Normativity Naturalized? Some Thoughts on Bruno Celanos Pre-Conventions

Abstract

Bruno Celanos thought-provoking 2016 paper on Pre Conventions, A fragment of the Background prompted intense discussion. Unsurprisingly so given the perplexity as to the existence of entities which dwell both in the normative and the factual realms. Ever since Hume and Moore we have grown zealous about this divide. My aim here, however, is neither an in-debt discussion of Humes Law nor a detailed critical analysis of Celanos Pre Conventions.  Rather, I want to point out that the underlaying structure of Celanos Pre Conventions closely resembles theoretical constructs offered by linguistic philosophers (and interestingly so, of the externalist branch) in their meaning formation explanations. I am thinking in particular of Millikans construct of natural conventions, reproduction and precedent. Following this thread, the question of the normativity of Celanos embodied facts seems to mirror the disjunction problem in informational theories of meaning (Fodor) and the general question of normativity of meaning (correctness conditions of terms implying meaning normativity). What I have in mind here is, then, to assess the validity and reach of Celanos claim not about the existence of entities of this type, but about their inherent normative nature.