Abstract
This review critically assesses the main claim and argument of Jacob Stegenga’s book Medical Nihilism, published in 2018 by Oxford University Press. It considers some problematic aspects of the application of Bayes’ theorem in support of the author’s thesis, and it discusses a brief selection of unclear consequences.
References
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[3] Gillies, D. (2018), Should we distrust medical interventions? Metascience, 28: 273-276.
[4] Shan Y. and Williamson J. (2023), Evidential Pluralism in the Social Sciences. New York: Routledge.
[5] Stegenga, J. (2018), Medical Nihilism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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