Epistemic Logic and the Problem of Epistemic Closure
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13130/2037-4445/7957Abstract
This paper argues that propositional modal logics based on Kripke-structures cannot be accepted by epistemologists as a minimal framework to describe propositional knowledge. In fact, many authors have raised doubts over the validity of the so-called principle of epistemic closure, which is always valid in normal modal logics. This paper examines how this principle might be criticized and dis- cusses one possible way to obtain a modal logic where it does not hold, namely through the introduction of impossible worlds..
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