Mathematics to Cope with the World

A Pragmatist Reading of Quine and Rorty

Abstract

This article examines the divergent yet converging perspectives of W.V.O. Quine and Richard Rorty on the ontology of mathematics. While Quine grounds mathematical entities in the indispensability of abstract objects for scientific theories, Rorty rejects representationalist commitments, constructing mathematics as a contingent linguistic practice. The study reconstructs Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment, his holistic epistemology, and his treatment of mathematics as an indispensable component of the web of belief, contrasting them with Rorty’s anti-foundationalist account of mathematics as a pragmatic tool devoid of ontological import. The analysis emphasizes their respective views on the functional role of mathematics, highlighting a shared pragmatist orientation that, beneath their surface disagreement, converges in situating mathematics as a practice for coping with and structuring experience rather than as a reflection of a pre-given reality. The article argues that their apparent opposition between realism and anti-realism masks a deeper convergence: both conceive mathematics as a constructed and adaptable device for generating conceptual possibilities and enabling action.