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translation

translation is an international peer-reviewed journal published in collaboration with the Nida School of Translation Studies.

Recent developments in our contemporary world (globalization, interculturalism, global and transcultural communication through the web) are challenging every traditional concept of translation. Today translation has to be considered as a transformative representation of, in, and among cultures that is poised to become a powerful epistemological instrument for reading and assessing cultural exchange.

We imagine a new era that could be termed post-translation studies, an era of fundamental transdisciplinarity.

translation invites new thinking about what translation is today, about where translation occurs, and about how we can find new words to speak about translation.

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Contents

Publisher's Announcement

Issue 2 of *translation* contains the same quality of articles found in the inaugural issue and issue 1. The difference in appearance came at the decision of those who fund the journal. We have discontinued our relationship with the production and distribution companies who completed the inaugural issue and issue 1. We apologize for the delay in getting issue 2 to you. We are grateful to The Project Company for assisting us in the interim and getting issue 2 to you the readers. We are also grateful to our Editor, Siri Nergaard, and editorial team for their work. You will be kept appraised of the dates for future issues. As you will read, the Editor has several important thematic issues nearly completed.

We apologize for any inconvenience the present changes may cause and trust that, going forward, the journal will indeed meet the expectations of our audience and continue to make its unique contribution to the discourses that combine to shape translation studies.

Stefano Arduini and Philip H. Towner

Introduction

Siri Nergaard

I think of *translation* as a young plant that is still growing and taking shape, with short roots and some small flowers already blooming. Being young gives us a certain freedom: the journal's future is not yet fixed; many decisions are yet to be taken; and we are not limited by traditions, conventions, or expectations. This issue therefore represents new elements not present in the earlier editions, differences I discuss at the end of this introduction. Despite the journal's young age, we can already glimpse certain continuities that I hope to maintain, such as inclusion of an interview. An interview represents a meeting between two or more individuals; it is by definition dialogical, and therefore it embodies more than one thought, more than one perspective. Together with the intimate quality that an interview provides, I find this dialogical emergence of ideas a positive step. We get closer to the interviewee, to her person and her more spontaneous thoughts. These qualities are all present in the interview that follows in this second issue: *Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak* meets *translation*'s Edwin Gentzler and Siri Nergaard in New York City during the Nida School of Translation Studies 2011 Research Symposium. (The video of the interview is posted on the NSTS website: http://nsts.fusp.it/about-nsts/videos/research-symposium-2011/interview-with-professor-gayatri-chakravorty-spivak.)

In addition to the image of a growing plant, I would like to think of our journal as a community composed by a variety of participants, always growing and changing. The participants have different roles—authors, readers, editors, reviewers, commentators, interviewers, and creators—and the roles are interchangeable, fluid. Some participants are more active than others; some are more visible. In this idea of community, certain contributors will be present in the journal more than once, and as such I consider them as special colleagues of the journal, helping us in shaping, evolving, and improving its identity, or, better said, personality. My wish is that our colleagues' participation shall be numerous

and variegated: coming from different cultural, geographic, scholarly and linguistic backgrounds, and offering different perspectives.

Thanks to her continuous presence, both as a contributor and as a member of the advisory board, I would like to consider Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak among the journal's first special intimate colleagues. In issue 1 (summer 2012) we published her lecture presented at the 2011 Research Symposium; here we publish the informal talk *translation* had with her during the lunch at the same symposium. Spivak's presence was further continued by her serving as this year's Nida School of Translation Studies professor, together with Sherry Simon, in Misano Adriatico in May. Simon, as a new contributor, together with Federico Montanari, has agreed to serve as one of *translation*'s future guest editors of a special issue on *Spaces and Places*.

Naoki Sakai is another of those whom *translation* considers a close colleague: in this issue we publish a revised version of the paper he presented at the Nida School in May 2012. During that same period, he gave me the opportunity to interview him, and the video of our conversation is posted on the journal's online version (http://translation.fusp.it/interviews/interview-with-naoki-sakai). Sakai's collaboration with the journal also has a bright future: our first special issue on *Translation and Politics,* to be published in 2014, will be guest edited by Naoki Sakai and his Italian colleague Sandro Mezzadra. Staying among collaborators, *Musa Dube* is also one: we are honored to publish a revised version of one of the lectures she gave at the Nida School last year as one of that session's Nida professors.

New acquaintances spur new impulses and fresh input: *Christine Gutman*, *Reza Pishghadam* and *Nasrin Ashrafi*, and *Liu Xiaoqing* are four young scholars I am very pleased to include in this issue.

From the inception of the journal, the aspect that we have declared as distinctive is the transdisciplinary nature of the field; *translation* hopes to provide an open space where a variety of approaches, theories, ideas, and practices meet and transform each other. We are also convinced that the topic that brings us together—translation—gives us a privileged opportunity to meet and discuss in a transdiscursive way: we are able to speak to each other in a transdisciplinary manner, since we translate ourselves and each other through our differing languages, ideas, concepts, and worldviews.

This "transidentity" also includes geography: in our journal we want the world to meet and transform itself, since we are convinced that real transdisciplinarity cannot be achieved by people coming from only one

hemisphere. This issue is a demonstration that we are succeeding in our transgeographic goal: the authors in this issue have their origins in Botswana, China, India, Iran, Japan, the United States, and Vietnam.

Transdisciplinarity can also entail the emergence of differences and conflicts: when people do not share disciplinary and cultural backgrounds, conflict emerges more easily; the challenge to meet around common ideas and perspectives suddenly becomes more complicated. But let us welcome the differences—translation is always an encounter with difference, in difference—and let us try to discuss and exchange ideas between and among these differences, not above or despite them. For as the Russian semiotician of culture Jurij Lotman says, *tension* and *explosion* are at the heart of the mechanisms of translation that lead to cultural change.

During this journal's short life we have already experienced how differences in perspectives and approaches might lead us to different, even conflicting, conclusions: in the introduction to the inaugural issue that I wrote with board member Stefano Arduini, we lamented an epistemological crisis in translation studies and announced the necessity of going beyond traditional schemes and borders. We did not realize how much those ideas were the fruit of narrow Western cultural and disciplinary notions—for instance, a strong emphasis on the written word and text-bound conceptions—before Babli Moitra Saraf commented on that pronouncement from another cultural and geographic position in *translation* issue 1 (summer 2012). From her position, geographically and culturally located in India, Moitra Saraf reminded us that "there has been little reflection in translation studies on how pre-literacy, pre-print cultural crossovers may have taken place, especially within geographical areas of great linguistic diversity" (Moitra Saraf 2012, 108). While we stated that we need to go "beyond disciplinary borders, and specifically beyond the bounds of translation studies" (Arduini and Nergaard 2011, 8), Moitra Saraf answered that

> it is difficult for us in South Asia to find ourselves in an intellectual cul-de-sac just yet with translation. In India, there are 22 officially recognized languages, *Ethnologue: Languages of the World 2011* lists 438 living ones. The linguistic diversity and cultural geography make for a potent combination that impacts the process of creation and the preservation of knowledge and its narration. (Moitra Saraf 2012, 108–9)

We agree on the necessity of rethinking our own positions and on the need for a shift in the approaches to translation, but this process may need to be much more radical than what we thought and expressed

in that introduction, as we still represent that scholarship "conditioned by the cultures of teleology and linearity within Judeo-Christian worldviews" (Moitra Saraf 2012, 107). The idea of translation as a linear operation, for instance, needs to be interrogated, as well as the very notion of "translation" that recognizes only interlingual practices as "translation proper." Another notion Moitra Saraf found to be conditioned by Western Judeo-Christian perspectives is that of an "original" being "inextricably linked to the idea of ownership" (2012, 108). This last fact "creates particular problems in cultures of memory where ownership is indeterminate and texts are produced in their articulation" (2012, 108).

Keeping Moitra Saraf's challenging observations in mind, let me briefly present some of the more interesting themes the authors in this issue discuss, many of them outlining paths toward the fundamental shifts we anticipated. The notion of *heterolingual address* developed by *Naoki Sakai* in his "Transnationality in Translation" seems certainly to be relevant to one of the matters that urgently needs to be challenged with regard to translation, namely, "the conventional comprehension of translation that depends on the trope of translation as bridging or transferring between two separate languages." Sakai simply reverses this convention—rather convincingly—by stating that "translation comes prior to the determination of language unities": "Before the postulation of a national or ethnic language, there is translation." Actually, "the idea of the unity of language as the *schema* for ethnic and national communality must also be a recent invention." With this reversed perspective—seeing translation as prior to the determination of language unities—Sakai proposes translation as a form of political labor to create continuity at the elusive point of discontinuity in the social, rather than a "tool" to create equivalence and exchange.

There are parallels to Sakai's idea of the heterolingual as previous to translation in *Loc Pham*'s raising questions about whether the narratives of translation should be seen as bridging. In fact, both authors challenge the frequently used trope in discourse on translation of "the bridge" as limited and limiting. The bridge both unites and separates distinct parts, representing the only means to put the parts into contact. The bridge metaphor excludes the contact zone, the in-between space where languages move, change, and merge without clear borders. To free himself from the simplified image of translation as bridging, Pham draws upon a concept referred to by Spivak (1988) and suggests that translators remain open to that *unlearning* process that precedes learning. Through such a process, Pham views bridging as "not always the end of cultural encounters" but rather a site of "cultural and mate-

rial exchanges that affect lives in significant ways," where the translator emerges "as an active participant in cultural and material justice." But bridging fails if "the translator views herself merely as a bridging agent who has the ambition of understanding the other without the necessary unlearning of her knowledge," since "hegemonic translation of the cultural into the material and the lack of rematerialization may constitute a form of injustice in the very process of justice." The relation Pham creates between translation and justice is interesting and new, and definitely closely related to a perspective held by Nancy Fraser, who sees *representation* as an important dimension of justice. Translation, argues Pham, "constitutes the very means whereby ethnic subjects of justice speak and are spoken to."

In "Translation Industry in the Light of Complexity Science: A Case of Iranian Context," *Reza Pishghadam* and *Nasrin Ashrafi* seek to apply the major principles of chaos/complexity theory to translation studies. Central concepts in complexity science, such as openness and dynamicity, feedback sensitivity, self-organization and emergence, adaptability, nonlinearity and unpredictability, and strange attractors are explained and connected to translation as an answer to what the authors see as a necessity. Pishghadam and Ashrafi write, "We need an analytical tool not only to describe the complex interrelations but also to propose a research framework that focuses on the dynamism of inter- and intra-relations." Emphasizing the idea that translation must concentrate on local realities, the authors look at Iran's translational network through the lens of chaos/complexity science and show how all the phases of a translation process are affected by the country's governmental authority expressed through censorship policies. Interestingly, the complex adaptive system of translation industry that Pishghadam and Ashrafi look at "encompasses various elements, such as publishers, translators, readers, critics, ethics, and values, as well as other related actants, such as economic, cultural, and political elements," and is not limited to the traditional binary opposition translator-author or translation-original.

In *Musa Dube*'s "The Bible in the Bush: The First 'Literate' Batswana Bible Readers" we are introduced to a different aspect of censorship. This time we are not dealing with a receiving culture that is controlling what is introduced to it but, on the contrary, a source culture that is controlling the introduction of what is translated and imported into a receiving culture. Dube illustrates the dramatic complexities of translating the Bible into colonized cultures, consisting in assimilation and muting the receptive cultures. Through the example of the Tiv people, who take the story the anthropologist Bohannan told them of Shake-

speare's *Hamlet* and relate it back to Bohannan anew by "telling it in their own way" so that she could not recognize the original play any longer, Dube questions how translations of the Bible could have been retold by culturally empowered translators more involved with intra- and intercultural activities. Comparing the two models of translation, Dube sees an alternative solution in which a translation can be "a public hearing," target cultures can be "as sacred as the stories we bring from other cultures," and the target communities "not the subjugated Other."

In her article Dube shows the earliest Batswana Bible readers' efforts to reclaim the Setswana culture by resisting colonizing translations and how this resistance concretely took place through a subversive form of "reading the Bible with and through Batswana oral cultures." It is fascinating to see how exactly the discriminated-against oral tradition becomes a means of resistance. Finally, Dube connects the Western tradition of Bible translation with globalization, concluding that it is timely to question how "biblical translations [are] embedded in the cultural and political systems and history that lead us to the current form of globalization," how they are tainted by globalization's power relations, and how "the current form of globalization inform[s] the functions of biblical translation in history and until now." The notions of resistance and subversion central in Dube's article also emerge as central in the two case studies presented, respectively, by Christine Gutman and Liu Xiaoqing. Both present interesting challenges again to the very definition of translation—this time through the "textual migrations" of the works of two important exiled authors, Isaac Bashevis Singer and Bertolt Brecht.

Christine Gutman explores "subversive use of translation as a means of navigating" one's own hybrid identity in the work of Bashevis Singer and discusses "the complexities of translating out of a hybrid language." Looking at Yiddish hybridity—*lehavdl loshn*, or "differentiating language"—Gutman illustrates how that language tradition might illuminate translation's fundamental role in decentering, empowerment, and enlargement. Again, as a thread through all the articles collected here, translation goes beyond discrete and clearly separated languages, identifying instead with hybrid, decentering, and enlarging forces. Another interesting question that arises regarding Singer's translations is the absence of originals, introducing the "questions about the extent to which Singer's practice of self-translation into English eventually became one of *writing* in English." Here we see yet another example of the relevance of questioning the one-to-one relation usually posited between original and translation. The many purposes for translating extend far beyond that of rendering an original in another language and might, as

here, represent a means for survival of languages, of literatures, and of identities. I am sure the discussions around "the lack" of an original will return in this journal, as it comprises, as emphasized by Moitra Saraf above, an inevitable break with traditional and Western definitions and delimitations of translation.

With many parallels to Gutman's exposition of Singer's writing-translating, *Liu Xiaoqing* states in her article on Brecht's *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* that "in both the actual and metaphorical senses, Brecht acted as a translator in his writing of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*. Writing was his way of translating." In such a form of translation, "the translator forms a dynamic relationship with the source and target systems in performing his creativity." Brecht's work is an interesting example of metonymic translation in that he "adopted elements from both the source (Chinese) and target (American) systems and made them into his own," in a rewriting both of the plot as well as of the value system in regard with law and justice.

Finally, there are further parallels between the articles by Gutman and Liu regarding their discussions around the conditions of exiled authors; in their working on the edges of different and even conflicting languages, traditions, poetics, and politics, translation is inevitably connected to dialectics of assimilation and adaptation, of resistance and surrender, that cannot but result in new hybrid rewritten discourses and identities.

translation's interview with *Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak* concludes the issue. In a personal and informal conversation she explains what she intends with translation: she calls herself a "literalist" and explains that her formula is "very careful literalism." She discusses the connections between creolization and translation as a question of class mobility and tells why "translation *is* the most intimate act of reading."

Cognizant of ongoing changes and open to innovation, *translation* has big projects in the works: on the content level we are planning several special issues that will further explore some of the themes that we believe are strategic in the transformation of the thinking and research on translation. *translation* invests much in its thematic issues because they represent a unique opportunity to realize the transdisciplinarity upon which we so strongly insist. In fact, every one of these issues will hold contributions by scholars who locate their work outside the usual domain of translation studies.

The first of these special themes is *Politics*, mentioned above regarding Naoki Sakai's work. I very much look forward to the collection of

articles co-edited by guest editors Naoki Sakai and Sandro Mezzadra, in that it will present and discuss the many and different facets of the political implications of translation. Another special issue for which I have high expectations is that on *Memory*, co-edited by guest editors Bella Brodzki (a member of the journal's advisory board) and Cristina Demaria. All forms of translation are in themselves articulations of memories, but what are the multiple repercussions of this form of articulation? With the special issue Spaces and Places guest edited by Sherry Simon and Federico Montanari we want to explore the different processes of translation that occur in the continuous negotiation of and in spaces and places. The initial idea is that all translation takes place in spaces and is both conditioned by space and able to promote or provoke changes in the perception and the use of spaces. A call for papers for this special issue can be found on the last pages of this issue; please visit our website to read a more extended explanations of the goals and guidelines for the issue.

If the special issues represent the innovations at the content level of *translation*'s textual future, the forthcoming transformation of our website represents innovations and options at the formal and visual level. A revised website will shortly introduce new multimedia elements that will put into practice a transdisciplinary and transsemiotic presence. *translation* will thus transform itself by offering a space where visual and acoustic translations also can find their natural expression. More details on the revised website will be posted soon.

In the meantime, I hope you enjoy reading the articles that follow!

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Transnationality in Translation[1]

Naoki Sakai

At the outset, let me note the increasing significance of the problematic of "bordering" in knowledge production today.[2] This problematic must be marked specifically as one not of "border" but of "bordering" because what is at issue is a great deal more than the old problem of boundary, discrimination, and classification. At the same time that it recognizes the presence of borders, discriminatory regimes, and the paradigms of classification, this problematic sheds light on the processes of drawing a border, of instituting the terms of distinction in discrimination, and of inscribing a continuous space of the social against which a divide is introduced. The analytic of bordering requires us to examine simultaneously both the presence of border and its drawing or inscription.

Indeed, it is in order to elucidate the differentiation of transnationality from nationality that I want to draw attention to the problematic of bordering. Most important, I want to reverse the order of apprehension in which transnationality is comprehended on the basis of nationality, on the presumption that nationality is primary and transnationality is somewhat secondary or derivative. The transnational is apprehended as something that one creates by adding the prefix trans- to nationality. Unfortunately the word *transnational* retains a morphology that the trans+national obtains only after *national* is modified, which implies that *transnational* is subsumptive to the *national*, thereby giving the misleading postulation that the national is more fundamental or foundational than the transnational. Consequently, the transnational is assumed to some degree to be derivative of the national. This widely

1. This article is built upon my previous articles and repeats some of their discussions; see Sakai 2009, 2010, 2012.

2. I learned the term "bordering" from Mezzadra and Neilson 2008.

accepted pattern of reasoning derives from our mental habit according to which the adjectival *transnational* is attributed to an incident or situation uncontainable within one nationality. For example, when some individual or people moves across the outer limits of one national territory into another, such a movement is called transnational. Likewise, a company incorporated in multiple national territories and managing projects mobilizing its employees of different nationalities living in different countries at the same time is called a transnational corporation. What I want to highlight, first of all, is the implicit presumption underlying the concept of nationality: that nationality cannot make sense unless it is postulated against the horizon of internationality.

Modernity and Internationality

We must keep in mind that *nationality* does not make sense unless it is viewed in conjunction with *internationality*, and transnationality must not be confused with internationality. In order to assert the priority of transnationality to nationality, therefore, our first move is to delineate the semantics of transnationality as distinct from that of internationality.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of the modern world can be found in its *internationality*; the modernity of the modern world has manifested itself in the formation of the international world. Today transnationality is generally understood within the schema of the international world. By "schema," I mean a certain image or figure against the background of which our sense of nationality is apprehended. However, it is important to note that, in some regions, such as East Asia, the international world did not prevail until the late nineteenth century. In this part of the globe the international world was entirely new, and it took more than a century before East Asian states gave up the old tribute system and yielded to the new inter-state diplomacy dictated by international law. In this regard, there the international world was a mark of colonial modernity. And it is in the very process of introducing the international world that the binary of the West and the Rest began to serve as the framework within which the colonial hierarchy of the globe was represented.[3]

Of course, the international world is not exclusively a phenomenon of the twentieth century. Dividing the world into two contrasting areas,

3. The idiom "the West and the Rest" has been used by a number of historians of modern colonialism. Arguably the most important is Hall 1996.

the West and the Rest, has been an institutionalized practice widely accepted in academia for a few centuries.[4] This dichotomy may be traced as far back as the seventeenth century, when the system of international laws was inaugurated with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This peace treaty, subsequent to the Thirty Years' War, established the division of the two geopolitical areas. The first of these two areas would subsequently be called "the international world," in which four principles were to be observed: (1) the sovereignty of the national state and its self-determination; (2) the legal equality among national states; (3) the reign of international laws among the states; and (4) the nonintervention of one state in the domestic affairs of another. The second of these areas was a geopolitical area excluded from the first, in which these four principles, including the reign of international laws, had no binding force. The first area would later be called the West, while the second area would be excluded from the international world and became literally "the rest of the world," with its states and inhabitants subject to colonial violence.

The beginning of modernization in Japan is usually depicted as her "opening to the West" when Commodore Matthew Perry commanding the United States naval fleet forced the Tokugawa shogun to sign the Convention of Kanagwa in 1854. It marks Japan's entry into the international world. It goes without saying that Japan's colonization of Korea half a century later, for instance, was accomplished following the protocols of the international world. Many parts of the globe were also colonized according to the schema of the international world. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the majority of the second area was transformed into colonies belonging to a few superpowers. However, this pseudo-geographic designation of the West—it is pseudo-geographic because, in the final analysis, the West is not a geographical determinant—gained currency toward the end of the nineteenth century when the international world had to expand to cover the entire surface of the earth as a result of three developments: (1) colonial competition among the imperialist states; (2) the emergence of Japan and the United States as modern imperial powers; and, most important, (3), the increasingly widespread anticolonial struggles for national self-determination. In this historical determination of the West, its distinction from the rest of the world derived from the legacy of colonialisms.

In order for a colony to gain independence, the colonized had to establish their own national sovereignty and gain recognition from

4. See Solomon and Sakai 2006, 1–38.

other sovereignties. In other words, the process of decolonization for a colonized nation meant entering the rank of the nation-states in the international world. As the number of nations being recongized in the international world increased, the presumptions of nationality and internationality were accepted as if these had been naturally given. As the schematic nature of the international world was somewhat forgotten, both nationality and internationality were naturalized, as though the institutions marking the border of the national community—national territory, national language, national culture, and so forth—had been genetically inherited.

It is at this juncture that the concept of transnationality must be invigorated. It must be rejuvenated in order to undermine the apparent naturalness of nationality and internationality and to disclose the very historicity of our presumptions about nationality, national community, national language, national culture, and ethnicity that are more often than not associated with "the feeling of nationality." Here the classical notion of *nationality* in British Liberalism is of decisive importance in order to historicize the schema of the international world. According to John Stuart Mill, *nationality* means:

> a portion of mankind are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively. This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, and community of religion greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past. (Mill 1972, 391)

In East Asia, it was arguably Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901) who first introduced the British discussion on the nation and nationalism systematically and wholeheartedly. Today he is remembered as one of the leading enlightenment intellectuals who advocated for the creation of the modern nation in Japan and translated the English term *nationality* into *kokutai* (national body) in the 1870s, the early Meiji period. Later *kokutai* was used as a fetish to express the sovereignty of the Japanese emperor. The word *nationality* or *national body* had acquired almost a

sacrosanctity and proscriptiveness in the Japanese Empire in the early twentieth century. In his *Outline of a Theory of Civilization* (1973), however, Fukuzawa included Mill's explications of nationality and the *feeling of nationality* (*kokutai no jô*) almost verbatim in his exposition of *kokutai*. For Fukuzawa, the project of creating the feeling of nationality among the inhabitants of the Japanese archipelago was an absolutely indispensable part of the construction of a nation-state. First of all, what had to be acknowledged in what used to be under the reign of the feudal government was the absence of the feeling of nationality among the masses inhabiting the islands of Japan; there was no nation of Japan, no Japanese as a nation. Therefore, the task of creating an unprecedented type of community called "nation" had to be found in the manufacture of the feeling of nationality.

Without being recognized as a sovereign state in the international world, however, people living in the Japanese archipelago would never constitute themselves as a nation or enter the modern international world. For Fukuzawa, the modernization of Japan, therefore, meant the creation of the institutional conditions for the feeling of nationality, without which people would never form a national community; neither as individuals nor as a collectivity would the Japanese be able to become independent without the feeling of nationality.

As soon as the term *nationality* was introduced in East Asia, it served to distinguish those who were capable of independence from those others who were doomed to colonization. Fukuzawa firmly believed that, unless the legacies of Confucianism were removed, society could not be reorganized to transform itself into such a modern community—namely, a *national* community—so that the feeling of nationality would prevail. As we know this was not particular to Japan, this conviction toward modernization was repeated by other nationalist intellectuals such as Lu Xun in China and Yi Kwansu in Korea. The urge to modernize and turn their countries into nation-states propelled many nationalist intellectuals in East Asia to engage in struggles against Confucianism and other feudalistic remnants in their own societies. In East Asia as elsewhere, the problem of nationality was closely affiliated with concerns about colonial modernity.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nationalist intellectuals believed, almost without exception in East Asia and elsewhere in the Rest, that the introduction of nationality was an absolutely necessary condition without which peoples in the rest of the modern international world could not deal with colonial modernity. They understood that only by turning local masses into a *people* with

nationality could they incite them to refuse to accept their predicament of colonial subjugation and humiliation. It was, of course, imperative to institute the systems of industrial capitalism in their own countries and to educate the population so as to make it capable of scientific rationality. The fate of the nation could not be divorced from the project of modernization. Modernization necessitated the introduction of industrial production facilities, national education, a system of national transportation, a national currency regulated by the national bank, a modern military built up with national conscription, and a spirit of scientific rationality guiding modern technology and production into a society. Still, any of these institutions necessary for nation-building would be empty and useless if not accompanied by the feeling of nationality that bound people together as a nation as a community of shared destiny. Nationalist intellectuals firmly believed that people under colonial domination would never be able to deal with the actuality of colonial modernity unless they formed a political community called "nation," a new political camaraderie shaped after the pattern of "fraternity" independent of the previous familial, kin, or tribal affiliations. They were convinced that, unless the indigenous population first formed a nation, they would never be able to liberate themselves from the shackles of colonial subjugation.

Of course, the problematic that guides my inquiry here is quite different from this nationalist concern. Rather, it is committed to the problem of how to emancipate our imagination from the international regime of the nation-state, not through negation of the nation-state itself but by problematizing the methodological nationalisms permeating knowledge production in the humanities, particularly in area studies, so as to project an alternative image of the transnational community. Suspending nationalist conviction, I refuse to view nationality as something given; instead, I reverse the order of priority while never rejecting our struggle with colonial modernity. Simply put, my starting point is that nationality is a restricted derivative of transnationality, and my guiding question is how the transnational, the foundational modality of sociality, is delimited, regulated, and restricted by the rules of the international world. It is in this context that I have to confront the issue of *bordering*.

Bordering and Translation

In order to problematize the priority of nationality and the international world, we must first problematize the figure—image, trope, or

schema—of the border. It goes without saying that the border cannot exist naturally; physical markers such as a river, a mountain range, a wall, or even a line on the ground become a border only when made to represent a certain pattern of social action. In this respect, a border is always constructed by humans and assumes human sociality. Only when people react to one another does a border come into being. Even if a border separates, discriminates, or distances one group from another, people must be in some social relation for a border to serve as a marker or representation of separation, discrimination, or distance. A border is a trope that serves to represent primordial sociality. Therefore, a border is posterior to social relations, which may well include the act of exclusion, discrimination, or rejection. At the beginning, there is an act of "bordering." Only where people agree to "border" can we talk about a border as an institution. Thus, "bordering" always precedes the border.

Prior to bordering, it is impossible to conceptualize the national border. Thus, the national territory is indeterminate prior to bordering. Similarly, it is impossible to determine a national language prior to bordering.

So what corresponds to this "bordering" as far as language is concerned? Of course, it is translation. What I want to put forth here is that, at the level of schematism, translation comes prior to the determination of language unities that translation is usually understood to bridge. Before the postulation of a national or ethnic language, there is translation, just as there is transnationality before nationality.

At this stage I do not know whether a focus on bordering has gathered momentum across different disciplines, but a bordering turn must be accompanied theoretically by a translational turn: bordering and translation are both problematics projected by the same theoretical perspective. Just as bordering is not solely about the demarcation of land, translation is not merely about language.

In this article I pursue a preliminary investigation about the discussion of translation beyond the conventional domain of the linguistic. Yet the first issue that must be tackled is how to comprehend language from the viewpoint of translation, or how to reverse the conventional comprehension of translation that depends on the trope of translation as bridging or transferring between two separate languages. However, please allow me to remind you that mine is a discursive analysis beyond the domain of the linguistic. Accordingly, it involves the questions of figuration, schematism, mapping, cartographic representation, and the institution of strategic positions. In the conventional understanding

of translation—elsewhere I characterized it as the schematism of configuration (Sakai 1997, 1–17, 41–71)—the separation of two languages or the border between them is already presupposed. This view of translation always presumes the unity of one language and that of another because their separation is taken for granted or already as given; it is never understood to be something drawn or inscribed. In other words, the conventional view of translation does not know bordering.

In this order of reasoning regulated by the tropic of translation I find one of the delimitations imposed by the presumptions of nationality and the international world. Nationality must be postulated prior to the process of the transnational transaction precisely because it cannot be conceptualized otherwise, just as national language must be assumed to exist prior to the process of translation because translation is preordained to be represented as bridging the gap between two separate languages. For this reason, the international world cannot but be predetermined as the juxtaposition of distinct nationalities that are external to one another. The economy of the international world thus excludes the potentiality of "heterolingual address" from the outset (Sakai 1997, 1–17).

Translation almost always involves a different language or at least a difference *in* or *of* language, but what difference or differentiation is at issue? How does it demand that we broaden our comprehension of translation? From the outset, we must guard against the static view of translation in which difference is substantialized; we should not yield to the reification of translation that denies it its potentiality to deterritorialize. Therefore, it is important to introduce the difference in and of language so that we can comprehend translation not in terms of the communication model of equivalence and exchange but as a form of political labor to create continuity at the elusive point of discontinuity in the social.

One may presume that it is possible to distinguish the type of translation according to the type of difference in or of the language to which translation is a response. To follow Roman Jakobson's (1971, 261) famous typology of translation, one may refer both to a project of overcoming incommensurability as a type of translation (interlingual translation) from one natural language to another and to an act of retelling or interpreting from one style or genre to another in the same language (intralingual translation) as instances of translation. Furthermore, one may cite an act of mapping from one semiotic system to another as a distinctive type of translation (intersemiotic translation). In this typology, however, the unity of a language must be unproblematically pre-

supposed. Were it not for this supposition, it would be hard to discuss a *different* language, different from the original language, in *inter*lingual translation that takes place between languages external to one another. Neither would it be possible to designate the inside of a language or to refer to a language as the same in *intra*lingual translation. Thus, we are forced to return to the question, What difference?

At this point my inquiry moves from the question of what is different *in* or *of* language to another question: What is different *from* the language? This is to say, we must entertain the question of what language is, how the linguistic differs from the extralinguistic, and how the domain of the linguistic is constituted. In the scope of difference in and of language, however, we are still caught in the mode of questioning where the unity of a language is assumed. By difference, then, do we still understand that one term in particularity is distinguished from another against the background of the same generality, just as a white horse is different from a black horse among horses in general? Do we have to understand difference necessarily as a *specific* difference? Can the sort of difference at stake in translation be appropriately discussed in terms of the *species* and *genus* of classical logic?

The world accommodates one humanity but a plurality of languages. It is generally upheld that, precisely because of this plurality, we are never able to evade translation. Our conception of translation is almost always premised on a specific way to conceive of the plurality of languages. Not surprisingly, we are often obliged to resort to the story of Babel when we try to think through the issues of the unity of humanity but the necessity of translation. But we must not forget that the ancient story of the tower of Babel is most often appropriated into the schema of the international world. Can we assume that this unity in plurality must be figured out only within the schema of the international world transhistorically? Can we conceive of discourses in which the thought of language is not captured in the formula of "many in one international world"? Are we able to conceive of language in an alternative way?

How do we recognize the identity of each language? That is, how do we justify presuming that languages can be categorized in terms of one and many? Is language a countable, like an apple or an orange and unlike water? Is it not possible to think of language, for example, in terms of those grammars in which the distinction of the singular and the plural is irrelevant? What I am calling into question is the unity of language, a certain *positivity of discourse* or historical a priori in terms of which we understand what is at issue whenever a different language or difference

in language is at stake. How do we allow ourselves to tell one language from another, to represent language as a unity?

My answer to this question posed some twenty years ago is that the unity of language is like Kant's *regulative idea* (Sakai 1992, 326). It organizes knowledge but is not empirically verifiable. The regulative idea does not concern itself with the possibility of experience; it is no more than a rule by which a search in the series of empirical data is prescribed. It guarantees not empirically verifiable truth but, on the contrary, "forbidding [the search for truth] to bring it to a close by treating anything at which it may arrive as absolutely unconditioned" (Kant 1929, 450). Therefore, the regulative idea gives only an *object in idea*; it only means "a *schema* for which no object, not even a hypothetical one, is directly given" (1929, 550, emphasis added). The unity of language cannot be given in experience because it is nothing but a regulative idea, enabling us to comprehend related data about languages "in an indirect manner, namely in their systematic unity, by means of their relation to this idea" (1929, 550). It is not possible to know whether a particular language as a unity exists or not, but by subscribing to the idea of the unity of language, we can organize knowledge about languages in a modern, systematic, and scientific manner.

To the extent that the unity of national language ultimately serves as a schema for nationality and offers a sense of national integration, the idea of the unity of language opens up a discourse to discuss not only the naturalized origin of an ethnic community but also the entire imaginary associated with national language and culture. A language may be pure, authentic, hybridized, polluted, or corrupt, yet regardless of a particular assessment of it, the very possibility of praising, authenticating, complaining about, or deploring it is offered by the unity of that language as a regulative idea. However, the institution of the nation-state is, we all know, a relatively recent invention facilitated by the formation of modern international law. Thus we are led to suspect that the idea of the unity of language as the *schema* for ethnic and national communality must also be a recent invention.

How should we understand the formula of many in one, the plurality of languages in one humanity, when the unity of language has to be understood as a regulative idea or *schema* for an object in idea? For Kant, a regulative idea is explicated with regard to the production of scientific knowledge; it ensures that the empirical inquiry of some scientific discipline will never reach any absolute truth and therefore is endless. Every scientific truth changes as more empirical data accumulate. Kant also qualifies the regulative idea as a *schema*, that is, an image,

design, outline, or figure not exclusively in the order of idea but also in the order of the sensory.

From the postulate that the unity of national language is a regulative idea, it follows that this unity of national language enables us to organize various empirical data in a systematic manner so that we can continue to seek knowledge about the language. At the same time, it offers not an object in experience but rather an *objective* in praxis toward which we aspire to regulate our uses of language. The principle is not only epistemic but also strategic. Hence it works in double registers: on the one hand, it determines epistemologically what is included or excluded in the database of a language, what is linguistic or extralinguistic, and what is proper to a particular language or not; on the other hand, it indicates and projects what we must seek as our proper language, what we must avoid as heterogeneous to our language and reject as improper for it. The unity of a national language as a schema guides us in what is just or wrong for our language, what is in accord or discord with the propriety of the language.

Of course, *translation* is a term with much broader connotations than the operation of transferring meaning from one national or ethnic language into another, but in this context I am specifically concerned with the delimitation of translation according to the *regime of translation* by which the idea of the national language is put into practice. I suggest that the representation of translation in terms of this regime of translation serves as a *schema of co-figuration*: only when translation is represented by the schematism of co-figuration does the putative unity of a national language as a regulative idea ensue. This schema allows us to *imagine* or *represent* what goes on in translation, to give to ourselves an *image* or *representation* of translation. Once imagined, translation is no longer a movement in potentiality. Its image or representation always contains two figures, which are necessarily accompanied by a spatial division in terms of border. Insofar as not the act of representation but the representation or image of translation is concerned, we are already implicated in the *tropes* and images of translation. As long as we represent translation to ourselves, it is not possible to evade the *tropics of translation*. Primarily border is a matter of tropics as far as translation is concerned because the unity of a national or ethnic language as a schema is already accompanied by another schema for the unity of a different language; the unity of a language is possible only in the element of many in one, and in order for there to be many, one unity must be distinguishable from another. In the representation of translation, therefore, one language must be clearly and visibly distinguished from

another. The unity of a language requires the postulation of border in the tropics of translation.

Discontinuity in the Social

Translation takes various processes and forms, insofar as it is a political labor to overcome points of incommensurability in the social. It need not be confined to the specific regime of translation; it may well lie outside the modern regime of translation.

The modern is marked by the introduction of the schema of co-figuration, without which it is difficult to *imagine* a nation or ethnicity as a homogeneous sphere. As Antoine Berman (1984) taught us about the intellectual history of translation and Romanticism in Germany, the economy of the foreign, that is, how the foreign must be allocated in the production of the domestic language, has played the decisive role in the *poietic*—and poetic—identification of the national language. Without exception, the formation of a modern national language involves institutionalizations of translation according to the *regime of translation*.

Most conspicuously manifest in eighteenth-century movements such as Romanticism in western Europe and *Kokugaku* (National Studies) in Japan, intellectual and literary maneuvers to invent a national language mythically and poetically were closely associated with a spiritual construction of new identity, in terms of which national sovereignty was later naturalized. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue, the nation makes "the *relation* of sovereignty into a *thing* (often by naturalizing it) and thus weed[s] out every residue of social antagonism. The nation is a kind of ideological shortcut that attempts to free the concepts of sovereignty and modernity from the antagonism and crisis which define them" (Hardt and Negri 2000, 95). This foundation for the legitimation of national and popular sovereignty was proffered as a "natural" language specific to the *people*, which ordinary people supposedly spoke in everyday life. This historical development is generally referred to by literary historians as the emergence of the vernacular. The emphasis on ordinary and colloquial languages went with the reconception of translation and the schematism of co-figuration.

Returning to the question of the relation between translation and discontinuity, I will explore how our commonsensical notion of translation is delimited by the schematism of the world (i.e., our representation of the world according to the schema of co-figuration) and conversely how the modern figure of the world as international (i.e., the world consisting of the basic units of the nations) is prescribed by

our representation of translation as a communicative and international transfer of a message between a pair of ethnolinguistic unities.

The measure by which we are able to assess a language as a unity—again, I am not talking about phonetic systems, morphological units, or syntactic rules of a language but rather about the whole of a language as *langue*—is given to us only at the locale where the limit of a language is marked, at the border where we come across a nonsense that forces us to do something in order to make sense of it. This occasion of making sense from nonsense, of doing something socially—acting toward foreigners, soliciting their response, seeking their confirmation, and so forth—is generally called translation, provided that we suspend the conventional distinction between translation and interpretation. The unity of a language is represented always in relation to another unity; it is never given in and of itself but in relation to an other. One can hardly evade dialogic duality when determining the unity of a language; language as a unity almost always conjures up the co-presence of another language, precisely because translation is not only a border crossing but also and preliminarily an act of drawing a border, of *bordering*. Hence I have to introduce the *schematism of co-figuration* in analyzing how translation is represented.

If the foreign is unambiguously incomprehensible, unknowable, and unfamiliar, it is impossible to talk about translation, because translation simply cannot be done. If, on the other hand, the foreign is comprehensible, knowable, and familiar, it is unnecessary to call for translation. Thus, the status of the foreign in translation must always be ambiguous. It is alien, but it is already *in transition* to something familiar. The foreign is simultaneously incomprehensible and comprehensible, unknowable and knowable, and unfamiliar and familiar. This foundational ambiguity of translation derives from the ambiguity of the positionality generally indexed by the peculiar presence of the translator; she is summoned only when two kinds of audiences are postulated with regard to the source text: one for whom the text is comprehensible, at least to some degree, and the other for whom it is incomprehensible. The translator's work lies in dealing with the difference between the two. It is only insofar as comprehensibility is clearly and unambiguously distinct from incomprehensibility that the translator can be discerned from the nontranslator without ambiguity in the conceptual economy of this determination of the foreign and the proper.

It is important to note that the language in this instance is figurative: it need not refer to any natural language of an ethnic or national community such as German or Tagalog, since it is equally possible to

have two kinds of audiences when the source text is a heavily technical document or an avant-garde literary piece. Language may refer to a set of vocabulary and expressions associated with a professional field or discipline, such as legal language; it may imply the style of graphic inscription or an unusual perceptual setting in which an artwork is installed. One may argue that these are examples of intralingual and intersemiotic translation, respectively, but they can be postulated only when they are in contradistinction to translation proper. The propriety of translation presupposes the unity of a language; it is impossible unless one unity of language is posited as external to another, as if, already, languages were considered as countable, like apples. These figurative uses of translation illustrate how difficult it is to construe the locale of translation as a linking or bridging of two languages, two spatially marked domains. Here I want to stress again that translation is not only a border crossing but also and preliminarily an act of drawing a border, of bordering.

Considering the positionality of the translator, we can now approach the problematic of subjectivity. The internal split in the translator, which reflects the split between the translator and the addresser or between the translator and the addressee, and furthermore the actualizing split in the addresser and the addressee,[5] demonstrates the way in which the subject constitutes itself. This internal split in the translator is homologous to the fractured I, the temporality of "I speak," which necessarily introduces an irreparable distance between the speaking I and the I that is signified, between the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the enunciated. Yet in translation the ambiguity in the personality of the translator marks the instability of the we as the subject rather than the I; this suggests a different attitude of address, which I have called "heterolingual address" (Sakai 1997, 1–17) and in which one addresses oneself as a foreigner to another foreigner. Heterolingual address is an

5. The split cannot be limited to the cases of translation, for, as Briankle Chang suggests, the putative unities of the addresser and the addressee can hardly be sustained because the addresser himself is split and multiplies, as figuratively illustrated by the Plato-Socrates doublet in Derrida's "Envois" (Derrida 1987, 1–256). As to communication in general, Chang argues, "Because both delivery and signing are haunted by the same structural threat of the message's nonarrival or *a*destination, the paradox of the signature also invades communication. Communication occurs only insofar as the delivery of the message *may* fail; that is, communication takes place only to the extent that there is a separation between the sender and receiver, and this separation, this distance, this *spacing*, creates the possibility for the message *not* to arrive" (Chang 1996, 216).

event, because translation never takes place in a smooth space; it is an address in discontinuity.

Rejected in monolingual address is the social character of translation, of an act performed at the locale of social transformation where new power relations are produced. Thus the study of translation will provide us with insights into how cartography and the schematism of co-figuration contribute to our critical analysis of social relations, premised not only on nationality and ethnicity but also on the differentialist identification of race, or the colonial difference and discriminatory constitution of the West.

Of course I cannot present an exhaustive account of how transnationality is prior to nationality, but I hope I have suggested one directive among many of analysis in which to emancipate our imagination from the regime of the nation-state by problematizing the methodological nationalism that permeates knowledge production in the humanities, particularly in area studies, and thereby projecting an alternative image of the transnational community. By focusing on the tropics of translation, I refuse to view nationality as something given and to seek in nationality the sole exit from colonial subjugation. Instead, I choose to reverse the order of priority between the transnational and the national. Simply put, my starting point is that nationality is a restricted derivative of transnationality, and my guiding question is how the transnational, the foundational modality of sociality, is delimited, regulated, and restricted by the rules of the international world. It is in this context that I want to situate the issue of *bordering* as one of translation.

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

Justice in Translation: From the Material to the Cultural

Loc Pham

Translating is sometimes analogized to a bridge-building undertaking in which linguistic and cultural disparities among communities are, as it were, reconnected in the post-Babel dispersal of human tongues. Translation creates connectedness, undoubtedly, yet as Michael Cronin has pointed out, "connectedness has as a necessary prerequisite the identification and maintenance of separateness" (2006, 121). Diversity lies at the heart of Cronin's insight of the separateness that is fundamental to translation, and he advocates the teaching of diverse languages. As diversity excites imagination, it also troubles communication. Much of the scholarship in translation studies has focused on the mediation of diversity and the trouble it has produced. The idea of bridging implies some sort of cross-cultural and cross-linguistic understanding. Maria Tymoczko notes that "the center of a translator's agency lies in the power to adjudicate difficulties caused by disparities and asymmetries in cultural understandings and cultural presuppositions" (2007, 231). In this light, she asserts that a cultural translator must assume the task of "inducing an audience to be willing to learn, to receive difference, to experience newness" (2007, 232). However, as Gayatri Spivak has suggested in her seminal essay "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (1988), in cases of cultural encounters marked by asymmetrical power relations, learning requires the anterior systematic unlearning of one's privilege and knowledge. Central to Spivak's notion of unlearning is the deconstructive questioning of the very discourse from within which one learns "to speak to (rather than listen to or speak for)" others (1988, 395). And although Spivak only deals here with the unlearning that is fundamental to the learning to speak to "the historically muted subject of the

subaltern woman" (1988, 395), I contend that unlearning is central to any task of translation.

Unlearning as I use it in this essay involves the necessary questioning of fundamental concepts in translation, including the definition of translation itself and the cultural assumptions surrounding the process of translation. Without this unlearning, as I will show, the bridge of translation could turn out to be a channel of cultural violence rather than cultural mediation. If cultural translation inevitably involves the task of cultivating the will to learn in the audience as Tymoczko has stipulated, and if learning must be preceded by unlearning, then it becomes clear that translation is much more complex than the ideal of bridging seems to suggest.

In this article I take up this line of thinking about translation as bridging and explicate the complexity of bridging itself by bringing in the notion of justice and the Spivakian task of unlearning as the foundation of justice. I argue that, in a multicultural context, justice is a matter of translation, and as such translation should be understood as part and parcel of the doing of justice. A view of translation as a gateway to an enlarged cultural horizon proves inadequate if justice is the ultimate goal of translation. Also, the emphasis on the translator as an agent who induces an audience to a world of otherness may in some cases pose injustice to more "resistant" groups for whom an enlarged horizon invariably involves the abandonment of fundamental aspects of their culture. The fact of the matter is that bridging is not always the end of cultural encounters. Reaching out to another culture, in today's world of multiculturalism, often carries with it a certain social and political agenda. A bridge is not constructed merely to provoke a romantic sense of connection and mutual understanding but itself functions as a passageway that channels the flow of ideas and materials across communities. As soon as a bridge is constructed, communities at both ends invariably undergo transformations triggered by the flows that ensue. The view of translation as a bridge-building exercise, therefore, should not stop at extolling it as a symbol of connection, a universally accepted form of mediation, but as a real channel of cultural and material exchanges that affect lives in significant ways.

In this light, the translator does not emerge merely as a cultural mediator channeling cross-cultural understanding but as an active participant in cultural and material justice. The unlearning that constitutes the necessary foundation of the translational bridge-building exercise is the questioning of the presence of the bridge itself, what it does to the communities that it connects, and from what cultural position it is built.

Translation should not be done simply because we want to understand and do justice to the other, yet without hindsight of the cultural consequences that ensue from this effort at understanding and doing justice.

What follows is an account of a case of failed translation in which the translator views herself merely as a bridging agent who has the ambition of understanding the other without the necessary unlearning of her knowledge. As is well known, translation does not take place in a vacuum but in a continuum (Bassnett and Trivedi 1999, 3), and from this case of failed translation I also bring forth the social fabric that anticipates such a failure. In other words, I attempt to show that in many cases translation lies at the heart of justice, especially when justice is to be done across linguistic and cultural borders and when justice in the contemporary world takes heterogeneous forms that require some sort of translation among themselves.

To do all this, I recount a story told by Bharati Mukherjee, "The Management of Grief" (1988). The story revolves around an effort by a social worker to connect with a group of Indian Canadian citizens whose loved ones were killed in a terrorist bombing of an aircraft. The white Canadian social worker wants to use Mrs. Bhave, whose husband and sons were among the victims, as a mediating agent to help her connect with this Indian Canadian community to provide them with access to the government relief effort. As the story unfolds, it becomes clear that, despite the linguistic and cultural mediation provided by Mrs. Bhave, the social worker fails to understand what it really takes for the community to understand and accept the government's outreaching effort and provision of material relief. The story ends with a sense of cultural disconnection whereby the social worker takes for granted the provision of material justice as something universally accepted. She fails to understand the cultural nuances underpinning the Indian Canadian resistance to her outreaching effort. She fails to unlearn the mainstream privileging of material provision over cultural recognition. The story, as I will show, demonstrates the failure of cultural translation as mere linguistic bridging whereby material justice is assumed to be universally valuable.

Forms of Justice

The literature on justice has undergone significant transformation as poststructuralism and cultural politics spread across the humanities and social sciences. In her most recent book, *Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World* (2009), Nancy Fraser revises the

dual model of economic redistribution and cultural recognition that she developed some ten years earlier in *Justice Interruptus* (1997b). Accordingly, the new model not only includes economic and cultural aspects of justice but also recognizes *representation* as an important dimension of justice in a world where economic, cultural, and political processes no longer work in a Keynesian-Westphalian frame.

In Fraser's view, both the substance and the framing of justice have been transformed radically. In terms of substance, there has been a radical heterogeneity of justice discourse in which claims of justice are no longer exclusively concerned with socioeconomic redistribution. There have arisen new demands for cultural recognition from marginalized ethnic groups and homosexuals as well as feminist claims for gender justice. Fraser solves the problematic of substance in the condition of diverse justice idioms by proposing a dual model that recognizes both socioeconomic and cultural claims as legitimate claims of justice. Although her tone in *Justice Interruptus* seems to lean toward reclaiming the prominence of redistribution, and with it the discipline of Marxist political economy itself, in the face of the rising cultural politics Fraser emphasizes times and again that these components of justice are irreducible to one another (Fraser 1997a; Fraser and Honneth 2003).

In *Scales of Justice* Fraser acknowledges that her dual model is inadequate in accounting for the increasingly deterritorialized operations of justice. Instances of injustice in the contemporary world of economic and ecological interdependence can hardly be handled within the borders of the nation-state, what Fraser refers to as the Westphalian frame. In this light, she suggests reframing the subjects of justice by introducing a third dimension: *representation.* While redistribution and recognition addresses the substance, the "what" of justice, representation deals with the subjects, the "who" of justice. According to Fraser, the notion of representation pertains to the political dimension of justice, apart from the economic and the cultural dimensions, and serves two purposes.

First, it sheds further light on internal injustice, that is, injustice within bounded political communities such as the nation-state, in which subjects already counted as legitimate members are deprived of parity of participation as peers in social interaction. This impairment of participation is not caused by an economic structure that effects maldistribution or by a cultural order that casts certain subjects, such as gay and lesbians, as abjects, thus effecting misrecognition. Rather, it is rooted in the political constitution of society itself, and thus the two-dimensional model of redistribution and recognition fails to account for instances of this "ordinary-political injustice."

The second purpose of the notion of representation is to account for the "who" outside of the Westphalian frame of the territorial state. In the post–Cold War era, with the rise of transnational economic and cultural forces, the subjects of justice can no longer be assumed to be the national citizenry. Globalization has rendered the life of citizens vulnerable to social and economic processes beyond their own national borders. A decision in one territorial state can impact millions of lives outside of its immediate borders. For example, a recent approval by the Chinese government of the construction of a nuclear power plant some sixty kilometers from the northern border of Vietnam has sparked both diplomatic tension and public concern in Vietnam. According to some estimates, radiation could reach Hanoi within ten hours following a breakdown of the plant. A Vietnamese official contends that "China has to follow international safety regulations, not act on its own" (Duan, Long, and Lan 2010). While the scenario of a nuclear leak is still a matter of probability, life in the reality of a globalized world is impinged upon on a daily basis by the operations of multinational corporations, supranational financial investors, international organizations, and so on.

The language of justice, therefore, can no longer be couched in the once self-evident framework of the territorial state. Fraser calls the injustice pertaining to this question of the "who" beyond the boundaries of political communities *misframing*. In light of these two functions of the notion of representation related to injustices of ordinary-political misrepresentation and misframing, Fraser has enlarged her theory of justice to include the political dimension, which she makes clear to be always inherent in claims of redistribution and recognition. In this three-dimensional model, practices of maldistribution and misrecognition constitute the first-order injustices, while misframing belongs to a meta-level of injustices.

The most interesting moment in Fraser's theory is when she tackles the politics of framing as a meta-level of justice, which she defines as comprising "efforts to establish and consolidate, to contest and revise, the authoritative divisions of the political space" as it pertains to the determination of the subjects of justice as well as the frame of that determination itself (2009, 22). On this account of the politics of framing, Fraser proposes two forms in which social movements seek to redress the injustice of misframing: the affirmative claims and the transformative claims. "The affirmative politics of framing," Fraser tells us, "contests the boundaries of existing frames while accepting the Westphalian grammar of frame-setting" (2009, 22). In other words, this politics

aims to redraw the boundaries of who count as subjects of justice without overthrowing the nation-state as a basic category in which to pose and resolve problems of framing injustices. By contrast, transformative movements seek to destroy the state-territorial principle itself on grounds that "forces that perpetrate injustice belong not to," and here Fraser borrows Manuel Castells's terminology, " 'the space of places,' but to the 'space of flows' " (2009, 23). In this way, transformative politics directly questions the process of frame-setting itself and thus renders it more dialogical and democratic. With the opening of frame-setting to contention and negotiation through transformative movements, Fraser surmises that "what could once be called the 'theory of social justice' now appears as the 'theory of democratic justice' " (2009, 28).

In what follows I would like to connect Fraser's theory of justice to the problematic of translation, which I see as constitutive of both levels of justice: the first-order justice of redistribution and recognition and the meta-level of the politics of framing. The role of translation in the first-order justice can be seen in Bharati Mukherjee's short story "The Management of Grief." I highlight the translation of the material into the cultural as an indispensable component of justice, especially when the operation of justice has to tread on the borders between cultures. In a sense, the story also poses the problem of ordinary-political injustices where the parity of participation in the social life of the legitimate subjects of justice within the same political community is impaired through nontranslation. In the case of "The Management of Grief," the Indian Canadian relatives of the victims, under the coverage of the so-called multiculturalism, are construed as legitimate subjects of justice within the borders of Canada. Yet far from being homogenous, the multilingual and multicultural territorial state is invariably split between mainstream and ethnic cultures, and translation thus plays a key role in providing the condition for the flow of justice across ethnic differences. Translation constitutes the very means whereby ethnic subjects of justice speak and are spoken to. In this way, the political dimension of justice, which is representation in Fraser's model, intertwines with the problematic of translation.

From the Material to the Cultural: Translation and the Failure of Justice

The intersection between cultural and material realms in which translation figures as a mediator is best reflected in Bharati Mukherjee's "The Management of Grief," printed in her collection *The Middleman and*

Other Stories (1988). The story is based on the 1985 terrorist bombing of an Air India jet carrying over three hundred passengers, most of whom were Canadian citizens of Indian birth. The aircraft, en route from Toronto to Bombay, exploded in midair while crossing Ireland and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, becoming the worst mass killing in modern Canadian history. "The Management of Grief" revolves around the aftermath of the incident as experienced by the narrator, an Indian Canadian woman, Mrs. Bhave, whose husband and two sons were among the victims of the tragic flight. The opening of the story takes place in her home, now crowded with men and women from the Indo-Canada Society, many of whom she does not even know. They are busying themselves with minor chores around the house, including listening to the news for more information about the incident. They all try not to disturb the bereaved mother and wife with their presence, and their effort to reach out to her is always taken with care and prudence. The first few sentences of the story are brief, yet they do more than set up the mood and context of the story. Within the space of a few lines, Mukherjee subtly uncovers the condition of liminality and uncertainty endured by Indian immigrants, especially during the vulnerable times of grief and the rationally prescribed management of it.

> A woman I don't know is boiling tea the Indian way in my kitchen. There are a lot of women I don't know in my kitchen, whispering, and moving tactfully. They open doors, rummage through the pantry, and try not to ask me where things are kept. (1988, 179)

A sense of ethnic bonding is here mixed, paradoxically, with alienation. "Boiling tea the Indian way" invokes identity, while the uncertainty over the subject doing the boiling in the intimate place of the kitchen splits the identitarian bonding at the personal level. The kitchen, the familiar and intimate place of Indian women, is now occupied by busy "women I don't know," and the repetition of "my kitchen" within the space of two short sentences echoes almost as a cry reclaiming what is most personal and intimate of the grieving subject. The strangers come on grounds of ethnic identity to soothe the woman's grieving, and although grieving is cultural or even "furnishes a sense of political community of a complex order" (Butler 2004, 22), it is reflected here rather as a private space trespassed and impinged upon in the name of ethnic identity.

Butler's vision of a political community enlightened to a sense of fundamental dependency through our socially constituted and exposed bodies is enunciated from the perspective of the mourning subject who

has the power to wage war and inflict violence upon others, namely, the United States after 9/11. In her criticism of the aggressive policies of the U.S. post-9/11, Butler calls for a deeper understanding of the task of mourning, and in so doing she has uprooted grief from the private realm and implanted it in the political. Grief in Butler's view is understood as containing "the possibility of apprehending a mode of dispossession that is fundamental to who I am" (Butler 2004, 28), and therefore, being mindful of it enlightens us to a necessary recognition of our bodies as fundamentally exposed and vulnerable to the touch of others. "Mindfulness of this vulnerability can become the basis of claims for non-military political solutions, just as denial of this vulnerability through a fantasy of mastery (an institutionalized fantasy of mastery) can fuel the instruments of war" (2004, 29). The subject of grief in Butler's criticism is one who has the power to act in retaliation, and in that light Butler summons grief and mourning back into self-recognition as a means to prevent violence.

However, for an immigrant subject, the grieving Indian Canadian mother and wife, mourning is deeply privatizing, and even a prudent touch of ethnic bonding could be damaging. The bereaved ethnic woman seems to be torn between the cultural appropriation of the personal and an inner demand to fully experience the emotional dimension of grief. The first passage of the story has introduced the first level of the tension in one's experience in times of vulnerability and mourning, the tension between the cultural and the personal.

As the story unfolds, Mrs. Bhave's experience of loss is caught at another level, the tension between the cultural and the material, which is laid bare within the very next passage of the story:

> Dr. Sharma, the treasurer of the Indo-Canada Society, pulls me into the hallway. He wants to know if I am worried about money. His wife, who has just come up from the basement with a tray of empty cups and glasses, scolds him. "Don't bother Mrs. Bhave with mundane details." (Mukherjee 1988, 179)

As a treasurer, Dr. Sharma's concern about Mrs. Bhave's financial condition is quite reasonable, while as a woman who cares (or is supposed to care?) about the emotional trauma that Mrs. Bhave is suffering, Mrs. Sharma condemns that question of money as mundane and irrelevant in times of grief. Not to mention the gender divide along the line of material and emotional concerns, there seems to be an irreconcilable tension between material needs, or rather, the mentioning of needs, and

emotional life. Later on in the story we learn that this emotional dimension is impinged upon in many ways and transformed into a site of social and cultural determinations, especially when the Canadian government comes into play in an outreaching effort to heal, materially, the wounds suffered by the hundreds in the Indian community. First of all, medical attention is given to tame a possible outburst of emotion, and in this regard Dr. Sharma once again appears to be on duty:

> The phone rings and rings. Dr. Sharma's taken charge. "We're with her," he keeps saying. "Yes, yes, the doctor has given calming pills. Yes, yes, pills are having necessary effect." I wonder if pills alone explain this calm. Not peace, just a deadening quiet. I was always controlled, but never repressed. Sound can reach me, but my body is tensed, ready to scream. I hear their voices all around me. I hear my boys and Vikram cry, "Mommy, Shaila!" and the screams insulate me, like headphones. (1988, 180)

Medical care seems to be given at the most superficial level. The personal emotion, the private struggle over the tragic loss, is occluded from the discursive network of grief management. Care is extended to her home, yet it hurts just as much as it heals. Dr. Sharma reports Mrs. Bhave's condition on the phone to someone unknown to her, and she does not even seem to care, for it would make no difference now that her physical condition and her private grief have been subsumed in the social and cultural network of care. Mrs. Bhave's "deadening quiet" is translated into a kind of "peace," the expected material effect of the calming pills. Controlled emotion is materialized into a bodily sign of calmness, which serves as a necessary condition for Mrs. Bhave to be picked out from among the bereaved to serve as mediator between the government and the affected community.

Judith Templeton, the appointee of the provincial government, comes to Mrs. Bhave's house in a "multicultural" initiative to provide assistance to the afflicted families. Her self-introduction is plaintively sincere, and her statement of the purpose of her visit is full of confusion and anxiety, yet in a sense precise and direct:

> "I have no experience," she admits. "That is, I have an MSW and I've worked in liaison with accident victims, but I mean I have no experience with a tragedy of this scale—"
>
> "Who could?" I ask.
>
> "—and with the complications of culture, language, and customs. Someone mentioned that Mrs. Bhave is the pillar—because you've taken it more calmly."

> At this, perhaps, I frown, for she reaches forward, almost to take my hand. "I hope you understand my meaning, Mrs. Bhave. There are hundreds of people in Metro directly affected, like you, and some of them speak no English. There are some widows who've never handled money or gone on a bus, and there are old parents who still haven't eaten or gone outside their bedrooms. Some houses and apartments have been looted. Some wives are still hysterical. Some husbands are in shock and profound depression. We want to help, but our hands are tied in so many ways. We have to distribute money to some people, and there are legal documents—these things can be done. We have interpreters, but we don't always have the human touch, or maybe the right human touch. We don't want to make mistakes, Mrs. Bhave, and that's why we'd like to ask you to help us." (1988, 183)

The social worker makes it quite clear that the confusion of language, culture, and customs poses a hindrance to distributive services, and Mrs. Bhave can help clear the issue because of her calmness and acquaintance with the locals. Money comes with legal documents that need to be signed by the beneficiaries, which Judith Templeton is well aware could not be done with interpreting alone but requires "the right human touch." What is here conceived of as the right human touch is precisely translation in its fullest linguistic, cultural, and psychological sense and not merely interpreting. Interpreting may help clear linguistic problems of the legal documents, but it alone cannot create a cultural channel for distributive services to be intelligible within the culture and customs of the receiving community. Distributive justice here figures as an original text unfamiliar and unintelligible to the target language and culture, which thus requires a process of target-oriented translation whereby it is rendered comprehensible within the local framework. Templeton, however, seems to conceive of the task the other way round: to get people "who've never handled money or gone on a bus" to sign some legal documents, that is, to bring the locals out of their cultural realm into the material realm she is bringing in. Government money, the material justice itself, is taken for granted as a value readily comprehensible and acceptable within the local cultural norms.

In the end, Templeton fails in her effort to reach out despite Mrs. Bhave's liaison. An old couple refuses to sign the document because "it's a parent's duty to hope" for the return of the beloved whose death has never been confirmed in any way. Signing the documents of justice means giving up this parental hope and therefore is against their moral and customs. What is even more troubling is the fact that the couple is Sikh, who Mrs. Bhave knows would not listen to a Hindu like her. The

choice of a mediator by way of the material sign of calmness once again shows a complete insensitivity to cultural nuances and contentions. Judith Templeton is vexed by the locals' resistance to her services, and she complains somewhat angrily to Mrs. Bhave: "You see what I'm up against? ... their stubbornness and ignorance are driving me crazy. They think signing a paper is signing their sons' death warrants, don't they?" (1988, 195). Templeton's initial awareness of the complex cultural issue and the need for "the right human touch" vanishes as she approaches the community, leaving in her mind only the material problematic, a failure of translation, of the fundamental unlearning task. The problematic at hand is, I argue, the translation of distributive justice into local language and culture, a translation of the material into the cultural, if the material is to be accepted as justice.[1]

"The Management of Grief" is in many ways a story about the interface between the material and the cultural and a certain kind of untranslatability between the two realms. We have seen how Mrs. Bhave's personal grief is translated into a material sign of calmness, presenting her as a "pillar" among the bereaved. That translation hurts because her inner voice and feelings can never be heard and felt once unilaterally translated into the visible field of the material. In her role as a mediator, Mrs. Bhave witnesses a form of violent translation from the cultural into the material, which leaves her getting out of Templeton's car in the

1. In some cases the lack of this sort of cultural translation of justice constitutes a deprivation of justice itself, rather than merely a refusal to accept justice, as in the case of the old couple in "The Management of Grief." In *The Sorrow and the Terror: The Haunting Legacy of the Air India Tragedy* (1987), Clark Blaise and Bharati Mukherjee records accounts of several parties involved in the tragedy, including the bereaved themselves. Mr. Swaminathan, a bereaved husband and father, sends his grievance to a law firm, contending that the legal differentiation of the death of an adult and the death of a child in determining compensation is against "the Indian way of life." According to him, a parent can be a dependent just as a child is. Bringing up a child means investing in the child's future and also the parent's future, a kind of contract implicated in Indian cultural and moral values and uniformly carried out in Indian society. Loss of a child, therefore, would impinge on the parent's future. More important, as Mr. Swaminathan points out, this "unique system of insurance," though unwritten, is honored in Indian courts. The Western category of "dependent," if untranslated, thus denies Indian parents of pecuniary compensation that they would otherwise be entitled to in their home country (Blaise and Mukherjee 1987, 101–3). This is a point I wholeheartedly identify with, because just as in India the Vietnamese elderly are not taken care of by the social network of nursing homes and social security benefits but live within the embracement and care of their children.

middle of their way home. The encounter between the two realms as represented in the story poses an agonistic relationship that cannot be mediated, it seems, once and for all. From the medical management of grief and the identification of dead bodies to distributive services, all material determinations at one point or another impinge upon the delicate cultural fabric of the ethnic community. Bharati Mukherjee seems to hint at a missing process of translation whereby the material is rematerialized in a cross-cultural context.

Judith Butler has made clear that for materiality to be conceived as such, it must go through a process of materialization that "takes place (or fails to take place) through certain highly regulatory practices" (1993, 1). Distributive justice as posed in "The Management of Grief" has been solidly materialized, yet its materialization is governed by norms and institutions that are culturally and politically bound and thus fail beyond their boundaries. The task of translation here involves more than the linguistic interpreting of legal documents or the use of local mediators as an extra force, but the necessary transforming of those documents and the money itself into the culture of the beneficiaries. Using calmness, the material effect of calming pills, as the first premise for her outreaching effort, Judith Templeton shows throughout her approach to the Indian Canadian community another faulty premise that takes untranslated material justice as the foundation of multiculturalism. Her commitment that "we don't want to make mistakes" becomes ironic, and Mrs. Bhave's response, "more mistakes, you mean," implicates more than a bitter reference to the faulty police procedures that led to the catastrophic bombing.

Interpreters and local mediators are provided, yet the Indian community is denied the very work of translation in the operation of justice. This nontranslation is probably implicated in the larger political context of this "houseless" tragedy, as Mukherjee calls it. It is houseless because neither the Indian nor the Canadian governments, despite their grief, named the bombing as its own tragedy. Instead, the two governments cross-referred to it as "their" rather than "our" tragedy (Blaise and Mukherjee 1987, 174).

The interface between the cultural and material realms appears to be a troubling one, especially if no adequate translation is done. It is hard, however, to determine once and for all the definite configurations of what constitutes adequate translation, with a fixed set of strategies and techniques that apply in every context. But at a more macro level, we can at least talk of justice here as a balanced flow of translation between the two realms. Bharati Mukherjee's "The Management of Grief" has

shown us that the hegemonic translation of the cultural into the material and the lack of rematerialization may constitute a form of injustice in the very process of justice. Materiality is not a universal and a priori category that transcends cultural specificities. They are invariably imbricated within frames that vary in size and shape across cultures. Rematerialization, or the translation of the material into the cultural, points at the necessary reworking of the material so it can be accepted beyond its original context of materialization. Positing a translation of the material into cultural, however, does not presuppose a distinction between the material and the cultural as ontologically separate spheres of life. In her essay "Merely Cultural" (1997), Judith Butler has convincingly shown that material life is inextricably linked to cultural life, and the separation of the two reflects a certain amnesia of the works of Marx himself. It is precisely because of its grounding in cultural relations that the material can be rematerialized or translated into another fabric of cultural relations.

There is no lack of translation in "The Management of Grief," since "we have interpreters," as Judith Templeton confirms. What is needed is "the right human touch," and it is unfortunate that, instead of an ethical recognition of the limited self and an ethical response to the other, the human touch is only configured as the use of mediation (through Mrs. Bhave) to pave the way for the assertion of the self. Nontranslation as injustice here can only be perceived at the level of the cultural frameworks in which justice is done, since it is covered up at the linguistic level with the provision of translators and at the material level with mediation. Although "the right human touch" is not fully realized in "The Management of Grief," it does complicate the problematic of translation beyond the sheer provision of translators/interpreters and local mediation.

When material justice is taken at face value and even universalized as readily accepted in all cultures, the cultural translation of the material itself is often ignored and repressed. Indeed, there is a tendency to posit materiality as a precultural foundation, and material relations become the rationale behind anything cultural. The category of sex in the Beauvoirean sense, for example, reflects one such recourse to the materiality of the body as the precultural foundation of gender, and Judith Butler (1993) has reminded that materiality is invariably bounded with the cultural in such a way that the distinction between sex and gender is but a grammatical fiction. In social life, the distribution of material resources seems to underpin cultural activities. Michael Cronin points out that "awareness of the primacy of communicative competence as a means

of economic integration and social survival is the rationale behind the organization of language classes for immigrants and the stress on the acquisition of the dominant language as the key to successful integration," leading to the condition of what he calls translational assimilation (2006, 52). The material is often taken for granted as transcendent of cultural particularities and does not require translation. "Translational accommodation," to use Cronin's terminology again, from the vantage point of the dominant culture, is yet to be accomplished, as seen in "The Management of Grief."

From the Cultural to the Material: Cases of Injustices in Translation

What emerges from my discussion of justice above is a perceptible relation of translation between the different components of justice within the same territorial state. Outside of the territorial state, translation figures even more prominently as an underpinning force that relates the cultural and the material spheres of justice. Eric Cheyfitz has brilliantly shown how the translation of Native American land into the European concepts such as *property*, *possession*, *ownership*, and *title* serves as the "prime mode of expropriation that the colonists used in their 'legal' dealings with the Indians" (1997, 48). With the conviction that "from its beginnings the imperialist mission is, in short, one of translation: the translation of the 'other' into the terms of empire" (1997, 112), Cheyfitz exposes the process of dispossession whereby "Native American land was *translated* (the term is used in English common law to refer to transfers of real estate) into the European identity of *property*" (1997, 43, emphasis original). Here Cheyfitz explores social and cultural disparities between the European and Native American conceptions of land and place and the colonizer's manipulation of the material through cultural translation, or, to be more exact, the programmed occlusion of a balanced cultural translation in which the terms of the "other" are honored. The violent hegemonic translation of the Native American land into the European terms of property corresponds here to the injustice of misrecognition. This misrecognition consists of the colonizer's refusal to recognize the Native American terms and conceptions of their land, which paves the way for the translation of those terms into European ones, invigorating the imperialist material appropriation. Thus, just as in the case of the Indian Canadians in "The Management of Grief," the native cultural terms are completely translated into the material. There is, of course, a difference in the two cases: the Indian Canadians are

meant to be receiving material justice, whereas the Native Americans are dispossessed of their land.

The exploitative translation of indigenous cultural values into the material realm of the colonizer is abundant in the history of colonialism and imperialism. History has shown that imperialist translation does not just take place in the colonizer's "legal" dealings with the natives. It pervades all aspects of native life and irremediably transforms the native environment and traditions. The destruction of the bison in North America in the late nineteenth century is an example of the imperialist translation from the cultural to the material. Although it is true that the bison population provided a vital source of food for Native Americans, in the native consciousness and cultures the roaming bison herds did not just represent a material resource for human exploitation. The human-bison relationship in the native memory extended back to creation itself (Zontek 2007), and the hunting of this animal was not merely an act of killing and consuming, since the people perceived the animal not as inhabiting an objectified material world but as cohabiting with themselves within the same realm. Writings in different genres such as John Neihardt's *Black Elk Speaks* (1979), James Welch's *Fools Crow* (1986), and Mary Brave Bird's *Lakota Woman* (1991) have all revealed to us what American imperialists of the nineteenth century either refused to see or reluctantly saw with a desire to totally destroy the other: the native hunting of the bison was a deep-rooted tradition of Native American cultures that not only reflected a native means of subsistence but also embodied a whole way of life with deep cultural nuances.

In *Black Elk Speaks*, for example, we see how hunting was performed as an initiation into manhood for Black Elk and Standing Bear and also as an activity embedded in the network of interpersonal relationships organic in the structure of native societies. In the mind of the Euro-American hunters, however, bison were merely objectifiable animals that provided them with basic material for consumption. The American government itself advocated slaughtering the bison population through legal and military means. Directives such as "Kill every buffalo you can. Every buffalo dead is an Indian gone" (cited in Zontek 2007, 25) would not invoke any feelings of abhorrence among the majority of Euro-Americans; instead, it was received as the natural progress of history.

Cultural misrecognition, configured as the wholesale translation of the cultural into the material as I have elaborated thus far, underpins the material destruction of the indigenous livable worlds and the disintegration of their cultures. To probe into the problematic of justice in relation to translation, therefore, necessarily means to instigate the reverse flow

of cultural translation that has been historically repressed. The problem has been provoked powerfully by Cheyfitz in *The Poetics of Imperialism*, and his question continues to invite inquiry: "Can one translate the idea of place as *property* into an idea of place the terms of which the West has never granted legitimacy?" (Cheyfitz 1997, 58, emphasis original).[2]

In my discussion of the relationship between the two dimensions of justice above, I have treated the material as encompassing economic relations. A close reading of Fraser's redistribution/recognition framework, however, reveals that the economic and the material do not inhabit the same sphere, and Fraser herself has made clear the necessary distinction between the economic and the material in her debate with Judith Butler (Fraser 1997a; see also Butler 1997). Nevertheless, the way Fraser situates her theory within what she refers to as the postsocialist scenario gives the impression that the notion of economic redistribution, in contrast to the increasingly prominent politics of cultural recognition, is synonymous with the material. Both Axel Honneth (Fraser and Honneth 2003) and Butler (1997) tend to understand the economic in Fraser's theory in this way. Fraser herself would not object to the fact that injustices of misrecognition could be just as material as injustices of maldistribution. What I have discussed thus far illuminates precisely this overflow between the material and the cultural without touching upon the economic. In regard to economic relations, a significant body of research in translation studies has been focused on the role of translation in the (re)organization of economic structures and the negotiation of economic power and interests. As the structuring of economies changes from a local scale to regional and international scales, the manners in which translation is done and perceived and the way it functions in society also fundamentally alter. In this respect, Michael Cronin's *Translation and Globalization* (2003) offers an exciting account of how the transformed economic factors, including the use of new information technologies, new networks of communication, and the global organization and management of capital, labor, raw materials, information, markets, and so on, have had a fundamental impact on the practice and theorization of translation. Although many of Cronin's claims about the

2. Another profound example of this imperialist translation can be found in Clayton W. Dumont Jr.'s *The Promise of Poststructuralist Sociology: Marginalized Peoples and the Problem of Knowledge* (2008). In a chapter on the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, Dumont offers a deeply engaged account of the struggle against the holding of the remains of deceased Native Americans by museums and universities for "scientific data" (Dumont 2008, 108–48).

changed nature of translation in the age of globalization are too general and tend to apply in any case of cultural production, thus failing to account for the specific impacts of globalization on translation, they provoke more thinking and unsettle any stubborn clinging to traditional ways of thinking about translation.

But translation is not just a passive activity perpetually influenced by globalization. Translation appears as an active force underpinning economic operations. In this sense, translation has been proven by scholars as an agent in the establishment of economic relations and transactions, or even in the mediation of economic orders. *Translating Slavery: Gender and Race in French Women's Writing, 1783–1823* (1994), a volume edited by Doris Y. Kadish and Françoise Massardier-Kenney, explores translation as an ideologically driven process with norms and strategies that are fluid enough to articulate political agendas that either efface or reinforce the abolitionist cause embedded in some French women's writing. The book, however, is a little disappointing in the sense that the authors, while dealing with writings that speak to the economic and political order of their times, often draw conclusions that are limited to emphasizing translation as a process of ideology. It seems that the volume refrains from making claims about the effects of translation on the economic and political order of slavery that the writers and translators under discussion engage so vehemently in their works. By abandoning the themes of slavery and returning to translation studies in its conclusions, the volume has in a way failed its own title, which appears to promise so much.

The reluctance to delve into issues beyond translation studies itself that we see in *Translating Slavery* could be attributed to the nascent phase of the cultural turn in the field in the early 1990s, when the book was published. At the time, ideological aspects of translation were not yet a prominent object of study, and research was still confined in the methods of contrastive linguistic studies, hence the authors' emphasis on the ideological underpinnings of translation. As the cultural turn has taken deep roots in translation studies and has swept across the humanities in general, there emerges a body of research that makes resolute claims about the role of translation in constructing economic, cultural, and political order. Sabine Fenton and Paul Moon, in their essay "The Translation of the Treaty of Waitangi: A Case of Disempowerment," have forthrightly stated that, "although the treaty had seemingly brought together two distinct cultural groups in an act of enlightened respect for and trust of each other, ironically, the translation to a large extent has managed to destroy both and has become the cause of

much confusion and bitterness" (2002, 25). For these authors, translation plays a primary role in the "imposition and reproduction of power structures" that obliterate the sovereignty of a nation and annex it to the British Crown. Interestingly enough, Fenton and Moon show how translation functions in the case of the Waitangi Treaty as a secret code to override English humanitarianism, which was at its height in British politics in the nineteenth century. The abolition of slave trade and the establishment of numerous political and religious groups, such as the Church Missionary Society, the Aborigines Protection Society, and the Society for the Civilisation of Africa, were in part the direct result of humanitarian aspirations. Fenton and Moon also point out that "the new humanitarian imperative found its highest expression in the establishment of the 1837 House of Commons Select Committee on Aborigines to consider the best ways of improving the conditions of the natives in the colonies of the British Empire" (2002, 28). In a sense, humanitarianism inspired a revision of the frame of justice, and natives became legitimate subjects to enjoy Empire's distributive justices.

Within this new framework of heightened humanitarian sentiments, Captain William Hobson, assigned by the British government to negotiate with the Maori the transfer of their sovereignty to the British Crown, found himself in the middle of a contradiction. On the one hand, he was to achieve the transfer of sovereignty; on the other hand, all transactions were to be, as instructed by the Colonial Secretary Lord Normanby, "conducted on the principles of sincerity, justice, and good faith" (cited in Fenton and Moon 2002, 29). As if magic, the translation of the treaty from English to Maori language, done by Anglican missionary Henry Williams, helped achieve the double task, of course, not without hindsight. Fenton and Moon observe that "the convoluted and technical English text is recast in simple Maori, with glaring omissions. Certain crucial terms were not translated into the closest natural Maori equivalents" (2002, 33). They conclude that "Williams was a product of his time, his religion, and the prevailing ideology. His translation reflected all three" (2002, 41).

I read the translation and signing of the Treaty of Waitangi as a complication of the injustice of misframing in Fraser's new model. New humanitarian sentiments permeated politics and unsettled the framing of justice within colonial rule, effecting a discursive inclusion of colonized subjects as legitimate subjects of justice. Yet the reframing here was not obtained in actuality due to a certain way of translation. Empire expands its border to account for new subjects of justice, and simultaneously it surreptitiously withholds justice through translation. Just as

in the case of redistribution and recognition, where translation must be called upon to mediate between the material and cultural spheres, I suggest that in the framing dimension of justice, with its necessary extension beyond the border of the nation-state, translation also plays a primary role and that without insight into the insidious working of translation, justice could hardly be achieved.

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Translation Industry in the Light of Complexity Science: A Case of Iranian Context

Reza Pishghadam and Nasrin Ashrafi

1. Introduction

In line with the fact that multidisciplinary studies as a whole have gained momentum these days, it seems that translation studies as a relatively young discipline has recently tried to embrace new findings from other disciplines to enrich and deepen itself. For instance, researchers in translation studies have successfully applied ideas from sociology, field theory (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), actor-network theory (Latour 2005), applied mathematics, and game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944; Myerson 1997) to translation studies.

One of the new theories in physics that might help us to broaden and advance our understanding in sociological aspects of translation studies is chaos/complexity theory. Complexity theory is not a single coherent body of thought but embraces a range of different traditions and approaches. Complexity science or complex system theory originated from math semantics, economics, and biology (Schroeder 1991). This new theory, inspired by Prigogine and Stengers (1984) and Poincaré's (1854–1912) ideas, has refuted the main tenets of Newtonian mechanics, which is based on absolutism, linearity, and predictability, and focused instead on relativity, nonlinearity, unpredictability, feedback sensitivity, and co-evolution. It encompasses many different disciplines, models, and perspectives, including complexity theory, catastrophe theory, dissipative structure, chaos theory, fractal theory, and self-organized criticality. Therefore, Lissack and Letiche (2002) pointed out that the research of complex systems is not a science but a collection

of concepts, interpretations, and analytical tools. Morel and Ramanujam (1999) also believed that complex system theory does not yet fulfill the many requirements of a "theory" per se. Rather than a unified theory, it is more of a perspective of research. Therefore, it might be more suitable to call it the "complexity science perspective" (Tsai and Lai 2010).

This new theory has been successfully applied to different fields of study, such as philosophy (Cilliers 2005), psychology (Spivey 2007), linguistics (Meara 2004), cultural studies (Appadurai 1990), first-language acquisition, and second-language learning theories (Larsen-Freeman and Cameron 2008). Due to the nature of translation, which acts like a system, it seems that the application of this nonreductionist and post-positivist approach in translation studies may open new horizons for research, shedding more light on the process of translation.

Therefore, this study seeks to apply the major principles of chaos/complexity theory to translation studies. The complexity science perspective has been widely applied in the field of social sciences. Therefore, the present research will attempt to find the common core concepts of various theories by evaluating complexity science and deducing the strategic implications of conceptualizing translation production network as a dynamic complex system.

Our study is divided into three main parts. The first part explores the key properties of chaotic complex systems. The second makes a theoretical and metaphorical analogy in the conceptualization of translation studies in the light of complexity framework. The last part of this study is devoted to concluding remarks and general discussion. We hope this article brings fresh insights to the sociology of translation, becoming the starting point for future studies.

2. Chaos/Complexity Theory

There has been a radical shift from static and deterministic theories to more dynamic ones in various fields, from mathematics, physics, and economics to humanistic subjects. Modern physics, employing chaos/complexity theory, aims to show how simple interactions result in the emergence of a complex system and how such a system interacts with its environment. This theory reveals that not all phenomena are orderly, reducible, predictable, and determined. It examines the frequently occurring unpredictable behavior displayed by nonlinear systems (Prigogine and Stengers 1984). According to Larsen-Freeman and Cameron (2008), this theory is characterized by six key features: openness and dynamism, complexity, adaptability and feedback sensitivity,

self-organization and emergence, nonlinearity and unpredictability, and strange attractors, all of which are briefly discussed below.

2.1. Openness and Dynamism

In contrast to closed systems, in which there is no interaction between the environment and the system, in open systems there exists energy interaction between the system and the surrounding environment. This interaction induces ongoing change, making the system dynamic. In open systems, the major features of closed systems, which are static, fixed, and "being," are replaced with dynamic, flexible, and becoming features. A concrete example of the open dynamic system is language: English, for example, is open to all sorts of influences; it changes constantly yet somehow maintains an identity as the same language (Larsen-Freeman and Cameron 2008).

2.2. Complexity

Complexity comes from the diversity and heterogeneity of multiple interconnected elements shaping a complex system in which its evolution is very sensitive to initial conditions or to small perturbations, one in which there is large number of independent interacting components, or one in which there are multiple pathways by which the system can evolve (Whitesides and Ismagilov 1999). Complex systems are constantly in the process of evolving and unfolding (Arthur, Durlauf, and Lane 1997). Taking an ecosystem of a forest as a complex system, the component *agents* in this system are animals, birds, insects, and people, while component *elements* would include trees, winds, rainfall, sunshine, soil, river, and air. The complexity of this complex system arises from heterogeneous components being interdependent and in constant interaction with each other.

One important feature of complex systems is that the whole transcends the sum of its parts. One good example can be water: water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen. Adding hydrogen and oxygen separately to fire can sustain and build fire; mixing them, however, to create water and then adding that water to fire extinguishes the fire.

2.3. Adaptability and Feedback Sensitivity

Feedback is defined as a circular process of influence where action and actor affect each other. A complex system is feedback sensitive, mean-

ing that, during the mutual interactions between the agents, feedback—whether negative or positive, internal or external—can play a pivotal role in the agents' subsequent actions and ultimately in the whole system. Considering the received feedback, the system adapts itself accordingly to the new situation to ensure its survival. In other words, a complex adaptive system is flexible enough to maintain its stability through continuous adaptation. For example, in first-language acquisition, feedback can cause change in U-shaped learning: children while acquiring a first language go through different stages of learning the verb *go*. After learning the word *go* and the usual rule for the past tense form of the verbs (add *-ed*), they frequently form the false past-tense form "goed." At this stage, positive and negative feedback plays a significant role. Negative feedback in the form of correction by parents and positive feedback for producing "went" cause change, leading children to use the proper past-tense form of the verb.

2.4. Self-Organization and Emergence

Actors within a complex system self-organize themselves; that is, they form new structures and connections, networks, and systems to meet their needs. Self-organization can happen because the system can adapt in response to changes. Sometimes self-organization leads to new phenomena on a different scale in a process called "emergence." More generally it refers to how behavior at a larger scale of the system arises from the detailed structure, behavior, and relationships at a finer scale (Larsen-Freeman and Cameron 2008). "The full, or ultimate, positive exploitation of emergence is self-organization; a system aligns itself to a problem and is self-sustaining, even when the environment changes" (Müller-Schloer and Sick 2008, 86). Thus, the term *self-organization* refers to a specific form of emergence. One of the concrete examples of emergence through self-organization in a complex system can be a social structure emerging from and influencing individual agency and action. The relation between "habitus" and "practice" in Bourdieu's works would be a good example. Habitus, as people's "mental structures through which they apprehend the social world ... [are] essentially the product of the internalization of the structures of that social world" (Bourdieu 1989, 18), but those social structures are also emergent from action in the social world.

2.5. Nonlinearity and Unpredictability

While predictability and linearity are the main properties of Newtonian determinism, chaos/complexity theory rooted in relativism challenges

this deterministic approach by highlighting nonlinear and unpredictable phenomena. Dynamic complex systems are unpredictable. Sensitivity to initial conditions is the main reason for the unpredictability of complex systems. One of the well-known instances exemplifying unpredictability and nonlinearity is Lorenz's "butterfly effect" (Gleick 1987). Lorenz postulated that weather systems are highly sensitive to tiny changes: even the flapping of a butterfly's wings may delay or change the direction of a tornado in one area of the world. This large effect arising from a tiny change (butterfly's flying) in initial condition of a complex system (e.g., a weather system) is referred to as the "butterfly effect." As Lorenz postulated, unless one can account for all the small changes that have an impact on a system, the prediction of the behavior of any chaotic complex system is impossible. In addition to pointing out the lack of proportionality between cause and effect, nonlinearity suggests that there is no exact cause for a particular phenomenon.

2.6. Strange Attractors

Attractors act as "magnetic" forces that draw complex adaptive systems toward given trajectories (Pascale, Millemann, and Gioja 2000; Wheatley 1994, cited in Gilstrap 2005), which can be considered as a focus of energies in the system. The attractors are called "strange" to distinguish them from stable attractors, states to which the system reliably returns if disturbed. A strange attractor requires high energy and information consumption, serving as a seemingly magnetic force (Stacey 2003; Wheatley 1994) that provides structure and coherence.

Attractors can produce order in a dynamic system, making it coherent by constraining the system into a small region of its state. In other words, systems tend to move toward attractors. For instance, in a "stable real-world system, long-term behaviors can be seen as attractors in the state space of that system" (Norton 1995, 56). A chaotic or strange attractor is a state of a system in which the system's behavior becomes quite wild and unstable, as even minute changes in conditions can cause it to move from one state to another, as in the previously described example of "butterfly effect."

Generally speaking, chaos/complexity theory is the study of systems that include large numbers of components constantly interacting. In a chaotic complex system, a very small change can have a large impact (nonlinearity and unpredictability) on the system's trajectory (attractors), and during this changing condition all the components influence

(feedback) each other (self-organization), leading ultimately to the rise of emergent behavior.

3. Chaos/Complexity in Translation

Looking at translation through the lens of chaos/complexity theory, we may observe some interesting shared grounds at the micro and macro levels. At the micro level, the process of translation involving the translator's own sociocognitive system, including the translator's culture and system of values, beliefs, and so on (Hatim and Munday 2004), might be regarded as a complex system. At the macro level, the translation industry involving various elements either human (publisher, translator, reader) or nonhuman (electronic tools, dictionaries, sociocultural features of literary system) can be conceptualized as a complex dynamic system. In what follows we try to apply chaos/complexity theory to the sociology of translation by discussing each of the features of the theory (as discussed above) in relation to different aspects of translation production in Iran.

3.1. Openness, Dynamism, and Complexity

Translation is not a closed, static system unaffected by its environment; it is the product of different factors, including editorial board members, publishers, sponsoring organizations, translators, readers, and even nonhuman participants, such as translational technological tools and other phenomena related to sociocultural or even political discourse termed *ideologems*: "the smallest intelligible units of the essentially antagonistic collective discourses of social classes" (Jameson 1981, 76). Translation is not done in isolation; these elements affect the whole translation production process: the text selection, the seeking for suitable translators, and the translation strategies employed by translators. In fact, the process of translation as a "dialogic event" (Bakhtin 1994) is an open process in which author, translator, text, and even sociocultural factors in both languages have an open-ended dialogue in the process and, ultimately, the product of translation. In fact, translation is a complex message in which several voices and perspectives intermingle.

At a sociological level, the process of translation production is a complex network of inter- and intrarelations (system) in which we can claim the whole exceeds the sum of its parts. That is, translators, readers, publishers, and technological tools work synergistically to produce

a translation product. Latour's Actor-Network Theory (1987), which has been applied to translation studies (Abdallah 2005; Buzelin 2005) provides a theoretical framework to examine how a network of relationships links different factors, producing a project. Various agents (e.g., translators, publishers, and patronage), along with different social powers, interact with each other to develop the network. As Jones points out, "[w]ho holds more or less power within the network is less important than whether the network forms and performs efficiently and effectively" (2009, 320).

Complexity theory (Cilliers 1998; Byrne 2005) is sometimes also referred to as dynamic systems theory (Haggis 2008; Valsiner 1998). Besides the systematicity of translation production, another important feature of translational network is its dynamic complexity, which arises in situations where cause and effect are subtle and where the effects over time of interventions are not obvious or when the same action has different effects in the short and long run; in all these instances there is dynamic complexity (Senge 1990). The dynamic complexity of a translation system lies in two distinct levels of analysis: the dynamic complexity resulting from a multitude of interactions between various elements (human or nonhuman) and the dynamic complexity of the emergent behavior of the system that is a translation product.

3.2. Feedback Sensitivity, Self-Organization, and Adaptation

The ontology of complexity thinking insists on a dynamic system's feedback sensitivity. As Stacey puts it, "positive feedback loops are fundamental properties of organizational life" (1992, 480). In a translational network, a translator can receive feedback, whether positive or negative, from different sources. Translation, as Wolf states (2002), is the result of cultural, political, and other habits of the social agents who participate in translation and of the various forms of capital involved.

As already mentioned, through feedback mechanisms involving positive or corrective (negative) reactions, new differentiated forms of behavior and systems emerge from the existing forms. Thus Hermans (2007) considers translation as a social system that may produce emergent phenomena.

Regarding feedback sensitivity, we can allude to the cognitive notion of *collaborative decision making* (Robinson 1997). In the same vein, Weick (1979) proposed a cognitive cycle for translation process, which is act–response–adjustment, in which the feedback from people on whom one's action as a translator has an impact causes a shift (adjust-

ment) in one's action (the translation product). In fact, at the sociological level, this cognitive cycle may change to a sociological one as event–feedback–repercussions.

Self-organization as one of the key features of dynamic complex systems is the one that Luhmann (1995) called *autopoiesis* for social systems. Due to their openness, chaotic complex systems are in constant contact with their environment; however, this contact is regulated by the self-organizing system. It is the system that determines when, what, and through what channels matter is exchanged with the environment. Obviously, one cannot deny the role of external forces, but the point is that, despite these influences, it is the system that determines what should emerge.

3.3. Nonlinearity and Unpredictability

Another aspect of complexity discourse worth examining in greater detail is the argument that the translational network as a complex phenomenon is intrinsically nonlinear and unpredictable in nature. Complexity science articulates a notion of causality that is multifactorial. It is impossible to talk about isolating *key* factors, because all of the factors work together, with no one factor being more important than any other. The causality implied by complexity theory is *decentered*, in the sense that in a dynamic system we cannot attribute a certain effect to a particular cause. Causation is too multidimensional, too fast, and in one sense too unpredictable to be a viable focus of attention (Haggis 2008). In the field of translation, Chesterman (2007) postulated the causal models that aim to show cause-and-effect relations. He also maintains that translations are seen as caused or influenced by various conditions, such as quality judgments by clients or readers.

Chesterman (2007) maintains three types of effects produced by translation. These effects ultimately impact the whole system of translation production. The first type of effect is labeled *reaction*, which is cognitive. When the effect moves beyond the cognitive sphere and becomes observable in different works such as criticisms and book reviews, it acts as feedback, affecting the public image of profession; Chesterman calls this second type *response*. The third type of effect is the one that shows the nonlinearity and unpredictability of the chain of effects in a translation network. Chesterman describes it as *translation repercussions*. The canonization of literary work, changes in the evolution of target language, and changes in norms and practices are examples of translation repercussions.

As mentioned in the butterfly effect metaphor, one of the important features of chaotic systems closely related to *unpredictability* is the disproportionality between causes and effects, such that "causation can indeed flow from contingent minor events to hugely powerful general processes" (Urry 2003, 7). In so far as this is a coherent notion, it suggests that small, apparently accidental or insignificant causes can have a major influence on the development of a system (Kemp 2009).

From the pragmatic point of view, translating is a decision process (Levy 1967/2000). Generally, the process of decision making is not a new concept in translation studies. Levy, inspired by and based on game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944; Myerson 1997), considers the process of translation as a "decision making process" (Levy 1967/2000). In a translational field, dynamic interactions and networks between publishers, translators, authors, critiques, and readers are influential in the decision-making process (Levy 1967/2000) and thus also in the final product. According to this view, at the micro level, translational "choices" are not linear and sequential but context-bound. Consequently, they are complex and unpredictable because they are motivated by dynamic factors, among which are aesthetics, cognition, knowledge, commission, and textual pragmatics. These factors are mainly subjective, depending on the translator's idiosyncrasies. Taking Peirce's pragmatic view (1903), during the problem-solving process the translator applies rules and theories (deduction), uses different lexical and grammatical sources (induction), and, finally, chooses the solution intuitively (abduction; Robinson 1997). With the application of Peirce's viewpoint in translation, when the translator reaches the solution it is not predictable even for himself. This solution comes abductively; it is "a mixture of conviction and doubt" (Robinson 1997, 260).

3.4. Strange Attractors

Strange attractors act as magnetic forces with a kind of unifying role that draw complex adaptive systems toward given trajectories (Wheatley 1994; Pascale, Millemann, and Gioja 2000, cited in Gilstrap 2005). At the micro level, in the translation process strange attractors can be metaphorically manifested in the domestication strategy employed by the translator. Although domestication is rejected by a number of translation scholars (Venuti 1995; Berman 1985/2000; Benjamin 1969/2000), it still has proponents who believe in the supremacy of meaning transference (Nida and Taber 1969; Jakobson 2000). When a translator tries to transfer the source message to the target reader, due to linguistic and

metalinguistic differences between the source language and the target language, on the one hand, and the source culture and target culture, on the other hand, the translator inevitably adapts himself or herself to the target language and its literary system, but simultaneously the translator is affected by his or her own schema.

At the macro level, Murphy (1996, 97) and Ströh (1998, 25) suggest that organizational ethics, culture, values, and communication are strange attractors that form the deep structure of any chaotic system and set the boundaries for the system's activities and transformations (Leonard 2005). Within the field of translation, strange attractors are at work in shared vision or, as Chesterman and Arrojo (2000) call it, "shared ground" among translators, translation scholars, publishers, and readers. Shared vision as a strange attractor metaphor is something that emerges from involving agents within the system; it cannot be determined by leaders and their exercise of power (Fullan 2001, cited in Gilstrap 2005; Pascale, Millemann, and Gioja 2000; Stacey 1992; Morgan 1997).

4. Complexity Science and a Systemic Approach

The plurality of agents and elements found in a translation network necessitates a systemic-based approach as a basis to take a more holistic look at the process of translation manufacture. Despite the major drawbacks associated with the deterministic aspects of systemic models in translation studies mentioned by different scholars (see Lefevere 1992; Pym 1998, 2001), the growing significance of translation in international communication systems and its critical value in shaping national identities calls for "a proper sociological analysis which embraces the whole set of social relations within which translations are produced and circulated" (Heilbron and Sapiro 2007, 94). Despite the wide application of social systems theory to the translational field, it is time to go beyond mere words and concepts. There is a general consensus among translation scholars that translation either as an action (product) or as an event (the sociological aspect of producing a translation product) is a complex phenomenon (Chesterman 2008; Hermans 2007). We need an analytical tool not only to describe the complex interrelations but also to propose a research framework that focuses on the dynamism of inter- and intrarelations, a tool that presents preferred ways of thinking about the organization of the world and at the same time fosters reflection and thoughtfulness (Kuhn 2008).

It is not our aim here to present a thorough analysis of systemic changes in the process of translation production at the global level.

The structure of the translation industry and translational networks is not the same all over the world; therefore, in order to develop a more precise look at the process of translation production, we should avoid generalizations. Agorni's (2007) proposed solution for avoiding such a generalization is "localism," that is, focusing on the local contingent conditions of each particular case. Localism had been introduced to translation studies through Tymoczko's work (1999) in the postcolonial context of translation. She believed that moving beyond gross generalizations toward sufficient specificity was necessary for future advancement in translation studies. It is at the local level that cultural, political, and social discrepancies between different translational systems all over the world are articulated, negotiated, contested, and defended (Tymoczko 1999).

Agorni explains that the aim of localism is to reduce the distance between the descriptive and explanatory approaches. Furthermore, "taking account of the complexity of dynamics of translation that present themselves in specific contexts" (2007, 126) is of prime importance in the sociological analysis of the translation industry.

In this article we look at Iran's translational network through the lens of chaos/complexity science. It is worth mentioning that complexity thinking is a qualitative research methodology that focuses on the interactions within an open dynamic system. Rather than looking from the *outside*, the researcher looks from the *inside* at what is conceptualized as a dynamically interacting system of multiple elements (Haggis 2008). The translational network needs to be treated as a dynamic entity. By focusing on interactions rather than static categories, complexity theory also makes it possible to consider different aspects of the translation process. Therefore, in the following section we attempt to look at the translational system as a chaotic complex system from a localized view. To this end, Iran's translational network is analyzed from this new perspective.

4.1. Iran's Translation Industry as a Chaotic Complex System

Iran's publication rules are different from those of Western countries, since all of the publishing houses are under the supervision of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. The process of getting a publication license is quite complicated. The Iranian translation network is not an *autopoiesis* (self-organizing) system; it is governed and controlled by external forces. As discussed earlier, a self-organizing system is not governed by top-down rules, so in Iran the translation network

is not a self-organized system. Authors (or translators) and publishers must negotiate the preview process of the Book Council of the Ministry. The choice of foreign works for translation in Iran is greatly affected by the dominant narrative (usually the political tendency). No book, whether it is original or a translation, is allowed to be published without first obtaining the approval of this governmental authority. The study of translated literature in Iran reveals that there are determining forces at play serving to remove traces of foreign, postcolonial, ideological, or cultural issues from the dominant narrative of the day.

In fact, censorship for localization is one of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance's most important responsibilities. It appears on the surface that translators in Iran are free to choose any topic for translation and submit it to the authorities for publication approval. There is no clear agenda for the selection of the materials for translation; however, there are hidden and unwritten rules for translators to follow. In fact, the authorities control and curb translators by censoring some parts of their work or rejecting their work altogether if they do not meet the prescribed criteria. As Haddadian Moghaddam (2012) has shown, some Iranian translators must censor some parts of their work to receive permission for publication. He claims that, in order to get their works published, Iranian translators employ multiple strategies, such as meticulous selection of titles and being more adaptive to the situation. As a result, this act of censorship may make translators either self-censor themselves or quit translation and become deactivated for some time.

Taking a local look at the macro structure of the different roles and players in the process of Iranian translation production, especially literary translation, it seems that translation studies is concerned with the politics and the politicization of translation. The Ministry is responsible for setting rules and regulations (attractors) that work as "magnetic powers" that dictate publication moves. These rules and regulations are in accordance with the cultural preferences of the dominant policy. However, in Iran's literary system, governmental publishers act as centripetal forces in the sense that their publications move toward the *centers* and dominant narratives; the private publishers that are more effective than their governmental counterparts sometimes act as center-fleeing, or centrifugal, forces. The dynamism of opposition between these forces creates a competitive ground in the national literary domain.

If we analyze the system in terms of dynamic processes and emergent phenomena, whether it is the translation of texts or the impact of



Figure 1. Iran's hierarchical translational network.

the translations, formal organizational hierarchy provides a starting point for identifying levels within the core translational system: publishers, editors, translators, readers, patronage, critics, and so on.

As figure 1 exhibits, Iran's translational network is not an autonomous and independent system; it suffers from instability in the general trend of the national literary system. This instability comes from dramatic change of the dominant ideology, that is, political orientations. Tyulenev's third paradigm, the "(y) paradigm," viewed translation as an "autopoietic closure" (Tyulenev 2009, 155). According to his sociocritical (y) approach, one of the critical aspects of the sociology of translation is the role of power relations in the process of translation from the very first step: the selection of works. The choice of the foreign works for translation, the changes, displacements, and censorship that the original texts undergo in the process of translation may form the emergent product of the system.

In this system publishers have some constraints in terms of text selection. Inevitably they impose these constraints on their translators. In Iran's translational network, the power relations are intertwined with political orientations. The governmental macro policy affects the ideological subsystem and ultimately the entire national literary system. Considering the hierarchical nature of Iran's translational network depicted in figure 1, all the involved *actants* (Latuor's term) are at the service of the dominant ideology, which is not necessarily the same as common sociocultural norms but is more associated with social and political orientations.

As already stated, the translation process is an open process in which the translator's own voice and idiosyncrasies intermingle with that of the publisher and reader. In a one-directional view, the Ministry of Culture dictates its preferences to publishers, publishers do the same with translators, and translators impose the final product on readers. This hierarchy follows a top-down approach (all the directions come from the top) in which authority bodies make decisions, providing guidelines for the whole system. Top-down network design is a traditional management style in which power is centralized in the hands of state policy makers. Complexity thinking prefers a participative bottom-up approach to an authoritative top-down approach. This preference lies in the fact that collaboration becomes much more efficient because team members within this approach work together more productively. In accord with chaos/complexity theory, order emerges from the self-organizing, bottom-up activity of a decentralized mixture of organisms (Bundy 2007). As Morrison maintains,

> complexity theory can be, and has been, used prospectively, to prescribe actions and situations that promote change and development, e.g. one can promote the climate or conditions for emergence-through-self-organization by fostering creativity, openness, diversity, networking, relationships, order without control, co-evolution, feedback, bottom-up developments and distributed power. (Morrison 2006, 7)

Complex systems are in disequilibrium and have the potential to evolve. A translational network (or system) must be far from stability and equilibrium in order to break away from the restrictions of existing structures and to settle a new ordered structure. From a dissipative structure perspective, an open dynamic system must be far from equilibrium in order to receive negative entropy from its surrounding and achieve self-organization and evaluation (Prigogine and Stengers 1984). This disequilibrium can cause chaos and disorder among involved agents and lead to a higher degree of freedom. The challenge of pro-government publishers (as centripetal forces) and independent publishers (as centrifugal forces) is very beneficial to Iran's translation industry. It is a good challenge, provided that the external control and imposing power are diminished. Iran's publishing field in general and translation system in particular are under the direct control of the political power. The government is supportive of writers who support their ideology and provides monetary grants and better distribution facilities for them. Under these circumstances, the system leads to equilibrium because external control supports only pro-government publishers so that they can compete with independent publishers, which are more influential in Iran's literary field than their pro-governmental counterparts.

Taking up Even-Zohar's (1990) terminology, the institution as an extra-literary power affects the repertoire, and the market provides the consumer with an institutionally regulated repertoire (it can be a specific idea) in this top-down approach. Given the dynamic complexity of the process of translation production, this one-dimensional scheme seems naïve. In the Iranian translational network, the selection of novels for translation has in general been made by translators themselves, so the determining role of internal agents is undeniable.

Moreover, the Iranian readership is very intelligent. It has been shown that, when the famous independent publishers are under pressure and face harsh restrictions, readers do not welcome or appreciate the products imposed on them. In fact, publishers and institutions cannot make decisions without taking consumer tastes into consider-

ation. In the same vein, readers provide the translators with constructive and encouraging feedback (feedback sensitivity): publish more similar works or perish. Interestingly, some Iranian translators in the introduction section of the new editions of their works have alluded to the feedback the readers have provided them to improve the quality of their works in the upcoming editions/versions. For instance, the translator of *Pride and Prejudice* in his fourth edition of the translation added a short note to his introduction: "Now that the book has been reprinted due to readership's wide warm reception, it is necessary to thank all those who have enhanced the [quality] of the translation with their reminders, expressing opinions, encouragement, and denials directly or indirectly" (cited in Haddadian Moghaddam 2012, 171). According to chaos/complexity theory, the essence of chaotic complex systems lies in viewing them not in a hierarchical order but in a more horizontal, "chaotic way," where the individuals driven by simple rules are the basis of these chaotic complex systems. Complexity theory's frame of thought rejects the hierarchical organizations; instead, this system prefers the co-evolutionary framework of system dynamics. Relying on the basics of chaos/complexity theory, the scheme (see fig. 1) should change into the model shown in figure 2.

In this newly proposed model, the complex adaptive system of the translation industry encompasses various elements, such as publishers, translators, readers, critics, ethics, and values, as well as other related actants, such as economic, cultural, and political elements. The double arrows in the figure indicate the interaction between involving elements and the role of feedback regulation. Chaos theory explores how small disturbances multiply over time because of nonlinear relationships and feedback effects. As depicted in figure 2, low reception from readers affects the whole system. When the translator and publisher receive this negative feedback from readers, they try to avoid the loss of a considerable amount of time and money by adapting themselves to readers' tastes. The ultimate product of this mutual feedback is the emergent behavior of the whole system. Translations are not just the consequences of the causal discourse of translation; they also act as causes that produce effects. Complexity therefore suggests a shift from the habitual preoccupation with causes to a focus on effects (Byrne 2005). The translational behavior in figure 2 is not merely the translated literature but all the effects of translations on the literary system and ultimately on society.

Figure 2. Iran's translational network based on chaos/complexity theory.

According to Vygotsky (1978), society can shape people's cognition and mindset. People in different cultures act according to the norms of their own culture (attractor) such that after some time their behavior is shaped by the *habitus* they have already formed (Bourdieu 1989). Undoubtedly, chaotic systems emerge in places where the necessary infrastructure is well-prepared. This means that culture, as an overarching system, can let systems become open or closed. For instance, in a culture in which people have zero or low tolerance for uncertainty, systems become monologic, static, and closed.

As already indicated, ambiguities and uncertainties are indispensable elements of chaotic systems, implying that any system that is chaotic must have the mechanism to deal with these elements. Considering the Iranian culture in which people cannot stand complexity and ambiguity (Hofstede 1980), it is fair to say that Iranian translators unconsciously transfer these features to their translation, striving hard to find the exact and absolute translation. As Haddadian Moghaddam (2012) has noted, Iranian literary translators generally favor literal translation to avoid any likely misunderstanding, hoping to produce perfect and exact translations. Since translators in this culture seek the exact meaning of a text, they may easily become bored and demotivated when any obstacle in deciphering meaning arises.

In the same vein, this type of culture leads to linear thinking, which affects the way Iranian translators deal with the craft of translation at the text level. It seems that generally Iranian translators work through the text in a linear manner from the beginning to the end. This type of translation may impede the full interpretation of a text, distorting the message that is to be conveyed. It implies that Iranian translators may avoid the nonlinear strategies (e.g., sporadic translation of a text) of translation that are sometimes more effective, creative, and illuminating.

Moreover, since the publication process in Iran is so lengthy and burdensome, involving a great deal of prescriptions and proscriptions, translators who want to be paid must translate in a way that is more accessible and adaptive to meet the required standards; hence at the textual level their agency is constrained (Haddadian Moghaddam 2012).

In the end, it should be emphasized that open systems cannot be dynamic and effective under all circumstances. For instance, in a country such as Iran with a collective culture and an educational system still in the modern era, open and interactive systems might not work effectively. In this type of context, centralization, transmission, and behaviorism are

prevalent from the primary years of education through the tertiary level, with students accustomed to didactic teaching and learning. The modern educational system of Iran seeks uniformity to find the best ideas and ideals (Pishghadam and Mirzaee 2008). The prevalent dominance of absolutism in Iranian culture impedes interaction and dialogue between various agents and elements.

In such a closed, centripetal, and collective context, translators do not see themselves as individual entities; they feel themselves to be members of a larger group who should be faithful to the upper-level power. It seems that, since the required infrastructure is not ready, even if the system becomes open for translators, they may not be able to adapt themselves easily with the interactive, dynamic, and autonomous nature of the system. Thus in this kind of system culture should change toward being more individual and interactive to get full use of chaos/complexity principles.

5. Conclusion

There is a general consensus among scholars that translation either as an action (product) or an event (the sociological aspect of producing a translation product) is a complex phenomenon (Hermans 2007; Chesterman 2008). We need an analytical tool not only to describe the complex interrelations but also to propose a research framework that focuses on the dynamism of inter- and intrarelations (Kuhn 2008).

Utilizing chaos/complexity theory as an analytical tool, this study takes a new look at the process of translation. Despite the limitations of a systemic approach, the plurality of involving elements, on the one hand, and the growing significance of translation phenomena, on the other, may call for a more holistic analytical framework. We seek to begin to define possible agendas for further research toward such a framework.

In this study Iran's translational network is conceptualized as a chaotic complex system in which the authorities in charge play the policy-making role. Regarding the large amount of literary translation publication (nearly 60 percent of all publication), literary translation is of paramount importance for Iran's publishing field. The translation industry as a complex system includes a large number of components that need an attractor to play a pattern-making role for subsequent actions. A competitive top-down approach in the translational system is no longer at work; it should be substituted by a participative bottom-up approach.

In the past, political policy makers dictated some rules and regulations on publishers and translators, but nowadays readers' preferences

influence higher agents such as publishers. In fact, if we look at translation through a lens of chaos/complexity theory, the role of the translator is more emphasized than in the previous systemic-like theories such as translatorial action (Holz-Mänttäri 1984).

This study provides us with some implications. First, according to chaos/complexity theory, researchers and theorizers in translation studies should avoid either/or notions, focusing more on complementarities. This means that we cannot find the "best" type of translation; in fact, translation is something relative that is context-bound, changing from time to time and place to place. Therefore, translators are expected to be bias-free, allowing more room for criticism of their own works. Second, it should be emphasized that translation is not just the product of a translator; it is a teamwork in which many people cooperate to achieve the final result. Third, according to chaos/complexity theory, translation is a dynamic system in which the translator self-organizes himself or herself. Translation should not be considered a static entity that cannot be changed to a better one. Fourth, based on the findings of chaos/complexity theory, we can claim that the process of translation moves from disorder to order, meaning that, while translating a work, order is not something to be imposed; it emerges in the course of time. The translational system is not only a subsystem but also what Hermans (2007) called a self-referential (self-organizing) system. The powers at the top of the hierarchy of a literary system should respect the self-organizing dynamic system of translation and not restrict the scope of this communicative event with some counterstrategies, such as censorship. When we examine the case of Iran's translational system, we come to this point that, despite all the privileges of open systems, the essential prerequisite should be fulfilled before this transformation.

In the end, it should be mentioned that, since this is the first attempt to apply chaos/complexity theory to the field of translation, we hope that other researchers employing this new theory can provide a good ground for further research in this area.

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

and international conferences. In 2007 he was selected to become a member of the National Association of Elites of Iran. In 2010, he was classified as the distinguished researcher in humanities in Iran. Email: rpishghadam@yahoo.com.



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The Bible in the Bush: The First "Literate" Batswana Bible Readers[1]

Musa W. Dube[2]

> You should know that when we read our Bible we change the letters with our mouths.
> — Sebotseng Loatile, 1890 letter to the editor of *Mahoko a Becuana*

Introduction: A Storyteller Meets Storytellers!

In this article I begin with Laura Bohannan's 1966 celebrated essay "Shakespeare in the Bush," which is where I derive the title "The Bible in the Bush." I then discuss some of the first written responses of Batswana to Robert Moffat's translation of the Setswana Bible of 1857. The third and final part of the article looks at some implications for biblical translations in the context of globalization and localization.

First Bohannan's tale of 1966—a story about telling a story to and with other storytellers.

"Not yesterday, not yesterday, but long ago, a thing occurred!" began Bohannan as she told the story of *Hamlet* among an African ethnic group of the Tiv in Nigeria, appropriating their way of telling a story. In the telling of it, European kings soon became chiefs, swords became machetes, ghosts became omens, and devils became witches.

1. In this article "Botswana" refers to the country; "Batswana" refers to the people of Botswana; and "Setswana" refers to the language and culture of Botswana. "Motswana" is the singular of "Batswana." The colonial spellings were different: "Bechuana" for "Botswana" and "Sechuana" for "Setswana."

2. This article is written to celebrate Eugene Nida, for his lifelong commitment to exploring theories of biblical translation.

But Bohannan was not prepared for the plot and motivation also to change as the Tiv actively grafted the story into their cultural worldview and made it a good story for themselves, for she initially thought that, "although some details of custom might have to be explained and difficulties of translations might produce changes..., *Hamlet* had only one possible interpretation, and that one is universally obvious" (1966, 28–29). So she thought, until she met the Tiv in Nigeria.

Hamlet, a Shakespearian tragedy, is about Prince Hamlet, whose father had died. The king's young brother, King Claudius, ascended to the throne and married his widow, Gertrude, within a month of the king's death. Hamlet, suspecting that his father had not died a natural death and unhappy that his mother married a possible murderer of his father so soon, went about investigating the death of his father. Hamlet also fell in love with Ophelia, a woman he could not marry because she was from a lower class. Hamlet, possibly stressed out, started behaving strangely, like a mad person. Having satisfied himself that King Claudius was the culprit, Hamlet made a plan to kill him. Unfortunately, he killed someone else, Polonius, the father of the woman he loved, Ophelia. King Claudius seized this moment to send Hamlet to a faraway land with two escorts and letters instructing the hosting king to murder Hamlet. But Hamlet changed the contents of the letter, and the two escorts were killed instead, while he headed back home. Meanwhile Ophelia, who heard about her father's death at the hands of a man she loved, went mad and drowned herself. On the day of her burial, her elder brother Laertes, who had being living in Paris, jumped into the grave to see her just once more; Hamlet, who had also returned, likewise jumped into the grave, and the two men began to fight. King Claudius, who wished Hamlet dead so he could maintain his throne, set up a duel, but he also prepared a glass of poison beer, just in case Hamlet won the duel. Hamlet and Laertes' fight is a deadly sequel, for both are critically injured. Seeing her son dying, the queen mistakenly drank the glass of poisoned beer. This moved Hamlet to leap out and kill King Claudius, even as he himself was dying. All four died at this moment.

It is this story that Laura Bohannan, an American anthropologist from Oxford who was on her second field trip to the Tiv to observe some of their rare ceremonies, decided to tell. She had mistakenly chosen an inappropriate time for fieldwork. She arrived when the swamps were rising, which hindered communication and interaction between different homesteads. Until the swamps dropped so that plowing could begin, the Tiv, hosting Bohannan, amused themselves with drinking beer,

telling stories, singing, and dancing. No ceremonies were performed because the swamps cut communication between various homesteads.

So it was that Bohannan found herself with plenty of time on her hands and very little to do save to read a copy of *Hamlet* that had been given to her following an argument with a friend, who held that Americans tend to misunderstand Shakespeare, "a very English poet," for they "easily misinterpret the universal by misunderstanding the particular" (1966, 28). Bohannan protested this perspective, holding that "human nature is pretty much the same the whole world over, at least the general plot and motivation of the greater tragedies would always be clear—everywhere—although some details of custom might have to be explained and difficulties of translation might produce other slight changes." To end an argument they could not conclude, the friend gave Bohannan a copy of *Hamlet* "to study in the African bush," hoping that it would lift her mind "above its primitive surroundings" and that with prolonged meditation she might "achieve the grace of correct interpretation," namely, the English one (28). The more Bohannan read *Hamlet,* the more she became convinced that "*Hamlet* had only one possible interpretation, and that one is universally obvious" (29).

It happened that one morning the Tiv invited Bohannan to tell them a story. She was quite reluctant to do so, for, as she said, she was not a storyteller; besides, "[s]torytelling is a skilled art among them, their standards are high, and the audiences critical—and vocal in their criticism" (29). But thinking to herself that "here was my chance to prove *Hamlet* universally intelligible" (29), Bohannan allowed herself to be persuaded. So she began in their own style of telling a story, "Not yesterday, not yesterday, but long ago, a thing occurred. One night three men were keeping watch outside the homestead of the great chief, when suddenly they saw the former chief approach them" (29). Disruption. They ask. "Why was he no longer their chief?" (29). Altogether, I counted up to nineteen questions they posed to Bohannan, besides commentary, suggestions, and co-telling.

"He was dead," Bohannan explained (29). Dead? Dead people do not walk, according to the Tiv beliefs. So one of the elders made a point of correction: "Of course, it wasn't the dead chief. It was an omen sent by a witch. Go on" (29). Quite shaken by the elder's self-assured explanation, Bohannan continued, "One of these three was a man who knew things" (29). This was the closest translation that she could find for "scholar," but it also meant "witch" among the Tiv. When she explained that the scholar associated the appearance of the dead chief with Hamlet, his son, the elders disapproved: such omens were issues to be handled by

chiefs and elders, not youngsters. They were of the opinion that at the most Hamlet should have consulted a specialized diviner to clarify for him about the death of his father and then approached elders thereafter for them to handle the case for him. They began to debate among themselves and to provide reasons why Hamlet did not follow this path. They concluded that the diviner would have been afraid to divulge information about the most powerful man in the land, King Claudius. This became the trend of their listening. They questioned, objected, commented, and provided explanations for the events that motivated the plot, quite freely placing the story within their cultural worldviews and then urging Bohannan to continue with the story.

So it was when Bohannan explained that the widow of the late king had married the young brother of the king soon thereafter, a month after the death of her husband, they approvingly said, "He did well," pointing out that it is consistent with their culture, thereby knocking off a key issue in the plot of the story *Hamlet* (29). The major question they had was whether the late king and the current one were sons of the same mother, a question that Bohannan could not answer but one that they held to be pivotal to the plot of the story. Given their positive perspective about the levirate marriage, Bohannan found herself skipping Hamlet's soliloquy of disgust at his mother's marriage. This would apply to several issues: they disapproved the kings' monogamy and taxes, insisting that a king must marry many wives and have many children so he is able to grow food and to entertain his guests without relaying on taxes; they dismissed the cultural norms that debarred Prince Hamlet from marrying Ophelia, pointing out that as a mistress to the king, her father would be lauded with many gifts more than a normal husband could pay bride price; they said Hamlet's madness and Ophelia's drowning was the work of witches or being exposed to creatures of the forest. Yet for them, one could only be bewitched by a male relative. King Claudius thus became the first suspect for causing Hamlet's madness. Similarly, Laertes, the only male relative of Ophelia, became the suspect in his sister's madness and death. Commenting from the perspective of hunters, they said that Polonius's accidental death was a result of an inexperienced fool: Why did the man not shout "It is me!" to identify himself (32)? Bohannan's explanation that Hamlet, who was scolding his mother, already had an intention to kill King Claudius sent shocking shudders to the Tiv. This was ethically unacceptable, for "a man should never scold his mother," and "for a man to raise his hand against his father's brother and one who has become his father" was unacceptable by all standards to the Tiv (31–32). There was deadlock about Hamlet's unacceptable behavior toward

his parents, but one elder unruffled the quandary by pointing out: "if his father's brother had indeed been wicked enough to bewitch and make him mad ... it would be his fault that Hamlet, being mad, no longer had any sense and thus was ready to kill his father's brother" (32). Bohannan notes that at this explanation, "There was a murmur of applause. Hamlet was again a good story to them, but *it no longer seemed quite the same story to me*" (32, emphasis added).

In the process of this major retelling of *Hamlet,* Bohannan became quiet upset by the Tiv for taking the story from her and telling it in their own way. The point of whether the ghost was an omen or not, whether a ghost or omen can talk, walk, or cast a shadow, was an intense moment of debate between the Tiv and Bohannan. One old man pulled a Kola nut from his pocket, bit it, and gave it to her, thus making peace with Bohannan and asserting that it was not a fight but rather the art of storytelling. The listeners in most African cultures are not passive listeners. They participate, urging the storyteller to go on and providing commentary; indeed, in some African cultures the listeners are so active that they can take the story from the storyteller and tell it to another direction. The storytelling space, therefore, becomes a writerly moment, a moment of public production of new stories through old stories and with various other storytellers. The storyteller does not have the last word, nor does one story exist to the exclusion of others. Rather, a storytelling moment is a space of production of new stories within the existing field of other stories (Donaldson 1992, 139). It becomes a moment of networking of stories.

Accordingly, the Tiv conclusion was an invitation for more foreign stories to be told: "You must tell us some more stories of your country. We, who are elders, will instruct you in their true meaning, so that when you return to your land your elders will see that you have not been sitting in the bush, but among those who know things and who have taught you wisdom" (Bohannan 1966, 33). Two ironies are noted concerning their concluding statement. First, we note that, like Bohannan, they were convinced that theirs was the "true meaning," just as Bohannan's friend held that the true meaning was in Shakespeare's English culture. Second, Bohannan's report of this event was published as "Shakespeare in the Bush," although the Tiv said that she was "not sitting in the bush" but rather among those who knew things and had taught her wisdom (33). Their knowledge and wisdom, informed by their worldview and value system, led them to conclude that Bohannan concurred with them, but it was through a different plot and assumptions. Her assumption that there would be one meaning of Shakespeare, one evident to all human beings,

was thus disapproved by her fieldwork data. The Tiv, however, were careful to point out that they were not just hearing and asserting their own culture but equally conscious that Bohannan presented them with a different story. Thus one old man reassured her, "You tell the story well, and we are listening.... we believe you when you say your marriage customs are different, or your clothes and weapons. But people are the same everywhere; therefore, there are always witches and it is we, the elders, who know how witches work. We told you it was the great chief who wished to kill Hamlet, and now your own words have proved us right" (32).

My Response and Implications for Translations

There is much more that can be said about Bohannan's narrative from various perspectives than I have been able to summarize. Like Bohannan, who had crossed many boundaries to reach the Tiv and found herself hedged by the swampy season, "the number of borders being crossed in one translation are always multiple" (Gentzler 2001, 203), as "Shakespeare in the Bush" amply demonstrates.

Maria Tymoczko holds that

> [t]he case of Hamlet in West Africa ... illustrates resistance to translation and transfer of concepts ("ghost"), values ("chastity of Ophelia"), customs (the European period of mourning), motivations (Hamlet's madness), material culture (swords for machetes) and plot sequence, as well as rhetorical and linguistic structures. The awareness of such resistance to the uptake and translation of oral material, as well as better understanding of the actual working dynamic between passive and active bearers of traditional cultures, has led to re-evaluations of the process of survival, transmission and translation of oral literature. (1990, 49)

Tymoczko further underlines that research in translation in the past two decades indicates that "translation is a form of literary refraction: translated texts are processed texts, texts that are manipulated between literary interfacings, illuminating the sociological, ideological and literary constants at work behind the manipulations involved in translation" (1990, 46). Nonetheless, Tymoczko admits that, "despite the historical documentation and theoretical build up for more than a decade now, the idea that translation involves manipulation—ideological and poetic processing—remains shocking to traditionalists, students and teachers alike, who persist in the belief in a value-free translation process" (1990, 46).

When I first read "Shakespeare in the Bush," I was highly impressed by the Tiv community. They were an empowered audience who listened critically, questioning, commenting, making suggestions, thereby rewriting the story within their own cultural worldview. While initially Bohannan thought her task was merely to find some "equivalent" words, such as using "great chief" for "king" or "machete" for "swords," the task involved much more. As translation studies have underlined, the translation of any work is not just a matter of formal, dynamic, or functional equivalents of words, phrases, sentences, meaning, or effect. Rather, translation work or processes involve "the translation of cultures," fully informed by the agendas of the patrons, publishers, and purposes they serve. As amply demonstrated by "Shakespeare in the Bush," translation studies "no longer defines translation as an activity that takes place between two languages, but views it as an interaction between cultures" (Gentzler 2001, 190). The Tiv had asked for Bohannan's story and threatened not to tell her any of their stories unless she told them stories from her culture. For them, it was an exchange of stories within their space, within their stories, and within their own culture. The Tiv acknowledged Bohannan's language limitation, saying, "you must explain what we do not understand, as we do when we tell you our stories" (Bohannan 1966, 29). As an anthropologist, Bohannan was a story collector. She had not forgotten that as an anthropologist she came to collect primarily the African stories for a European audience. Thus the moment the Tiv explained that madness is caused by witchcraft and creatures in the forest, Bohannan said, "I stopped being a storyteller and took out my notebook and demanded to be told more about these two causes of madness. Even while they spoke," she says, "I jotted down notes, I tried to calculate the effect of this new factor on the plot" (1966, 31).

It was quite intriguing to me as an African that Bohannan reached a point where, while her audience was enjoying the story, to her it was no longer the same story. At this point I said, "Laura Bohannan, welcome to the world!" For us Africans who come from largely oral communities yet in a historical context where the first written stories—whether they are cultures, history, religion, language—were written by Westerners, especially during colonial times, it has been excruciatingly painful to read the anthropological record, the travelers story, the missionary record: for the most part, one cannot recognize herself. It is a different story, precisely because it is an African story that is grafted into and interpreted within a Western culture. Unfortunately, the colonial context, which entailed the collection of the stories of the Other, who is different, was a time when the Other was already despised. Consequently,

the refraction of our stories was informed not only by Western cultures but by racism and Eurocentrism.

Similarly, when I first read "Shakespeare in the Bush" I also wondered what kind of Bible translations we would have if our translators and communities were culturally empowered citizens involved in intra- and intercultural activity where there is more interactive intercourse between the source and the target text, not in the missionary style, where the target culture is supposedly always submissively under, receiving male sperm from the source text—the biblical/Westernized cultures—but rather in a more interesting love-making where wrestling turns everyone up, down, sideways, and all angles. What kind of Bible translations would we have?

Further, do we desire this type of translation, or do we build a hedge of theories, intuitions, policies, practices, ideologies, agendas, experts, publications, and cultures that often mute the targeted communities as subjugated "recipient cultures"? "Shakespeare in the Bush" posits a model of translation as a public hearing. It posits a model that calls us to regard targeted communities and their cultures just as sacred as the stories we bring from other cultures. It posits a model where recipient/targeted communities are not the subjugated Other. Reading this story, I became quiet interested in those historical moments when culturally empowered communities first heard the Bible and the translations they embarked upon to bring the story home and how such translational spaces were negotiated—if, in fact, we can exegete them from missionary narratives. This, of course, leads me to the second part of my paper: the response of the first "literate" Batswana readers to the Setswana Bible translation. I place the word "literate" in quotes to mark the fact that there is literacy in all cultures outside the Westernized school system.

The First Batswana Bible Readers

In this section I seek to tell the story of the translated Setswana Bible and how the Batswana received the biblical story from the earliest translation presented to them. The translation was in stages, stretching from 1830, when the translation of the Gospel of Luke was completed, to 1840, when the New Testament translation was completed, to 1857, when the complete Bible was first printed in Kuruman, located in present-day South Africa. Since translation studies urges us to study the translators and their time, context, agenda, ideology, and patrons, a brief background of our Bible translator is in order.

The Scottish missionary Robert Moffat, who started his work in southern Africa in 1817, is credited with translating the first Setswana Bible. Moffat's academic records indicate that he was a gardener who later trained as a farmer. He joined the London Missionary Society in 1816 and arrived in South Africa in 1817 to start his job (Doke 1958, 85). Obviously, Moffat's training was close to nothing—a year or less. As Clement Doke points out, "Moffat had never trained as a linguist" (nor as a biblical scholar, I must add), and "he came up against intricacies of Tswana" (1958, 85). In addition, Moffat carried out his work and translation during the height of modern colonialism, fully immersed in its thinking and attitudes toward the colonized.

How did the Batswana respond to the translation? To explore the latter, I will largely read the letters Batswana wrote to the editor of *Mahoko a Becwana*, a newspaper that was published by the London Missionary Society (LMS) from Kuruman, between 1883 and 1896. A number of "literate" Batswana wrote letters on various subjects, which gives us a window into how they responded to Setswana Bible translation. These letters were recently collected and made available in *Words of Batswana: Letters to Mahoko a Becwana 1883–1896* (Mgadla and Volz 2006). I will focus on those letters dealing with correct ways of writing Setswana, since the first written Setswana was associated with Bible translation. Perhaps the reader is wondering how and why *Hamlet* is comparable to the Setswana Bible. Just as *Hamlet* was a work of "a very English poet," the Setswana Bible was the work of a Scottish man who was grafted in his worldview, which at that time was that of the British Empire. Would the Batswana readers demonstrate efforts to reclaim the Setswana culture as the Tiv of Nigeria did? The analysis of their letters will greatly assist us in answering this question. In reading these letters, I seek to identify ways employed by the earliest Batswana Bible readers to resist colonizing translations.

I must admit that comparing the Tiv with Batswana literate writers may be unfair on several levels. First, the Tiv had an opportunity to comment and rewrite the story of Hamlet prior to its written translation. The Batswana writers were only commenting on a completed translation, and we have no substantive knowledge of their engagement with the biblical story during the process of translation, since Robert Moffat does not provide a detailed description of if. Second, unlike the Tiv, whom Bohannan characterizes as "pagans ... who had no belief in individual afterlife" (32), most of the Batswana writers were converted Christians who had already undergone training in mission schools. Third, while the Tiv were apparently oral, these Batswana were literate,

since they could write letters. Fourth, their letters, written between 1883 and 1896, were drafted almost four decades after Moffat's New Testament appeared in 1840. However, since the LMS newspaper's publication of these letters was the first of its kind among Batswana speakers, we could say that this was the first written response to the translated version that was addressed to the missionaries and the writers' fellow Batswana. Remarkably, forty years after the publication of the New Testament, the debate was still hot! We may well say that these Batswana writers had been waiting to exhale!

Although I have not had access to Batswana's first oral hearing and response to the biblical story, I have read Moffat's 642-page volume on *Missionary Labours and Scenes in Southern Africa*, a volume he published in 1842 in London, two years after he published the Setswana New Testament translation. The volume amply indicates that in the first decades Batswana resisted the biblical story, displaying significant indifference that was frustrating to missionaries. Moffat thus observed that, "although they received much instruction, they appeared never for a moment to have reflected upon it, nor to retain traces of it in their memories, which are generally very tenacious" (1842, 244). To illustrate the point, he cites two examples: one from a friend and one from an adversary.

Moffat describes his friend Munameets as a very supportive and intelligent Motswana man who always traveled with Moffat. Just before his death, however, Motswana rhetorically pleaded an incapacity to understand Moffat's teaching due to age, deferring such a task to the future generations. Munameets said, "Perhaps you may be able to make children remember your *mekhua* (customs)" (1842, 246). The second case involved the speech of a rainmaker that received great applause, leading Moffat to remark that "the poor missionary's arguments, drawn from the source of Divine truth, were thrown into the shade" (247). Moffat narrates that, "when we attempted to convince them of their state as sinners, they would boldly affirm with full belief in their innate rectitude that there was not a sinner in the tribe" (254).[3] So Moffat laments that, "O, when shall the day-star arise on their hearts? We preach, we converse, we catechise, we pray, but without the least apparent success" (285).[4]

3. See Carroll 1996, where he discusses a case of one missionary's attempt to deal with lack of guilt among his targeted audience in Latin America by making a translation that said that the particular group "killed Jesus."

4. See Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, where they show that in fact Batswana

These are largely reported accounts in Moffat's book, but I have not yet encountered intense engagement concerning a particular biblical story, including dialogue, comparable to Bohannan's Tiv.[5] The letters to the editors, which began to appear in 1883, the year that Moffat died, discussed his Bible translation, focusing on the orthography, the various dialects of Setswana, the correct way of writing Setswana, and various Christian teachings that clashed with Setswana culture. They thus serve as my source for now.

Setswana Bible Translation: "Whose Interests Are Served?"

Given Moffat's accounts of Batswana's disinterest and indifference toward biblical teaching, it is obvious that they hardly asked for the translation. What was the purpose of this translation, when the community was quite indifferent? Who commissioned it, and who was served by it? We can hardly place it in the hands and agenda of Batswana. As Part Mgadla and Stephen Volz point out:

> Most African-language publications in the nineteenth century were produced by European missionaries as part of a larger project to make the Bible and other Christian teachings more widely available to potential converts. This process began in southern Africa in the 1820s and 1830s with the publication of biblical excerpts, catechisms and other materials in Setswana, Sesotho, and Isxhosa. The first complete vernacular bible was in Setswana, published in 1857 by the LMS. (2006, xix)

The agenda behind the Bible translation lay outside Batswana's interest. It follows that it did not necessarily serve their interest or agenda. Obviously, Robert Moffat's Setswana was not perfect when he undertook the translation, and I have yet to discover literature that describes the indigenous people who helped him with the task. In his voluminous *Missionary Labours and Scenes in Southern Africa,* which I as a native of that region can only describe as a "text of terror," Moffat speaks very disparagingly and bitterly of his interpreter for his poor translations, to a point where Moffat holds that:

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were very resistant to Christian conversion until a time when they realized that they had lost autonomy to the ever-encroaching forces of colonialism.

5. Some Bantus' response to the biblical text was to regard it as "an instrument of divination" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, 228).

> A missionary who commences giving direct instruction to the natives, though far from being competent in the language, is proceeding on a safer ground than if he were employing an interpreter, who is not proficient in both languages, and who has not a tolerable understanding of the doctrines of the Gospel. Trusting to an ignorant and unqualified interpreter, is attended with consequences, not only ludicrous, but dangerous to the very objects which lie nearest the missionary's heart. ... The interpreter, who cannot himself read, and who understands very partially what he is translating, if he is not a very humble one, will as I have often heard, introduce a cart-wheel, or an ox-tail into some passage of simple sublimity of Holy Writ, just because some word in the sentence had a similar sound. Thus the passage, "The salvation of the souls is a great and important subject;" The salvation of the soul is a very great *sack*, must sound strange indeed. (1842, 294)

But by criticizing the translator for translating "great and important subject" as "*kgetsi e kgolo*," or a "great sack," Moffat demonstrates that he was quite unqualified to criticize his interpreter, for the latter was correct. An important issue, a court case or task, is referred to as *kgetsi* among Batswana to denote its importance and gravity. The interpreter was spot on to refer to the salvation of the soul as "a very great sack." Of his own ignorance, as one who also could not speak both languages fluently and who was equally vulnerable to translation blunders, Moffat is apparently self-forgiving and tolerant, arguing that a gross mistranslation is forgiven on the basis of good character! He writes, "The natives will smile, and make allowances for the blundering speeches of the missionary; and though some may convey the very opposite meaning to that which he intends, they know from his general character what it should be, and ascribe the blunder to his ignorance of the language" (1842, 294). It is not only Moffat's translator who falls under the mercy of Moffat's eye; the whole of Batswana/southern Africa are held to be ignorant and godless.

There is, however, hope under the able hand of a gardner-farmer to cultivate their arid souls into the fertile fields of salvation. "Satan," Moffat says,

> is obviously the author of polytheism of other nations, he has employed his agency with fatal success in erasing every vestige of religious impression from the mind of Bechuanas, Hottentots, and Bushmen; leaving them without a single ray to guide them from the dark and dreary futurity, or a single link to unite them with the skies. Thus the missionary could make no appeals to legends, or to altars, or to an unknown God, or to ideas kindred to those he wished to impart. ...

> Their religious system, like those streams in the wilderness which lose themselves in the sand, had entirely disappeared; and it devolved on the missionaries to prepare for the gracious distribution of the waters of salvation in that desert soil, sowing the seed of the word, breathing many a prayer, and shedding many a tear, till the Spirit of God should cause it to vegetate, and yield the fruits of righteousness. (1942, 244)

In service to this major agricultural project of cultivating arid desert soils into life, Moffat had produced a Setswana Bible translation before he grasped the language. First he had to do the orthography. Five to six decades later, different mission centers used his Bible to develop better Setswana, even within the LMS; hymns and other books appeared with an improved Setswana orthography. Thus by 1883 there were varieties of written Setswana, Robert Moffat's Bible translation being the crudest of all.

The rising numbers of educated Batswana became dissatisfied with Moffat's translation, as attested by their letters to the editor of *Mahoko a Becwana*. The debate became heated as soon as the newspaper was launched with regard to the correct way of writing and pronouncing Setswana. Many Batswana writers insisted that Robert Moffat's earliest translation clearly indicated that he did not understand the language. They preferred the latest forms of writing and pronouncing Setswana (Mgadla and Volz 2006, 7–42).

Since better ways of writing Setswana had been developed over the years, most Batswana readers also insisted that the latter should be adopted as the standard for the newspaper. At the center of the debate were the letter *d*, which was translated with *l* or *r*; the consonant *w*, which was written as *oe*; and the letter *t*, which in some words needed to appear with *l* (*tl*), in some words with *h* (*th*), and in others with *lh* (*tlh*) together. Leaving *l, h, or lh* out of the letter *t* when they need to be included creates different meanings than the intended. A good case in point is the verb "created" in Genesis 1:1. When *h* was left out of *tl*, the verb was written as *tlola* (jump?) instead of *tlhola* (create). The Moffat Bible thus read "in the beginning God jumped the heavens and the earth," instead of "in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth" (Mgadla and Volz 2006, 29).

Another debate centered around the vowels *o* and *e*, whether they should be written plainly or with an accent and a macron, respectively (i.e., è and ō). In each case, using or not using the letter *d*, *w*, or the accented/marked *e* and *o* changed the pronunciation of the Setswana word; in some cases, meaning was changed as well, as elaborated above.

In his letter to the editor, Gomotsegang Magonaring (December 1889) underlined that, even though there are a number of Setswana dialects, "the letters *d*, *o*, *e* and *w* are the ones with which the language of Setswana is spoken, throughout the entire language of Setswana" (Mgadla and Volz 2006, 31). Another letter dated December 1889, written by Sekaelo Piti, captures and illustrates the general concern:

> we have complained much about our language in the books, because they have not been representing true Setswana but rather Setswana and English—an English Setswana—that is read as only a reminder of the real thing.[6] For example, "*go diha*" [to make] has been written as "*go riha*", "*didimala*" [be quiet] as "*ririmala*" or "*lilimala*", also "*Modimo*" [God] as "*Morimo*," and "*legodimo*" [heaven] as "*legorimo*". But when we saw hymn books in the year 1883, we were very happy because a missionary had arrived who speaks the language of our mothers and who speaks proper Setswana. He says, "*Yesu kwana ea Modimo*" [Jesus lamb of God] and not "*Yesu koana*" or "*kuana*". This missionary also printed a spelling book in the year 1885. He is the one who knows the true language of Setswana. (Mgadla and Volz 2006, 31)

These concerns were quite legitimate, for in some cases the changing or leaving out of one letter dramatically changed the meaning of verses. For example, changing the *w* in *kwana* to a *u* created verses that, instead of reading "Jesus, the lamb [*kwana*] of God" or "behold the lamb of God," actually read "Jesus, the hat [*kuana*] of God" or "behold the hat of God." If *go diha* is used for the verb "to make," it would easily be heard and understood as "to drop something down" instead of making or creating. Going back to Genesis 1:1, suppose the translation chose the missionary word for "to make" (that is, used *go diha*) for "to create"; the Setswana translation could read, "In the beginning, when God dropped [*diha*] the earth and the heavens," instead of make (*dira*). In other cases the translation created meaningless new words, such as *ririmala* for *didimala* (be

6. This writer was spot on, for indeed when Moffat discussed how he designed the written Setswana it is clear that he based it on Western languages and sounds. Giving guidance of how to pronounce Setswana, he says, "*Ch* [is] represented in Bechuana books by the Italian *c*, is sounded like *ch* in chance ... *tl*, like the Welsh *ll*, preceded by a t; *ng*, which is represented in the written language by the Spanish *ñ*: has the ringing sound of *ng* in sing. This outline will enable anyone to read the Sechuana language with tolerable correctness" (Moffat 1842, 226). He goes on to discuss how the word *Botswana* was spelled differently among the Dutch or English, depending on whether they found an equivalent sound or not in their languages.

quiet). The new word, *ririmala,* could possibly be read as referring to a hairy stomach, if it signifies anything at all.

In the same letter to the editor mentioned above, Gomotsegang Magonaring (December 1889) provides a number of examples to illustrate how replacing the consonant *d* with *r* creates new unintended meanings. For example, exchanging an *r* for the *d* in the word for "thundering" or "sounding" (*duma*) produces the word *ruma*, which means "to devour." With the *d* replaced with *r* in the verb *duela* (to pay), one reads *ruela*, which means "to keep, domesticate, or possess something for someone" (Mgadla and Volz 2006, 31). One can imagine that, if a verse said that Jesus paid (*duela*) for our sins, it would now be read to mean that he *kept* (*ruela*) our sins. Similarly, the word *dumela*, which is used in Setswana for "greeting," meaning "let us agree" or "peace among us," written with an *r* instead of *d* would read *rumela*, which means "send"!

Second, Batswana were unhappy because, through translation and the written books (hymns, spelling books, dictionaries, Bible), their language was now infused with English and was now an English version of Setswana. Piti called it "an English Setswana ... that is read only as a reminder of the real thing" (Mgadla and Volz 2006, 36). As Banani Diphafe would state in his letter of January 1890, "I see us becoming confused, only parallel to the language and speaking it like a white person who is just learning Setswana. He says '*Modimo*' [God] as '*Morimo*', and '*dilo*' [things] as '*lilo*'. Speaking with a '*d*' sounds right but '*l*' is ridiculous" (2006, 35). In Setswana only little children still learning to speak are expected to be unable to pronounce words and say things such as "*lilo*" instead of "*dilo*." The Moffat translation thus introduced changes that made readers sound like stuttering and stammering little babies still learning how to talk. The translation had infantilized them. Hence each time they had to read the Bible they had to put on the persona of infants. Age among Batswana is traditionally an important social marker, far above gender, in fact. Failing to recognize an elderly person and treating him or her as a child is regarded as great disrespect and an insult. Naturally, then, Batswana readers were upset by their Bible-reading experience.

In a letter dated June 6, 1883, the missionary editor (Alfred Gould), though patronizing, acknowledged that, indeed, the issue of the correct way of writing and pronouncing Setswana needed to be attended (Mgadla and Volz 2006, 15–16). He then promised to include the issue for consideration by the general missionary council. This he did, although not until three years later. On his return, he reported that the

missionary council had voted to return to the most "original" written Setswana, one that was consistent with the earliest Bible translation of Robert Moffat, and to suppress the newer ways of writing, which were more appreciated by Batswana. This meant the retention of the most corrupted written Setswana. The report on the response of missionaries, dated September 2, 1889, is worth quoting at length:

> In March this year, missionaries of the LMS who teach in the language of Setswana gathered at Kuruman. As they met, they took up the issue of the letters that are used for printing and writing. Many missionaries of other missions oppose some of the letters with which they have been writing. They reject them because they have never liked them. They reject the letter *d* and they reject the letter *w*. These missionaries like the old way of printing, the one that is still used today for the Bible and the Testament. They also argue that the old printing is known by many more people. So, these things were discussed, and it was agreed that those letters should not be changed, and that writing and printing should be done only with the old letters. Now *w* has been dropped so that it will be written "*banoe*" [others] not "*bañwe*", and it will be written "*rumela*" [greet] not as "*dumela*", and "*Morimo*" [God] not "*Modimo*", and "*lilo tse di thata*" [difficult things] not "*dilo tse di thata*". It was agreed that *è* and *ō* should be changed and instead put as plain *e* and plain *o*. Some letters will for the time being still be published as they are. The letter "*h*" will be used to differentiate "*tlala*" [hunger] from "*tlhala*" [divorce]. (Mgadla and Volz 2006, 27)

The report indicates that one little but significant victory was won: the inclusion of *h* in the syllable *tl*. At last Genesis 1:1 could be read as, "In the beginning God created [*tlhola*] the heavens and the earth," instead of as, "In the beginning God jumped [*tlola*] the heavens and the earth." Indeed, Alfred Wookey's 1908 revised version of the Setswana Bible did just that.

The report from the missionary council meeting, however, had more bad news than good. The overall concerns with other central consonants and vowels such as *d*, *l*, *w*, *ō*, and *è* were rejected. The reasons given are quite telling and patronizing, to say the least. The views and feelings of the missionaries were all that mattered. It was what they liked that would stand. The prevailing or current and better ways of writing, appreciated by Batswana speakers, were to be reversed. The protests of Batswana about their distorted, meaningless language, which was now reduced to "an English Setswana ... that is read only as a reminder of the real thing" (Mgadla and Volz 2006, 29), did not matter, "for these missionaries like

the old way of printing" (2006, 27). The report goes on to say, "So, these things were discussed, and it was agreed that those letters should not be changed, and that writing and printing should be done only with the old letters," that is, the Robert Moffat Setswana Bible translation. The missionaries preferred the English Setswana and insisted that it should be the standard way of writing. Their response enables us to answer better the question about the agenda of the translation.

Decolonizing the English-Setswana: Subversive Ways of Reading

Following this report, the letters to the editor revealed that many Batswana objected to this decision, and some pleaded for the decision to be reconsidered, to no avail. They were, in fact, protesting something that had already been concluded, a nonnegotiable issue—until such time that it pleased the missionaries to reverse it. Shot down, forced to write and read Setswana according to the stuttering tongue of a child, forced to read and write in English-Setswana, the Batswana were nonetheless not helpless. In fact, they had already developed reading strategies that circumvented the imposed discourse of the "English-Setswana." They had hoped it could be corrected, but now they had been informed that what would be maintained as the standard way of writing the Setswana language was what the missionaries liked. Consequently, the Batswana readers fell back to their strategies of reading as resisting readers. Dikokwane Gaboutlwelwe, who wrote in response to the report using the example of Genesis 1, illustrates the point: "I see the old written Setswana in the Bible, as we read in Genesis, chapter one. There we find it written like this: '*Morimo o lo ua tlola magorimo le lehatsi mo tsimologong*.' ... but when we read it aloud we say, '*Modimo o lo wa tlhola magodimo le lehatshe mo tshimologong*'" (Mgadla and Volz 2006, 29). Gaboutlwelwe says that their reading strategy overlooked the colonial missionaries' constructed English-Setswana language. Instead, they read the Moffat Bible from their oral base, putting back all the excluded consonants *d*, *h*, *w* and ignoring the new creations of *r*, *l*, *ua*—which infantilize readers, create confusion or meaningless words, and induce wrong meanings. So, in fact, even if the verse said "In the beginning God jumped [*tlola*] the heavens and the earth," they read it as "In the beginning God created [*tlhola*] the heavens and the earth." (I have to say there was more that was problematic in the translation than the create/jump debate. While I do not know how to name it, I think it is best noted that what we have here was "setswana-english//English-Setswana.)

This reading strategy is further confirmed by Sebotseng Loatile's response to the missionary report:

> I am very happy to receive the newspaper and to hear the words that I have been hearing. I hear news about other nations and the word of God. But about the letters that have been taken out, I am very concerned. I assumed that our Bible was printed as it is because the missionaries had not quite grasped our language. But now they understand our language and they speak it very well. So I am surprised they are removing core letters [*d*, *w*, *ō*, and *ė*]. Here everyone who reads books is not happy about the removal of the letters that have been removed. *You should know that when we read our Bible we change the letters with our mouths.* (Mgadla and Volz 2006, 33, emphasis added)

This strategy of reading from the base of the oral tradition is quite significant. What is in the oral base is the whole culture, another canon embodied by the community. The refusal to change what was overtly wrong helped Batswana readers to openly assert their oral tradition and understanding as the main reference point than to take the English-Setswana Bible as the final authority about their culture. This was crucial because the English-Setswana translation of the Bible involved more than just the replacement of key consonants and vowels with newly created (*li ri*) ones. It also included changing the Batswana spiritual world from sacred to evil in order to supplant it with Christianity. An excellent example was the translation of *badimo* as "demons" (Dube 1999). I renarrate my encounter with this translation in order to illustrate how the Batswana ways of reading from the Setswana oral tradition base subverted the colonial discourse of darkness and heathens.

Reclaiming *Badimo* as Sacred Figures: Batswana Reading Strategies

In 1995 I carried out fieldwork research, seeking to read Matthew 15:21–28 with Batswana women. In the process, I discovered something else: "demons" had been translated as "ancestors" in the Alfred Wookey revised Setswana Bible of 1908. I did not have access to Robert Moffatt's original Bible of 1857 to verify where this use of "ancestors" for "demons" originated. Where in Matthew 15:21 the woman says, "My daughter is severely possessed by demons," in the Setswana translation she says, "My daughter is severely possessed by *badimo*/ancestors." Where Jesus cast out demons in the original, he cast out *badimo*/ancestors in the translation. I was so shocked by this translation that I pored

over all the other New Testament passages where Jesus cast out demons to verify my stunning discovery.

Yes, I discovered a very sad story: the word "demons" had been translated "ancestors" in the Setswana Bible. It was unbelievable. Almost desperately, I turned to Mark 5, where Jesus cast out the Legion demon that possessed and maddened a man. I found out that in the 1908 Setswana Bible Jesus cast out the legion of *badimo*/ancestors, who ran into the lake and were buried beneath its waves. It was a textual burial of *badimo*/ancestors. I was trembling, shocked that Batswana who first read the so-called word of God were made to discover that what they venerated as sacred figures were, in fact, just demons. Ancestors—the extended memory of the families with their departed members—could not be reduced to demons without reducing everyone to the same. What a perfect way of proving that Batswana were helpless heathens lost in the darkness. For more than 150 years Batswana Bible readers consumed this colonial bomb, planted to explode their cultures away, and they could not read Greek for themselves to find out if this was representative or the closest "equivalent" term. I was deeply shaken. But that was before I discovered that the first Batswana readers had long known to read the Bible from their oral cultural base rather than from the missionaries' perspective of heathens in the darkness. As expressed by Gaboutlwelwe and Loatile: "You should know that when we read our Bible we change the letters with our mouths." But how would they reinstate the demonized *badimo*/ancestors?

Again, this was a separate but pleasant surprise and discovery. In the process of reading the Bible with nonacademic women who were church leaders in African Independent Churches, I found out that they read/use the Bible as a divination set. Now, divination among Batswana involves consulting *badimo* about all situations of concern for the living and finding useable solutions. It involves recognizing *badimo*/ancestors as mediators between the living, the dead, and God. So, far from *badimo* functioning as demons in the service of negative power, in the Batswana ways of reading *badimo* together with Jesus were divine forces of positive power. I could not have imagined this U-turn. This strategy of resistance depends on reading the Bible with and through Batswana oral cultures. It depends on using the authority of African traditions rather than giving the English-Setswana Bible the final word. It is a strategy of the Tiv, taking a story that conflicted with their values and retelling it such that to them it was "a good story again," although to Bohannan "it no longer seemed quite the same story." In these processes we are in touch with the forces of globalization and localization

(the Tiv and Batswana readers) appropriating the new texts according to their cultures, texts that were being globalized by agents of globalization (Bohannan and Moffat).

The Bible in the Bush: Globalization, Localization, and Biblical Translation

I must conclude by touching briefly on translation in globalization and localization contexts. In fact, when we speak of globalization, we hark back to modern colonialism, which has given us the current form of globalization. Both Moffat and Bohannan are important cultural translators during this spinning of time, cultures, and spaces into Western images. In her article "Globalisation and Translation: Theoretical Approach," Esperança Bielsa argues that, although the digital language is purported to be the universal language of globalization, there can in fact be no globalization without translation, for "the activity of localisation, through which a product is tailored to meet the needs of a specific local market," involves translation (2005, 142). She thus proposes that translation is a "key infrastructure for global communication and can also be conceived as an analytic borderland where the global and the local are articulated" (2005, 139). The current form of globalization is often defined in terms of the compression of time and space and the speed with which goods, ideas, and services move across the globe (Krishna 2009, 2). The major instrument of the current globalization is information technology: the computer and the Internet. Hence today's Bible translators celebrate that they no longer need to carry bulky manuscripts across real distance and that one can have access to various translation resources from a particular office, leading to faster and cheaper production. Nonetheless, it is important not to eschew the inherent inequalities or the history of globalization. As Cheryl Kirk-Duggan points out, "Globalization emerged with voyages of discovery, land theft via manifest destiny, imperial hubris, freebooting conquest, and colonialism" (2010, 476). The question we must ask is whether globalization implies the disappearance of differences or equality. Studies indicate that with globalization there is more localization: communities are more likely to hold on to their cultures for fear of being washed off by the dominant cultures and languages of the globalizing structures. Thus if we agree that much of translation is not just "interlinguistic process but more ... an intracultural activity" (Gentzler 2001, 194), then we are more challenged "to study cultural interactions" in the context of globalization. As Edwin Gentzler holds,

"the most obvious, comprehensive data for studying cultural interactions are the translated documents themselves" (2001, 194).

In the biblical area, we have a mighty archive of "translated documents," for, as Philip Noss writes, "No other book has been translated over such a long period of time, portions of no other literary work have been rendered into many languages, and no other document is today the object of such intense translation activity as the Bible" (2007, 1). By studying the first literate Batswana readers' response to the Moffat translation, we observed cultural interaction between the globalizing agents and resistance on the localization sites. To digress a little, as a biblical scholar I think we have underutilized this major archive, since most of the time translation is not part of our biblical and religion departments, save for the exercises of those learning Greek, Hebrew, Syriac, French, German, and Spanish. It is good that there are independent schools of translation, but how did Bible translation as an area of study become so marginal from the academic studies of the Bible, given the record that Noss highlights? How did the theories of translation in the past six decades become propounded largely among linguists, with a marginal participation of biblical scholars? Although we may be touching here on the power, patronage, agenda, and ideology of translation houses and their structures (Yorke 2012, 159–71), I still cannot explain why academic departments of the Bible and religion do not have full-fledged programs on translation. In the light of what Noss tells us, it is a major academic gap in most academic departments and schools of religion. In a recent article I have argued for a curriculum shift in biblical studies in favor of studying the language of the first translated Bible in one's particular region (Dube 2012, 11–15). That is, instead of Two Thirds World biblical students being required to learn two more European languages on top of Greek and Hebrew, as is the standard requirement, they should rather learn and pass a language that was used to translate the first Bible translation in their region.

Acknowledging that biblical translation is a cross-cultural exchange within the context of globalization brings with it responsibility. It obligates us to ask how biblical translation has been part of the globalization process and what its undesirable aspects have been. Irina Shchukina argues that "globalization is the appropriate culmination of the processes that began two thousand years ago with the spread of Christianity" (2010, 139). According to Bassnett and Trivedi, "Translations are always embedded in cultural and political systems and in history" (1999, 4). They underline that "translations are never produced ... untainted by power, time, or even the vagaries of culture. Rather, translations are

made to respond to the demands of a culture and of various groups within that culture.... A culture, then, assigns different functions to translations of different texts," and that "function of translation has very little to do with the transfer of information which is so often claimed to be its one and only raison d'être" (Bassnett and Lefevere 1990, 7–8). By evoking globalization and localization in the translations of the Bible, the 2012 Nida School of Translation Studies has accepted the responsibility of tracing the biblical translation function within "cultural and political systems and in history." If we go with Bassnett and Trivedi's proposition, then we need to ask: How are biblical translations embedded in the cultural and political systems and history that lead us to the current form of globalization? How are biblical translations tainted by power relations, time, and the vagaries of culture that have brought us to the current globalization? How did the culture that brings us to the current form of globalization inform the functions of biblical translation in history and until now?

Further, if we consider that the current form of globalization is the culmination of the modern colonial history and modernization of the past two centuries, then it is quite significant that the last two hundred years were also two hundred years of the most intense and Western-dominated Bible translations. Gille Gravelle holds that this "200-year period of largely Western and cross-cultural Bible translation ... is quickly coming to an end" (2010, 13). Given this historical background, Gravelle underlines that it is necessary to review these translations and that we should review in terms of "1) what the goal of Western mission was, 2) how that goal influenced translation practice, and 3) how translation practice may have been influenced by advances in linguistic theory" (2010, 13). Bassnett and Trevidi place translation theory within this colonial history and ideology—as a metaphor for colonization. They hold that "Europe was regarded as the great Original, the starting point, and the colonies were therefore copies, or 'translation' of Europe, which they were supposed to duplicate. Moreover, being copies, translations were evaluated as less than originals" (1999, 4). It follows that Bible translation should review its theories and practice in terms of the history that brought us to the current form of globalization, paying attention that inequalities and cultural wars will intensify rather than get diminished. It also means training translators, translation consultants, and communities to become self-conscious of their identity and journeys in history and how it informs their current translation practices.

Bohannan's story highlights that all readers will translate narratives according to their worldviews. I believe this is perhaps the reason

why biblical translation currently emphasizes the importance of involving mother-tongue translators—one can only hope that such mother-tongue translators are not already-muted subjects who are unable to assert their own cultural dignity. One can only hope and pray for Tiv-type communities who make their cultures central to the translation of the text, particularly in light of modern colonial influence in worldwide biblical translation. I want to believe that Bible translation has been on the road for so long. Like Bohannan, the traveling anthropologist, Bible translation and translators have long crossed many boundaries, and they are already perched among elders who seek to hear more stories told according to their own terms, even if the story may no longer seem quite the same story to its bearers. Such decolonizing community rewritings are long overdue.

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Smuggled Words: Textual Migration and Subversive Assimilation in the Translations of Isaac Bashevis Singer

Christine Gutman

> The Yiddish mentality is not haughty. It does not take victory for granted. It does not demand and command but it muddles through, sneaks by, smuggles itself amidst the powers of destruction, knowing somewhere that God's plan for Creation is still at the very beginning.
> — Isaac Bashevis Singer, Stockholm, 1978

1. Introduction

A well-known rumor, never confirmed nor dispelled, surrounds the translation of Shakespeare into Yiddish. There is said to have existed a Yiddish translation of *King Lear* that proclaimed on its title page "far-taytsht un farbesert" ("translated and improved"). Regardless of the rumor's dubious grounding in fact, it stands as both a testament to the stubborn pride with which Yiddish readers and writers viewed their literature (insofar as it could easily not only accommodate but *improve* upon the great Western classics) and a jibe at the stereotypical insular, unworldly Jew who might believe such a claim (indeed, the assertion that one could "improve" Shakespeare would have been dismissed as a quixotic delusion in most literary traditions).

Nevertheless, starting in the late nineteenth century the Yiddish publishing industry began appropriating large quantities of foreign literature. Major publishing houses were established in Warsaw, Vilna, and New York, and by 1917 there were eleven Yiddish-language dailies in the United States alone, which introduced their readers to serialized works of Zola and Maupassant alongside those of Sholem Aleichem, Sholem Asch, and Avrom Reisen (Michels 2000, 51). But given the

amount of literature being produced in Yiddish within the United States and the propensity of the Yiddish press for translating classic works *into* Yiddish, it is striking that, as of 2004, less than 1 percent of Yiddish literature had been translated into other languages (Lansky 2004, 298).

Of these translated writers, no one has gained more international attention than Isaac Bashevis Singer, the Polish immigrant to Manhattan's Upper West Side whose short stories and novels, once translated into English, earned him enormous popularity and, in 1978, a Nobel Prize in Literature. Alongside fellow Nobelist and bilingual writer Samuel Beckett, Singer enjoys a somewhat unprecedented double role in world literature: his works occupy a place in both the Yiddish and American canons;[1] his writing has arguably been more influential to English-language Jewish-American writers than to Yiddish writers. In fact, he was generally viewed by the latter as inferior to his older brother, Israel Joseph Singer, whose 1936 epic novel *Di brider ashkenazi* (*The Brothers Ashkenazi*) established him as a promising master of Yiddish prose, even drawing comparisons to Tolstoy (Newberger Goldstein 2010, vii–xi). But the elder Singer died in 1944, and within a year his brother published the work that would make of him an international celebrity: the short story "Gimpl tam."

This article will explore Isaac Bashevis Singer's/Yitskhok Bashevis's subversive use of translation as a means of navigating, on the one hand, his hybrid identity (the Polish-Jewish intellectual and son of a Hasidic rabbi who became a Nobel Prize–winning American writer) and, on the other, the complexities of translating out of a hybrid language. Using Singer as a case study, I will highlight the need for a broader reevaluation of the relationship between Yiddish and translation: one that moves toward a perception of translation rooted in decentering, empowerment, and enlargement (what Antoine Berman has called "eccentric" translation) rather than grim fatalism (1992, 180). The mechanisms behind Yiddish hybridity—in particular its so-called "*lehavdl loshn*," or "differentiating language"—mirror the process of translation and therefore should be regarded not as a hindrance but as a useful means

1. For proof that the American canon has claimed Singer, see the anthology *Collected Stories: Gimpel the Fool to the Letter Writer* (Singer 2004). Its publisher, The Library of America, boasts on its website (www.loa.org) of "publishing, and keeping in print, authoritative editions of America's best and most significant writing." The *New York Times Book Review* has dubbed it "the 'quasi-official national canon' of American literature."

of conceptualizing the translation of Yiddish as a generative, dialogical process as opposed to a destructive, dialectical process.

In order to (1) evaluate the ethics of Singer's translation methodology (and, indeed, Saul Bellow's, whose translation of "Gimpl tam" propelled Singer into mainstream American recognition) and (2) delineate a more ethical, decentering approach to translating out of Yiddish in general, I suggest that we look beyond critiques of Singer's supposed assimilationism and recognize Singer as the hybrid writer he was—one whose texts were inevitably inflected as much by his experience of immigration and exile in America as by his formative years in Poland.

2. Situating Singer

The literary prestige associated with the Singer family name, combined with the attention of key Jewish-American intellectuals, propelled Singer further toward transcanonical success than those fellow immigrant Yiddish writers (modernist poets Mani Leib and Yankev Glatshteyn, for example) whose works, although highly influential within Yiddish literary circles, were perhaps perceived as too esoteric or avant-garde for translation and mainstream publication in English. Conversely, one must wonder if popular Yiddish writers such as Moyshe Nadir,[2] whose writings, unlike Singer's early works, liberated Yiddish from an Eastern European context to articulate instead the immigrant experience in America, posed a threat to a nebulous—indeed, mythical—"all-American" target readership precisely because the very alterity of such narratives brought about an unsettling defamiliarization of domestic territory. (Singer himself, as I will later discuss, worried along similar lines that writing about America in Yiddish constituted an impossible deterritorialization of the language. Perhaps this viewpoint explains the writerly aphasia Singer experienced during his first five years in the United States [Epstein 1991].)

Regardless of the reasons for his peers' inability to attain his level of success in translation, American-Yiddish writers viewed Singer with skepticism,[3] an undeniable degree of jealousy (vividly captured

2. Moyshe Nadir (1885–1943) went largely untranslated until 2006, according to the Index Translationum (http://www.unesco.org/xtrans/bsform.aspx).

3. Glatshteyn criticizes the "Jewish façade" and "distasteful blend of superstition and shoddy mysticism" that define Singer's work, which, he claims, "reads better in English than in the original Yiddish" (1986, 145). Invoking an essentialistic "humaneness" common to Yiddish literary works, Glatshteyn denounces the lust

in Cynthia Ozick's short story "Envy; or, Yiddish in America" [1983]), and perhaps even, like Ozick's poet protagonist, the underlying fear that Singer would "save" himself through translation while consigning the rest of the Yiddish language and its literature to oblivion. For Singer, translation was indeed a quest for survival: his own as a writer as well as that of his work. Whether or not concerns over the uncertain future of the Yiddish language also played into Singer's decision to selectively self-translate, the fear that within a generation Yiddish might only survive through translation undeniably loomed over both his work and the criticism he received from fellow Yiddish writers.

Over a period spanning five decades, Singer's novels, short stories, reviews, articles, and literary criticism were published in the New York–based Yiddish-language newspaper *Forverts* under various names: Bashevis (the possessive of his mother's name and the name by which he was known to his Yiddish fiction readers), I. B. Singer (the name that appeared on his translations and English-language publications), Varshavski, and D. Segal (two pseudonyms he claimed to use only when writing for a deadline and that he abandoned once he had "cleaned ... up" the piece in question; Saltzman 2002, xi–xii; Singer in Miller 1985, 41). Singer's arsenal of pseudonyms allowed him to cultivate multiple identities according to the language in which he was writing and, perhaps more importantly, the quality of his work. This latter distinction is inextricably connected to his linguistic identity, since for Singer "cleaning up" was often carried out not by editing but by translating, a form of "collaborative" self-translation. Translation offered him an opportunity to improve his Yiddish texts, which were often written in haste for a *Forverts* deadline. So for Singer, *fartaytsht* and *farbesert* were one and the same.

Eventually this process of editing through translation led to the apparent displacement, indeed *replacement*, of the original by the translation. The difficulty of even proving the existence of Singer's original texts is startling. Even though the translated works of I. B. Singer have appeared in multiple hefty English and French anthologies, to this day only four small volumes (all long out of print) containing original works by Yitskhok Bashevis have been published in book form; the rest are stored on unindexed microfilm in the New York Public Library, making them almost impossible to retrieve (Saltzman 2002, xi). According to

and violence in Singer's writing, which "places his so-called heroes on the same level with the heroes in non-Jewish literature" (1986, 145).

Singer bibliographer Roberta Saltzman, between 1960 and 1991 Singer, the most famous name in contemporary Yiddish literature, produced "fifty-five short stories, eleven novellas, and eleven novels that have yet to be translated into English" and that exist only on microfilm and as manuscripts (2002, xi).

Yet at least one of Singer's works that appeared in English has left the existence of its Yiddish original shrouded in mystery. "Moon and Madness," a short story that appeared in the *New Yorker* in 1980 and was subsequently published in an anthology of Singer's stories without a translation credit, raises questions about the extent to which Singer's practice of self-translation into English eventually became one of *writing* in English.

Anita Norich has invoked the dialectical tension inherent to translating out of Yiddish: it promises at once survival and obliteration, since, in the case of what Jeffrey Shandler has referred to as a "postvernacular" language, the translational afterlife threatens to supplant both the text that it extends and the language itself (Norich 1995, forthcoming; Shandler 2006). In short, translation has been perceived as something of a pharmakon to the Yiddish language; it is a selective lifeline that determines, for better or worse, the shape of Yiddish postvernacularity, dictates how Ashkenazi Jewish culture will be remembered—two decidedly pessimistic implications that posit Yiddish as a moribund or at the very least decidedly rare language—even as it also, and most crucially, promises a potential renewal of the language. Norich, embracing the latter possibility, proposes that the relationship between Yiddish and translation need not be antagonistic; the obliteration/generation paradox, which she frames in terms of *collaboration* (translation as obliteration) and *resistance* (translation as survival, furthering), suggests that the very translation of Yiddish texts is in effect "an act of resistance to history" insofar as any kind of engagement with Yiddish after the Holocaust necessarily represents "a defiant gesture aimed at preserving the traces of a culture that has undergone startling and dreadful transformations in the past century" (forthcoming, 209).[4]

While Singer's critics slammed his translations—and increasingly his work in general—as overly assimilative (and thus obliterative), Singer's translations in fact subversively complicated the relationship between original and translation and in that respect resisted the very

4. I am grateful to Anita Norich for sharing with me a chapter from her forthcoming book, *Writing in Tongues: Yiddish Translation in the Twentieth Century*.

notion of translation as salvation. It is too simplistic to think of Singer's translation process as one of improvement: often the texts have been extensively reworked, resulting in an entirely distinct plot that in some way contradicts, indeed negates, the original, for example, by rendering irony earnest and *heymish* (Yiddish for cozy and familiar)—or at least cloaking irony in the folksy tropes of the Jewish shtetl tale so that an American audience, nostalgic for a mythical past, cannot recognize it. Many of the omissions and alterations in translations of Singer's work arise from the sheer complexity of the Yiddish language—elements that make translation particularly challenging, including its rootedness in pre–World War II Eastern European Jewish culture, its unique differentiative tendencies (most often distinguishing between what is Jewish and what is not), and its dizzying semantic range (a result of the Ashkenazi Jews' contact with several languages and cultures over the past thousand years). Therein lies the rub: fatalist Yiddish writers and critics (Singer himself, ironically, among them) brand Yiddish an inherently untranslatable language, failing to see that the elements of its complexity are precisely what make it ripe for translation (Singer 1989, 7).

3. The Stakes of Translation

> Yiddish, I call on you to choose! Yiddish! Choose death or death. Which is to say, death through forgetting or death through translation. Who will redeem you? What act of salvation will restore you? All you can hope for, you tattered, you withered, is translation in America!
>
> — the fictional untranslated Yiddish poet Hershel Edelshtein, in Cynthia Ozick's "Envy; or, Yiddish in America" (1983, 74)

The wariness with which contemporary Yiddish writers have regarded translation is the product of several factors. The Holocaust, to speak euphemistically, suddenly and drastically reduced the world's Yiddish-speaking population; indeed, since Yiddish was the first or second language of a majority of the six million Jews killed in the Holocaust, it was indelibly bound to memories of atrocities against Jews. The establishment of the State of Israel just a few years later definitively squelched what remained of Yiddish in Erets Yisroel: the institution of Hebrew as the official language of Israel only served to underscore the perception of Yiddish as a stateless, diasporic language, one considered at best the "vulgar" Jewish tongue and at worst a corruption of German (Norich 1995, 209). Persecution at the hands of hostile pre-State Hebraists was later channeled into government policies that for over four

decades essentially refused to recognize the presence of Yiddish within its borders (Shandler 2006, 9–10). In the Soviet Union, which, under Stalin, had initially supported measures to foster Yiddish publishing, Yiddish was subject to increasing hostility as the Second World War approached, culminating in the murder of fifteen Yiddish-speaking Soviet-Jewish intellectuals on August 12, 1952. Finally, the use of Yiddish was in decline in America well before the war, largely as a result of the desire among Eastern European Jewish immigrants to assimilate. Sons and daughters of immigrants were encouraged to speak only in English—even to parents who themselves barely spoke it—or else were made to view Yiddish as a shameful language only to be spoken in the privacy of the home.

In an environment where Yiddish was the object of both violent and passive suppression, translation became vital to the survival of its literature. Singer was keenly aware of this urgency, and it likely played into his decision to "self-translate"—more specifically, the fear that if *he* did not do it, there would soon be no one left to translate for him. Yet paradoxically, for Singer translation was not an attempt to meticulously reproduce his work for posterity in another language; it was, rather, the creation of a new but complementary work. It kept the secrets of the original encoded in the Yiddish but offered a narrative that (generally, but not always) owed its existence to the Yiddish. Here I quote Norich at length on the relationship between Singer's translations and originals:

> Neither a view of Singer's English stories as secondary and derivative versions of Bashevis's Yiddish, nor a view of them as edited improvements on novels that are often exceedingly repetitive and meandering seems apt. Rather, the Yiddish and English texts comment on one another, the latter reworking and sometimes completing the ideational and imaginative work of the former. The English clarifies the Yiddish but for a growing audience it also replaces the Yiddish as the definitive text. This is typical of the history of Yiddish literature in America, but Singer is remarkable among Yiddish writers in the extent to which he contributes to and validates this usurpation of Yiddish by English even as he suggests a different model. (1995, 214)

Singer's goal in translation was not transparency; indeed, even though his translations arguably made his work more accessible to the English-speaking American reader (and the often-censorious methods by which he facilitated this accessibility will be discussed later on), they simultaneously shielded the content of the original from view. Singer harbored a lifelong fascination with Kabbalah and in a way treated his original

Yiddish stories as kabbalistic, sacred texts. In altering them in translation, it might be argued that he was in fact "respecting the intimate secrets" of Yiddish culture they carried (Noiville 2006, 101). Indeed, if the Yiddish was, as Irving Saposnik suggests, the Torah, the English was "almost a Talmud to the primary text" (2001, 6).

Still, Singer's translations may have produced a very different effect. Norich's quote raises some questions. First of all, are non-Yiddish-speaking readers aware of Singer's subversive use of translation as a means of simultaneously opening up and closing off Yiddishkeit to external scrutiny? Was Singer successful in preserving Yiddish if his English-language readers believed they were reading "the definitive text"? Moreover, was Singer conscious of the "usurpation of Yiddish by English" that his translations allegedly brought about? While we cannot speculate about Singer's intentions (which he kept as tightly concealed as his original texts), one important effect of his translations must be considered: somewhere between writing and translating Singer upset the traditional binary roles of original and derivative, yielding instead a fluid relation based on interdependency. The usual linear temporal relation between original (first) and translation (second) is brought into question when Singer's original becomes, in a way, a product of its translation (and most apparently when the original *is* the translation). How can we hear, to quote Benjamin, "the echo of the original" in a text that precedes the original, alters it beyond recognition, or threatens to conceal its very existence (1969, 76)?

Here a consideration of Singer's fellow self-translator and linguistic exile Samuel Beckett might prove enlightening. In delineating the complex relationship between Beckett's original texts and their often vastly divergent self-translations, Brian T. Fitch suggests that, in the case of a self-translator/rewriter, each text merges with its translation to form a single *work*, informed by the cross-fertilization of the "two different fictive worlds" merged within it, thanks to additions, subtractions, and alterations in translation. The gaps produced by asymmetries between the complementary texts constitute what Fitch refers to as a "recalcitrant remainder": the residue formed by the totality of divergences, gains, and losses in translation (1987, 32). Far from being debris left in the wake of a violently distortive translation, however, this remainder should be viewed as a crucial translational *gain*: it enables the refiguration of both translation and original as contingent, incomplete texts until the moment they are placed in dialogical contact. If translation does indeed intend "language as a whole" (that is, look beyond the context of a single literary work in order to encompass the totality of a language), the inter-

text of original and translation (Yiddish and English, respectively) places Yiddish in a position of power vis-à-vis English: the act of translation is one of mutual influence and growth, but particularly as it enables Yiddish to enrich English—an idea that, in Benjamin's words, evokes the procreative potential of translation ("birth pangs") realized in the target language, thus figuring the source language as a virile source of interlinguistic regeneration (Benjamin 1969, 76 and 73).

Seidman draws an insightful comparison between Singer's deceptively opaque translations and the English translations of yet another Nobelist, Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore, which yields the conclusion that viewing Yiddish literature and translation through the lens of postcolonial theory might be instructive (2006, 253). Beyond the distinctions that Seidman draws between the two writers (the most crucial being that Tagore's Bengali readership was not, like Singer's Yiddish readership, in imminent danger of extinction), the comparison yields fascinating parallels. Tagore's translations were not entirely reflective of his body of work: he selectively adapted his most mystical poetry to fit into an Edwardian style. Whether he found such stylistic assimilation appealingly Western or whether, as Kishore has suggested, he viewed Edwardian stylistic mimicry as necessary to achieving success in the literature of the colonizer, Tagore constructed an image of himself as a visionary Eastern mystic who speaks in the familiar words of Keats.

Much like Tagore's, Singer's initial translations were of those texts we might consider his most "Orientalizing": narratives that exoticized and often eroticized shtetl life, even as characters were generally endearing. His English-language American readers were charmed by such friendly defamiliarization, and Singer happily *gave the illusion of* indulging their curiosities, when in fact the inherent mysticism of his texts was toned down significantly in translation: obscure talmudic references were suppressed as more universal Jewish clichés were played up.

Singer's brand of Orientalism was in large part a result of his belief upon arriving in the United States that "Yiddish literature is a product of the ghetto ... and it can never leave the ghetto" (Singer 1989, 10). In other words, since Yiddish as a language had such strong cultural and geographic ties to Eastern Europe (in spite of its status as the language of the Jewish diaspora), it did not have the capacity to express Western modernity.[5] On top of that, Singer implied that even his Yiddish-

5. This is a rather perplexing statement, and Singer would later moderate his opinion. Norich has rightly suggested that Yiddish has long been an international cosmopolitan language (1995, 209). Indeed, enclaves of Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazi

language readers approached his texts with the expectation that they would be transported "back" to the shtetl: "The reader of Yiddish, insofar as he still exists, turns to Yiddish books mainly for their Jewish content, not for their ill-conceived and pathetically rendered 'worldliness'" (Singer 1989, 11). With those words Singer peremptorily, if temporarily, relegated his writing to a historical Eastern European context.

Where Singer suppressed, Tagore expanded; his use of Edwardian verse reconfigured language as a vehicle for transmitting the heterogeneity of his own culture and thus enabled him to expand in English his already hybrid subject position to include the colonial dimension. Although Tagore's translations have, like Singer's, been harshly criticized for their assimilative tactics (Sengupta 1990), their syncretic fusion of elements of Hinduism, (Sufi) Islam, and British colonialism carries an important affirmation of hybridity (Kishore 2013). (Although, again, when it came to choosing which texts to translate, Tagore, like Singer, privileged his most mystical texts to the neglect of his "rational, humourous, patriotic [or] satirical" texts, which neither conformed to the visionary mysticism the British reader expected of an Eastern poet nor did much to endear him to the colonizer [Sen 2013].) For Singer, however, it was not so much a question of stylistic adaptation as it was ideological change: as I will discuss, the domestication carried out by Singer entails a simplification of Ashkenazic cultural hybridity (perpetual contact between Jews and Christians, Yiddish and Polish, sacred and profane—all of which inflect Singer's Yiddish texts). Accordingly, if Tagore used an altered and distinctly British register as a means of maintaining—even further complicating—cultural complexity, Singer omitted and simplified alterities in translation.

Whereas Tagore's poetry soon fell prey to stylistic archaism, Singer was keenly aware of his aging readership and adapted accordingly. As much as Singer was moved to translate by the plight of his language and the possibility of "improvement" that translation afforded him, he was also an astute businessman, and his overarching motivation, some have contended, was opportunism (Saposnik 2001, 4). Saposnik cynically attributes Singer's sudden success among intellectuals to his calculating entrepreneurial mind: "Much like his most famous character Gimpel, he was shrewder than he pretended to be, far more the wily peasant than the impish old man.... Bashevis often read his American audience better

Jews have thrived in cities as diverse as Berlin, Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Melbourne, and Johannesburg.

than they read him, and proceeded to give them what they wanted, all the time concealing both his literary and literal Yiddish originals" (2001, 4). However, Saposnik overlooks the fact that Singer's strategy of concealment and the eventual relocation of his stories from the shtetl to modern America were symptoms of a larger dilemma: what Singer has termed the "inherently untranslatable" nature of Yiddish (Singer 1989, 7). On the one hand, modern English lacked the extensive and layered semantic range necessary to adequately convey Eastern European Jewish culture, which initially caused Singer to criticize *Yiddish* as a language stuck in time and place. Ironically, though, Singer eventually remedied the problem by forcing Yiddish into the very context he claimed did not support it: starting around 1960, he began writing stories set in New York in Yiddish (Roskies 1995, 304). Perhaps that way he was assured that what was expressed in Yiddish could easily be replicated in English; indeed, in the case of many of his later works, accusations of blatant rewriting and suppression no longer hold.[6] This makes one question the extent to which Singer had taken to writing the original with the English translation already in mind. While complicating the ontological status of original and translation, was Singer's practice of "preemptive" translation a form of self-censorship?

Regardless of his motivations, the fact remains that Singer shifted his writing toward a new target audience: the New York intelligentsia who were first introduced to him through the appearance of Saul Bellow's translation of "Gimpl tam" ("Gimpel the Fool"),[7] which appeared in the prestigious *Partisan Review* in 1952. Singer's newer plotlines tore Yiddish away from its roots in Eastern Europe and replanted it in the streets of New York: the adventures of the shtetl schlemiel were replaced by the semi-autobiographical adventures of the successful Yiddish writer living in the big city, and the publications in which they appeared followed suit; many of them migrated from *Forverts* to *The New Yorker, Esquire,* and *Playboy* in translation.

If Singer's later stories were indeed written with a view to English translation, their content (or more precisely their *lack*) offers fascinat-

6. David Roskies suggests rather dramatically that these texts "lose little in translation because there is nothing much to lose": neither on a stylistic level nor, more importantly, on an ideological level insofar as the complexities of Yiddish as a hybrid, stateless, and Jewish language—all of which are so integral to the Eastern European context of Singer's earlier work—are conspicuously absent (1995, 304).

7. Bellow's translation remains the only published English translation of the story.

ing insight into what Singer viewed as untranslatable. The absence of the once-ubiquitous talmudic and anti-Christian references that were such an integral part of shtetl banter in his older works points to the fact that Singer had begun suppressing the distinctly Jewish component of Yiddish in favor of a more secular, even ecumenical, language. These changes could be attributed in part to Singer's failure to find an equivalent in English for the complex system of differentiation that is so integral to Yiddish.

4. Separation and Differentiation: *Lehavdl loshn*

In her discussion of Singer's early story "Zeydlus der ershter," the tale of a Jew who converts to Christianity after being told by the devil (*der yeytser-hore*) that he could one day become pope, Seidman speaks of Singer's "comedy of hybridity, an allegory for the mutual implication of language and identity" (2006, 271). The very irony of the story is that Yiddish is so inextricably linked to Judaism that any Christian who spoke it would be effectively expressing his or her Christianity in Jewish terms—so the conversion remains incomplete until Yiddish is relinquished. Singer's implicit conflation of language and religion—and, by association, identity—is a powerful comment on the role of Yiddish in the lives of its native speakers. It was long labeled "the Jewish vernacular" (affectionately, *mame-loshn,* or mother tongue)—the language that expressed the things of everyday life in a way the holy tongue, Hebrew, could not and *should* not. Such a view is reductive, however, since Yiddish is by its very name a Jewish language.[8]

Since the Ashkenazim were a diasporic people, their language is a product of contact with a number of cultures and languages across Europe. Yiddish combines elements of Middle High German (whence its syntax and a majority of its vocabulary), Hebrew and Aramaic (the *loshn koydesh,* or "holy tongue," component, although *loshn koydesh* borrowings are not limited to religious terminology), Slavic languages (a result of the Jews' movement from the Rhineland into Eastern Europe starting in the thirteenth century), and, finally, a small number of words derived from French, Italian, and Latin (a reflection of the Ashkenazi Jewish community's origins in France and Italy).[9] As a result of the intermix-

8. Native speakers of Yiddish will often produce the English sentence "I speak Jewish," carrying over into English Yiddish's lack of differentiation between language and religion.

9. For a more detailed explanation of the makeup of Yiddish, see Harshav 1990.

ing of languages and, more importantly, of the language of the secular and the divine, Yiddish has developed what the linguist Max Weinreich refers to as an internal *lehavdl loshn*, a "differentiating language."[10] It is not a question of register per se, because even an uneducated Jew could be well-versed in the Torah,[11] and again, the *loshn koydesh* component of Yiddish includes many words expressing everyday secular concepts; if anything, the *lehavdl loshn* creates a possibility for nuance that is not possible in English. For example, for the English word "question," Yiddish has *frage* (a straightforward question), *shayle* (a question demanding interpretation, often reserved for talmudic dilemmas), and *kashe* (a question provoking discussion), the first term coming from German, the second from Hebrew, the third from Aramaic. The bifurcation of the sacred and the profane, and the domestication of Christian terms (perhaps most transgressively, the use of the diminutive *yoyzl*—a term I will revisit shortly—to refer to Jesus) function as a means of identity affirmation that can be traced back to Eastern Europe, where for centuries Jews lived in close proximity to non-Jews. Roskies suggests that *lehavdl loshn*, "[m]ore than a motley of ethnic slurs [terms such as '*goy*' and '*shikse*,' which convey varying shades of contempt or mockery when used in English], of the kind that Philip Roth and other American satirists came to exploit ... is a linguistic structure that serves to insulate the Jews even as they live and work among the Christians" (1995, 286).

Lehavdl loshn played a central role in Singer's early writing, and perhaps that is why translating Singer's earliest works required so much alteration. "Zeydlus der ershter" provides a prime example of how the nature of a language can function as an important plot device. The problem is, what happens when that plot device is translated out of the text? This was the dilemma Saul Bellow faced when he agreed to translate "Gimpl tam."

10. Since the word *lehavdl* is notoriously difficult to define in English, I cite Seidman's thorough explanation: "[*Lehavdl loshn* is] the 'differentiating language' that distinguishes between what is Jewish and what is not. This semantic field is untranslatable in part because English lacks the capacity to mark these distinctions—the interjection '*lehavdl*,' a verbal marker used to distinguish between a Jewish and non-Jewish phenomenon mentioned in uncomfortably or misleadingly close proximity, should serve as a sufficient example" (2006, 253–54).

11. Sholem Aleichem's Tevye stands as one example of a shtetl Jew in Tsarist Russia who is well-versed in the Jewish scriptures, even as he constantly misquotes them for comic effect.

In 1952 Bellow, at the time an up-and-coming novelist, was approached by Eliezer Greenberg and Irving Howe to translate Singer's short story "Gimpl tam," the tale of a seemingly gullible baker who repeatedly allows himself be taken in by his fellow townspeople, for the forthcoming anthology *A Treasury of Yiddish Stories*. Bellow agreed on the condition that Greenberg dictate the text to him, which would enable him to translate simultaneously. Appearing first in the *Partisan Review* that same year, "Gimpel the Fool" was an immediate success: suddenly the name Isaac Bashevis Singer was on the lips of critics, publishers, and non-Yiddish-speaking readers. This was not, incidentally, the first time Singer had been translated into English. Two years prior, A. H. Gross's English translation of the novel *Di familye mushkat* was published to little fanfare. But the publication of Bellow's "Gimpel" in Greenberg's anthology coincided with the publication of Bellow's defining work, *The Adventures of Augie March*, and gained him as much (if not more) attention as Singer.

In his translation Bellow carefully retains the idiomatic character of the original "Gimpl," reproducing common Yiddish turns of phrase that ring exotic but charming to the American reader (Singer's "Az ikh hob derlangt a patsh hot men gezen kroke" [1] reads in Bellow's translation: "If I slapped someone he'd see all the way to Cracow" [3]; "Nu-nu, hot men mir gemakht a katsn-muzik mit a pekl" [2] yields the disconcerting "Well, what a cat music went up!" [1953, 4]). The effect of such idiomatic calquing is humorous (and in some cases not where Singer would have intended) but also distancing; the reader constantly hears vestiges of the Yiddish in the translation. However, if Bellow aimed for a foreignizing translation, he failed in one crucial way: he suppressed all of what are ostensibly anti-Christian references in the text—and there are a few.[12]

Much of the supposed anti-Christian rhetoric in the text is in fact an example of the *lehavdl loshn*, quite literally in the sense that it is used to assert Jewish identity by contrasting it with Christianity. It is not meant to be malicious but is, rather, a reflection of the way Eastern European Jews actually spoke—especially given that shtetls were, contrary to the

12. But the responsibility must not be pinned on Bellow alone; Bellow claimed that Greenberg had omitted one particularly inflammatory line from his recitation, though subsequently "neither Singer nor Bellow had it reinstated in subsequent printings of the English text" (Wirth-Nesher 2008, 105).

myth propagated by literature and more recently film,[13] often home to intermingling Jewish and Christian communities. If Jews were known both among themselves and among Christians as skeptics—defined by what they *did not* believe in—then it makes sense that this kind of vaguely mocking rhetoric would figure prominently in their conversations. But for Greenberg and Bellow, to have included such talk would have undermined the kind of *heymish* Orientalism they felt would please readers. That said, the omissions were likely motivated by more than a simple appeal to reader satisfaction. One cannot overlook the fact that in 1952 the Holocaust was still fresh in Jews' minds: the omissions may have been motivated, more than anything else, by the underlying fear that depicting Jews as "Gentile-haters" would fuel anti-Semitism.

Paradoxically, by opening up Singer's text to a non-Jewish readership, Bellow was simultaneously barring access. The primary problem with Bellow's translation is that some of his most blatant omissions actually mislead the reader. For example, when in the Yiddish text Gimpl first lays eyes on his future wife, Elke, he remarks that "zi hot gehat tsvey tsepelekh, vi, lehavdl, a shikse, fardreyt in beyde zaytn in krentslekh," a common hairstyle for Eastern European Christians of the time (1953, 3); Bellow gives: "She had her hair put up in braids and pinned across her head" (5). The purpose of the passage is to establish that Elke is abnormal, revolting, and possibly not to be trusted—all of which is succinctly conveyed in the original by the words "vi lehavdl, a shikse" ["like, forgive the comparison, a non-Jewish girl"]. Since Bellow omits the comparison, he adds that Gimpel, upon seeing Elka, is stifled by "the reek of it all" (5) to establish that what Gimpel is seeing displeases him, but the translation provides no explanation as to why. Similar references to *goyim* or skepticism about Jesus' resurrection[14] are either omitted entirely or altered to lose their anti-Christian overtones.

13. See, for example, how the 1971 film *Fiddler on the Roof* reconfigures the shtetl of Sholem Aleichem's stories to segregate Christians and Jews, thus heightening bilateral antagonism. The film also stands as a paradigm of what I will refer to as the *heymish* Orientalism of Yiddish texts in translation.

14. The phrase "nisht-geshtoygn, nisht-gefloygn" appears twice in the original. Literally it means something akin to "didn't rise, didn't fly," expressing skepticism about the resurrection. At the beginning of the story the townspeople try to fool Gimpel into believing that his parents have risen from the grave, to which he responds: "[K]hob gants gut gevust, az s'iz nisht-geshtoygn, nisht-gefloygn" (2). Bellow gives: "I knew very well that nothing of the sort had happened" (1953, 4). Here he accurately conveys the idea that Gimpel is not fooled, but the weight of Jewish skepticism toward Christianity is lost.

One final and crucial omission in Bellow's translation bears noting. When Elke tries to convince Gimpl that the child she gave birth to seventeen weeks after their wedding is indeed his, Gimpl, after initial skepticism, says, "Un tsurikgeshmuest, ver veyst? Ot zogt men dokh az s'yoyzl hot in gantsn keyn tatn nisht gehat" (1953, 6). Bellow translates the first sentence "But then, who really knows how such things are?" (7) but omits the second (literally: "People say that little Jesus didn't have a father"), which is perhaps one of the most important—and most inflammatory—sentences in the story, for in it Gimpl essentially produces a line of Christian doctrine in Yiddish. What is more surprising is that he does not refute it; rather, he seems passively to accept it. The sentence is the last of the paragraph—his last pronouncement on the question of his paternity—and as such it brings his vacillation between skepticism and acceptance of his wife's story to an abrupt, unexpected conclusion. Since Gimpl comes to trust his deceitful wife only once he has seen in his situation an analogy of the Immaculate Conception, his gullibility is explicitly equated with Christian belief. In fact, scholars have long fought over the significance of Gimpl's "Christian" innocence: Is Singer using Gimpl as a vehicle to mock Christianity, or is he in fact mocking the stereotype of the skeptical Jew by allowing a marginalized Jew with vaguely Christian beliefs to triumph in the end through his realization that, although the world is made of lies, even lies hold a degree of truth?[15]

Regardless of how one chooses to interpret the sentence, one of its bilateral transgressions lies not in the Christian doctrine to which it alludes but rather in Singer's use of the word *yoyzl*, a diminutive form of *yeshu* (Jesus). Use of the diminutive form is common in Yiddish and can convey affection or disdain. Norich suggests that the traditional use of the diminutive in Yiddish when referring to Jesus, preceded by the definite article "dos" (which functions deictically to establish distance: "*that* little Jesus"), provides "a way of containing the danger posed by the figure of Jesus" (2013). In Singer's text it functions to highlight the subversion of both Yiddish and Christianity inherent in the term: he has used a Jewish language to appropriate a Christian term—indeed, the divine symbol of Christianity—and refashioned that term within the constraints of the language to *become* Jewish (even specifically Yiddish). Bellow's translation, however, will later erase Singer's domestication of the Christian referent by suppressing it, reframing the story for a non-

15. Seidman explores these and various other interpretations of the story in her chapter on Bellow's translation (2006, 255–63).

Jewish target reader. But the translation does more than just omit possibly offensive terms; it goes so far as to neutralize and in some cases actively "Christianize" *Jewish* references, resulting in a text that sounds more generically ecumenical than Jewish. The *shames* (the assistant to the rabbi) thus becomes first the "sexton" (1953, 6) and later the "beadle" (8), and the *tare shtibl* (the ablution chamber) loses its religious connotation as the almost humorous "little corpse-washing hut" (5).

But for scholars of Yiddish, the most controversial part of Bellow's translation has nothing to do with his censorship of perceived anti-Christian rhetoric; it is the very title of the story itself, "Gimpel the Fool." As many before me have pointed out, *fool* is an inaccurate translation of the Hebrew-derived *tam*. The term has roots both in the Passover Haggadah and in Jewish folklore (two sources with which Singer's Yiddish readers would undoubtedly be familiar): the third son in the Passover story is referred to as *tam*, simple but laudably pious.[16] The term later appears in Rabbi Nachman of Bratslav's eighteenth-century parable "The Wiseman and the Simpleton" about two men who are summoned by the king. The simpleton goes unquestioningly and is rewarded, while the wise man stops to ponder why the king would call upon a common man such as himself. This leads him to deny the very existence of the king, so he never collects his reward. *Tam* here has a positive connotation: it is associated with unyielding piety and innocence (ironically the same quality that links Gimpl to Christianity), even perfection. Whether we understand Singer's use of the term as his earnest praise of simplicity or as an ironic jab at bygone unenlightened shtetl Jews, both are impossible readings in Bellow's translation: the nuances and rich historico-religious resonances of the term are lost in the word *fool*.[17]

16. The term also appears in the Bible: Job declares to God that he is *tam* (innocent, blameless) and undeserving of punishment (Habel 1985, 193).

17. The most obvious indication that Singer did not equate *tam* with "fool" comes in the opening lines of the original Yiddish: "Ikh bin gimpl tam. Ikh halt mikh nisht far keyn nar" (1). Gimpl introduces himself as "Gimpl tam" (essentially "Simple Gimpel") but adds that he does not consider himself to be a "fool" (the German-derived *nar*). In using the two different terms, Gimpl is acknowledging that he *is* simple (pious, perfect, blameless)—he willingly lets himself be taken in by others—but *not* that he is foolish, for a fool would not *willingly, knowingly* be deceived. Bellow gives: "I am Gimpel the Fool. I don't think myself a fool" (1953, 3). Without the distinction between *tam* and *nar*, Bellow's Gimpel becomes at best a decidedly less-complex character, a hackneyed sketch of what Paul Kresh calls the "quintessential Jew" and at worst a character whose self-perception is at odds with his actions (quoted in Seidman 2006, 260).

Bellow's failure to distinguish between two concepts that are in Singer's original designated by two vastly different terms (one derived from *loshn koydesh* and the other from German, it bears noting) reveals the obstacles to translation posed by Yiddish's *lehavdl loshn*. A term with positive—and uniquely Jewish—religious associations harkening back to the Bible and Jewish folklore is expressed in English by a word that, according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, refers to "[o]ne deficient in judgement or sense, one who acts or behaves stupidly, a silly person, a simpleton." So far a term that conveys nothing of the innocent piety of *tam*. Most telling, however, is the parenthesis following the definition: "(In Biblical use applied to vicious or impious persons.)." The term *fool*, carrying its own set of biblical associations, is thus the *exact opposite* of the term it is used to translate. Here the *lehavdl loshn* does more than reveal linguistic asymmetries; it underscores the unique conceptual plane on which Yiddish operates and the consequent limits to translation that it entails. Was Bellow, who spoke fluent Yiddish and was raised in a devout Jewish household, aware of the multiple positive connotations of the word *tam*? Most likely. Was his choice of "fool" then a purely aesthetic one—a means of avoiding, as Norich suggests, the tempting but facile rhyme of "Simple Gimpel"—or was it the result of a decision that, since *tam* cannot be conveyed in all its complexity in English, it must not be conveyed at all (1995, 213)?

In many ways Bellow's translation of "Gimpl tam" reveals that the practice of protectively burying the Yiddish text under its translation had begun even before Singer forcibly intervened as "collaborator" in all of his translations. If Bellow's distortive translation made of the translator an author by imbuing him with the power to censor or alter problematic passages, Singer was determined to regain control over his texts through similarly distortive means. As co-translator of his works, he would assure that no one could challenge his claim to authorship—by rewriting his own texts in translation. The result was an apparent bifurcation in Singer's identity: his simultaneous presence, thanks to his translations, in both the American and the Yiddish canons.

As I have discussed, Singer was certainly not the first writer to use translation as a means of straddling literary traditions: Beckett's dual-canonical status (a product of his decision to write and self-translate between French and English), like Singer's, presented a challenge to library classification systems, which generally "base their divisions on the principle of linguistic nationalism" (Chamberlain 1987, 17). The Library of Congress divides Beckett's works among the English and French sections—a classification that dissociates him completely from

his Irish national identity (1987, 17). The inevitably awkward attempts to circumvent ontological problems posed by the multilingual author result in the fragmentation of both the works and the writer: divvied up between national literatures, contingent texts sit in exile from one another on the shelves, enlarging the gap between original and translation that Fitch argues should be bridged in order to allow for the dialogical unity of both texts. This separation, an echo of the Yiddish utterance *lehavdl*, had particularly significant implications for Singer, whose position as a writer of Yiddish—a diasporic and postvernacular language—meant that, while his translations opened the way for his acceptance as a Jewish-American writer (and those translations were categorized accordingly on the shelves), there was no place for his Yiddish originals. His texts seemed destined for exile and eventual oblivion.

6. Singer as Self-Translator

After the publication of the translation "Gimpel the Fool," Singer abruptly cut off all contact with Bellow. He even went so far as explicitly to prohibit Bellow from translating any of his other works. When the two met years later, Bellow asked Singer why he had reacted so violently to his translation. Singer's cryptic response was, "They'll say it's you, not me" (Noiville 2006, 93). Singer harbored fears that Bellow's fame and talent would overshadow his own, that the translator would displace the author in much the same way that Yiddish texts—including his own, ironically at his behest—once devoid of a readership, could potentially be replaced by "definitive" English translations.

Before Bellow came along Singer had worked directly with A. H. Gross on the English translation of *Di familye mushkat* and made significant changes in English, removing entire chapters while adding a chapter to the end of the novel.[18] For Singer it was not enough to awkwardly reproduce the idiomatic character of his stories in English, as Bellow had done to great success. To do so was to perpetuate the per-

18. In response to the suggestion that 50 percent of the original text is lost in translation (an arbitrary number to be sure), Singer told an interviewer, "That's why I try to write one hundred and fifty percent" (quoted in Landis 1989, 2). This is not far from the truth. During the translation process, according to Henri Levi, Singer "pared his texts to the bone, keeping only the indispensable elements of the setting and the details essential to the story line. The rest—the Hebrew, the Aramaic, the inbred allusions, the anti-Christian quips—all these were written off as losses" (Noiville 2006, 95).

ception of Yiddish literature as "folksy," to relegate it to the shtetl (something Singer himself had championed during the early part of his career and something he realized was becoming less and less relevant—not to mention increasingly difficult the further removed both geographically and temporally he found himself from life in Poland). By the time Bellow's "Gimpel" appeared, Singer had been in America for close to twenty years and was more at home at the Garden Cafeteria conversing with members of the Jewish intelligentsia than reminiscing with aging immigrants about his adolescence in the Polish shtetl of Biłgoraj. Having come to terms with the fact that he was an American writing for Americans (Yiddish speakers and otherwise) *in* America, he developed the following outlook: "It happens often with me, working on the translation and working on the book itself go together, because when it's being translated I see some of the defects and I work on them—so in a way the English translation is sometimes almost a second original" (quoted in Saposnik 2001, 11). Source and target texts then stand in a symbiotic relationship: the original is altered through the very process that engenders the translation, so that consequently original and translation are mutually derivative.

By the time he set out to translate several of his works following Bellow's "Gimpel," Singer was already a seasoned translator, having translated works by Thomas Mann, including *Der Zauberberg,* into Yiddish and collaborated on the translation of *Di familye mushkat* (Garrin 1986, 50). His post-Bellow translation process consisted in hiring a group of mostly women, often recruited from the ranks of his admirers, to serve essentially as his transcribers insofar as Singer himself would dictate to them in English (Noiville 2006, 105). In fact, many of his credited "translators" did not even speak Yiddish; they were merely polishers, editing his dictation to flow more naturally in English (Noiville 2006, 106). In this way Singer exerted complete control over the translation process, and the attribution of his later translations reflect this: fifteen of forty-two credited translations appearing in the 1982 Singer anthology bear the note, "Translated by the author and _____."[19] One effect of this approach to translation, whether intended or not, was Singer's complete freedom to alter the original text by suppressing or modifying perceived anti-Christian or obscure Jewish references without protest from

19 Not including Bellow's "Gimpel the Fool," of the remaining translations, seventeen are attributed to various collaborators; eight are attributed to Singer's nephew, Joseph Singer; one to Singer's wife, Alma Singer, and a collaborator; and five lack attribution entirely.

his translators. In many ways, Singer had assumed the role of Greenberg to his transcribers' Bellow—a role that led him to suppress just as many, if not more, potentially problematic passages than his predecessor.

Around this time Singer mandated that all future non-English translations of his work be done from the English text (Noiville 2006, 99). English really did then displace the Yiddish to become the "definitive text"; indeed, English was the source text for his French, Italian, German, Spanish, even Korean and Japanese readers.[20] This resulted in the existence of two supposedly "identical" but actually ideologically opposed texts. Henri Levi attributes this split to the disconnect produced by the Christianization of Singer's translations—this time by Singer himself:

> David Roskies has shown that *a shnur patsherkes*, meaning literally (and not without mockery) "Pater cord," becomes "rosary"; the word *galekh*, a rude term for a Christian priest ("the closely cropped one"), is changed to "sacristan"; "house of impurity" expresses an external, hostile point of view; "rosary" and "sacristan" are Christian words that Polish Jewish readers may not have understood. (quoted in Noiville 2006, 95)

As unhappy as he was with Bellow's translation of "Gimpl tam," Singer practiced the same censorship and ecumenicalization as Bellow. But ironically, by neutralizing, if not outright Christianizing, Jewish or anti-Christian references Singer had shifted his work onto an entirely different semantic plane, one that was incompatible with the original Yiddish, resulting in translations that were in some ways impenetrable to his original readers, not necessarily linguistically (most Yiddish speakers in America at the time were proficient in English) but ideologically. The decision to circumvent instead of confronting the challenge of translating *lehavdl loshn* is fraught with implications. By Christianizing their English translations Bellow (and Greenberg) and Singer appear to implicitly accept the terms of Singer's "Zeydlus": Yiddish is so inextricably linked to Judaism that the relinquishment (translation) of Yiddish necessarily constitutes a conversion—yet one that can never be complete so long as traces of Yiddish cultural sensibility remain.

20. As a result, we have "Gimpel l'idiota" in Italian, "Gimpel, el tonto" in Spanish, "Gimpel der Narr" in German, "Gimpel l'imbécile" in French (updated to the more appropriate "Gimpel le naïf" in a 1993 retranslation). In fact, nearly all translations of Singer's works are listed in UNESCO's Index Translationum as being translated from English with a note indicating that the original was in Yiddish.

Further complicating the status of Yiddish in translation is Singer's designation of his English translations as the source texts for translations into other languages, perhaps because the English translations, which he himself oversaw, served as a safely ecumenicalized mediation of the Yiddish, thereby promising that no translations into any other language would have to grapple with the complications of *lehavdl loshn*.[21] More than the vehicular language through which Singer's works entered the world stage, English was the intermediary that simultaneously hid the Yiddish and enabled it to be more easily transmitted into languages lacking its system of differentiation.

Perhaps it was by rendering the two texts partially opaque outside of their intended readership that he was able to keep his two authorial identities (Yitskhok Bashevis and I. B. Singer) separate. Both the dual identity that Singer had constructed for himself and the complex relationship between his originals and translations provide, then, an instantiation of the process of differentiation inherent in the word *lehavdl*. The question is, does this form of identity differentiation contribute to the obliteration of source text/language/culture? Singer's incorporation of the differentiating tendencies of Yiddish in his translation methodology enacts a compelling conflation of self and text: that the insular, oppositionally defining elements of Eastern European Jewish discourse are manifested in Singer's approach to translation as a means of maintaining those very aspects of his identity amidst the intercultural fluxes of immigration (against, of course, the broader backdrop of the Jewish diaspora) and generational change indicates a poignant resistance to the very assimilation of which Singer has been accused. Singer's influence on American writers (Jewish and non-Jewish) signals a fluidity between texts and between self and text that points to contiguity, not separation: Singer's creative approach to translation, though ostensibly assimilative, enriched twentieth-century American literature with innovative magical realism and fantasy, which would soon be appropriated by English-language Jewish-American writers such as Cynthia Ozick and Bernard Malamud. Unlike Singer, however, the next generation of Jewish-American writers chose to embrace, instead of suppress, the Jewishness of

21. Here I do not place Hebrew alongside Yiddish because, although several of Singer's works were translated into Hebrew from the original Yiddish, the majority were translated from English. Perhaps this offers evidence that even Hebrew, the sacred Jewish tongue from which a substantial amount of Yiddish is derived, does not possess Yiddish's *lehavdl loshn* capabilities and thus is more easily translated from English.

their texts in all its complexity, entering into dialogue with Singer's work by writing the contemporary Jewish-American experience in English: echoing the pioneering Jewish-American writer Henry Roth, phrases in the works of Ozick, Malamud, and Roth are dotted with Yiddish words (including the same mildly derisive terms referring to non-Jews that Singer, and Bellow and Greenberg before him, carefully omitted in translation) and Jewish references left untranslated and unexplained; English is altered to reflect Yiddish syntax and idiom, while the content reflects the struggles of American-born Jews navigating life amidst the fresh collective memory of the Holocaust with a familiar mixture of pathos and humor common to Singer's works.

If Singer's translational practices coupled with the disappearance of a Yiddish readership threatened the destruction of a literature, those writers who followed him promised its redemption—even as they redefined it, allowing for American readers to discover Singer anew through the clarifying mediation of a newly solidified, self-reflexive corpus of Jewish-American literature. The barrier between original and translation, deceptively reified in the term *lehavdl*, has thus proven porous, artificial. Not only has the unique fictive world of Singer's translations laid the groundwork for Ozick's and Malamud's magical realism (even as it has also stood as a stylistic paradigm in opposition to which Jewish writers initially preoccupied with existential realism—Philip Roth and, ironically, Bellow among them—have defined themselves); the intertext that exists between Singer's Yiddish writings and the innovative works of subsequent Jewish-American writers offers a fruitful dialogue—as well as the possibility of reconsidering Singer's work within the canon to which it has been definitively, if problematically, assigned.

7. Conclusion

The aim of this article has been to explore (1) the implications of Isaac Bashevis Singer's construction of a dual authorial identity through translation (a process initiated by Saul Bellow in his translation of "Gimpl tam" and later reclaimed by Singer himself), and (2) to provide a framework for reconceptualizing Yiddish translation more broadly. The split between (the works of) Yitskhok Bashevis and (the works of) I. B. Singer poses the question: How does one translate oneself out of Yiddish and into a language lacking its complex system of differentiation? For Singer, the answer was to assimilate subversively. Indeed, as Singer's career progressed he appeared to write increasingly with a view to translation, but that is only half the story. As Saltzman has pointed

out, Singer continued to write prolifically in Yiddish from 1960 on, though only a small portion of that writing has been translated into English (2002, xi). The rest, confined to manuscripts and an uncatalogued mass of microfilm, stands as a reminder that, even though Singer had cultivated a somewhat domesticated image of himself for his English-language American readers, he never abandoned his Yiddish readership nor his identity as a Yiddish writer. As strongly as he believed that Yiddish would soon die out, he continued to write in Yiddish stories he never intended to translate. It is the task of future translators first to locate these texts and then to translate them in a way that neither censors the cultural and religious beliefs that inform them nor leaves them intact and unexplained so that they remain impenetrable to the non-Yiddish reader—in short, to break through the unique barriers to translation posed by a hybridized source language (one that is, moreover, charged with the spatio-temporally distant reference points of pre–World War II Eastern European Jewish life).

Berman calls on translators to confront the *épreuve* (trial, experience) of translation with a commitment to decentering, to a shunning of opaque ethnocentric translational practices: "[W]e must struggle relentlessly against our fundamental reductionism, but also remain open to that which, in all translation, remains mysterious and unmasterable, properly speaking in-visible" (1992, 180). It is precisely the "mysterious and unmasterable" content, the kabbalistic "secrets" permeating Singer's Yiddish writing and Yiddish literature more broadly, that must be *embraced*, not suppressed, in translation. With these complexities in mind, I would suggest that any attempt to articulate a comprehensive and ethical theory of Yiddish translation might do well to consider the centrality of the term *lehavdl* within Yiddish discourse as an analogy for translation out of Yiddish: as a linguistic device, the term unites and separates at once, establishes both proximity and difference, translates between the sacred and the profane; in its contradictory function, *lehavdl* differentiation reifies the process of translation, which similarly creates difference-based contingency between two texts.

Finally, it is time to work toward an understanding of the relationship between Singer's Yiddish texts and their translations as *dialogical*—not dialectical. Indeed, perhaps resituating Singer's Yiddish works amidst the works of his many as-yet-untranslated peers will allow us to better appreciate his unique hybrid status as a writer, his role in the formation and bridging of two canons. Acknowledging those Yiddish writers whose works shape and respond to Singer's own (including those peers who, like Glatshteyn, problematically branded him as unrepresentative

of Yiddish literature) can lead us toward a methodology of translation that enables a more complete representation of Yiddish literature, while respecting its internal diversity and cultural particularities. Engagement with Yiddish writers on (and *in*) their own terms is becoming increasingly possible thanks to the growing presence of Yiddish at universities worldwide[22] and the outreach of youth-oriented Yiddish organizations such as Yugntruf (Shandler 2006, 2). As the twenty-first century witnesses a resurgence of interest in Yiddish language and culture that extends well beyond the bounds of the kitschy, commercialized postvernacularity to which Yiddish long seemed destined, it is quite possible that we will yet encounter Yitskhok Bashevis and his peers in the language of Shakespeare.

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22. Jeffrey Shandler estimates that, as of 2006, some two hundred doctoral dissertations and master's theses involving Yiddish were written in North American universities alone—about half of them since 1990 (and only two prior to World War II) (2006, 2).

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A Metonymic Translation: Bertolt Brecht's *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*

Liu Xiaoqing

The Caucasian Chalk Circle is one of the most important works of the German playwright Bertolt Brecht (1898–1956). It is also one of the most widely performed modern plays in the West. However, this critically acclaimed play is not purely Brecht's "originality" but is indebted to an ancient Chinese play, Li Xingdao's *Hui Lan Ji* 灰闌记 (The Story of the Circle of Chalk).[1] Brecht acknowledged his adaptation in the prologue of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* in the voice of the singer: "It is called 'The Chalk Circle' and comes from the Chinese. But we'll do it, of course, in a changed version" (Brecht 1983, 126). The "changed version" Brecht made was for the Broadway stage during his exile in America. Inevitably, he also took influences from American culture and society. Thus, in the creation of the play Brecht had two systems, Chinese and American, as his source and target systems to respond to. In addition, Brecht was not a native speaker in either of the systems; rather, he approached both primarily in German. Therefore, in both the actual and metaphorical senses, Brecht acted as a translator in his writing of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*. Writing was his way of translating.

1. To Westerners, the story of two mothers claiming one child is a well-known biblical story that showcases King Solomon's wisdom; therefore, critics generally think Brecht takes influence from both the biblical story and the Chinese source for his creation of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*. However, Brecht only acknowledged the Chinese source; in addition, there is no clear evidence showing that Li Xingdao had known or was influenced by the biblical story for the writing of his play. Hence, in this article I focus on the relationship between Brecht's *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* and Li Xingdao's *Hui Lan Ji*.

I propose that, in his writing as translation, Brecht adopted a metonymic translation strategy. Following Roman Jakobson's two devices, metaphor and metonym, in the study of the arrangement of language, Maria Tymoczko propounds that the two modes correspond to the two approaches in translation. Metaphorical translation, which treats "translation as a process of substitution and selection," has been favored by translation theorists, whereas "the metonymic processes of combination, connection, and contexture in translation are not able to be captured with theoretical language restricted to the structuralist binaries" (Tymoczko 1999, 284). However, what has been neglected is actually an important facet of translation, as Tymoczko explicates:

> Such metonymies are to be found in the way that translation is always a partial process, whereby some but not all of the source texts is transposed, and in the way that translations represent source texts by highlighting specific segments or parts, or by allowing specific attributes of the source texts to dominate and, hence, to represent the entirety of the work. Metonymy operates also ... in the way that translations, as elements of the receiving literature system, metonymically encode features of the receiving cultures. (1999, 282)

Tymoczko thinks that this feature of metonymy is present in all rewritings and retellings (1999, 42).

Tymoczko's theory of metonymic translation is a useful device for reading Brecht's *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* because Brecht adopted elements from both the source (Chinese) and target (American) systems and made them into his own. Brecht's creativity was not diminished by his borrowing. Rather, he made his careful and thoughtful selection, in which he highlighted certain elements and rejected others, to serve his purpose of creating a work of his own. In this way, we can see how Brecht turned re-creation into creation.

Relationship with the Source

Brecht rewrote Li Xingdao's story. The connection between Brecht's *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* and Li Xingdao's *Hui Lan Ji* is distinct. Brecht keeps Li's core story: in the case of a lawsuit involving two women claiming one boy as their son, the judge uses a chalk circle as the device to determine the true mother and rules that the boy goes to the mother who truly loves him. In addition, Brecht preserves specific details of Li's writing and distinctive features of Yuan drama (*yuan zaju*), the genre to

which Li's play belongs. At the same time, Brecht deliberately departs from Li's play with his characteristic changes, prominently reflected in his new interpretation of the relationships between mother and motherhood and between law and justice.

Rewriting of Rewritings

In keeping with Tymoczko's proposal that the rewriting of a story evokes metonymically all the previous rewritings of the tale, Brecht's rewriting also bears a relationship with all rewritings of Li Xingdao's story. The "original," Li Xingdao's *Hui Lan Ji*, was produced in Chinese during China's Yuan dynasty in the fourteenth century. The heroine, Haitang, a gentle and beautiful girl from a good family, is sold into a house of prostitution after her father dies. A businessman, Lord Ma, sees her and marries her as his second wife. Haitang bears Lord Ma a son, the only child in the family. Meanwhile, his first wife has a secret lover and has long schemed to obtain Lord Ma's wealth. After she poisons Lord Ma to death, the first wife accuses Haitang of the murder and then snatches away Haitang's child. Haitang is arrested and found guilty by a corrupt judge and the first wife's lover, who works as a clerk at the court. Fortunately, a well-known and impartial judge named Bao Zheng looks into the case and conducts a second trial. He orders a lime circle drawn on the floor and the child placed in the middle of the circle. The two alleged mothers are asked to stand on each side of the child to pull in opposite directions, with the one who pulls the child out of the circle to her to be declared the real mother. The first wife pulls as hard as she can, whereas Haitang remains motionless. When the judge asks them to try a second time, Haitang again does not move. When the judge asks why she does not pull, Haitang states that she cannot bear to hurt her own child. She then relates the whole story. The wise judge finds Haitang innocent and also the true mother to the child. Absolved of the crimes, Haitang returns home to live with her brother and her child.

The Chinese play first became known to the Western world in a French translation by Stanislas Julien, published in London in 1832. Julien substituted "chalk" for the original "lime" and abridged several passages related to the first wife and her lover. Wollheim da Fonseca translated Julien's version into German in 1876 (Tatlow 1977, 293). A German poet and translator, Alfred Henshke, under the pseudonym Klabund, adapted the play into German based on Julien's translation (Williams 1954, 5–10). One of the liberties Klabund took with the play is that he inserted a love theme whereby Haitang and a prince named

Pao are in love before she marries Lord Ma. In fact, the boy is Prince Pao's rather than Lord Ma's. When Prince Pao becomes emperor, he himself conducts a trial in which he finds Haitang innocent and marries her with their son. Reinhardt staged Klabund's play in 1925, and it was a popular success. In addition, a few other playwrights also made German adaptations, of which some assume Brecht might have seen one or two (Tatlow 1977, 293–94).

Brecht had seen Klabund's play while living in Germany, and he also read the original Chinese play in translation while exiled at the end of the 1930s (cited in Berg-Pan 1975, 219). In 1940 Brecht wrote a short story titled *Der Augsburger kreidekreis* (The Augsburg Chalk Circle). In this version of the story, the cause of the conflict between the true and false mothers is the religious division between Protestants and Catholics. Brecht omits the imperial intervention and makes the first wife the biological mother who has abandoned the child. The heroine is a servant girl who rescues the child and becomes the "real" mother. In 1944 Brecht worked the story into a play, *Der Kaukasische Kreidekreis* (*The Caucasian Chalk Circle*), moving the events to medieval Georgia and adding a prologue set in Soviet Georgia. It is this version that is widely performed today.

In the prologue to *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*, two peasant groups, the goat-raisers and the fruit-growers, dispute the ownership of a valley in Soviet Georgia. The land initially belongs to the goat-raising people. After some arguments, it is decided that the land should go to the fruit-growing party because it will benefit the greatest number of people. As the farmers celebrate their agreement, a singer introduces the main play with a song. This inner play begins with an insurrection during which the tyrannical governor and his wife quickly flee and desert their baby son. A young maid, Grusha, not only saves but goes to great trouble in taking care of the child. Later, when the governor and his wife come back, the wife demands that the child be returned to her for the purpose of inheriting the governor's property. The two women, both claiming the child, confront each other in court. The judge, Azdak, uses the chalk circle in the same way as in Li's Chinese play to determine the true mother.[2] With the child placed in the middle of the chalk circle, the two

2. Chinese scholars Zhu Bingsun, Tao Wei, Qiu Delai, and Zeng Xin and Sri Lankan scholar E. F. C. Ludowy all have discussed the theme of the two mothers claiming one child in Li Xingdao's and Brecht's plays. They connect the story to three major religions, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. Furthermore, Tong Jinghua traces Li Xingdao's play to two Tibetan stories. A Japanese scholar, Nakata

women are asked to pull the child in their direction. Twice the governor's wife pulls hard while Grusha does not move for fear of hurting the child. The judge then rules that the child goes to Grusha. The resulting happy ending mirrors the ending of Li's story.

Adoption

Apart from the obvious similarities between the core stories, there are other notable similarities shared by Li's and Brecht's plays. Antony Tatlow is one of the scholars who has made in-depth comparisons between the two works. According to Tatlow, "the structure of the plot of *Der Kaukasische Kreidekreis* stands in a precise relationship to the Chinese model" (1977, 291). He also thinks that the realistic style is distinctive in the two playwrights' treatment of the well-known story, commenting that "[b]oth Brecht and Li assume that human behavior is largely determined by economic conditions and influenced by social position. ... both the Chinese and the German dramatists observe the practical realities of life" (1977, 298). The realism shared by Li and Brecht differentiates them both from Klabund's romanticism and the biblical King Solomon's universal wisdom. Thus, contrary to the "idealizations, fairy-tale creations" in Klabund's character depiction, both Li and Brecht portray Haitang and Grusha realistically (Tatlow 1977, 298). Tatlow also sees that the two judges of Li's play—good and bad—converge in Azdak. Furthermore, Tatlow lines up Azdak with the bandit-hero of Chinese outlaw literature and plays in general and with Judge Bao in particular. According to Tatlow, although Azdak does not take after Bao in Li's play, he follows Bao's other judgments in other Yuan court plays in which Bao defies high officialdom or even the emperor to give justice to common people. Thus Tatlow connects Brecht's concept of justice to the genre of Yuan drama, one of whose themes is to critique social injustice and other social problems in many of its plays.

Tatlow also observes specific details shared by the two plays: both stories are set in the past; in both of them the son is five years old at the time of the trial (he is only three months old in Kabund's version); the relationship between Grusha and her brother resembles the one between Haitang and her brother; and the child goes to the disadvantaged in the end. Further, both Li and Brecht distinctively used vulgar languages in

Wakaba, thinks that Li Xingdao's work influenced a similar play in Japan. See Ceng 2007; Qu 2002; and Nakata 2001.

the dialogues of their characters. These and other similarities show that Brecht transposed aspects of Li's play into his writing.

Tatlow and other scholars also reveal Brecht's indebtedness to the Chinese poetics of Yuan drama. The narrative style of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* follows closely the pattern of Chinese Yuan drama. Generally speaking, Yuan drama is composed of four episodic acts, with the exception that a few plays are made up of five acts and that the acts of a few plays develop with the plot (Shih 1976, 43). Although Brecht's play is made up of five rather than four acts, its structure is much closer to that of the Chinese drama than his other plays. Also, the five acts of his play are episodic rather than sequential. Thus, John Fuegi comments that Brecht's narrative style comprises "non-naturalistic or 'presentational' devices of traditional Chinese dramaturgy, which is both condensed and explicit" (1972, 146). Wenwei Du thinks that the singer, who functions as a narrator in the play, solely accomplishes "all the narrative devices of the traditional Chinese theatre—such as the characters' self-introduction in stylized recitation or chanting, their narration of the plot's development, and their expression of feelings or thoughts in lyric singing" (1995, 316). Furthermore, Du also ascribes the origin of the prologue, which causes contention among Western critics for its unusualness and incongruity with the main play, to Chinese *xiezi* (wedge), which appeared not only in Li's original play but also was frequently used in Yuan drama, functioning to introduce the whole play (1995, 317). Thus, the "exoticism" of the narrative style of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* can be traced to the Chinese poetics of Yuan drama.

On stage, Brecht conscientiously adopted the performative devices of Yuan drama. It is said that pantomime, "a trademark of the Chinese acting style," fascinated Brecht in that it expresses the idea of the Chinese performer's "awareness of being watched" (Du 1995, 317; see also Willett 1964, 91–92). In the scenes when Grusha and the singer appear together on the stage, Brecht has his heroine adopt pantomime to act out what the singer sings in lyrics. Later, when he staged the play in 1954 in Berlin, he had one actor play two roles, the singer and the judge Azdak, with the use of pantomime. The practice not only follows the performing traditions in the Chinese Yuan and Ming periods but also illustrates Brecht's deft use of pantomime (Du 1995, 317). In a rehearsal in 1955 in Leipzig, Brecht again used pantomime to help solve the problem of not having enough actors to play all the characters. If the characters were masked, he gave them Chinese faces; moreover, he insisted that the masks follow the Chinese method of being painted on the actors' faces rather than being worn (Berg-Pan 1975, 225). Attracted

by the music played by the Chinese musical instrument, gong, in Chinese operas, Brecht commissioned his composer to create "Gongspiel" to imitate the sound (Berg-Pan 1975, 225). Brecht's stage design especially pays homage to the Chinese origin. According to Karl von Appen, stage designer for many of Brecht's performances staged by the Berlin Ensemble, Brecht was very particular about his stage setting. He ensured that the stage backdrop for *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* was done in the particular Chinese manner, which is on a silk screen painted with a Chinese aesthetic style. Brecht even went to the point that he "insisted on helping his stage designer to buy the appropriate type of silk" (Berg-Pan 1975, 226). In this way Brecht made his play thoughtfully respond to his source, Li's play and Yuan drama.

Adaptation

However, just as he purposefully chose to retain some aspects of the source, Brecht also deliberately left others out or substantially changed them. For instance, he moved the setting from Li's Yuan dynasty of China to medieval Georgia (and Soviet Union in the prologue). He especially gave prominence to the social background, which was rarely touched upon in Li's play and had little impact on the story, by casting the scene in a warring time that hinted of his own time. Essentially, by rewriting Li's story Brecht redefined the meaning of law and justice. Brecht first complicated Li's easy logic that a biological mother is necessarily a good and true mother whereas a woman who claims a child who is not hers is dishonest in the first place and eventually proves to be a morally vicious person. Instead, Brecht showed that the biological mother does not necessarily manifest true motherhood and vice versa. In similar fashion, Brecht confounded the unification of law and justice. By depicting a judge who is both good and bad in a certain sense and who rules against the law but does justice to the people, Brecht questions Li's clear-cut demarcation that a bad judge corrupts law and justice and a good judge upholds it.

Mother/Motherhood

Brecht kept the pattern of two mothers, one good and the other bad, struggling for one boy but made substantial changes. Following Li's striking contrast between the two "mothers," good and bad and virtuous and evil in their own characters, Brecht also opposed the two women characters in their morality. Like the first wife in Li's play, the governor's

wife in Brecht's play is an evil character. Also similar to the situation with Lord Ma's first wife, inheritance is the key issue for the governor's wife to fight for the child (Tatlow 1977, 295). However, Brecht reversed the bad character's relationship with the child: in Li's play the bad woman is also the false mother, whereas in Brecht's play the bad woman is the real mother. More important, Brecht portrayed his heroine in a different way from what Li did in his play. Brecht provided no background information about Grusha, except her identification as a maid of the governor's wife. He rarely touched on Grusha's physical features, focusing instead on her character after she adopts the governor's son. In order to raise the child, she is forced to overcome all kinds of difficulties, including jeopardizing her safety and happiness. In a word, Grusha sacrifices herself entirely for the sake of the child.

In this way Brecht disrupts Li's clear-cut relationship between mother and motherhood. In Li's case, Haitang is the biological mother who manifests true motherhood, whereas the first wife is the false mother without any maternal virtues. In Brecht's rewriting, the good and virtuous woman, Grusha, is not the biological mother of the child, in contrast to the governor's wife, who is bad and vicious but is the biological mother. However, the "false" mother, Grusha, manifests true motherhood, while the "true" mother, the governor's wife, shows no maternal love at all to her son, instead using him in her interest. The disparity between Haitang and Grusha highlights Brecht's differentiation and complication between mother and motherhood.

Also, while both Haitang and Grusha manifest true motherhood, it is worth noting their differentiation. Motherliness comes to Haitang naturally, whereas it comes to Grusha socially—which is more admirable as a result of circumstances. Furthermore, the condition of raising the child is much more difficult and dangerous for Grusha than it is in Haitang's safe and comfortable environment. In Haitang's case, except for the time when she fights to win her child back, she enjoys the wealth and love that Lord Ma provides to bring up her child easily. However, what Grusha does is unusual because she jeopardizes her safety, love, happiness, and even life for the child with whom she has no genetic relationship and of whom she voluntarily takes care. This is the point Brecht makes in his rewriting of Haitang into Grusha. By separating motherliness from its integration with biological motherhood in Haitang and making it independent in Grusha, he gives prominence to fostering, nurturing motherliness as the essential quality of a mother. This change points directly to Brecht's central concern in *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*: law and justice.

Law and justice are unified in Li's play. When the law is followed, justice prevails; when the law is neglected or breached, injustice dominates. The first judge in Li's play does not abide by the law. In fact, he knows nothing about law but seeks money all the time. Consequently, injustice runs rampant during his rule. By contrast, the second judge, the famous Bao Zheng, follows the law strictly. Also in contrast to the first judge, Bao Zheng is a man of integrity. He never accepts bribes but dedicates himself to the service of the state and the public. The combination of the two—strict adherence to law and noble character—makes him an ideal judge. In fact, this character in the play follows its prototype, Bao Zheng (999–1062), a historical figure in Chinese history who is well known as the symbol of justice both in reality and in Chinese plays.

It is easy to see that Li links morality with the positive relationship of law and justice. In his thinking, "good" and "bad" refer not only to judges' competency but also to their moral character. In fact, Li makes it obvious that honesty and impartiality are prerequisites for a just result. Overriding this idea of justice is the thought that, alongside good judges, the state can absorb some bad judges because in the end the just judges will redress any wrongs. It is interesting to note that there is little involvement of natural law in Li's play. It is more a competition between a good person (or judge) and a bad person (or judge). Fairness and justice come with the person, not by natural right.

Brecht deliberately subverts Li's clear-cut images of judges as well as his positive connection among law, justice, and morality. His judge, Azdak, is a mixture of Li's first and second judges. Azdak is both good and bad. Morally, he is a disputable figure. Like Robin Hood, he takes from the rich to give to the poor. At the same time, he is also "a thief, a timeserver, and a coward" (Gray 1962, 153). He steals rabbits and is chased by the police. He hates the grand duke but is also protected by him. Upon hearing the news that the former governor is coming back, Azdak displays great fear. Also like Li's first judge, who openly acknowledges his love for money, Azdak seeks bribes publicly. Nevertheless, in contrast to Li's first judge's blatant ignorance of law and the second judge's devotion to law, Azdak takes an eclectic attitude. He knows the law well; however, he does not want to be bound by it. In fact, he shows contempt for the form of law; his only use of the law book is to sit on it.

The judgments Azdak makes are unconventional and even odd. Generally speaking, he does not follow the law but breaks it. However, Azdak does this not out of his ignorance of law or merely for his personal

gain or enjoyment (although he does receive some money from it), but to grant fundamental justice to the poor. In the play Brecht lets an outsider, the singer, praise Azdak for what he does:

> And he broke the rules to save them.
> Broken law like bread he gave them,
> Brought them to shore upon his crooked back.
> At long last the poor and lowly
> Had someone who was not too holy
> To be bribed by empty hands: Azdak.
>
> For two years it was his pleasure
> To give the beasts of prey short measure:
> He became a wolf to fight the pack.
> From All Hallows to All Hallows
> On his chair beside the gallows
> Dispensing justice in his fashion sat Azdak. (Brecht 1983, 211–12)

By endorsing Azdak's practice, Brecht actually questions whether legality brings about justice. His two stories, happening in modern and ancient Georgia, respectively, explain his thought well. In each of them—one is about land and the other is about a child—the unlawful party wins over the lawful one. Rather than injustice, they both produce justice. In the former, justice benefits the majority of the people; in the latter, it lets the child go to the mother who has true motherliness. Nevertheless, Brecht does not mean that law and justice have to be contradictory and that justice always goes against law. Rather, through the play he makes his point, "[t]hat what there is shall go to those who are good for it, / Children to the motherly, that they prosper, / Carts to good drivers, that they be driven well, / The valley to the waterers, that it yield fruit" (Brecht 1983, 233). This, to a great extent, represents Brecht's social ideal. He rewrites Haitang into Grusha and Li's two judges into Azdak to illustrate how this social justice can be achieved in an unusual way. In other words, Brecht is not content with bringing justice to a single case: a boy returning to his mother; rather, what he cares about is to bring the whole of society to its most reasonable and productive order, which benefits the majority of its people. With this new storyline and new moral, Brecht re-creates Li's story into his own.

Relationship with the Target System

In his rewriting theory, André Lefevere (1992) holds that writers and rewriters either conform to or fight with their target systems, owing to the tension between the poetics and the ideology of writers and rewriters and those of their target systems. However, I propose that the relationship between writers and rewriters and their target systems is not a clear-cut either/or but an interaction between the two. That is, in writing and rewriting, writers and rewriters can both assimilate to and challenge their target systems, with one outweighing the other.

This is the case with Brecht's creation of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*. Brecht wrote explicitly in one diary entry that the structure of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* was "conditioned in part by a revulsion against the commercialized dramaturgy of Broadway. At the same time it incorporates certain elements of the old American theatre which excelled in burlesque and shows" (cited in Lyon 1999, 239). The diary reveals Brecht's accommodation to and resistance against the American system. Brecht's interest in American performing arts and his eagerness to be recognized by it can be attested by his goal of "conquering Broadway" between 1943 and 1944. To this end, he willingly absorbed its theatrical influences and made concessions to its political and financial pressures. While this adaptation represents one side of his relationship with the American system, the other side, his resistance, prevails over the adaptation and plays a dominating role.

Assimilation

Brecht's assimilation to American culture and society, American movies and theater in particular, is a mixture of choice and pressure. On the one hand, he was attracted to American movies and theater and was willing to adopt them in his plays; on the other hand, because Brecht was an exile in America, the social milieu, the patron, and the audience all exerted pressure and forced him to make concessions.

Brecht was fascinated by American movies. Hanns Eisler recalls that during Brecht's first trip to America in the 1930s he and Brecht went to watch gangster movies regularly and jokingly called their excursion "social studies" (Weber 1997, 344). In addition, Brecht also collected books and newspaper clippings on American movies. During his seven years of exile in America, Brecht was said to go to Hollywood movies once or twice a week, in addition to seeing plays and shows. As a result, American performing arts not only affected Brecht's concept

of theater but also were directly adopted into his creation of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle.*

Carl Weber, Brecht's former assistant, studies the impact of American theatrical performance on Brecht. He thinks vaudeville and its offspring, musical comedy, are the "elements of the older American theatre that excelled in burlesque and show," which Brecht acknowledged in the production of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* in Berlin in 1954 (cited by Weber 1990, 59). Weber also cites Kenneth Tynan, who proposes that Brecht "used the zany exaggeration of facial staging and acting devices to demonstrate socially relevant behavior" (Weber 1990, 59). Tynan especially believes that the wedding scene in act 3 of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* showcases Brecht's appropriation of the American vaudeville tradition. Weber also recalls that Brecht referred to the Marx Brothers' stateroom scene in *A Night at the Opera* as the model for the staging of the wedding scene. In the Ludovica scene in act 4, Weber thinks the actress who played the seductive innkeeper's daughter walked in a way imitating Mae West, and the actor who played the soldier Blockhead was instructed to display an expression resembling Buster Keaton. In addition, Weber remarks that Brecht employed musical theater processions, pantomimes, and visual ideas that "showed the influence of Broadway techniques" (Weber 1990, 63). All this evidence shows that American performance tradition had a direct impact on *The Caucasian Chalk Circle.*

Based on his teaching and research, James Lyon provides a detailed study of American movie components in *The Caucasian Chalk Circle.* Lyon believes that the underdog image of Azdak, who is believed to be the only Robin Hood figure in Brecht's plays, fits very well with the American movies of the time. He explains that "his [Azdak's] antics, both before and after being made judge, not to say his manner of speech, are much like those of Groucho Marx, whose films Brecht also knew" (Lyon 1999, 241). Similarly, unlike the heroines in Brecht's other plays, Grusha goes through development in her character. Lyon's American students find that this characteristic of Grusha is common with American conventional dramas. According to one of Lyon's students, the scene where Grusha's husband sits in the bathtub also recalls the similar scenes of Hollywood westerns. Acknowledged by Brecht himself, the suspenseful plots in this play and others are influenced by Chaplin. The neat and happy ending of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* is exceptional for Brecht, since all his other plays have open or ambiguous endings. Lyon attributes this to Brecht's knowledge that an American audience would like upbeat entertainment right after World War II. According to Lyon

and his American students, other features, such as flashback, action scenarios, and the love scenes between Grusha and Simon, are unusual in Brecht's oeuvre of plays but are close to Hollywood prototypes. The detailed analysis of Weber and Lyon tells convincingly that Brecht conscientiously adopted American artistic elements into his writing of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*.

While actively adopting American performing poetics, Brecht also complied himself to American society for political and financial reasons. As an exile fleeing from Nazi Germany, Brecht found in America a temporarily stable place to live and write after his changing "countries more often than his shoes" (cited in Fuegi 1987, 86). However, Brecht's relationship with America turned out to be not as an "exile in paradise," as he had expected (Clurman 1958, 228). First, America's long-held isolationism aggravated its fear of immigrants and émigrés, who were already vulnerable to social oppression. Second, the antipathy to communism, which started to gather momentum in the late 1930s, set the foreign-born artists based in Hollywood as targets of suspicion. As an "enemy alien," Brecht, along with other German immigrants, was subject to "close surveillance by the FBI, a ten o'clock curfew during the early years of the war ... and spot check" in his early years of exile (Cook 1982, 72). Brecht's belief in Marxism and his association with the Soviet Union made his situation even worse. The climax came when he was called before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1947, where he was interrogated for his affiliation with the Communist Party, his relationship with Hollywood, the political ideology of his works, and so on. Although Brecht was never charged with any crimes in America, his insecure situation made him sensitive and even alert to his social surroundings.

Brecht's change of the prologue of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* can be seen as an instance of his response to the political situation at the time. The Soviet Union and America were allies when the play was written, so the background of the prologue, the Soviet Union and land settlement resolved with the "idealistic Marxist principles," did not provoke unpleasant feelings (Lyon 1999, 240). However, with the outbreak of the Cold War, the allies turned into enemies. Brecht then "instructed Eric Bentley to omit the entire scene from the 1948 printed version, as well as from the world premiere production at Carleton College that same year" (Lyon 1990, 240). Clearly, the ideological situation affected Brecht's dramatic decision.

Most of all, financial restrictions made survival the issue of paramount importance in Brecht's life. The poem "Hollywood," written

during this time period, best illustrates his situation: "Every day, to earn my daily bread / I go to the market where lies are bought / Hopefully / I take up my place among the sellers" (Brecht 1976, 382). Although the poem refers particularly to Brecht's experience in film-making, it can be applied to his life in general during his exile in America, including his writing of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*. In fact, there is no denying that financial reasons account for part of the motivation for Brecht to write *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*. Contracted with Broadway before the play was written, Brecht received $800 in advance royalty payments (Hayman 1984, 81; Lyon 1980, 124). The payment and contract made Brecht obliged to his patron as well as to the American audience.

All these constraints were clearly felt in the creation of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*. In a diary entry written during this time, Brecht complained about the tension between "art" and "contract" (Lyon 1999, 239). Lyon interprets Brecht's uncommon use of the word "art" as his "desire to follow his own instinct as a playwright" and the "contract" as his wish to win over the Broadway audience (1999, 239). While taking American theatrical elements willingly and the hostile treatment as a German exile reluctantly, Brecht did not resign himself to his target system in his creation. Rather, he resisted it with his own poetics and ideology.

Resistance

Brecht's resistance against the American system came from two directions: the revolt against American politics and ideology, particularly those in the show industry, and the assertion of his own ideology and poetics. These two forces converged in Brecht's writing and rewriting; together they brought out the epic theater and Marxism, Brecht's hallmark, against the Broadway poetics and anti-Communism prevalent in America at the time.

First of all, Brecht distanced himself from American life, except for his professional involvement with Broadway and Hollywood. Martin Esslin makes a perceptive observation in this regard: "while he [Brecht] admired the productive achievements of the United States, he had no contact with his cultural climate; distrusted its politics, wrongly believing that after the war the U.S.A. would inevitably relapse into isolationism; and disliked its cooking" (Esslin 1984, 65). As a result, after Brecht came to the United States, "the American scene, which had dominated his early works, disappeared from his writing" (1984, 65). In fact, Brecht's indifference to American culture is reflected in his shunning not only American scenes and subject matters in his plays

but also American poetics as a man of letters. Frederic Ewen regards this as a limitation of Brecht and impugns him for it:

> That he [Brecht] did not in the course of his six years' stay deepen his knowledge of the profounder currents of American thought, and of the major literary figures of the past and the present century, and that he remained almost wholly indifferent to the literary upsurge of the twenties and the thirties, many of whose representatives were even then in Hollywood or nearby, reflects the limitation of his mind. That mind, otherwise so alert and so given to ready assimilation, would undoubtedly itself have been deepened by a more positive contact with such movements. He never really discovered Hemingway, Dos Passos, Dreiser, Farrell, Steinbeck, Lillian Hellman; nor for that matter any of the poets of that era. (Ewen 1967, 384)

However, I find that what Ewen considers a fault is actually Brecht's fight. It shows both his character and his attitude toward the target system. Being "at bottom essentially a dissident" and considering himself the "Einstein of the new stage form," Brecht always tried hard to create in his own way rather than being influenced (cited in Lyon 1980, 8, 32). His relationship with his patrons is illustrative in this regard.

Although *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* was the only play that Brecht contracted with Broadway, Brecht broke up with both of his patrons, Broadway and Luise Rainer, the Australian-born Hollywood actress who initiated the project and secured the contract for him. To Rainer, his immediate patron, for whom Brecht intended to write the play, Brecht did not particularly accommodate himself. Shortly after the writing started, the two of them began to clash. On the one hand, Rainer simply found Brecht hard to get along with; on the other, once Brecht started writing, he no longer kept his verbal promise to write the heroine for Rainer but followed his own pursuit. By the time he finished the first draft of the play in June 1944, their relationship had become so strained that Rainer withdrew from the play. The end of the cooperation thus completely released Brecht from the obligation to write for Rainer.

Brecht took an equally uncompromising attitude with his professional patrons in Hollywood and on Broadway, from whom Brecht earned his bread, as Lyon depicts:

> Nor did Brecht have a reputation for doing things on anyone's terms but his own. If he had asked Reyber about the conventions of Hollywood film writing, chances are he would have ignored them anyway. Convinced of his own superiority as a writer, he wanted to change public taste, not pander to it. (Lyon 1980, 50–51)

The same was true of his attitude toward Broadway. Although Brecht's own response to the detraction that he had not compromised enough was that he felt exactly the opposite, John Fuegi shares Lyon's opinion on Brecht's insubordination (Fuegi 1987, 90–91). In fact, Lyon believes that "from 1936 till the end of his American exile [Brecht] appeared to be uncompromising in his view," and that that was the reason that caused his failure on the American stage (Lyon 1980, 13).

I believe that Brecht did compromise, yet not only was his compromise insubstantial, but he also gradually backed away from his initial compromise and returned to his principles. The transformation of the character Grusha is a case in point.

Katja, the early version of Grusha, was originally modeled on Luise Rainer. However, ten days after Brecht sent Rainer the first draft, he began to envision his heroine differently: "She should be artless, look like Brueghel's Dulle Griet, a beast of burden. She should be stubborn instead of rebellious, placid instead of good, dogged instead of incorruptible, etc., etc." (cited in Hayman 1984, 81). Following his own liking, Brecht started to modify the character until he finally recast her into a new figure by the time Rainer relinquished the role. According to Lyon, the original Katja was much nicer and better suited to the American audience, while Grusha was "less saccharine and more obtuse, a character that bore the stamp of the retarded development of her class" (Lyon 1980, 127). In fact, Brecht made his character so unappealing to the audience that he even used the word "sucker" to describe her. Brecht thus defied the stereotype of the heroines on the Broadway stage and portrayed a character as what he intended her to be. The contract for *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* did not bind Brecht. Although it restricted him in the beginning, he managed to break away from it and wrote on his own terms.

Brecht's Poetics and Ideology

Generally speaking, epic theater and Marxism, as Brecht's trademark in poetics and ideology, pervade his creation. In *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*, Brecht writes with distinctive features of them not only to resist the target system but also to rewrite Li's play to transform it into his own. In terms of rewriting and translation, Brecht asserted his subjectivity and creativity by flaunting his poetics and ideology.

In dramaturgy, the epic theater and the V-effect are generally acknowledged as the most representative features of Brecht. In contrast to the Aristotelian dramatic tradition, epic theater is characterized by

its dynamic depiction, its resort to the reason rather than the feelings of the audience, and the goal of education over entertainment. Brecht employed these features in almost all his plays. In *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*, the epic theater can best be seen in its difference from Li's play.

In Li's play, Li restores justice and peace to the world by letting the wrong be redressed. In other words, with the injustice removed, the world remains as it is. However, Brecht creates justice by disrupting the old order. As illustrated by his two cases, the world changes for the better by turning the old standard upside down. This difference between Li's "static" and Brecht's "dynamic" depiction of the world parallels Brecht's contrast between Aristotelian drama and epic theater.

The principle of appealing to the reason rather than the feelings of the audience can be best seen by Brecht's "awarding" the child to the adoptive mother rather than the biological mother. It is one of the biggest alterations Brecht makes with Li's play. Within this revision Brecht radically changes the class and character of the heroines. From Li's beautiful and weak middle-class woman who is at the mercy of fate, Brecht changes his heroine into a maid who is strong and takes control of her own fate. Li portrays Haitang as a sympathetic character. Her beauty and kindness make her likeable. She does not do anything particular to demonstrate her qualities but performs her duties devotedly. Moreover, she is victimized: in the beginning she is sold into prostitution because of her family situation, and later her child is taken from her by the evil first wife. In both situations she has no power over what happens to her. Haitang appeals to the emotion of the audience. The more she suffers, the more people feel sympathy for her. By contrast, Brecht depicts his heroine as a strong woman who elicits admiration rather than sympathy. He deliberately omits the physical features of Grusha to diminish any chance for the audience to be attracted to her because of her beauty. Furthermore, he complicates the relationship between mother and motherhood, posing for the audience a choice between blood relationship and moral character. In this way he achieves his purpose of asking the audience to use their powers of thought rather than their emotions to watch his play.

The third characteristic of epic theater, that the play is to educate more than entertain the audience, is closely related to the second principle: reason over emotion. By letting the child go to the adoptive mother, Brecht reverses both the Chinese original play and social conventions to drive his point home that a true mother is determined by her motherly characteristics rather than the blood relationship. Moreover, because the gist of his rewriting is not the triumph of the true mother but the

justice of society, he especially challenges his audience with the controversial character and ruling of the judge and exposes the audience to a new perspective on law and justice. A morally blemished judge does not necessarily make a bad judge. Similarly, following the law does not always bring justice, and breaching the law does not necessarily cause injustice. With the example of the two circumstances, the modern-day Soviet Union and medieval Georgia, Brecht confronts the conventional view of law and justice and puts forward his point that justice lies wherever it best serves the needs of the people.

Brecht's theoretical technique of *Verfremdungseffekt*, generally considered the core of Brecht's epic theater, is also prominent in the play.[3] As critics generally agree, the singer in *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* is one of the most noticeable symbols of the V-effect. Although the idea is believed to be inspired by the Chinese performing arts, Brecht's singer does not have a counterpart in Li's play. In *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*, the singer does not belong to any group on the stage, nor does he have an actual role in the plot. Rather, standing between the audience and the actors, he provides what cannot be performed by the actors or to make comments on the story throughout the play. This includes introducing the background and the progress of the story and giving voice to and externalizing the inner thoughts of the characters. In keeping with Brecht's own theory, this role breaks the illusion that what is on the stage is reality. The appearance of the singer constantly reminds the audience that they are watching a play. For instance, before Simon and Grusha enter the stage, the singer introduces them with the five-line song, "The city is still. / Pigeons strut in the church square. / A soldier of the Palace Guard / Is joking with a kitchen maid / As she comes up from the river with a bundle" (Brecht 1983, 131). In traditional theater

3. The term is shortened by Fredric Jameson as V-effect and translated as defamiliarization effect, alienation effect, estrangement effect, or distancing effect. Its roots can be traced to Russian formalism, to Viktor Shklovsky's "priem ostranenniya" (the device of making strange), but it takes its inspiration from Chinese drama performance. According to Brecht, the Chinese play has the distinct V-effect in that "the artist never acts as if there were a fourth wall besides the three surrounding him. He expresses his awareness of being watched.... The audience can no longer have the illusion of being the unseen spectator at an event which is really taking place" (Willett 1964, 91–92). However, the effect does not limit the actors and audience. Brecht thinks that it is achieved "also by the music (choruses, songs) and the setting (placards, film, etc.). It was principally designed to historicize the incidents portrayed" (Willett 1964, 92). Precisely because it tends to distance itself from the audience, the V-effect is regarded as controversial by some critics.

these lines, serving as stage instructions, are unseen by the audience. However, Brecht has the singer sing the lines to the audience to make them aware of the stage and to direct them to the play. At other places the singer supplies what cannot be performed, for instance, the inner thinking of a character, even the baby, who cannot speak. The singer also makes comments on behalf of the author or the audience. Thus, in the whole play the singer plays the role of the "trouble-maker." He breaks the integrity of the play and constantly brings the audience back to their reality from the "reality" created by the play. In this way Brecht forces his audience to take a detached view of the play.

Ideologically, against the currents of Broadway as well as American society, Brecht made his long-held belief in Marxism and antifascism evident in his writing. Although Lyon suggests that the background of the Soviet Union in the prologue can be a sign that Brecht appealed to his American audience because the Soviet Union entered World War II as America's ally at the time of his writing, I argue that it derives more from its association with Stalin than from the U.S.-Soviet friendship.

Despite the fact that Brecht was not officially a Communist Party member and had conflicts with the orthodox Marxism doctrines, he was, or at least he considered himself, a veteran Marxist. From the mid-1920s, when he was exposed to and became interested in Marxism, until his death in 1956, Brecht's most important political thought was Marxism. As a strong opponent of bourgeois society, Brecht believed that Marxism provided "a new [and] critical science of bourgeois society" and at the same time "a practical theory" for the proletarian revolution to overthrow it (Kellner 1997, 284). Antifascism does not stand separate from Marxism in Brecht's political thought. Rather, he saw the two combined in that the Nazi group, representing the interests of industrialists and the bourgeoisie, stood opposed to the working class and exploited the people. Therefore, in his writing during his exile, the two political thoughts are usually fused.

Although *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* is not a noted antifascist or Marxist work, it necessarily bears marks of Marxism and anti-Nazism. On the one hand, the war-torn setting in medieval Georgia and the two authoritarian rulers easily remind readers of Germany under Hitler's control, the land from which Brecht fled for his exile; on the other hand, the class division and struggle in the play is the biggest signifier of Marxist thought. The two major characters—Grusha and Azdak—both come from the proletarian class, and their opposites—the governor's wife, the grand duke, doctors, and landlords—all belong to the bourgeoisie. The two classes form a distinct contrast. While the bourgeoisie

are lazy, hypocritical, greedy, and lifeless, the working class, represented by Grusha and Azdak, are full of life and love. The latter group may not be perfectly "good," but they are much better people than their bourgeois counterparts. Grusha is kind, loving, and altruistic, in contrast to the cold, cruel, and selfish governor's wife. Azdak is happy-go-lucky and above-board compared to his cunning and hypocritical bourgeois customers. The class division forms the basic contradiction of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* and reaches its climax in the dispute over the child in court.

Motivated by this ideological message, Brecht changes the core plot—two women claiming one child—into a class struggle. Darko Suvin expresses similar thinking when he states, "The tug-of-war between the biological upper-class mother and the plebeian 'social mother' over the Noble Child is an *exemplum*, standing for a decision which social orientation shall prevail as the parent of posterity, future ages" (Suvin 1989, 165). In this view, the center of the struggle, the child, represents not only a child but also the future of society. To the governor's wife and her group, the child is closely related to the property they want to repossess and is thus a tool to reproduce their bourgeois life. The immediate benefit of having the child back is to inherit the wealth of the governor. In the long run, it confirms their social status and interests and consequently continues their bourgeois rule. By contrast, Grusha wants to have the child not out of material consideration but out of love. Yet, with the symbolic meaning of the child, her claim for him is not only for the good of the child but also a claim for her class. By taking the child from the governor's wife, she annuls the latter's chance of inheriting the wealth and the continuation of the bourgeois life of their group. In this sense, Grusha's act is revolutionary. Her victory represents the victory of the working class for her time and the future.

Conclusion

The perspective of translation and rewriting, especially Tymoczko's metonymic translation approach, allows us to take a better look at the interrelationship between creative writing and translation in Brecht's case. Brecht was both a writer and a translator. The two roles are interrelated. Writing and rewriting were his way of translating, and vice versa. In this writing/translation, he challenged traditional translation concepts of "equivalence" and "faithfulness" by forming a dynamic relationship with the source and target systems. He transposed and transformed portions of both systems to construct his own. In other words, by performing

metonymic translation strategy, Brecht creatively turned translation into his creation.

The Caucasian Chalk Circle is not the only work among Brecht's oeuvre that manifests features of translation. *Good Woman of Szechuan*, *Saint Joan of the Stockyards*, and others all attest to his talent as a rewriter and a translator. Brecht's unique way of writing provokes much controversy among critics: while some accuse him of being a "plagiarist," others validate it as his characteristic. Brecht's major critic and translator, Eric Bentley, thinks that "[c]ritics ... fail to note how Brecht made his borrowings his own" (Bentley 2008, 358). In a similar vein, Fredric Jameson takes plagiarism as Brecht's "mode of production." He explicates:

> Yet in the sense in which it has been affirmed that every thing in Brecht is plagiarism in one way or another—whether from past or present, from other people or the classics—the *Grundgestus* also suggests the uniqueness of some Brechtian "mode of production" in which there is always a preexisting raw material that requires a reworking based on an interpretation. (Jameson 1998, 105)

While regarding Brecht's characteristic way of writing as a way of translating in general, I think the distinction of *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* is its close relationship with both the source and target systems. From Walter Benjamin's point of view, we can see that Brecht's work gives Li Xingdao's Chinese source an "afterlife". By partially translating Li's play and the Chinese classical drama, Brecht made the famous story of two mothers claiming one child as well as Chinese poetics live on in modern Western society. Yet more prominently, as translated literature, understood from the perspective of descriptive translation studies, Brecht's work became part of the target system—American culture and society—and impacted the latter.[4]

Although it took decades for Brecht to achieve belated success with *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* in America, in the long run it fulfills Brecht's aim to "conquer" its target system. The play script, which Brecht wrote initially for Broadway, was not staged as it was expected. When it was finally performed by Carleton College (Northfield, Minnesota) in

4. Gideon Toury in his *Descriptive Translation Studies and Beyond* writes explicitly that "translations are facts of target cultures; on occasion facts of a special status, sometimes even constituting identifiable (sub)system of their own, but of the target culture in any event" (2012, 29).

1948, it attracted only a small audience on account of being "too left-wing, too risqué, too avant-garde, and in some instances, simply too boring" (Connelly 1997, 97). Unsurprisingly, the "epic theater" suffered immediate rejection due to its failure to compromise itself for the target audience. However, today *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* is one of Brecht's most staged plays in the United States. The epic theater has become one of his important legacies and is widely discussed and cited in American art. Brecht produced deep and far-reaching influence on the American theater, as Carl Weber comments:

> Even during the slump of the 1980s, however, Brecht maintained his position as one of the four most frequently produced playwrights in translation, in company with Molière, Ibsen, and Chekhov. He also is the only German dramatist who has gained a permanent position in the American professional repertoire. Neither the German classics Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, Kleist, Büchner, nor any of their successors have achieved a comparable status. (Weber 1997, 349)

The playwrights Brecht influenced include Tony Kushner, Robert Schenkkan, George C. Wolfe, Anna Deavere Smith, and others (Weber 1997, 353). Visual artists such as Andy Warhol, Dan Graam, Hans Haache, and Martha Rosler have referred to Brecht or his epic theater in their writings. Famous writers and critics such as Roland Barthes, Michael Fried, Clement Greenberg, Herbert Marcuse, and others paid much attention to his poetry and theater as well (Glahn 2006, 29). Eva Goldbeck analyzed *Lehrstück* in detail, and Mordecai Gorelik discussed the "epic theater" at length in his influential 1940 book *New Theatres for Old* (Glahn 2006, 30). Among others, Rainer Fassbinder is a notable filmmaker whose direction followed Brecht's device of the "alienation effect." All these examples show the impact of Brecht on American culture.

Brecht's Marxist beliefs did not present an obstacle to his American audience either; audiences not only accepted it but took it as his hallmark. It turned out that it benefited him rather than damaged him. In his book *Brecht in Exile*, Bruce Cook notes:

> In America, especially during the sixties and early seventies, when Brecht was firmly established here, an enthusiasm for his work became a kind of badge of radicalism, a sign that you favored free speech, opposed the war in Vietnam and the Nixon administration. He was at least part of the package—and at the most, to some, a touchstone of radical authenticity. (Cook 1982, 217)

Thus, instead of being converted or ignored, Brecht was recognized and remembered by the American people for his distinctive difference.

Also, with his play Brecht throws in a new perspective in the relationship between law and justice. Adapting Li Xingdao's play provides Brecht a perfect device to illustrate his views on law and justice. Following the same device of the chalk circle, Brecht exemplifies with his play that diversion/digression from the law rather than adherence to it produces justice. But to Brecht the reason that diversion is made is the key. When corrupt judges ruin the law and justice, one must hope, as in the Chinese play, that fair-minded judges like Bao Zheng will overrule them. However, we see Brecht's view emerge in his adaptation of the play that Bao Zheng is not necessarily ideal. With the complicated relationship between law and justice, Brecht deliberately designs the "evil" character, Azdak, to achieve justice by distorting law in an unjust society.

There is no doubt that Brecht's idea on law and justice is unconventional. It does not fit the American circumstance during his time of exile. As Michael Freeman points out,

> Brecht was in some ways ahead of his time. There is no way that in the United States (or for that matter in Britain or Germany) a court would have cemented a fostering relationship over one based on a blood tie. There is still a reluctance to do so. Even today, we attach such an importance to the genetic that we see as "real" relationships where the links are tenuous, and as a result, put parentage over parenting. (Freeman 1999, 208–9)

Nevertheless, in *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* the split between law and justice does not suffer any changes in performance on the American stage; instead, these changes become its feature and are welcomed. In fact, the fictional legal case established by Brecht—the child goes to his adoptive mother rather than his biological mother—becomes a source for study by Professor Martha in her course on family law at Harvard Law School (Lyon 1999, 245). As literature extends reality, Brecht's *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* adds a new dimension to our understanding of law and justice and other social and political issues. More important, it achieves Brecht's goal in his life and career: to change the world by changing people. Today, with its wide performance and popularity in America and other countries, *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* makes a difference to the world.

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

Interview

translation *speaks to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak*

translation *editor Siri Nergaard and editorial board member Edwin Gentzler met with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak for an informal conversation during the 2011 Research Symposium organized by the Nida School of Translation Studies in New York City (September 14). As one of the symposium's two principal lecturers, Spivak gave the speech "Gender and Translation in the Global Utopia," a transcribed version of which was published in issue 1 of* translation *under the title "Scattered Speculations on Translation Studies."*

During the conversation that follows, Spivak explains how she understands translation: she calls herself a "literalist" and explains that her formula is "very careful literalism." She discusses the connections between creolization and translation as a question of class mobility. On a more personal note, Spivak talks about how she lives her life under two different teaching situations, one in the United States and the other in India, suggesting that both the children of the superpower as well as the subaltern who accept wretchedness as normality "need to have their desires rearranged" and understand the importance of the right to intellectual labor, in two different ways. We also hear the stories behind Spivak's own work as translator of Jacques Derrida, Mahasweta Devi, and, more recently, Aimé Césaire's Season in the Congo. *Finally, and very interestingly, Spivak explains how "translation is the most intimate act of reading": "something that one should not really call an 'I' is writing," and "taking the responsibility for the writing of the text," a sustained prayer to be haunted.*

NERGAARD: We are excited about your presentation today at the Nida Research Symposium. In your opinion, where is translation taking place, and what is translation today?

In addition to this, I would like you to tell why you started to ask yourself questions about translation. I guess your experiences both as a translator of several texts and your living in a continuous process of translation must be parts of the explanation.

SPIVAK: I think when one uses the word *translation*, then one is looking in English—because you know in the major North Indian languages, you have the Sanskrit-origin word, which is *anuvaada*, which is "following-speech," or you have *tarjama*, which is from the Arabic Farsi meaning "translation," but also suggesting "biography" and "memoir," a big source of loans for us—so to an extent before I even start talking about translation, I would want to undertake the impossible project of translating the word "translation" in all the languages of the world, going beyond its "latinity." We all know translation is transference, and we all know the Italian proverb about the translator as a traitor. But these are all "latinate" words, right? Do we know what happens to the concept when it begins to inhabit other words, other lingual memories? Therefore, when I talk about translation, I'm talking about an English word as a teacher of English because I love English. English is a supple language, and I'm talking about what is done at universities or what is done in tertiary systems of education; I think that translation should be done very well. I'm a literalist. I follow Aristotle in a very vulgar way, and Aristotle is teaching his creative writing class, *Poetics*, where he's talking not theory, but he's talking to people who are going to write tragedies to win competitions. What does he say? He says, "Be very careful, very good with *mimesis* and if *poiesis* happens it will come by *tychē*, "by chance." That is my formula here: very careful literalism. Because I'm a human being, I can't be perfectly literal, but also on the positive side if I really hit it, *tychē* will bring something beyond literalism.

So that's where I am with translation. I believe you wanted me—and I'm sorry my answer is so long because I didn't want to answer the implicit question—you wanted me to talk about creolization. That is not just something happening today because of diasporics; that is something that has happened forever. That is a phenomenon that has nothing to do with translation studies as a discipline, nothing. Forever the servant has learned the master's tongue, not well, but well enough so that the master can understand and communicate. This oddly occurs in exogamy in which the wife learns the in-laws' tongue. In Vienna, I gave a talk where I talked about the wife in exogamy as the original diasporic. It's not theorized. The Victorians brought in love. The artificiality of courtly love has nothing to do with this. It let us conveniently forget

female exogamy as the originary diaspora. Broaden this, and creolization can be seen as the source of all the grammatized languages of the world. It's happening all the time, and you should think of that very much more as a model in practice. For example, I live in Washington Heights. I go into a grocery store, and I creolize Spanish because otherwise the grocer can't talk to me. You know I have more power than he, but in that situation I'm a buyer, a customer; he's the server. If I don't realize the only language he speaks, I don't get served. That's something that's been happening all the time; that's not something that's happening just today. I just offered it because people seem completely blind to it as they talk about translation.

NERGAARD: And this reveals maybe the connection between the relation that has always existed between creolization and translation.

SPIVAK: It can be: class mobility. At the beginning of this process, when Dante chooses the curial creole, he chooses the aristocrats speaking in court out of all the creoles. That's like access to translation; it was written in Latin in *De vulgari eloquentia*. But it's confined to class, and to an extent the women become honorary males, as it were. My sister is married to a Hindi speaker; our language is Bengali. My sister has a chemistry doctorate; she's just been nominated by the government of India in the spreading of science as the head of the advisory committee on gender and communication, and she's an extremely successful person. But she had to learn the language of her husband like a native. I love my brother-in-law, but his Bengali is not that good. This is an imperfect example, because Hindi is also the national language. It's a question of class mobility, and what connection is there? The same connection as Dante told us in the thirteenth century: one is between grammatized languages, and the other is a survival technique. That's how I connect them.

GENTZLER: In your talk earlier today you mentioned that you were a New Yorker, and we're here in New York today. New York is wonderfully diverse, multilingual, multicultural, and multireligious, very dynamic. We're here on the tenth anniversary of 9/11. It strikes me as if the whole world is watching how New Yorkers move on, commemorate, and regenerate. You're also from Kolkata, which is also a wonderfully diverse multilingual, international city, with great filmmakers, dynamic political parties, and great diversity. How does the multilingual transla-

tion environment of these cities contribute to or underscore or impact your scholarly thinking about translation?

SPIVAK: What happens is that my experience in the village schools teaches me how not to generalize when I'm at a place like this because my cultural difference from the landless illiterate "schedule" castes and tribes in my home state is greater than my cultural difference from you. They are Indians, so I have an affect that that's what informs me. This symposium started not because I wanted to do anything but because I was asked. I always wait for someone else to ask me. In the subaltern teacher-training endeavor also I was asked by a local activist, in 1986. I'm self-subsidized; I'm not corporately funded. In the beginning I told my students in Pittsburgh and Columbia, "I love you, you're my students, but I need a dollar salary in order to carry out this big challenge: supplementing vanguardism, my greatest intellectual challenge. My mind is not on teaching you. And, because I'm the child of plain-living, high-thinking bourgeois parents, precisely because I don't want to work for you any more I feel that I have to work very well for you so that you will get your money's worth and pay good attention to what I'm saying." But then as the years passed I realized that at two ends of the spectrum I was doing pretty much the same thing because the children of the superpower need to have their desires rearranged—understand the right to intellectual labor—just as much as subalterns who accept wretchedness as normality also need to have their desires rearranged—and learn to practice intellectual labor after millennia of prohibition. I'm not doing good to anyone, I mean these people are not in any problematic situation; I'm teaching at both ends. Therefore, I think that's what makes me tick, and I don't really see it as translating. I am with the language here, I don't just mean English, but the language of detrivializing the humanities here, and I'm with the poetry of the decimal system there because there's no science stream in the local high schools so the rural students can't get into the mainstream. So they're two different idioms—bottom and top—that I have tried to internalize in my own way and not really succeeded. I've not succeeded at this end—I've been kicked upstairs, and I've not succeeded at that end because it's very hard to know what a subject is like after a millennium of cognitive damage. It's not a real answer to your question. You had wanted a more ethnocultural answer, but for that you'll have to wait for my friend, Homi Bhabha.

NERGAARD: Even if we say that the grounding problem of how words get their meaning suggests the necessary impossibility of translation, is

it still important to translate as a political act, as you have translated Mahasweta Devi? You introduce, you explain, and you accompany the translations with explanations. Is that a politically important act to do?

SPIVAK: I think it's losing its importance as the translators are talking more and more about how important they are. Herbert Marcuse and Robert Paul Wolff's idea of repressive tolerance, Raymond Williams's idea of the oppositional being turned into alternative (as an adjective)—that's what's happening with the powerful languages translating a lot of stuff. I think translation is inevitable, and I think as far as what I did, no, I would not say these are political gestures. The only thing that was somewhat teacherly, not really political, was that I wanted not just to supply quick ways of learning culture, because culture can't be learned. And since very often writers are obliquely related to their so-called culture of origin, I gave a few notes. But in India this editor or reviewer for *India Today*, the Indian *Time Magazine*, right, says, "The translation is excellent except for Gayatri Spivak's sermonizing." See, so you think it's a political act, but the Indian upper-class thinks, the nonresident Indian "should keep quiet." So therefore, no, it wasn't a political act; it was just that I wanted these texts to be treated as texts for study rather than a quick way of learning culture without reading the history books. You know what I mean? So, no, I don't think they were political in any broad sense. They were narcissistic. When I first read Derrida, I didn't know who Derrida was. I ordered his books in 1967; I was twenty-five years old. I ordered *De la grammatologie* out of a catalog; I read it. I thought, "My God, this is a fantastic book." And I thought: this guy is an unknown guy, I am a very young assistant professor at the University of Iowa, and I'll destroy myself if I write a book on this guy. I'd heard the University of Massachusetts Press was doing translation, so let me translate. I thought I was being so practical. Also, my chair said, "What are you doing? You wrote a nice dissertation on Yeats. Why are you going off in the direction of this peculiar book?" He also didn't know. So I wrote a query letter that was so innocent that the University of Massachusetts Press said yes. So that is hardly a political act, number one. I said I won't translate unless I can write a monograph-sized introduction. When this scandal became known, J. Hillis Miller sold the contract to the Johns Hopkins Press without my knowledge.

GENTZLER: The introduction is brilliant.

SPIVAK: It's now being translated into French as a separate document and twice into Chinese, once straight and once as Cliff's Notes.

GENTZLER: Brilliant, brilliant.

SPIVAK: I think that's so funny.

GENTZLER: I learned more about Freud from your introduction to *Of Grammatology* than in any of my German courses.

SPIVAK: How wonderful—you know what Paul de Man said. He had been my dissertation adviser. So I wrote the introduction, and I sent it to him, and he said to me, "Gayatri, this is three books. Why are you putting it into an introduction?" And I said, "Well, because it is my introduction." But then with Mahasweta Devi, I started translating her because, in 1981 *Yale French Studies* and *Critical Inquiry* had both asked me to contribute pieces: *Yale French Studies* on French feminism and *Critical Inquiry* on deconstruction. And I was an idiot; you know this is completely narcissistic stuff. I was thirty-nine or something, and like a fool, instead of stepping into the European enclosure, I said, "How can this be?" So for the sake of my "identity," I started translating Mahasweta Devi. Do you call this politics? Then the years passed by, and I began to discover her feudality. So with *Chotti Munda and His Arrow*, I put an end to it. This is just part of my life story. It's not seriously political; I think politics is more complicated. In the political you influence the policy makers, the decision makers. You think anybody cares?

GENTZLER: May I ask a follow-up? You just finished translating Aimé Césaire's *Season in the Congo*, and there you have no introduction. Have your thoughts about the presentation of a translation as a book changed after the Devi experience, or is this a different publisher, a different editorial policy, or a different audience for your book?

SPIVAK: You didn't hit the one word that I wanted—a different author, a different author: Aimé Césaire. I don't have to go forward to introduce him.

GENTZLER: This is true.

SPIVAK: I mean he himself was so tremendously active within and beyond Négritude, then his own political work in the Antilles, and

then all the wonderful writing on him. I didn't feel that I had to educate anyone in anything. I do have a short paragraph called "Words from the Translator." For me, that part had to be said because it was the dream of United Africa after Pan-Africanism, just after decolonization and Nkrumah's dream and Lumumba's dream—these were taken up by the others from within French-language imperialism because Aimé Césaire, you see this nation-state business—postimperialism rather than postcolonialism—was not focused on his own nation-state. Aimé Césaire tried to imagine the Congo in a way that Patrice Lumumba would see, and he also made it clear that it wasn't just the CIA or the UN withdrawing that killed Lumumba, but those Katangans within the Congo, with their minerals, etc., who wanted to go with general capitalism. Lumumba himself said he was against "tribalism." Capital has no country. I do have a sentence there where I talk about how one should look at that dream within which Nehru placed his India. But the dream failed. When I said this I forgot the double bind. I who always thinks about double binds forgot it because it was my own problem. I was born before Independence, and the disappointment of decolonization didn't leave my generation because we had hoped with the enthusiasm of adolescence. My colleague Bachir Diagne reminded me of the double bind and the perennial mode of "to come." I gave the task of the introducer to Bachir Diagne. So there is an introduction, but it is written by Bachir Diagne, who's from Senegal.

GENTZLER: Lumumba is a great hero of mine, but I am also from that generation. I was shocked to learn—I teach a course on the Vietnam War, and I mention Lumumba as part of one of my talks on the United States' paranoia against liberation movements around the world, and none of my students knew who Lumumba was. I was just shocked. We have to reteach a new generation the international politics of the period. So your new translation is very well timed. It may extend the parameters of my teaching and maybe others as well.

SPIVAK: Please include the "Words from the Translator" because there I really write as a person of that generation.

GENTZLER: It's very political [laughter].

SPIVAK: That is political. I sense you have another question.

GENTZLER: I am thinking about a love in translation question.

SPIVAK: I want to see how you pose it.

GENTZLER: How I pose it?

SPIVAK: Pose was a very big question, a big word when I was at the University of Iowa, and we used to laugh because one of our co-teachers was always posing questions. So I want to see how you pose it.

GENTZLER: I guess, hmmm, how do I phrase it ... You say that translation is the most intimate act of reading. I think I agree. Sometimes my students say that they learn more about a text in my translation class than they did reading it in any Spanish or French literature class. You suggest that the translator has to surrender to the text, making choices more erotic than ethical. This strikes me as—I see this sort of Schleiermacherian ethics—the domesticating versus foreignizing binary so prevalent in translation circles; I see that as limiting a translator to fairly rational choices. I see your intimate act of translation as more of an individual choice, more of a visual choice, or more of a personal choice. Could you talk a little bit about this third avenue, this third way of translation?

SPIVAK: I see. You are right, and I agree with you, that it would be an irrational decision. What I am doing is I am describing. I am not giving a method. I am saying that translation *is* the most intimate act of reading, whatever you choose to do. Even as a bad translator, that is about as intimate that you can get. Haven't you met people who cannot really get close to you, which is their misfortune. For me it would also be correct to say that reading is also the most intimate act of translation. It wouldn't be a chiasmus. There would always be a difference. Yet they are a pair of dissimilar similars. And for some people, the intending subject always slips in, their misfortune; they can't give it up to the text. The interesting difference between this whole translation business, how good it is, etc. and the dismissal of reading—oh, get your Kindle, etc. is a global cultural lesson. We read when we were young, since there was no Xerox machine, no nothing, and it was always borrowing and going to lending libraries, national libraries. Karl Marx, in his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, copied pages and pages and pages. That way of reading is gone. That's okay. I am not saying bring it back. When the desire to translate grabs you, it is an unexpected thing that you welcome. You begin to feel, and the trouble is, this is so without guarantees, so without the ability to test, that people will claim it. It's too bad. People will always claim that they are doing this. You cannot do anything about

it. But you begin to feel that you are writing the text. This happened to me with Melanie Klein. I really began to feel as if—not that it was me—but it was that the *text* was being written in the reading. It is not at all an identity—Melanie Klein/Gayatri Spivak—that kind of thing. I invite my students to think when I am teaching Marx, which I do, a thousand pages of Marx with the translation—it's not Marxism—I invite them at least to imagine, to take it out of history, as it were, and to imagine that there was a day when this stuff was not there. It's actually a contingent piece of writing. I mean, of course, being what I am, the historical must be considered, but there again, I very much, I have this sense, and with Aimé Césaire, in that one scene where Lumumba is dying and there is the blood coming up and in that foam he sees outside of himself into dawning Africa, right, the rosiness. That particular scene, which is of course incorrect because that is not how he died, but it is a play. I must have, but it is not living that scene, because that would be this kind of narcissism that one works against, but I felt again and again that I, that something that one should not really call an "I," is writing. That's the intimacy that I am talking about. Taking the responsibility for the writing of the text. This can't be given as a method, nor as a choice. Even if you teach it, you should not give it as a prescription that I am giving. I just wrote a little piece on loss for Seagull Books, who brought out the Aimé Césaire translation, for their catalogue, and the biggest thing about humanities teaching when it really is humanities teaching is that you are teaching people to play something, to philosophize if philosophy, and to read if literature. You do history of this and history of that and other things, but they are only other models. The main thing that you are teaching is to *play* something: one's self as an instrument. And there are some who surprise you as being the ones who can be taught to play to lose. Because that is how one teaches. Playing to lose. Because *qui gagne perd*. This is like an abyss. Because if who wins loses, then is winning losing, losing winning, losing one's desire to win and all of that stuff, is playing to lose winning? This doesn't end. It is something that you kind of give in to, right? Rather than think about incessantly. So for them, the philosophers of the future, we who are just servants of our students, earning a living teaching, we live in that hope and this intimate act of reading, which is really a prayer to be haunted by the spirit of the writing, not the person. How can I describe it? I am a complete atheist; I am a complete nonbeliever in the soul, but this is about as close to this effect of grace that one can get to. It is the intuition of the transcendental, which, unless you have it, you cannot mourn and you cannot judge,

and that is what is caught by this definition of intimacy. It's not a definition; it is a description.

NERGAARD AND GENTZLER: Thank you very much.



Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, University Professor at Columbia, has recently been awarded the Kyoto Prize for Thought and Ethics (2012). Her most recent publication is *An Aesthetic Education in an Era of Globalization* (Harvard University Press, 2012). She is a translator of the works of Derrida and Mahasweta Devi and is the author of *Death of a Discipline* (2003), *Other Asias* (2008), and *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason* (1999). She founded The Pares Chandra and Sivani Chakravorty Memorial Project for Rural Education in 1997, to train teachers among the landless illiterate and to return to modern indigenous agriculture, in a rural district of West Bengal, India, continuing work that she had started doing in 1986. She is at work on a book on W. E. B Du Bois. Email: gcspiv@gmail.com.

Call for Papers

Special Issue: Spaces and Places of Translation

Guest editors: Sherry Simon (Concordia University, Montreal, Canada) and Federico Montanari (University of Bologna, Italy)

Publication: 2015

The issue will explore the different processes of translation that occur in the continuous negotiation of and in spaces and places.

The initial idea is that all translation takes place in spaces and is both conditioned by space and able to promote or provoke changes in the perception and the use of spaces. The main attention will focus on places in space, mainly physical, architectonic places such as squares, official buildings, places devoted to religious cult, museums, schools, and the like, but also specific translation zones defined by a relentless to-and-fro of language, by an acute consciousness of translational relationships, and by the kinds of informal translation practices characteristic of multilingual urban areas, *banlieues* and slums, infra- and inter-urban boundaries, scenarios of social conflict and change. It is also impossible to ignore virtual spaces, as they today increasingly define the reality of all living spaces as transactional and plural.

A particularly intense locus of translation are borders, refugee camps, sites where refugees and immigrants arrive, as well as passageways, crossing points, and mediation places in postconflict situations (see, e.g., examples from postconflict countries of the former Yugoslavia such as Bosnia and Kosovo), and sites of conviviality that are staked out in hostile cities, sites such as railway stations where migrants gather.

In the recent past we have seen different examples on how spaces and places are vulnerable to natural disasters (tsunami, Katrina, Sandy,

earthquakes in Italy). These improvised catastrophes causes traumas and force people to reinterpret their lives and their spaces.

We will consider the following main areas of investigation:

1. Physical spaces and their traversing
   - — Emblematic city spaces with historical resonance as sites of translation, rewriting, negotiation of shared meanings and memories.
   - — Practices of mapping that account for translation zones and language flows. What kind of maps can reveal successive overlays, expungings, and interactions of languages, and how can maps take account of virtual spaces?
2. Places of worship
   - — The transformation of cities where places of different worship cohabit.
3. Spaces and places of migration
4. Spaces and places of conflict
   - — Postwar places (e.g., Kosovo).
   - — Social conflicts in urban areas (*banlieues*, slums).
   - — Natural catastrophes (Katrina, Sandy, earthquake).

Due Dates

Abstracts (ca. 300 words) or drafts can be sent to:

- Sherry Simon: Sherry.Simon@concordia.ca
- Federico Montanari (federico.mont@gmail .com).

When submitting, please consider the possibility of including videos and photos; in general we encourage submissions that consider other forms of expression than the written language.

- Deadline for submitting abstracts is **September 30, 2013**.
- Deadline for submitting completed articles is **December 31, 2014.**

For additional information, email Cristina Demaria at cristina.demaria2 @unibo.it.

The Journal

translation is a new international peer-reviewed journal published twice a year. The journal, a collaborative initiative of the Nida School of Translation Studies and leading translation studies scholars from around the world, takes as its main mission the collection and representation of the ways translation is a fundamental element of cultures' transformation in the contemporary world. Our ambition is to create a new forum for the discussion of translation by offering an open space for debate and reflection on post-translation studies. *translation* moves beyond disciplinary boundaries toward transdisciplinary discourses on the translational nature of societies, which are increasingly hybrid, diasporic, border-crossing, intercultural, multilingual, and global.

Translation studies is enjoying unprecedented success: translation has become a fecund and frequent metaphor for our contemporary intercultural world, and scholars from many disciplines—including linguistics, comparative literature, cultural studies, anthropology, psychology, communication and social behavior, and global studies—have begun investigating translational phenomena.

The journal starts from the assumptions that translational processes are fundamental to the creation of individual and social histories and to the formation of subjective and collective identities—that is, to the dynamic transmission and preservation of culture(s). From here the journal invites reflection and exchange on translation's role in memory-making through the representing, performing, and recounting of personal and collective experiences of linguistic and cultural, psychic and physical displacement, transfer, and loss.

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Musa Dube

For us Africans who come from largely oral communities yet in a historical context where the first written stories—whether they are cultures, history, religion, language—were written by Westerners, especially during colonial times, it has been excruciatingly painful to read the anthropological record, the travelers story, the missionary record: for the most part, one cannot recognize herself. It is a different story, precisely because it is an African story that is grafted into and interpreted within a Western culture. Unfortunately, the colonial context, which entailed the collection of the stories of the Other, who is different, was a time when the Other was already despised. Consequently the refraction of our stories was informed not only by Western cultures but by racism and Eurocentricism.

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

I am saying that translation *is* the most intimate act of reading, whatever you choose to do. Even as a bad translator, that is about as intimate that you can get. ... When the desire to translate grabs you, it is an unexpected thing that you welcome. You begin to feel, and the trouble is, this is so without guarantees, so without the ability to test, that people will claim it. It's too bad. People will always claim that they are doing this. You cannot do anything about it. But you begin to feel that you are writing the text.

Loc Pham

Yet far from being homogenous, the multilingual and multicultural territorial state is invariably split between mainstream and ethnic cultures, and translation thus plays a key role in providing the condition for the flow of justice across ethnic differences. Translation constitutes the very means whereby ethnic subjects of justice speak and are spoken to. In this way, the political dimension of justice ... intertwines with the problematic of translation.

The problematic at hand is, I argue, the translation of distributive justice into local language and culture, a translation of the material into the cultural, if the material is to be accepted as justice.