today's postimperial scholars—even the ones who specialize in postcolonialism—have embraced this ethics of positionality associated with their respectful acceptance of the area in which they are supposed to be assigned.

It is precisely at this point that Naoki Sakai's unique account of the position of the translator really shines. What is revealed here is an essential, original hybridity and indeterminacy, present in every social relation, yet whose presence can never be fully represented or conveyed or captured. I would like to suggest that it is this "position" that is the only viable option for the intellectual *of any location* on today's postcolonial/postimperial geocultural map who is concerned about the ethics of subalternity. So, for professional intellectuals, *it is a question of becoming subaltern with regard to the postimperial etiquette, and then of using this process of becoming to expand the ranks of subalternity without end*. This process of becoming must not be viewed through the terms of sympathy, much less appropriation; *it must not, in other words, become an aesthetic project of mimesis and figuration through which the modern project of perfictioning, or fabricating racial/species perfection, can be realized technologically!* Instead, the process of becoming subaltern has to be directly aimed at the apparatus of area, which is the main impediment to the maximization of subalternity without end. That injunction means that intellectuals will have to undertake or commit to a series of revolutionary changes in the oppositions that structure the "area–institutions" in which they work, beginning, in the context of a discussion about translation, with the valorization of authorship over that of translation, and extending beyond that specific context to the affective economy that is mobilized in support of the apparatus of area. The invention of new forms of inhabitance outside of the apparatus of area—or, to use a

less jargonistic language, the abandonment of the postimperial/postcolonial, civilizational state and the exodus from the future-ruins and past-images in which it has trapped us—is, to my mind, the only way to "adequately address the damage done by colonialism" (Maggio 2007, 431). Which is to say, of course, that the only form of reparation that makes any sense in the face of *that unrepayable debt* is to recyle the affective debris of area into a being that does not accumulate, but grows through shedding.

Transforming the Postimperial Etiquette

A collective pact concluded precisely over the apparatus of area could never function without an affective component. In a recent work, Franco "Bifo" Berardi has described what he sees as the major affective traits of "semiocapitalism" (Berardi 2009a). Chief among them is the pendulum that swings between depression and panic, from bear market to bull market. Berardi talks about interrupting the obsessive repetitions in order to create alternate refrains. My very un-Spinozist response to Bifo is that we replace depression with *sadness*. In the context of this essay, I will define this as the positive affirmation associated with carefully observing the way in which the trio of homolingual address, *ressentiment*, and erudition entraps us and prevents our liberation from the apparatus of area. Such sadness becomes the platform not for rejecting the affective structure of area, perhaps claiming ourselves to be liberated from it while others languish (or revel) within, but for embracing it within the transformations of the collective bodies–tongues–minds assemblage(s). In other words, while depression is individual, sadness is transindividual. Depression is the form that sadness takes as it goads us into individuating in the retroactive–proactive way that is typical of the apparatus of area. Sadness is affirmative in the sense that it restores depression to its transindividual element.

Undoubtedly, this transformation of affect from the individual to the noncollective transindividual is part of an ontological shift. Scheler's text on *ressentiment*, for example, can be read, as Olivier Agard's neat analysis of Scheler shows (Agard 2009), through the twin themes of an antihumanist problematization of hylomorphic anthropology and resistance to capitalist modernity. First published in 1912 and rereleased in an expanded, revised edition in 1915, Scheler's work in this text presages his incursions in the 1920s into the debates over philosophical anthropology taking place in the Weimar Republic. Agard's excavation of Scheler's work reveals a philosopher who stands, problematically, at the center of a paradox between an "anthropocentric tendency" and an "inverse tendency towards a rupture with anthropomorphism" (Agard 2009, 185). As both the "measure of every reality" and a "cultural construction" or bit of "stardust," summarizes Agard, "man is both central and decentered at the same time" (Agard 2009, 185). In *Ressentiment*, Scheler bemoans the way in which modern capitalist society perverts the Christian notion of love, directing it towards humanity in its generic qualification as a species (Scheler 1994, 99). Under capitalism, "the will of the species" substitutes itself for the good, which is reduced to a function of utility. As a result, a "new man" is produced. The new man is a hylomorphic type, defined by his relation to animality (not God). For Scheler, it is precisely this sort of hylomorphism (a word that he does not use, as far as I am aware) that creates of man a figure that oscillates between the "overman" and the "overanimal" (Scheler 1994, 105; my translation of *Übertier*). Even as Agard warns against conflating Scheler's antihumanist problematization of anthropology with the likes of Michel Foucault (leaving aside the details of Agard's fascinating, yet brief, comparison between the two thinkers), his description of Scheler implicitly recalls the Foucaultian critique of man as an empirico-transcendental doublet. Agard concludes that "[t]his dilemma remains valid today" (Agard 2009, 185). The conclusion I take from his analysis is that, at its base, *ressentiment* arises when the nonhylomorphic pair "Common/singular" (Virno 2009) is diverted to serve the interest of accumulation, becoming a state–people nexus instead. When Scheler speaks of affect in terms of a contrast between being a "passive feeling" (what is translated into French as a "state") as opposed to an "action" and "movement" (Scheler 1994, 93), he betrays the productive negativity in his antihumanism and falls back into anthropology. The vocabulary of state, act, and movement is political as well as physical. Behind this physics of power lies a Hobbesian anthropology. In place of this classical political physics and its attendant anthropology, it would be well to recall what Bifo says about power: it is not a force, but a field of relations (Berardi 2009b, 118).

With regard to reclaiming erudition, the most stubborn obstacle to a reappropriation of this relationship today is the colonization of time. I feel embarrassed to admit that the only strategies I can propose in the face of this time-consumption system are the refusal of work and volunteerism. The latter is undoubtedly a compromise, and bears an uncomfortably close resemblance to the way in which "free" labor is an integral part of the neoliberal model of labor management. The former is simply not an option for many—work, in the capitalist logic of surplus population, refuses them. For these reasons and others, the liberation from the colonization of time through the refusal of work is only the beginning, and could never be an end in itself. The most important ways of reappropriating erudition will have to come from transformations in the relation between knowledge and the body. This is another facet of permanently leaving behind the anthropological project modernity. We start by refusing to adopt an exceptional position, such as seen in the Cartesian split. For professional intellectuals, this means first and foremost that the construction of disciplinary objects must always be contested, if not refused. First, by questioning codes of domination in the objects presently considered "legitimate"; second, by questioning and rejecting the institutional imperative to devote one's work to disciplinary objects at all. In place of disciplines devoted to objects that accumulate in the body of knowledge, we need disciplines devoted to knowledgeable practices of subjective transformation.

By way of conclusion to this section, let me quote a passage from a fascinating work on the capitalist mobilization of affect by a member of the French Regulation School, Frédéric Lordon: "[I]t is once again Spinoza who gives us perhaps the definition of true communism: exploitation of affect will come to an end when men know to direct their common desires—and form an enterprise, yet a communist one—towards objects that are no longer material for unilateral capture, or, in other words, when they understand that the true good is that which wishes that others possess it at the same time as I" (Lordon 2010, 195–196). Lordon is expressing nothing less than an ontological revolution away from possessive individualism. For Lordon, this means going beyond the notion of objects as "material for unilateral capture." Yet, based on my experience engaging in and reading through a critique of the apparatus of area, Lordon's formula still leaves too much room for the subjective investment in objects that is known as disavowal. No longer taking the individual as the legitimate unit of analysis means precisely rethinking the nature and status of objects. Ultimately, the constative part of the intellectual sphere rejoins the performative part. Social relations enjoy the singular position of being the nonrepesentable, practical fulcrum between those two moments: they are both the originary point of departure and the element of determination-in-the-last instance. Armed with this sort of awareness, our interest in objects, be they disciplinary or transdisciplinary, pales in comparison to our eagerness to embrace the realm of *cooriented ontology*, "neither a return to the substantial object nor a so-called necessary anthropocentrism [but] an existentialism resolutely opposed to all homogeneity, to all ontological flattening as to all foreclosure of the common—an existentialism without reserve" (Neyrat 2013, 25). The critique of area studies shows that what is crucial to the transition to a world that has nothing to do with colonialism, and perhaps capitalism, is neither the accumulation of critically powerful troves of knowledge about specific objects nor so-called maturation and growth in the sphere of the subject, but rather the simplicity of thinking relation before the emergence of the two terms of which it is supposedly the expression—something like what the philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy calls *Mitdasein*.[7]

Once we focus firmly on relations, all those "bridging technologies" can no longer operate their ideological functions. Just as the citation above is a passage from Spinoza to Lordon, now it becomes here a passage of mine and yours. *The wish to be as numerous as possible in the sharing of indeterminate relations* is a vow that befits the practice of the translator–subaltern, and the multitude(s).

Areas in the Age of the Logistical Population

The postimperial etiquette's function is to leave the apparatus of area intact. This is what "being tactful" in the era of postcolonial/postimperial globalization means: *it is an affective*

[7] Unfortunately, it is precisely in the relation between the constative and the performative elements that Nancy's philosophical writings sometimes most grievously betray his ontological discovery of the importance of being-in-common. See Solomon 2013.

economy that obviates the need to link a radical reorganization in the mechanisms of accumulation to subjective transformation. This understanding of the postimperial etiquette is corroborated by Gayatri Spivak's observation that "a hyperreal class of consolidated so-called international civil society is now being produced to secure the post-statist conjuncture" (Spivak 1999, 399). Although the postimperial etiquette promises to mitigate the possibility that historical resentment will break out into open struggle, it does so at the cost of instituting a highly normative regime. Clothed in an ostensibly ethical discourse of respect for "cultural difference," the postimperial etiquette prolongs racism, in the broadest sense of the term, by naturalizing the apparatus of area.

Transnational complicity is acquiring a new face in the age of global semiocapitalism and biocapitalism, while the institutions and practices that constitute areas are changing rapidly. As we move from the age of the nation–state to the corporate–state, fueled by unprecedented privatizations of state functions, one has to be concerned that the postimperial etiquette today may well be operating as an ideological "justification" for the political legitimacy of the neoliberal corporate–state. Given the increasing integration of biotechnology, information technology, and nanotechnology within the context of capitalist accumulation, the meaning and role of population is undergoing vast change. The shift from "statistical populations" to "logistical populations" (Harney 2010) takes on its greatest significance, to my mind, in the apprehension of population in terms of a "pool." As biocapitalism identifies life with code and code with value, populations themselves essentially become warehouses of value–code available for the development of virtually unlimited new products to be advanced by biocapitalism. Genetic code, as seen in the expression "DNA pool," is thus the first level of meaning that I would ascribe to the "pooling" effect of logistical populations. The second and third levels occur in the moments of production and consumption. As the products of biocapitalism will be marketed directly back to the populations from which the value–code was originally sourced, logistical populations are also composed of a "consumer pool" and a "labor pool," both of which are essentially held captive to, or made targets for, the extraction of surplus value out of the bioeconomy. Needless to say, the maintenance of discipline and control within each of these pools requires an elaborate security apparatus capable of monitoring in real time the movements and borders that constitute pooling as such. The utopian vision behind logistical populations considers the possibility of aligning in perfect synchronicity the global supply chain with the food chain of the global biosphere, thereby realizing the transhumanist dream of overcoming the limits of the individual body to create the perfect species–being. Yet within the context of social action motivated by the pursuit of surplus value, this utopian vision functions in the mode of ideological alienation, covering up the separation between a present and a future whose real function is to be found not in the promised alignment of cosmic supply and demand, but in the temporal circulation of the capitalist circuit that transforms money into commodities and then back into money.

In order to see the ways in which logistical populations function as transactionable pools for the corporate surveillance state, we will unquestionably need to develops ways of looking beyond the ideology of cultural difference and identity that naturalizes the pooling effect. Even as the state moves away from a classic national form of organization, the ideology of the nation–state continues to play an enormously influential role in the mobilization of affect and the short-circuiting of collective transnational resistance to the corporate surveillance machine. In view of this situation, I expect that translation and the heterolingual form of address will play an increasingly important role in the insurrections-to-come for a coinhabitable planet.

References

Agamben, Giorgio. 2000. *Means Without End*. Translated by Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.

Agard, Olivier. 2009. "La question de l'humanisme chez Max Scheler." *Revue germanique internationale*. http://rgi.revues.org/331. Accessed November 26, 2012.

Anghie, Antony. 2004. *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Balibar, Étienne. 1994. *Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx*. Translated by James Swenson. London and New York: Routledge.

Benjamin, Walter. 1969. *Illuminations*. Translated by Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken.

Berardi, Franco. 2009a. *Precarious Rhapsody: Semiocapitalism and the Pathologies of the Post-Alpha Generation*. Translated by Arianna Bove et al. London: Minor Compositions.

———. 2009b. *The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy*. Translated by Francesca Cadel and Giuseppina Mecchia. New York: Semiotext(e).

Cole, Phillip. 2000. *Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University.

Dorlin, Elsa. 2009. *La Matrice de la race: Généalogie sexuelle et coloniale de la Nation française*. Paris: Éditions la Découverte.

Foucault, Michel. 2000. *Essential Works of Foucault (1954–1984), Volume 3: Power*. Translated by Robert Hurley, edited by James Faubion. New York: New Press.

Géophilosophie de l'Europe. 1992. *Penser l'Europe à ses frontières*. Paris: Éditions de l'aube.

Harney, Stefano. 2010. "From Statistical to Logistical Populations." http://transit-labour.asia/blogs/statistical-logistical-populations. Accessed May 29, 2013.

Kapferer, Bruce. 2010. "The Crisis of Power and the Emergence of the Corporate State in Globalizing Realities." Paper presented at James Cook University, Australia. Video: http://www.jcu.edu.au/cairnsinstitute/info/resources/JCUPRD1_061065.html. PDF: http://www.jcu.edu.au/cairnsinstitute/public/groups/everyone/documents/audio_object/jcuprd1_061188.pdf.

Maggio, J. 2007. "Can the Subaltern Be Heard? Political Theory, Translation, Representation, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 32 (4): 419–444.

Lordon, Frédéric. 2010. *Capitalism, désir et servitude: Marx et Spinoza*. Paris: La Fabrique.

Merriam–Webster. Dictionary of the English Language. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/etiquette. Accessed June 9, 2013.

Neyrat, Frédéric. 2013. *Le Communisme existentiel de Jean-Luc Nancy*. Paris: Lignes.

Nowotny, Stefan. 2007. "The Double Meaning of Destitution." *Transversal*. http://eipcp.net/transversal/0507/nowotny/en. Accessed September 24, 2011.

Quijano, Anibal. 2000. "The Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America." *Nepantla: View from the South* 1: 3.

Sakai, Naoki. 1997. *Translation and Subjectivity: On Japan and Cultural Nationalism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

———. 2009. "How do we count a language? Translation and discontinuity." *Translation Studies* 2: 1, 71–88.

Scheler, Max. 1994. *Ressentiment*. Translated by William W. Holdheim. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

Solomon, Jon. 2009. "The Proactive Echo: Ernst Cassirer's 'Myth of the State' and the Biopolitics of Global English", *Translation Studies* (New York & London: Routledge) Vol. 2 No. 1, Jan. 2009. 52-70.

———. 2010. "The Experience of Culture : Eurocentric Limits and Openings in Foucault", Transeuropéenes, No. 1, Vol. 1, 2010. http://www.transeuropeennes.eu/en/articles/108/The_Experience_of_Culture_Eurocentric_Limits_and_Openings_in_Foucault.

———. 2011. "Saving Population from Governmentality Studies: Translating Between Archaeology and Biopolitics." 2011. In eds. Deotte, Brossat, Liu & Chu. *Biopolitics, Ethics and Subjectivation* Paris: L'Harmattan. 191-206.

———. 2012. "Another European Crisis? Myth, Translation, and the Apparatus of Area." http://eipcp.net/transversal/0613/solomon/en. Accessed June 5, 2013.

———. 2013. "Zai shijie shuju yushang gongcundashi: ping Nonxi 'Lun sixiang de jiaoyi'" [Meeting the Master of "Being-In-Common" at the World Bookstore: A Review of Jean-Luc Nancy's *On The Commerce of Thinking*"]. *Router: a journal of cultural studies* 15: 498–515.

———. 2014. "Invoking the West: Giorgio Agamben's 'Romantic Ideology' and the Problems of Civilizational Transference." Forthcoming. Eds. Huang, Cory and Jon Solomon. *Concentric*.

Spivak, Gayatri. 1999. *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason*. Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press.

———. 2005. "Translating into English." *Nation, Language, and the Ethics of Translation*. Edited by S. Bermann and M. Wood, 93–110. Princeton: Princeton University.

———. 2009a. "Can the Subaltern Speak?" *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*. Edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

———. 2009b. *Outside in the Teaching Machine*. London and New York: Routledge.

Venuti, Lawrence. 1995. *The Translator's Invisibility: A History of Translation*. London and New York: Routledge.

Virno, Paolo. 2009. "Angels and the General Intellect: Individuation in Duns Scotus and Gilbert Simondon." Translated by Nick Heron. *Parrehsia* 7: 58–67.

Vollaire, Christiane. 2007. *L'Humanitaire, le coeur de la guerre*. Paris: L'Insulaire.

Jon Solomon was born in the United States and trained at Cornell University. He lived in east Asia for twenty-five years before relocating to Europe to assume a position as professor in the Institute of Transtextual and Transcultural Studies, Université Jean Moulin, Lyon, France. His extracurricular interests include backpacking and Vajrayana (Tibetan) Buddhism. His current project is to develop a discussion of "area" as an essential operation for the governing capacity of the state in parallel to the question of "population," a form of the investment of state power within life, what might be referred to as "biopower," following Foucault. Within this project, an examination of the biopolitics of translation occupies a privileged place for understanding the relations between anthropological difference, geocultural area, and regimes of accumulation.

translation speaks to Vicente L. Rafael

translation editor Siri Nergaard met with Vicente Rafael in Misano Adriatico, Italy in May 2013 at the Nida School of Translation Studies where he gave a series of three lectures. During the conversation, Rafael explains how he, as a historian, became interested in translation and how he sees translation in connection to war and weaponization. The imperial ideology of translation to gain control over linguistic plurality and diversity is threatening translation, he says, and can be seen as a war of both and on translation. The control over linguistic plurality through English is our own contemporary example of the United States' imperial project of dominating the world, according to Rafael.
The conversation continues with Rafael's telling about his interest in translation play as an opposite mechanism to war, enabling an undoing and reconfiguration of the power relations between languages and cultures. Via the example of the Philippines, the talk touches upon the role colonial education plays in regulating language, creating a linguistic hierarchy, and how translation nevertheless appears in surprising forms and expressions.
The interview with Rafael was recorded and can be accessed at the journal's website: http://translation.fusp.it/interviews

NERGAARD: Hello, Vicente

RAFAEL: Good Morning

NERGAARD: Since our journal *translation* has the subtitle "a transdisciplinary journal," you are really the perfect person for us to talk to in this interview for our journal: you are not a traditional scholar of translation studies, but you work deeply on translation from your perspective as a historian. Translation offers a unique perspective on, or a new way to analyze, colonialism, power, and language, especially in the Philippines, and even today in the United States. I would like you to tell the story of how translation became such a central theme for you.

RAFAEL: Well, like all good things in life it happened quite accidentally. By accident I mean that when I was in graduate school two things—one I [was] looking for a topic to do and I got interested in the early modern period, sixteenth century, looking at the Spanish colonization of the Philippines among other things. I noticed that there were very, very few sources written by colonized natives themselves. Most of the history was written by Spanish missionaries. I was also quite surprised to see that a lot of the writings of Spanish missionaries had to do with problems of translating the gospel because they had to preach in the native languages in order to be understood, which is much easier than translating the native languages into Spanish. It is much easier for the missionaries to learn the local languages than for the na-






tives to learn Spanish. And this is, of course, a practice consistent with what they had been doing in Latin America, so I got very interested in this topic and asked myself what would happen if one were to take a look at native languages as historical agents. Because we often think of historical agents as human beings, but there is a certain way in which you can also think of language as a historical agent that is somehow free of human control, in excess of human control, and that's exactly what happened. One result is that I wrote my book, *Contracting Colonialism*, where I talked about the centrality not just of translation, but the relationship between translation and Christian conversion. And it turns out that in the missionary tradition the two are in fact almost synonymous. To translate and to convert are very closely related. And these in turn were absolutely essential for carrying out a kind of imperial project of colonization. So from then on it seemed like translation, conversion, and colonization seemed to all resonate with each other as part of a continuum, and that has been a recurring obsession on my part, where I started looking at my subsequent work. In my later work I started looking at the American empire and the American colonization of the Philippines. But I also became very, very interested lately in the emergence of English as a kind of hegemonic language. So those are the things that have led to my becoming very interested in translation. Originally, the interest in translation grew out of my interest in larger historical issues relating to empire and colonialism.

NERGAARD: As a historian this attention to language and translation in relation to history became a kind of obsession, as you said. How did the institutions, the universities react to this? The departments of history have not paid so much attention to language—the role of language and translation. So how was your work accepted, how was it received in the universities?

RAFAEL: First of all I think you are absolutely right. Not just history, but in many other Social Sciences, even in the Humanities, translation has been ignored.

NERGAARD: Even Comparative Literature ignored translation for many years…

RAFAEL: It is for the same reason that there is a tendency to see language in purely instrumental terms, as a means to an end, as if thought was possible without language—as if actions were possible without language. I was very, very lucky again to be at the conjunction of things. I started my graduate training in the late '70s and I went to Cornell, which is in upstate New York, and at that time the United States was just opening up to a fresh wave of Continental theory, mostly from France and Germany. Everything ranging from Hermeneutics to Deconstruction, to French Feminism—all of which paid close attention to the workings of language. So it was a time that was very hospitable to what they used to call the Linguistic Turn and so it allowed me space and resources to do my own work. But it is still a struggle. In other words, the question of language is not something that is easily thought about in the historical profession. In that sense, my work is still sort of idiosyncratic, but that is OK because then I always feel like I have something different to say than what most other historians have to say. I am not doing the same old thing. I have got something different to contribute. There are certain advantages to being on the margins. One just has to know how to take advantage of that position.

NERGAARD: You are speaking about a period in which the so-called Linguistic Turn took place in philosophy, but it also ignored translation.

RAFAEL: There is another aspect in my case to what I was doing that made translation absolutely essential—that I was involved in the US in what was called Area Studies, which is this thing that emerged in the post-Cold War period. The United States was very interested in competing with the Soviet Union, and one of the things that they did was try to extend not just their military influence, but their cultural influence around the world. Part of that was to fund universities to put up what they called Area Studies so they would study different regions of the world and develop a kind of scholarly expertise in these areas. Very similar to what Britain and France and Holland and all the other European countries had done. And in the process of funding these Area Studies programs they began to emphasize language training and of course that brought out the question of translation. So people became very adept, or at least there was a whole generation of Area Studies experts that emerged from these centers that developed fluency in the languages and some of them became interested in the problem of translation. This included two of my advisors at Cornell—one of whom was Benedict Anderson, another of whom was James Siegel—and they had written particularly on problems of translation around the emergence of things like nationalism, the emergence of authoritarianism in various parts of Southeast Asia. So, in a way, again I was very fortunate to be working with people who already assumed the importance of translation. In my case, as I said, translation emerges organically from the very sense of the problems I was looking at, beginning with religious conversion and then later on with... more lately thinking about problems of counterinsurgency and militarization and so forth, where once again language and the attempt to tame language through translation becomes absolutely crucial.

NERGAARD: In the last works you mentioned, you introduced new terms and a new vocabulary with which to discuss translation studies. War of translation, translation in wartime, weaponization of translation, targeting translation in the counterinsurgency. This is really a new vocabulary and it is quite strong.

RAFAEL: Well it's not so much that it is new. The other day I was rereading *The Translation Studies Reader* by Lawrence Venuti. It is very interesting to read his historical introduction about translation studies in which he talks about, for example, Roman Antiquity and the status of translation as it was understood by the late Roman writers—Cicero and Horace and others. I am not very familiar with that history, but I was very surprised to realize that even then there were competing notions of translation. For example, a part of the idea of translating Greek authors into Latin in part had to do with the late Roman desire to rival the legacy of Greece. Not only were they appropriating Greek literature and Greek writing and Greek thought, they also wanted to, as it were, conquer it in the sort of imperial vein and so you realize that the idea of translation, at least in the West, was always implicated in the idea of rivalry, competition—which is another word for war. Not only that, but there has always been a contest between rhetorical approaches to translation and grammatical approaches to translation—word-for-word, sense-for-sense—and that tension has animated, for example, translations of the Bible from St. Jerome to Luther. And, of course, it has figured in the history of missionary translations of the gospel all the way up to today. At the Nida School of Translation Studies we are talking about this. So it is not surprising translation should figure in imperial projects of all sorts including the latest one, which is the United States' project to maintain their dominant position in the world. So in a sense what I am doing is simply reminding people of a feature of translation that tends to get lost, which is it tends to turn on not just the transfer of meaning, but also on the struggle to control that process of transferring meaning. It relates to all sorts of tensions around procedures, around the limits of what can be translated. In that sense, translation is always fraught, so it is always at war, as it were. And, finally, something I was trying to talk about yesterday is that there is what Derrida calls a kind of logocentric tradition in Western thinking, which tends to privilege thought over speech and then, of course, speech over writing and so, for instance, there is this hierarchical chain of signs. And translation figures very prominently there because within the logocentric context, as I have tried to argue, translation becomes a means to an end. And that end, at least in the Western logocentric context, is the end of translation, so you can say the end of translation is the literal end of translation—the point where people will feel like everything is so transparent that there is no need to translate. That itself is part of this war of domination that is going on.

NERGAARD: And it is almost always there as a ghost, as if that transparency was the ideal, where translation is not necessary any more.

RAFAEL: Yes, exactly.

NERGAARD: With that transparency—the end of translation—we would lose everything. We would lose plurality. We would lose meaning. We would lose everything. Nevertheless, that's the kind of ideal ghost right there.

RAFAEL: Right.

NERGAARD: As if we could avoid difference.

RAFAEL: And it not so much, really, to avoid difference or to avoid plurality. It is to be able to have total control over linguistic plurality, to make this control totally mechanical. And that is the dream, for example, of automatic translation systems. Now, the attempt to develop automatic translation systems, which I have also written about, is precisely to make everything perfectly equivalent to everything else, which of course is the dream of capitalism. This would be a perfectly capitalized world where everything could be exchanged for a single medium and measure of exchange, and in this case that medium and measure of exchange is increasingly English. English is now becoming the equivalent of the dollar, the capitalist "sign *par excellence*." So, again, it is not so much the disappearance of difference—it is about the ability to control the production and circulation of differences that this imperial ideology of translation, in my opinion, has set out to do. And, of course, there are all kinds of resistances to that, and that is part of the story that I am very, very interested in: to try and plot the way in which not only this war on translation is progressing—that is, the war *of* as well as *on* translation—but also the way in which this war is being evaded, the way this war is being displaced, the different responses to this war in such a way as to make the kind of final victory impossible. So what you get, instead, is the emergence of what I call ongoing insurgency, linguistic insurgencies of all sorts: puns, jokes, the creation of slang. And there is, of course, the most important arena for linguistic insurgency, which I believe to be literature. So long as you have literature you have hope. Because so long as you have literature, you have the need for translation. It works both ways: to the extent that you have translation, literature becomes possible, and to the extent you have literature, translation becomes essential.






NERGAARD: Necessary and essential.

RAFAEL: Right, to that extent you cannot have a single ideology of translation controlling the production of difference, because difference will always proliferate beyond the control of any particular translation ideology, thanks to literature.

NERGAARD: Thanks to literature…

RAFAEL: Yes, so literature is a principle of hope as far as I am concerned, or I should say a resource, a resource of hope in a world where translation tends to get reduced to merely instrumental terms, such as, for example, when the US Department of State calls translation a complex weapons system.

NERGAARD: Very interesting. And the connections to other areas in translation studies becomes clear. But I still suggest that you introduce a new vocabulary. With postcolonial criticism we are familiar with concepts like "power" and "conflict," but you use "war." You use other concepts, too, such as "weaponization"…

RAFAEL: In part, that grows out of the influence of the events of the last ten years, including the "Global Wars on Terror," the kind of brazen attempt at colonial occupation on the part of the United States in Afghanistan and in Iraq as well as interventions in places like Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and so forth. Not to mention, of course, the occupation of the Palestinian territories by Israel, which would not be possible without the aid of the United States. All of that has placed the question of war, I think, in a lot of people's minds, and my attempt to talk about translation in terms of war grows out of my concern with more recent events. There is also another aspect to it, which is that there is a way in which war has always played a central part in the formation of social relations and the formations of society. When you think about how, for example, modern national states have arisen, almost every single modern state has arisen precisely in the wake of, or in the process of, engaging in war both against other nation–states, as well as against certain peoples within that particular nation–state. So I would think that, to the extent that war is constitutive of social relations, it would then also have a constitutive role in the processes of translation, as indeed one can see by looking at the history of translation, showing how it is always fraught, it is always involved in all sorts of conflict. That there is, just as Derrida many years ago said about the violence of writing, so too I think there is a violence that is intrinsic to every act of translation. I think in certain cases it helps to think about translation in those terms. I do not, of course, assume it is an appropriate way to think about translation in every possible context, but, especially in contexts I have been looking at, I think the connection between translation and war is very useful.

NERGAARD: You probably could relate this to what Antoine Berman says—that all translation is naturally ethnocentric. So you sense this violence again, because you want to change what is foreign and make it look more like what you are familiar with.

RAFAEL: I mean, I agree with that to a certain extent in that the translation might begin in a sort of ethnocentric vein, but to the extent that translation also signals a kind of ineluctable opening to the other, it also initiates a kind of ongoing alterity. Its war-making powers, as it were, invariably become attenuated. Again, as I suggested yesterday in my talk, the other possibility in thinking about translation as war is translation as play, and the question of play then turns conflict, violence, and so forth in a different direction. It is about the displacement of conflict. It is not the banishment of conflict, but the reformulation of conflict as a kind of indeterminate, ceaseless displacement that allows for the destabilization of any particular power relations. And play, this is something I would like to explore further. I have only just begun to think about this question of play and of course there is an enormous literature about this. But the question of play as that which attenuates, not just a particular kind of dialectical conflict, which is at the heart of war, but the question of play is that which opens up into other possibilities, the possibilities of the literary, for example, as I was trying to suggest yesterday. Play as that which is connected to the question of freedom. Why do we play? We play because in some sense play offers a kind of escape. It offers a kind of release. It opens up an alternative world where nothing is stable, where no one is permanently on top, no one is permanently on the bottom, where there is a certain kind of joy and happiness in being able to not just control the world, but also in allowing oneself, as it were, to be controlled by the world; so there is a kind of delight in the loss of identity, or the fluidity of identity.

NERGAARD: But you have to be empowered with language before you can allow yourself to play in such a fashion.

RAFAEL: Well, you have to know the rules, of course, you have to know the rules before you can play the game, so it also brings in a certain kind of discipline, but a discipline that is not about surveillance. It is a discipline that is not about submitting to a particular power. It is a discipline that enables you precisely to participate in the loss of power, if you will. So much of play is predicated on

this loss of power, and, as I said, a kind of opening up to a certain kind of freedom. It is to think about translation as that which is connected to an emancipatory project. That is the other side. So on the one hand translation is war, which is to think of translation as ineluctably implicated in power relations, but on the other side of it is translation as play, which is to think of translation as that which also has the potential to undo and reconfigure, and perhaps do away with these power relations in the name of a more just and a more free world.

NERGAARD: Yesterday, during your talk at The Nida School in Misano Adriatico, you were discussing the school system back in the Philippines. Can you tell us a bit more about that situation in which local languages are prohibited and the use of a foreign language is imposed?

RAFAEL: What I was talking about yesterday was colonial education and the role colonial education plays in regulating language and in the creation of what I have been calling a linguistic hierarchy. I think this is typical with all, not just in a colonial context. I think this is typical of all schools, the majority of schools, where the idea of going to school, among other things, is the idea of learning how to behave in a certain socially acceptable way. And intrinsic to that mode of behavior is the ability to be able to speak in a certain accessible way. So one is educated, but one is educated in a particular way, so one becomes recognizably "grown up," becomes developed. There is this whole developmentalist philosophy that is, I think, intrinsic in all modern educational systems, colonial and postcolonial. And that has to do with being able to speak in a certain way. Speaking in a certain way, speaking in a way that is educated, as they say, and this is something that can be empirically verified in lots and lots of different situations. But this idea of appearing to be, or sounding to be, educated means being able to speak language in a kind of standardized conventional way. That often entails repressing the more idiomatic, more colloquial, more dialectical versions of that language. So one speaks Italian correctly, which means not speaking the local dialects. This is intensified and amplified in the colonial situation. The colonial situation I was talking about yesterday, where Filipino students were expected to speak English, but in the process of speaking English, they were expected to repress the vernacular. And then, of course, the question becomes to what extent is this repression successful? Or does the repressed always return? And obviously in the case of the Philippines that is what happens. It returns to haunt, as it were, various attempts to speak in a standardized conventional fashion. How do we know this? Very simply, we know this because of the persistence of accents. To the extent that people still speak with accents is the extent to which

their speech is always marked by the very thing they were supposed to suppress. And what is that very thing they were supposed to suppress? They were supposed to suppress their mother tongue, which is their origin, right? So the origin always comes back, as it were, in displaced fashion. In the form of an accent, and I think this is true every time people speak, they always speak with accents and those accents always betray where they came from, their accents always betray another speech. Deleuze has this wonderful short essay called "He Stuttered," where what he says about stuttering we can say about accents. Stuttering, he says, reveals the existence of another language within language. And he goes on to talk about this in another register when he talks about style. He says style is the foreign language that dwells within conventional speech, and to the extent that we all have our own style of speaking, that we try to develop our own style of speaking when we speak with an accent, is the extent that we are always speaking another language within the language that is socially acceptable. So that means we are always translating whenever we speak, whether our own or another's language.

NERGAARD: And can I use the accent because I want to keep my identity, too? It is not that I am not able to speak proper English, but I keep my accent because that is part of my origin.

RAFAEL: Yes, perhaps, perhaps. As you know the sounding of accents is always the sign of translation at work, so another way of thinking about accents is that accents are always the points where translation occurs, where it fails or it succeeds, right? Now, I don't know how you do this, but for example in my case, my English would be standard American English, but when I go to the Philippines I cannot speak like this. If I spoke like this people would have difficulty understanding me, or they would think that I was putting on airs, that I was trying to be better than them because I spoke a different, more Americanized English, and so they would expect me to speak in the local register. I would have to change accents and usually within a day or two I am speaking entirely, as it were, "native." I have to "go native," right? Perhaps this happens to you too when you go to Norway? And this usually is the case, so we are always translating back and forth, not only between languages, but between accents, because accents are ways of marking our identity, which is to say, difference, right?

NERGAARD: Exactly, exactly. I was thinking about the history of Norway when the Danish dominated Norway and the official language was Danish. Our written language was Danish, but the accent persisted: no Norwegian speaker used the Danish pronunciation. These languages are very close, so you have the language, the nonlanguage and the in-between, and the





Norwegians were still always in-between—they wrote in Danish, but the pronunciation was Norwegian.

RAFAEL: Fantastic, fantastic. And there is a question of whether or not it is a matter of intention. We like to think it is a matter of intention. We like to think we are in control of our accents, but in fact, to the extent that we always speak with an accent, is the extent that we cannot help but speak with an accent. That suggests that there is something physiological about speech that is beyond intentionality. Which is to suggest, if you take it one step further, that there is something about translation that is beyond our intention. There are different ways to think about it. One can think maybe translation is hardwired into our body. We must translate, we have no choice but to translate within language, across languages, within accents, across accents. It is precisely something that we are compelled to do, which is to say it is compulsive. It is beyond our intentionality. That is the other interesting thing, too, about accents: we find it is not just the sign of translation at work, it is also the sign of a certain kind of resistance to intentionality. Right?

NERGAARD: That's very interesting. That's another area that has not been explored in translation studies at all. The psychological aspect of it, too, deserves study, so I will look forward to your next book, Vicente.

RAFAEL: It will be on accents.

NERGAARD: Of course. Thank you very much.

RAFAEL: You are very welcome. It has been a pleasure.

NERGAARD: Thank you.

Vicente L. Rafael, is Professor of History at the University of Washington in Seattle. Much of his work has focused on such topics as comparative colonialism and nationalism, translation, language and power, and the cultural histories of analog and digital media especially in the context of Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and the United States. His books include *Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society Under Early Spanish Rule* (1993); *White Love and Other Events in Filipino Histories* (2000), and *The Promise of the Foreign: Nationalism and the Technics of Translation in the Spanish Philippines* (2005).

translation is published both as print and electronically, with the two versions conceived together, in constant dialogue, stimulating reflection, discussion, and debate in an open intersemiotic space where all forms and channels of communication are welcome.

The journal's online version is not simply a copy of the paper version, but much more. There you will find reviews, video interviews, shorter articles, debates, and news. Whereas the paper version is English only, we desire to open up opportunities for articles beyond English with the online version. With this translingual aspiration, we wish to create a space for continuous translations, language encounters, and hybridity.

Submissions

We accept article proposals for both the journal's paper version and web site.
We welcome articles of various length and format in both media (paper and web). Texts that consider other forms of expression than the written language—multimodal texts—are also welcome.
To submit your article, go to **http://translation.fusp.it/article-proposals**

Subscription

Subscriptions can be purchased for two issues in one calendar year. Once the subscription has been confirmed, the most recent issue in the current calendar year will be shipped to your address; the next issue, when published, will be sent to you when ready. Your subscription will also grant access to both online PDF downloadable versions and extra contents such as the right to post comments on the blog. To subscribe, either as individual, or as institution, go to **http://translation.fusp.it/subscriptions**

Printed in Italy

ISBN 978-88-6792-050-1

Raffaelli Editore
www.raffaellieditore.com