Due osservazioni sulla metafisica della prescienza
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13130/2240-9599/3475Abstract
The paper discusses two problems concerning the metaphysics of foreknowledge. In the first section I focus on an argument that purports to show that there is no such a thing. In the second one I discuss the relation between the foreknowledge of our own behaviour, or ‘autoforeknowledge’, and what we may call ‘the phenomenology of freedom’. As for the first issue, I employ David Lewis’ discussion of the Grandfather Paradox to argue that the argument in question overlooks a key feature of the semantics of ‘can’. As for the second issue, I develop some remarks by Paul Horwich to show that, contrary appearances notwithstanding, autoforeknowledge is not necessarily incompatible with the phenomenology of freedom.
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