Taking Our Feelings Towards Animals Seriously
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54103/balthazar/29607Parole chiave:
Sentimentalism, Rationalism, Intuitions, Animal Ethics, Affective TurnAbstract
Much of contemporary animal ethics can be read as a reaction to its rationalistic roots, trying to correct for an epistemically impoverished picture of moral cognition. This “affective turn” in animal ethics which seeks to take seriously the role of affective cognition in moral deliberation has been very fruitful but it has also resulted in a tendency to take affective intuitions as evidence against alienating, demanding or repulsive conclusions from traditional, principle-based universalist ethics.
I argue that this is a mistake. Rather than elevating our affects to the position of evidence, taking their role in moral cognition seriously should actually make us more scrupulous in their use, not less. If moral cognition inescapably involves the use of feelings and emotions, I argue, then we must be especially careful to keep our feelings and emotions free from biases and fallacies. This will involve more intense alienation from and reevaluation of our affective intuition, not less.
Downloads
Riferimenti bibliografici
Aaltola Elisa, “Love and Animals: Simone Weil, Iris Murdoch and Attention as Love”, in A. Martin (ed. by), The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy, New York (NY)-London, Routledge, 2018, pp. 193-204.
Aaltola Elisa, “The Anthropocentric Paradigm and the Possibility of Animal Ethics”, in Ethics and the Environment, vol. 15, n. 1, 2010, pp. 27-50.
Abbate Cheryl, “The Epistemology of Meat-Eating”, in Social Epistemology, vol. 35, n. 1, 2021, pp. 67-84.
Abbate Cheryl, “Virtues and Animals: a Minimally Decent Ethic for Practical Living in a Non-Ideal World”, in Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, vol. 27, 2014, pp. 909-929.
Acampora Ralph, “The Affective Turn in Animal Ethics”, in Relations. Beyond Anthropocen-trism, vol. 11, 2024, pp. 9-23.
Baez Sandra et alii, “Men, Women… Who Cares? A Population-Based Study on Sex Differ-ences and Gender Roles in Empathy and Moral Cognition”, in PLOS ONE, vol. 12, n. 6, 2017, online: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179336.
Coghlan Simon, “An Irreducible Understanding of Animal Dignity”, in Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 55, n. 1, 2023, pp. 124-142.
Crary Alice, “Minding What Already Matters: a Critique of Moral Individualism”, in Philo-sophical Topics, vol. 38, n. 1, 2010, pp. 17-49.
Deininger Konstantin, Grimm Herwig, “Certainties and the Bedrock of Moral Reasoning: Three Ways the Spade Turns”, in Analytic Philosophy, 2024, online: https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12357.
Donaldson Sue, Kymlicka Will, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights, Oxford, Ox-ford University Press, 2011.
Donovan Josephine, “Animal Rights and Feminist Theory”, in Signs, vol. 15, n. 2, 1990, pp. 350-375.
Donovan Josephine, “Attention to Suffering: a Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals”, in Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 27, n. 1, 1996, pp. 81-102.
Fischer Bob, Anja Jauernig, What Do We Owe Other Animals?: a Debate, London, Routledge, 2023.
Gilligan Carol, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, Cam-bridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 2016.
Gruen Lori, Entangled Empathy: an Alternative Ethic for Our Relationships with Animals, New York (NY), Lantern Books, 2015.
Gruen Lori, “Expressing Entangled Empathy: a Reply”, in Hypatia, vol. 32, n. 2, 2017, pp. 452-462.
Hursthouse Rosalind, Ethics, Humans and Other Animals: an Introduction with Readings, London, Taylor & Francis, 2000.
Hursthouse Rosalind, “Applying Virtue Ethics to Our Treatment of the Other Animals”, in ead., J. Annas, J. Reid (ed. by), Virtue and Action: Selected Papers, Oxford, Oxford Univer-sity Press, 2022, pp. 136-155.
Kahane Guy, “On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology”, in Mind & Language, vol. 27, n. 5, 2012, pp. 519-545.
Kheel Marti, “The Liberation of Nature: a Circular Affair”, in Environmental Ethics, vol. 7, n. 2, 1985, pp. 135-149.
Köllen Thomas, Schneeberger Doris, “Avoiding Unnecessary Suffering: Towards a Moral Minimum Standard for Humans’ Responsibility for Animal Welfare”, in Business Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility, vol. 32, n. 4, 2023, pp. 1139-1149.
Kunzmann Peter, “Die ‘Würde der Kreatur’ und die Frage nach dem moralischen Status von Pflanzen und Tieren bei gentechnischen Eingriffen”, in Journal für Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit, vol. 4, n. 3, 2009, pp. 305-311.
Linder Erich, “What Is It Like to See an Animal? Self-Examination and the Moral Relevance of Ordinary Descriptions of Animals”, in U. D. Leibowitz, K. Coko, I. Nevo (ed. by), Philo-sophical Theorizing and Its Limits: Anti-Theory in Ethics and Philosophy of Science, Basel, Springer Nature Switzerland, 2025, pp. 141-157.
Loder Reed Elizabeth, “Animal Dignity”, in Animal Law, vol. 23, n. 1, 2016, pp. 1-64.
May Joshua, “Moral Rationalism on the Brain”, in Mind & Language, vol. 38, n. 1, 2023, pp. 237-255.
McHugh Cillian, McGann Marek, Igou Eric R., Kinsella Elaine L., “Reasons or Rationaliza-tions: the Role of Principles in the Moral Dumbfounding Paradigm”, in Journal of Behavior-al Decision Making, vol. 33, n. 3, 2020, pp. 376-392.
McHugh Cillian, McGann Marek, Igou Eric R., Kinsella Elaine L., “Searching for Moral Dumbfounding: Identifying Measurable Indicators of Moral Dumbfounding”, in Collabra: Psychology, vol. 3, n. 1, 2017, pp. 1-24.
Melnikoff David E., Bargh John A., “The Mythical Number Two”, in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 22, n. 4, 2018, pp. 280-293.
Midgley Mary, “Biotechnology and the Yuk Factor”, in ead., The Myths We Live By, London, Routledge, 2003, pp. 102-107.
Palmer Clare, “What (If Anything) Do We Owe Wild Animals?”, in Between the Species, vol. 16, n. 1, 2012, pp. 15-38.
Railton Peter, “The Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale: Intuition and Attunement”, in Ethics, vol. 124, n. 4, 2014, pp. 813-859.
Regan Tom, The Case for Animal Rights, Berkeley (CA), University of California Press, 1983.
Rydenfelt Henrik, “Controversial Views and Moral Realism”, in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, vol. 44, n. 2, 2023, pp. 165-176.
Sauer Hanno, “The Appropriateness of Emotions: Moral Judgment, Moral Emotions, and the Conflation Problem”, in Ethical Perspectives, vol. 18, n. 1, 2011, pp. 107-140.
Scarantino Andrea, “Insights and Blindspots of the Cognitivist Theory of Emotions”, in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 61, n. 4, 2010, pp. 729-768.
Sidgwick Henry, The Methods of Ethics, ed. by E. E. C. Jones, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 1874.
Singer Peter, Animal Liberation, New York (NY), Ecco Pr, 1975.
Stanley Matthew L., Yin Siyuan, Sinnott-Armstrong Walter, “A Reason-Based Explanation for Moral Dumbfounding”, in Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 14, n. 2, 2019, pp. 120-129.
Thompson Valerie A., Prowse Turner Jamie A., Pennycook Gordon, “Intuition, Reason, and Metacognition”, in Cognitive Psychology, vol. 63, n. 3, 2011, pp. 107-140.
Walker Lawrence J., “Sex Differences in Moral Reasoning”, in W. L. Kurtines, J. Gewirtz, J. L. Lamb (ed. by), Handbook of Moral Behavior and Development, London, Routledge, 1991, pp. 333-364.
Dowloads
Pubblicato
Come citare
Fascicolo
Sezione
Licenza
Copyright (c) 2025 Konstantin Eckl
Questo lavoro è fornito con la licenza Creative Commons Attribuzione 4.0 Internazionale.
