Collusion and Inequitable Prices in the EU Mandatory Bid Regime
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54103/milanlawreview/29027Parole chiave:
Mandatory Takeover bid, Highest Price Paid rule, Takeover Directive, CollusionAbstract
This article examines the phenomenon of collusion in corporate acquisition transactions under the framework of the EU mandatory bid rule, focusing on avoidance practices that undermine the application of the highest price paid rule. Through a comparative analysis of landmark cases in France, Italy, and Germany, this study shows how collusive arrangements—often involving side contracts — enable acquirers to offer lower prices to minority shareholders, thereby undermining shareholder protection and distorting the efficiency of the market for corporate control. This article also assesses the adequacy of legal responses at both the EU and national levels in addressing these distortions, arguing that, to effectively restore an “equitable” price, supervisory authorities should take into account any additional benefits granted to the seller of the controlling stake. Compared to valuation methods based on allegedly “objective” criteria, this approach more effectively neutralizes the distorting effects of collusion and strengthens the deterrent function of the mandatory bid rule against inefficient acquisitions.
Downloads
Riferimenti bibliografici
A. Abu Awwad, Collusione e rettifica del prezzo nell’OPA obbligatoria, in Rivista della regolazione dei mercati, 2019, p. 167
P. Agstner and C. A. Nigro, Obbligazioni convertibili e corrispettivo dell´opa volontaria nell’esperienza tedesca (con uno sguardo al diritto italiano), in Rivista del diritto societario, 2021, p. 751
L. A. Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994, p. 957 DOI: https://doi.org/10.3386/w4788
F. Cadorin, Opa collusiva, poteri della Consob e tutela degli investitori, in Giurisprudenza commerciale, I, 2020, p. 399
F. Cadorin, OPA obbligatoria e prezzo “equo”, Milano, Giuffrè, 2023
A. Dyck and L. Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, in The Journal of Finance, 2004, p. 537 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00642.x
E. Elhauge, The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine, in University of Chicago Law Review, 1992, p. 1465 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1600007
L. Enriques, Mercato del controllo societario e tutela degli investitori: la disciplina dell’OPA obbligatoria, 2002
L. Enriques and M. Gatti, Creeping Acquisitions in Europe: Enabling Companies to Be Better Safe than Sorry, in Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 2015, p. 55 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2492158
M. Gatti, Opa e struttura del mercato del controllo societario, 2004
M. Gatti, Mancata promozione di OPA obbligatoria e risarcimento del danno, in Giurisprudenza commerciale, 2005, II, p. 774
R. J. Gilson and J. N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, in University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1999, p. 785 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/3313035
J. Grant, T. Kirchmaier and C. A. Nigro, Convertible bonds and the best price rule: the Celesio case, in J. Grant, European Takeovers: The Art of Acquisition (2nd edition), Globe Law and Business, 2018, p. 39
H. Le Nabasque, Solidarité résultant d'une action de concert et obligation de déposer un projet d'offre publique d'acquisition, in Revue des sociétés, 2015, p. 185
M. Maugeri, Partecipazione sociale, quotazioni di borsa e valutazione delle azioni, in Rivista del diritto commerciale, 2014, p. 93
M. Pagano, F. Panunzi and L. Zingales, Osservazioni sulla Riforma della disciplina dell’opa, degli obblighi di comunicazione del possesso azionario e dei limiti agli incroci azionari, in Rivista delle società, 1998, p. 152
A. Perrone, Informazione al mercato e tutele dell’investitore, Milano, Giuffrè, 2003
D. Preite, Il conflitto di interessi del socio tra codice e disciplina del mercato mobiliare, in Rivista delle società, 1988, p. 361
E. P. Schuster, The Mandatory Bid Rule: Efficient, After All?, in Modern Law Review, 2013, p. 529 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12023
R. Skog, Does Sweden Need a Mandatory Bid Rule? A Critical Analysis, in SUERF Studies, 1997, p. 967
L. A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, in Yale Law Journal, 1990, p. 1235 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/796737
L. A. Stout, How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and ECMH under Conditions of Uncertainty and Disagreement, in Cardozo Law Review, 1997, p. 475 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.23263
S. Torck, Offre publique obligatoire d’ICADE sur SILIC: quelques propos dissidents ausujet de l’arrêt de la Chambre commerciale du 25 novembre 2014, in Droit Des Sociétés, 2015, p. 31
M. Ventoruzzo, Europe's Thirteenth Directive and US Takeover Regulation: Regulatory Means and Political Economic Ends, in Texas International Law Journal, 2006, p. 171
J. Winter et al, Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, 2002 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.315322
E. Wymeersch, Takeovers from a Comparative Perspective, in Seminario internazionale in materia di Opa. Atti del convegno (Roma, Palazzo Giustiniani, 29 maggio 1998), Quaderni di Finanza Consob, n. 32, 1999, p. 55
Dowloads
Pubblicato
Come citare
Fascicolo
Sezione
Licenza
Copyright (c) 2025 Milan Law Review
Questo lavoro è fornito con la licenza Creative Commons Attribuzione - Non commerciale - Non opere derivate 4.0 Internazionale.
